HEBEI SPIRIT: Summary of position as submitted to the Korean Authorities by owners, managers and insurers
- Causes of the collision
Based on our understanding of the facts, the following have been identified as being the major causes of the collision that occurred around 0702 am on December 7, 2007 between the MT Hebei Spirit and the crane-carrying barge Samsung 1, which was under tow of tugs Samsung T No 5 and Samho T3. The Hebei Spirit, a 260,000 dwt very large crude oil carrier was at anchor at the designated pilot station off Daesan port, awaiting orders to deliver her cargo.
- Direct Cause: The Unexpected breaking of the Tow Line
A.According to the VTS records, at around 0635 hrs, the tugs and
Barge had completely made it clear and past the Hebei Spirit,
Ahead of the Vessel from her starboard side to port side, and as a
result, there should not have been any risk of collision thereafter.
However, at around 0651 hrs, the tow line connecting the tug
Samsung T5 and the Barge suddenly broke and the crew on board
The tugs and Barge very quickly lost control over their vessels.
- As a result, the Barge began drifting towards the Hebei Spirit due
to the effects of the winds and the currents. The Barge soon
Thereafter collided with the Vessel on her port side (11 minutes
after the tow line broke). It was impossible for the Master and
Chief Officer of the Vessel to predict that the Barge, which had
already cleared the bow of the Vessel would collide with the Vessel.
- The other fundamental cause of the collision was the imprudent decision
On the part of the tugs towing the Barge to depart from Inchon and continue
their voyage, despite forecasts of strong winds and the issuance of a strong wind warning.
- The Barge which collided with the Vessel is one of the largest barges in
Korea and was carrying one the largest cranes used in the industry today
weighing approximately 3000 tons (the crane is actually much larger than the barge). Because the Barge is not self-propelled, it needs to be towed at all times while at sea. Because of the size and the physical characteristics of the Barge and the fact that there were two tugs towing the Barge, the tugs and Barge would be strongly affected by winds.
- Barges the size of Samsung 1 need to obtain towing certificates issued by
a surveyor, which is a requirement under their insurance policies. Without such certificates, they may be denied coverage. In general, in the case of large barges such as Samsung 1, towing certificates are issued on the condition that the barge would not set sail when winds are at Beaufort Scale 5 and that the barge would stop their voyage and take shelter if the Beaufort Scale goes up to 6. Therefore, it is likely that a towing certificate with similar conditions was issued when the tugs and Barge set sail from Inchon on December 6, 2007.
- However, as of 0430 hrs on December 6, 2007 the weather authorities had already issued a warning that a strong wind warning was to be issued later that morning and such a wind warning was in fact issued later that day. Around the time of the collision, there were strong winds at reaching Beaufort Scale 6 or 7 in the EasternSea.
- Despite these known conditions, the tugs and Samsung Barge proceeded
To set sail from Inchon at around 1500 hrs on December 6, 2007, probably in violation of the conditions specified on the towing certificate. Proceeding with their voyage under such dangerous weather conditions was also a cause of the collision.
- Other Factors: The changes (twice) of the course of the tugs and Barge
A According to an analysis of the records of the Daesan Vessel Traffic
Information Service, the tugs and Barge were sailing southward, in a
Crab-like motion, in the early morning of December 7. Suddenly at around
0444 hrs, they changed course to head east. Then at around 0531 hrs, they
again changed course, this time heading in a south-westerly direction.
- Under the circumstances, it is quite clear that these changes in direction
were not the result of the winds and currents, but the result of a conscious decision to do so.
- As a result of these changes in direction, the distance between the Vessel
and the tugs and Barge was reduced from 1.3 nautical miles to a mere 0.3 nautical miles (550 metres) at around 0600 hrs. Considering the fact that a north-westerly wind was pushing the tugs and Barge in the direction of the Vessel and the fact that the Barge, because of the structure and size of the crane it was carrying, was especially vulnerable to wind forces, the idea of attempting to clear the Vessel within such a close distance was a very risky move indeed.
- Lookout duty regarding passing vessels
It is not common for moving vessels to collide into ships at anchor, but when such collision is imminent, the anchored ship may also have certain duties to avoid collision. However, although an anchored vessel has a high degree of duty regarding the confirmation of its own anchored location, the anchored vessel does not have a comparably high level of duty with respect to ships passing by.
