A decade of disaster supplement
Responses and lessons learned during 10 years of major incidents
From: Sept2011
Comment:
Lessons from adecade of disaster
By Laura King
When we set out months ago to plan this editorial supplement, we consulted our advisory board of 13 fire chiefs and fire-service manufacturers to discuss topics and approaches.
Seemingly, weather-related incidents and emergencies are becoming more common and being prepared to react to wildfires, floods, hurricanes, monster snowstorms (in October, no less) and tornados is critical for most Canadian departments.
Already this year we’ve run pieces from Surrey, B.C., about a matrix system of response to windstorms (Fire Fighting in Canada, August 2010) and lessons learned from the 2003 and 2009 wildfires in B.C. (FFIC, June 2010).
This Decade of Disaster section looks at the preparations for and co-ordinated responses to some of the most significant weather events of the last 10 years, from the 2000 tornado that shredded the Pine Lake trailer park in Alberta, to Hurricane Juan that devastated parts of Nova Scotia and floods in Manitoba and Peterborough, Ont.
“I think stories could include not only those of actual incidents but those of climate issues and the effect this has on the natural disasters we see now,” said Tom DeSorcy, the chief in Hope, B.C., a member of our editorial advisory board and our Volunteer Vision columnist.
“Also, how the emergency services have learned to work together as a result, such as combined events, communications, etc.”
We’ve tried, in each of our 11 stories, to describe the co-ordinated responses and the lessons learned to help Canadian fire and emergency services plan for future incidents and events. And we found some interesting trends. Cell phones, for example, are often an issue. In Vaughan and Midland, for example, which were struck by tornados within a year of each other, cell phone reception was iffy. In Vaughan, the city used only one carrier and when that provider went offline briefly, communications shut down. Vaughan now has backup phones linked to a second carrier. In Midland, cell reception was sporadic in the aftermath of the tornado that hit on June 23, 2010, and some network providers failed intermittently. A new cell tower has since been installed. These are the kinds of details that departments need to know about in advance of major incidents.
Another common issue is access to emergency operations centres. In some cases, critical players had no way to reach the EOC to find out if they were supposed to report for duty. In another, no one had the entry codes for the EOC. And several communities learned that having permanent computers in the EOC, rather than laptops that may or may not arrive with personnel, along with the correct chargers for laptops and cell phones, is critical.
Bernie Turpin, the administrative deputy chief for Halifax Regional Fire & Emergency Services and a member of our editorial advisory board, knows the drill, having endured Hurricane Juan in 2003 and its winter counterpart, White Juan, in 2004.
“Too often we read stories about disaster but don’t focus on what was learned,” he said. “And even more important, show how those tidbits helped somebody deal with the next event. It might take a bit of research, but would show how important it is to put our successes (and failures) out there for others to learn from.”
Several departments have bared their souls and outlined their successes, challenges and lessons learned in the following pages. We hope you find their testimonies helpful.
Halifax’s Lake Echo/Porters Lake wildfires June 2008
Early evacuations aid firefighters
By James Careless
In June 2008, the Halifax Regional Fire & Emergency (HRF&E) fought two major wildfires at the same time. Both fires started on June 13.

More than 5,000 residents were evacuated from homes during the 2008 wildfire near Halifax.

HRF&E firefighters rest between shifts during the Lake Echo/Porters Lake wildfires in the spring of 2008.
Photos courtesy Halifax Regional Fire & Emergency
The first wildfire occurred in the heavily wooded communities of Lake Echo and Porters Lake. It destroyed two homes, damaged more than 20 and forced the evacuation of 5,000 residents from 800 homes. This fire covered 6,000 acres and was 15 kilometres long. It burned out of control for two days, fed by 60 kilometre-per-hour winds and forest floor debris left by Hurricane Juan in 2003.
The second fire, which occurred in Tantallon, started later, and forced 32 home evacuations, with no lives lost. It covered 130 acres and was 1.5 kilometres in length.
According to the Nova Scotia government, the Lake Echo/Porters Lake fire “was the largest wildland fire in an urban area fought in Nova Scotia and the largest fire in more than 30 years. It resulted in the most significant fire-caused evacuation in the province’s history.”
“It was a little stressful knowing where all of our resources were at any one time,” said Roy Hollett, an HRF&E deputy chief and the designated site commander for the Lake Echo/Porters Lake fire.
“Yet, thanks to our member departments, we weren’t actually all that stretched. As a result, although the conditions were tough – with our crews having to retreat a number of times due to fast-moving flames – we had what we needed to fight the fires.”
■ Response
  • Halifax Regional Fire & Emergency – 158 firefighters.
  • Fixed wing/helicopter water bomber support from the Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the province of New Brunswick.
  • Water tankers were loaned to the regional municipality by Newfoundland and Quebec.
  • RCMP.
  • Red Cross.

