UNITEDNATIONS

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION UNIT FOR SIERRA LEONE

SIERRA LEONE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION REPORT

Special Issue, 7 March 2000

IN THIS ISSUE:

INTRODUCTION

1.OVERVIEW – POLITICAL, SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT

  • Gaining Humanitarian Access: A continuing Challenge
  • The DDR Factor
  • The UNAMSIL Factor

2. THE PEACE PROCESS- Is time running out? – A humanitarian perspective

3. CRITICAL AREAS OF NEED

  • Rehabilitation of water and sanitation facilities
  • Rehabilitation and support to the health sector
  • Rehabilitation of Educational infrastructure and provision of learning materials Agricultural support in the northern and eastern regions, particularly Tonkolili and Bombali districts
  • Close monitoring of food security situation especially in rural areas
  • Reinforcement of bridges and arterial routes prior to rains
  • Close monitoring of refugee and IDP returnees
  • Increase support to the DDR Process to facilitate access.

4. BUILDING BLOCKS – A case for continued constructive engagement

  • A vibrant civil society
  • A more dynamic GOSL leadership in coordination of assistance programmes
  • The DDR Programme – A more integrated system
  • International/Regional Support – Sustained interest

5. MOVING TOWARDS A COMMON VISION – The way forward

6. SECTORAL HIGHLIGHTS – February 2000

  • 100 Days of Disarmament and Demobilization
  • Resettlement and Reintegration
  • Agriculture
  • Health and Nutrition
  • Refugees – UNHCR monitors spontaneous Returns
  • Logistics
  • Water and Sanitation
  • Child Protection
  • Food Aid
  • Education
  • Socio-economic
  • Trends in IDP Movements
  • Human Rights

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Introduction

This review period marks the seventh month of the Lome Peace Agreement, which was signed on 7 July 1999. While some progress has been made towards the implementation of the Accord, there is every indication that the process is troubled. Security has improved in some parts, but the overall situation in the country remains tense and volatile. Achieving unhindered humanitarian access, one of the first major agreements signed by the parties to the conflict in Lome on 3 June 1999, has proved difficult. Despite the establishment of a Government of National Unity, former RUF/AFRC fighters continue to lay claim to large areas of the country, obstructing free movement. This makes it extremely difficult for agencies to gain a longer-term perspective on assistance programmes. This special issue examines the current humanitarian situation and the external and internal factors affecting the implementation of humanitarian programmes countrywide.

1. OVERVIEW – POLITICAL, SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT

Gaining Humanitarian Access: A continuing challenge

The Lome Peace Agreement cracked the doors open to previously inaccessible parts of the country, but only wide enough to allow for needs-assessment and limited relief intervention. At this time, humanitarian agencies still do not have unhindered and safe access to seven out of 12 districts (Bombali, Tonkolili, Kambia, Kono, Kailahun, Koinadugu and Port Loko), which make up 80 of the country’s 149 chiefdoms, with a total population of 2.4 million according to 1997 projections. Current operations in these areas are carried out under very difficult circumstances, characterised by frequent disruptions and uncertainty. This hinders appropriate programming and effective and sustained engagement in support of the most needy. Furthermore, interventions are mainly limited to emergency relief, while assistance programmes aimed at rehabilitation and reconstruction of devastated communities await more favourable conditions. Humanitarian Profiles of Currently Unstable Areas (attached) highlights present conditions.

In sharp contrast to the grim picture in the north, the southern province, the Western Area and some parts of the eastern province continue to enjoy relatively good conditions of safety and security. Local administration such as the Police and traditional chiefs are also in place in some of these areas supporting the maintenance of law and order. As a result, these areas are benefiting from programmes of reconstruction and rehabilitation in such sectors as agriculture, education, road rehabilitation and restoration of health facilities. It must however be noted that as long as insecurity persists in the northern and eastern parts, the whole country remains vulnerable, particularly places like Kenema with close proximity to Kailahun district.