(i)It is common for anchoring locations to be near sea routes. In this case, although it could be suggested that as the passing distance between the Samsung crane barge and the Hebei Spirit was a short distance of 0.3 miles, the Vessel had a duty to heave up its anchor and move to a safer location, this is not reasonable when one considers that many ships pass through the sea route in Inchon, which is as narrow as 0.1 to 0.2 miles in certain places. Moreover, it is not reasonable to expect a vessel anchored near such a sea route to have a duty to heave up its anchor and move several times a day each time a vessel passes through the route. In fact, attempting such moves may increase the risk of collision with other surrounding vessels. Therefore, it should be noted that generally, an anchoring location is determined without considering whether such a location would be suitable in the event the anchored vessel would need to heave up its anchor and move.
It is common for vessels to pass one another within close distances, and even if a moving vessel within such a close passing track approaches the anchored vessel on a collision course, there is not much that the anchored vessel can do other than signal its presence.
(ii)Although the Master was asked why he did not heave up its anchor and move to shelter, the question ignores the fact that it usually takes an anchored vessel at least 30 to 40 minutes just to heave up its anchor, during which time, the Vessel also has to move forward a significant distance before its anchor can be heaved up, so putting the Hebei Spirit closer to the passing tugs and crane barge In this case, given the close passing distance and the time required to heave up its anchor, practically speaking, there was not much that could have been done. Moreover, given the fact that several tens and hundreds of ships pass by each other within a short distance of each other every day, it is impractical to expect the anchored vessel in each instance to note the distance, bearing and passing distance of every vessel passing by.
- Actions of the C/O
a.The vessel was anchored at the location instructed by the Daesan VTS at
1918 hrs on December 6, 2007; the Vessel displayed all the lights required
by the Collision Regulations; red lights indicating hazardous cargo were
also on.
b.According to the observations of the C/O at around 0545 hrs, the distance
to the tugs and Barge was approx 1.6 miles and the CPA was approx 1.3
miles. Given such distances, the C/O did not have any reason to fear that
the tugs and Barge would be incapable of avoiding collision. In addition,
anchored vessels are unable to move until the anchor is heaved up, and in
the case of VLCC’s like Hebei Spirit, it takes a very long time to heave up
the anchor, not to mention the fact that it needs to move quite a distance
forward before heaving up the anchor, as already stated.
c.If it was difficult, or impossible for the tugs and Barge in this case to avoid
collision with the Hebei Spirit, the tugs and Barge should have displayed
lights that signalled such difficulties, in accordance with Article 27(b) of
the Collision Regulations. In addition, they should have signalled their
horn, or alerted their situation to the VTS or other surrounding vessels by
VHF. Yet, the tugs and Barge failed to take any of these measures.
Moreover, if the movements of the tugs and Barge were so obviously
dangerous, then the VTS which uses efficient radars to observe all
Vessels should have been aware of such dangers, regardless of whether
The tugs and Barge communicated with it. However, the Hebei Spirit
did not receive any such warning from the VTS, and at around 0609 hrs
On the morning of the collision, it was the Hebei Spirit that first
Initiated contact with the Daesan VTS which only ordered the Vessel to
‘stand-by please’. Under these circumstances, the Chief Officer could not
Have been expected to predict that a collision between the Vessel and the
Tugs or Barge would occur, and thus, there was no duty on the part of the
C/O to take any measures to avoid collision.
- Actions of the Master
- Alert to Master
- The C/O confirmed that the distance between the Vessel and the
Tugs and Barge was 1.0 mile (CPA 0.3 mile) at around 0605 hrs
and alerted the Master.
- Once coming onto the Bridge and after listening to the report
By the C/O, the Master sounded the Vessel’s horn five (5) times.
With the aid of the radar and using his own eyes, the Master
observed the weather and sea conditions and instructed the
Cadet to continue to try to communicate with the tugs and Barge.
- At that time, the Master could have considered two options (i)
Heaving up the anchor and moving the Vessel or (ii) paying out
the anchor chain to increase the distance and CPA between the
vessel and the tugs and Barge.
(i)However, it would have been impossible for him to consider heaving up the anchor and setting sail. It should be noted that for an anchored vessel to heave up the anchor, it does not wind up the anchor chain; rather, it needs to move forward a distance equal to the length of the anchor chain. The distance from the bow to the anchor is about 211 metres for the Vessel, and given that the passing distance of the tugs and Samsung crane barge was only 0.3 miles, it would have been an act of suicide for the Vessel to move forwards towards the approaching tugs and Barge, in order to heave up the anchor. In addition, in order to heave up, the engine needs to be readied, which usually takes about an hour, but in this case, it was readied within 10 minutes, despite the risks that such an act would give severe stress to the engine.