■ Timeline
  • The Lake Echo/Porters Lake fire started during the morning of Friday, June 13, 2008, apparently as the result of an out-of-control campfire during dry weather conditions. “It didn’t take long to see the magnitude of the fire as you drove east on Highway 107 out of the city,” said Deputy Chief Hollett. “When you see that much smoke, you know it’s a big one.”
  • The fire soon crossed Highway 107. HRF&E and RCMP diverted traffic.
  • The Lake Echo/Porters Lake fire was upgraded to EMO-level [Halifax Emergency Measures Office]. “Under that multi-agency plan, I assumed site command; we set up shop right where we were,” said Hollet.
  • DNR water-bomber helicopters were on site within a few hours. The fire still grew due to high winds and forest-floor debris.
  • The area was evacuated. Evacuation centres were set up in Cole Harbour and at the Seaforth Community Hall, where residents were regularly briefed on the progress in fighting the fire. “We were pushed back down Highway 107 several kilometres at a time; the fire was so fast and intense,” recalls Capt. Cory Dominix of the HRF&E’s Station 21. “Wild rabbits, foxes and raccoons were gathered all around us, just trying to get away from the heat and smoke. It was surreal.”
  • The same afternoon, the Tantallon fire started “in brush near three houses on Fir Lane,” says Platoon Chief Paul Hopkins, who ran the Tantallon operation. “We had sustained winds of 30-40 kph with gusts up to 70-90 kph, so the flames just took off from there.” Eventually, 111 firefighters and two DNR helicopters fought this fire.
  • On Saturday, both fires raged out of control until the winds died at night. Fire crews finally stopped their progress on Sunday, helped by lighter winds. Residents were allowed to return home
  • on Monday.

■ What went well
  • Despite size of fire, no lives were lost.
  • Early evacuations made a difference.
  • Fire crews worked well together; co-ordinated effort brought the situation under control.

■ Challenges
  • High winds, extensive dry forest debris.
  • Minimal road access, made worse by fires cutting across roads.
  • Coincidence of two major wildfires at one.

■ Damage
  • Damages were in the millions of dollars due to loss of and damage to homes, land and trees, plus the costs of the evacuations.

■ Lessons learned and actions taken
  • Following the fire, which occurred in dry conditions, the HRF&E imposed a complete ban on outdoor burns.

Peterborough flood July 15, 2004
Timing likely prevented tragedy
By James Careless

Damages to public and private property from the 2004 flood exceeded $100 million.
Photos courtesy City of Peterborough Emergency Management Division
In the early morning of July 15, 2004, the City of Peterborough, Ont., was inundated by a record-breaking 175 millimetres (6.9 inches) of rainfall in two hours. The rainfall overwhelmed the city’s storm water and sanitary sewers, resulting in the declaration of a state of emergency that lasted 15 days.
A roof collapse at the Extendicare Nursing Home required the evacuation of 171 residents through flood waters. Another 25 residents had to be rescued from flooded cars. Hundreds of basements and street level buildings were flooded; roads and embankments were destroyed, leading to considerable property damage; drywall, flooring and furniture were ruined due to mould.
The numbers tell the tale.
  • 1,868 basement pump-outs (including garages, backyards) were completed by firefighters.
  • 1,000 gas disconnections were conducted.
  • One structure fire occurred at a commercial building on July 15.
  • 498 electrical disconnect calls were made.
  • Six building evacuations were carried out.
  • There were 28 medical calls.
  • 28 motor vehicle accidents occurred.
  • One person was trapped in an elevator;
  • There were six calls for downed power lines.

■ Response
  • Peterborough Fire Department
  • Peterborough Police Department
  • City of Peterborough (all departments)
  • 28 fire departments from across Ontario, including Toronto Fire Services
  • Emergency Management Ontario
  • Otonabee Region Conservation Authority
  • Ministry of Natural Resources
  • Ministry of the Environment
  • Mennonite Disaster Services
  • Buddhist Monk Organization
  • Two community colleges, which provided shelter space for evacuees.
  • Salvation Army
  • Red Cross
  • Amateur Radio Emergency Service
  • Auxiliary Coast Guard Ontario Volunteer Emergency Response Team
  • Incident commander: Fire Chief Lee Grant, Peterborough Fire Department (now deputy chief, Oakville Fire Department)

On July 15, the Emergency Operations Centre was activated and became fully operational by 5:30 a.m. The Emergency Control group and city staff worked around the clock for the duration of the flood. In many cases staff worked 18 to 20 hour days until the centre closed on July 29 after the state of emergency was lifted. Professional first responders and 503 volunteers worked together to rescue people, shut off power and gas and control the incident scene until the flood waters receded. Shelters were set up at local schools and colleges. The Salvation Army served more than 10,000 meals.