The DDR Factor:

Formally launched on 4 November 1999, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme is perhaps one of the most important benchmarks for the consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone. After a difficult start, the Programme is finally gaining momentum, but continues to be bogged down by a troubled political process. According to the Peace Agreement, Disarmament and Demobilization should have been completed by 15 December 1999. While there is an overall upward trend, (see chart on current DDR trend), the process has been slow, with just over 12,000 of the estimated 45,000 combatants enrolled in the Programme during the first 100 days.[1] Furthermore, less than 5,000 of those who disarmed have actually undergone demobilization, as many of them, in particular, the ex-SLA, have refused to demobilize, in anticipation of a chance to re-enter the Army. The result is over-crowding in the camps, a more cumbersome working environment for DDR personnel and further delays in moving the process forward.

Perceptions on factors contributing to the slow pace of the Programme vary. In addition to slow progress in the political process, the DDR Programme is clearly bogged down by fear, suspicion and mistrust, with each group waiting for the other to disarm first. This is most evident between the RUF and the CDF, which are both disarming at a close rate of 23% and 22% respectively. (see bar chart for proportional representation by group). The leaders of the combatants all claim unflinching commitment to the process, while at the same time justifying reluctant participation. For NCDDR Executive Secretary, a factor in the slow pace is the lack of security, especially in the north and east of the country, which has prevented the institution from setting up centers there.

With over 7,000 men of the approved 11,100 military personnel on the ground, UNAMSIL has successfully deployed forces in Makeni, Port Loko, Lungi, Daru and Kenema. But there has been little or no progress in disarmament in the northern and eastern parts of the country, the exception being Port Loko District. The Daru centre is currently functioning below capacity, with less than 100 people, most of who are ex-SLA wishing to be considered for the new Army. Neither the RUF nor the CDF combatants are showing up at the center. In Makeni, the programme is yet to commence, as DDR officials were unable to secure existing facilities for encampment of the ex-combatants. The NCDDR has identified two sites in the area, but construction, scheduled to begin in March, will take 4-6 weeks.

Additionally, DDR officials believe that the unresolved issue of who would be able to join the new Sierra Leone Army has contributed to slowing down the process. Over 900 of the 1300 ex-combatants currently residing at the Lungi center are ex-SLAs who have refused to demobilize. Some of them have been in the centers for more than three months. Similarly, another 700 ex-SLAs continue to occupy much needed space at the Port Loko DDR camps. The situation in the northern town of Kabala is equally worrying. Agencies have repeatedly reported attacks on civilian populations and aid workers by ex-SLA soldiers in the town who are either waiting to be enrolled in the DDR programme or to be reintegrated into the new Army. Kabala is not one of the designated locations for setting up DDR centres. While UNAMSIL undertook some ‘mobile’ disarmament, there remains a large number of the combatants in and around the town, extorting money and attacking civilians. The latest victims of these attacks are currently being treated at the Kabala hospital. Aid agencies in the area have noted that a continuation of the situation will inevitably lead to the suspension of much need programmes. For instance, a measles outbreak has been reported in the district and a vaccination campaign should begin immediately, but this will be difficult under the current conditions.

It is hoped that this problem will be resolved when the Government adopts a policy on Military Reintegration.

In the interim, Defence Headquarters has issued a press release stating that it has completed plans to move all ex-SLA soldiers to designated bush camps where they will be disarmed and catered for in accordance with the Lome Peace Agreement. At the time of release, nearly 1,000 of the solders had already been moved to a bush camp at Matene (approximately 8 km NE of Masiaka). This activity is aimed at screening and sensitization training for those ex-SLA soldiers who wish to join the new SLA and who are not currently in the DDR programme. Those who do not qualify for the new Army will be absorbed in the DDR Programme.