(ii)Also the oil pressure pump also needs to be readied in order to activate
the winch. All of these processes, plus the time it takes to heave up
9 shackles of anchor chain, take more than 30 to 40 minutes, and under bad weather conditions, it could take longer. Therefore, it was impossible for the Master to move the Vessel forwards under such circumstances. Even from a common sense standpoint, it seems inconceivable that the Master would make the decision to move forward when he saw the tall crane (taller than the deck of the Vessel) approaching the bow of his vessel on the starboard side, with its hooks and spreader swinging dangerously.
(iii)Given the impossibility of heaving up, the decision of the Master was
to pay out the anchor chain to its fullest, thereby allowing the Vessel
to move backwards and increase the passing distance between the vessel and the tugs and Barge. The Master instructed the C/O to be on standby to pay out the anchor chain and asked the Chief Engineer to ready the engine for use. At around 0617 hrs, the Vessel set its engine to dead slow astern, a fact is taken from the engine telegraph records. The length of anchor chain at that time was 13 shackles, and the Master was able to add 4 shackles, the maximum length allowed to be safely added, adding approximately 110 metres to the passing between the Vessel and the tugs and Barge.
(iv)Because of these prudent measures taken by the Master, the tugs were
able to clear the bow of the Vessel from the starboard side to port side.
D.At around 0627 hrs on the same day, the Daesan VTS contacted the Vessel
For the first time through VHF radio, after previously giving orders to
Standby, requesting that the Vessel heave up its anchor and move to a
different location. However, when the Master explained how there may
be an increased risk of collision if the anchor is heaved up, the Daesan
VTS replied ‘Very good Captain’. The Master took this response to mean
That the VTS was agreeing that his decision was appropriate under the
circumstances.
E.Therefore, thanks to the appropriate preliminary measures taken by the
Master, the tugs and Barge were able to clear the Vessel’s bow. Under
These circumstances, it would be unreasonable to find that the Master
had failed to meet any duty of care.
2.Tow Line Breaks
- At around 0636 hrs, the tugs had pulled the crane barge past
the Hebei Spirit. At 0651 hrs, the tow line connecting the
Barge to the tug ‘Samsung T5’ suddenly broke, causing the
Crane Barge to be driven by wind and currents onto the anchored Hebei Spirit.
- The most important point out that, after the tugs and Barge had
cleared the Vessel, there is no relationship whatsoever between
the collision and the facts and circumstances relating to events that happened prior to the Collision. In other words, the focus of the analysis in determining the collision cause and liability should be on why the tow line broke and how that event caused the collision.
3.Appropriateness of actions taken by the Master during and after the
Collision
- The Master was questioned on why he did not move the Vessel
backwards at full speed. However, had he done so, there would have been a risk that the anchor chain or the windlass would break, or that other steel structures on the deck of the Vessel would be destroyed, and if such events were to have happened, it is clear that the six crew members at the bow would have been exposed to tremendous risk of bodily harm and even death.
- Measures taken after the collision
(i)After the collision, the Master undertook many measures, the first of which being the confirmation of the welfare of his crew members.
(ii)In addition, the Master determined whether the Vessel
would sink as a result of the collision. He was able to
confirm the spilling of oil through the hole visible above
the water surface level. But more importantly, he had to
determine whether there were holes in the ship underwater,
and in such an event, how he would be able to prevent the
Hebei Spirit from sinking. Immediately after the roll call,
the Master ordered an assessment of the damages to the
Vessel’s deck and engine room, if any.
(ii)After confirming the safety of the crew and confirming
That the vessel would not sink, the Master checked the
circumstances surrounding the spilling of oil and
endeavoured to limit the flow. In order to do this, the Master examined the ullage of all the oil tanks and did soundings on all the ballast tanks. Based upon such examination, the C/O was able to confirm that the oil was leaking from only tanks number 1,3 and 5.
(iii)In order to minimise the flow of oil, the Master placed
heavy collision mats around the holes. He also attempted to decrease the flow of oil by using a crane to tie two ends of the collision mats and placing them around the hole. Because of the strong north-westerly winds blowing oil onto the deck, and the list of the vessel the deck surface was very slippery and such efforts very time consuming.
(iv)The Master also realised that there was a risk of explosion
because of the loss of the inert gas tanks during the collision. Therefore, the Master ordered the production of more inert gas in order to facilitate the movement of oil from damaged tanks to other tanks on board and so limit or stop the outflow of oil. It is impossible to move the oil to a different tanker in the absence of inert gas as there is a risk of explosion resulting from static electricity.