Peterborough firefighters pumped out almost 2,000 basements in the aftermath of the 2004 flood.
■ What went well
“We were very lucky that this only happened in Peterborough, since we were able to get aid from all over central Ontario,” says Grant. “Had the storm also flooded Oshawa or Toronto, we would have been on our own.”
The incident happened when most roads were clear. Had it happened during rush hour, entire streets would have been clogged with flooded cars and the rescue situation would have been much worse. There were no casualties.
■ Challenges
  • “This happened in a town whose infrastructure is over 100 years old in the downtown core,” says Grant. “Worse yet, no one in North America has ever designed a storm water management system to deal with this amount of rainfall in just two hours. The rapid speed of the flood overwhelmed drivers, roads, sewers and thus limited mobility by emergency services.”
  • There was a tremendous influx of groundwater into sanitary sewers through pipe leaks and illegal connections.
  • Many natural drainage channels had filled in without providing alternative overflow routes.
  • Utility crews had to push their way through the water to pull meters (disconnect power) from flooded homes.
  • Peterborough simply did not have the facilities or people to manage such a downpour.

■ Damage
  • Estimated damages to public and private property exceeded $100 million.
  • Staff overtime and expenses were $1.4 million.
  • There was considerable damage to homes, furnishings, roadways, retaining walls, landscapes, cars and city infrastructure.
  • Peterborough’s main library suffered millions of dollars in damage including damage to the Balsillie Collection of Roy Studio Images.

■ Lessons learned and actions taken
  • Peterborough now has a permanent Emergency Operations Centre and Public Inquiry Centre,” says Jodi DeNoble, certified municipal manager II.
  • It has also expanded its Emergency Control Group complement to 50-plus staff, and the Public Inquiry Centre has about 80 trained staff. The city has since entered into mutual assistance agreements with the County of Peterborough and its eight lower-tier municipalities, and with Durham Region.
  • Backup generators have been installed at most city-owned reception centres and there is a program in place to continue with the installation of generators at key service locations in the city.
  • A comprehensive emergency social services plan and team (60-plus members) has been developed and trained for the delivery of emergency food, clothing, lodging, registration and inquiry, and other personal services
  • such as counselling, financial aid, first aid, child care, and pet services.
  • Following the flood, the City completed a flood reduction master plan. Based on the plan, there have been significant upgrades and improvements made to municipal infrastructure under the City’s adopted flood reduction. This is a multi-year, multi-million dollar program that is ongoing to date. Details can be found at:

Hurricane Juan/White Juan, Halifax 2003/2004
EOC activation proves prudent
By James Careless

The category 2 Hurricane Juan prepared Halifax-area residents for White Juan six months later.
Photos courtesy Dartmouth Yacht Club

Category 2 Hurricane Juan marched through Halifax, N.S., just after midnight on Monday, Sept. 29, 2003. Its impact was extensive: five people dead; more than $100 million in direct damage; one million trees destroyed; and power disrupted to hundreds of thousands of home for days afterwards.
“Hurricane Juan was a 100-year storm, something none of us had ever dealt with before,” says Barry Manuel, emergency management co-ordinator for the Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM). “It was one of the biggest catastrophe to hit Halifax since the 1917 explosion.”
Just six months later, on Feb. 18, 2004, a blizzard that came to be dubbed White Juan, dumped 60 to 90 centimetres (24 to 36 inches) of snow on Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. Halifax declared a traffic curfew to keep the roads clear for snow ploughs, but even with this effort, public transit was offline for four days after the storm.
Still, things could have been much worse. The reason they weren’t? In both cases, HRM officials activated the city’s emergency plan before the events, opened up their Emergency Operations Centre in Woodside – in the same building and floor as the provincial and federal emergency ops centres – and made sure everything that could be done was done beforehand.
“We’ve had our emergency plan in place since 1996,” says Manuel. “It saw us through after the Swissair Flight 111 crash of 1998, in which all onboard that MD-11 died. The same plan helped us during 9-11, when we had to house 8,000 stranded airline passengers. It did the job during Hurricane Juan and White Juan, and we are still using it today.”
■ Responding agencies to Hurricane Juan and White Juan
  • Halifax Regional Fire & Emergency Service
  • Halifax Regional Police
  • Halifax Regional Municipality government
  • Nova Scotia government
  • Federal government
  • Incident commander: HRM EMC Barry Manuel

■ What went well
  • In both instances, emergency officials activated HRM’s EOC before the event.
  • All municipal fuel tanks (backup power and vehicles) were topped off beforehand.
  • In the case of Hurricane Juan, extra oil tankers were purchased and parked.
  • Vehicles and buses were staged across the 5,000 square kilometers of HRM to ensure that road blockages would not hamper response.
  • Emergency staff were in position before each events, reducing reaction time.
  • The public was briefed by various media sources before events began.
  • The closeness of the EOCs and adherence to emergency plan allowed for fast face-to-face meetings, easy inter-agency liaison and clear lines of authority/responsibility.
  • Hurricane Juan made HRM residents more likely to stock up when warned about White Juan.

■ Challenges
  • Fallen trees and power lines blocked many roads during Hurricane Juan; snow blocked them during White Juan. This slowed down many emergency responders.
  • Power was lost in many areas due to storm damage.
  • Hurricane Juan struck from midnight through the morning of Sept. 29; White Juan raged for 24 hours straight.

■ Lessons learned and actions taken
  • Beyond making some minor tweaks to the emergency plan, the system worked and is still in use today.

Fort Erie, Ont., snowstorm October 2006
Communication key to better response
By James Careless