The UNAMSIL Factor:

An important milestone was reached in November when the UN Security Council established a Peacekeeping Force for Sierra Leone. In a further move to support the country’s fragile peace, the Council voted for an expansion from 6,000 military personnel to 11,100 in February. This move has raised hopes that a precarious security situation will finally be stabilized, facilitating DDR and enabling humanitarian and development agencies to meaningfully assist needy populations. The first gain was reaped in February, when the successful deployment of UNAMSIL troops in the northern provincial capital of Makeni paved the way for agencies to undertake a comprehensive multi-sectoral assessment of needs in the area. It also provided an opportunity for the UN to successfully negotiate with the RUF field commanders for the withdrawal of earlier (unacceptable) demands for agencies to channel all aid through the RUF humanitarian wing – the Organization for the Survival of Mankind (OSM). As a way of resolving the issue, the GOSL has invited the OSM Coordinator to join its National Commission for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (NCRRR), while the UN has advised the RUFP to transform the OSM into an independent NGO. Both proposals were accepted by the RUFP.

Although the relationship between UNAMSIL troops and the RUF command is presently tense, causing the RUF to re-establish checkpoints in the Makeni area, the RUF has given assurances that aid agencies operational in the area would be granted free access. This has so far been maintained, but the situation remains volatile. This growing tension between the RUF and UNAMSIL troops is a cause for concern for the humanitarian community. The RUF’s constant refusal to allow UNAMSIL troops to deploy in key areas, has not only dashed hopes of improved security conditions, but also raised concerns of a possible military confrontation between the two forces, which could potentially increase the risk to aid workers on the ground.[2] Although UNAMSIL has so far refrained from forceful action against the RUF, it carries a “robust” chapter VII mandate to “take necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.” The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Oluyemi Adeniji, has warned the RUF leader that contravention of the Lome Peace Accord, such as the seizure of weapons from UN peacekeepers, mounting illegal road blocks and blocking the free movement of UN troops in the discharge of their mandate, must stop immediately or would “invite forceful response.”[3] Meanwhile, Foday Sankoh continues to express the RUFP’s disappointment with regard to the current trend of events in Sierra Leone. In a 24 February letter to the Moral Guarantors and other key actors, Sankoh claimed that the RUFP was not consulted about UNAMSIL’s Mandate, which it considers “highly threatening.”

2. THE PEACE PROCESS – Is time running out? – A humanitarian perspective

The direct implications of a delayed DDR Programme on the humanitarian situation are significant: lack of humanitarian access for sustained intervention; lack of spontaneous and promoted return of refugees and IDPs to their home areas; continuing human rights violations against civilian populations; lack of speedy return to productive activity; and prolonged dependence on relief aid.

Inter-sectoral assessments carried out in the last six months have confirmed speculations that the unstable northern and eastern provincial districts (see Humanitarian Profiles) suffered much destruction during the years of war, in common with the rest of the country. Infrastructure damage/looting/destruction has been recorded, affecting roads, schools, health facilities, water and sanitation among others. Outbreaks of communicable diseases such as bloody diarrhea are prevalent. The latest harvest has alleviated hunger in some areas, but below-normal-yields leaves food security in most communities fragile and vulnerable. Stocks are expected to run out in April, leading to a further deterioration of the nutritional status of both children and adults. The lingering instability in this section of the country allows for only tentative relief-type activities despite the fact that long-term rehabilitation and reconstruction activities are critical to facilitate a return to normal existence.

The regular rainy season, also known as the “hungry season” is fast approaching (April/May). DDR officials are concerned that if significant progress is not made before the rains, the process will suffer considerable delays and would be more cumbersome and more costly to manage. Furthermore, the humanitarian situation would deteriorate with the arrival of the rains. Heavy rains will confine rebel activities to fewer locations, but increase the intensity of attacks on villagers. Food has remained an issue for armed combatants on all sides. They are currently looting and raiding and engaging in forced labour for their survival. When the “hungry season” sets in, and given the enforcement of the ceasefire, civilians will be the immediate targets for meeting the needs of hungry and frustrated rebel factions. At the same time as the suffering of those in the interior deepens, humanitarian agencies will face greater difficulties in reaching them due to poor road conditions.

Nearly half a million Sierra Leoneans are refugees in neighbouring countries, including professionals whose skills are critical to mounting an effective and efficient recovery campaign. This small country with a pre-war population of less than 5 million people has suffered a severe brain drain. To begin rebuilding the country, some of its citizens would need to return home to help. If conditions are not right, they will not return. UNHCR on its part, will not promote their return until the conditions for a return in “safety and dignity” are in place. Without their speedy repatriation and reintegration, local capacity will stay at the lowest level and the country’s reliance on expatriate assistance will escalate.

Agriculture provides employment to over 80 per cent of the rural population and contributes 30 per cent to the GDP in normal times. The arable land is estimated at 5.3 million hectares of which less than 10 per cent is reported to be cultivated annually. As a result, only an estimated 50 per cent of the annual national rice requirement is domestically produced. Continued hostilities have undermined efforts to bridge the gap. The devastation of livestock and displacement of fishermen means an attendant decline in protein intake. With only two months to go before the first phase of the planting season (April/May) begins, conditions for re-starting full-scale agricultural activities in some areas are still remote.

Further delays in re-starting educational activities in most of the country will adversely affect future development of the country. Some children have not been able to return to school for the entire duration of the war. For those children between the ages of 9 and 15 who have never been exposed to formal education, time is running out. Most educational facilities are in shambles, needing urgent repairs or reconstruction. Though some work has begun in accessible areas, lack of access continues to hinder efforts to extend these activities throughout the country.

3. URGENT AND CRITICAL AREAS OF NEED

In most areas assessed, priorities for urgent intervention include:

  • Rehabilitation of water and sanitation facilities: WATSAN problems have led to outbreaks of communicable diseases such as bloody diarrhea. The situation will get worse during the rainy season if action is not taken in the immediate future.
  • Rehabilitation and support to the health sector: UN and NGOs are supporting health centers in most areas but there is a lack of equipment, and staff incentives and training are inadequate in some areas. Also, lack of access makes it difficult to go beyond relief support in the unstable locations.
  • Rehabilitation of Educational infrastructure and provision of learning materials: Education remains a major concern for local populations. There are now opportunities to support schools with feeding programmes and provide incentives for reconstruction and repair of school buildings.
  • Agriculture support particularly in the northern and eastern regions: Due to low-level harvests and mass looting of already scarce food supplies, people in many of the chiefdoms are exposed to high risk of food shortages. While food aid will meet short-term needs, food security can only be achieved with the restoration of agricultural and productive activity.
  • Close monitoring of food security situation especially in rural areas: Agencies anticipate a significant deterioration in the nutritional status of the population by April 2000.Before then, the situations must be closely monitored to determine the level of support required to avert a crisis situation.
  • Reinforcement of bridges and arterial routes prior to rains: the NGO-run humanitarian helicopter will cease operations by 10 March. Although the WFP helicopter will continue to be operational for some time, it will not be able to meet all demands. Movement of people and goods will have to be undertaken by road.
  • Close monitoring of refugee and IDP returnees: some of those spontaneously returning are still unable to settle in their home areas. If security conditions do not improve, they will likely become internally displaced and would require relief support.
  • Increased support to the DDR Process to facilitate access:It is well understood that without the effective management and completion of the DDR Programme, the risk and cost of intervention will continue to rise both for donors, aid worker, the GOSL as well as the beneficiaries.

Two main factors directly affect timely intervention in these areas: safe and sustainable access, and timely availability of adequate resources. Both require the attention of local, regional and international actors. The Moral Guarantors of the Peace Process and other influential partners should intensify pressure on the parties to the Accord to speed up the DDR process. Secondly, donors should develop a joint strategy to address major funding gaps.