GOVT 387/587 – RELIGION AND POLITICS - SELECT FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
Syllabus Topic D1: How ought the religion clauses to govern situations in which religious beliefs and practices are unintentionally hampered by government?
Sherbert v. Verner (1963)
Facts of the Case: Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied her benefits, finding unacceptable her religious justification for refusing Saturday work.
Question: Did the denial of unemployment compensation violate the Free Exercise Clause?
Conclusion: Yes. The Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore, there was no compelling state interest which justified such a substantial burden on this basic First Amendment right. Decision: 7 votes for Sherbert, 2 votes against.
Goldman v. Weinberger (1986)
Facts of the Case: Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear could not be worn “except by armed security police in the performance of their duties.”
Question: Did the Air Force regulation violate the Free Exercise Clause?
Conclusion: No. The Court argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the need for the military to “foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.” Since allowing overt religious apparel “would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations,” the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate. In 1987, Congress passed legislation that reversed this decision and allowed members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a “neat and conservative” manner. Decision: 5 votes for Weinberger, 4 votes against.
Bowen v. Roy (1986)
Facts of the Case: Steven Roy and Karen Miller are parents of a two-year-old child, and all are members of the Albenaki Indian tribe. They applied for public assistance, but were denied benefits by the state of Pennsylvania because they refused to obtain a Social Security card and number, which is a requirement of the assistance program. Their refusal was based on the claim that to obtain the card and number would be a violation of his family’s Indian religious beliefs.
Question: Does the requirement to participate in the Social Security requirement, for the purpose of obtaining state welfare benefits, violate the Free Exercise Clause?
Conclusion: No. The clause does not prevent state welfare agencies from using Social Security account numbers in the administration of public assistance programs. The Free Exercise clause is a right possessed by individuals against government action; it has never been understood to require the government to act in a way that suits with the religious beliefs of individual citizens. Religious convictions “do not automatically entitle a person to fix unilaterally the conditions and terms of dealing with the government.” The Social Security requirement is religiously neutral, i.e. it does not individually discriminate against any religion. Sherbert does not apply, for in that case government hostility was involved; such is wanting in Bowen. Decision: 8 votes for Bowen, one against.
Lyng v. NICPA (1988)
Facts of the Case: The United States Forest Service was considering building a paved roadway that would cut through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. It was also considering timber harvesting in the area. A study commissioned by the Forest Service reported that harvesting the Chimney Rock area would irreparably damage grounds that had historically been used by Native Americans to conduct religious rituals. After the Forest Service decided to construct a road, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association took action against Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng.
Question: Did the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause prohibit the government from harvesting or developing the Chimney Rock area?
Conclusion: No. The Court held that the Forest Service was free to harvest the lands. Though the government's actions would have severe adverse effects on the Indians' practice of their religion, those effects were only incidental and did not constitute an attempt to coerce Native Americans to act in violation of their beliefs. The Court reasoned that government could not operate “if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires,” and that the First Amendment did not give any one group veto power over public programs that did not actually prohibit the free exercise of religion. Decision: 5 votes for Lyng, 3 votes against.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014)
Facts of the Case: Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., is a business that seeks to run its commercial operation according to Christian principles, one of which is that the use of contraception is an immoral practice. Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA, or “Obamacare”), employment-based group health care plans must provide FDA-approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, the law contained no exemptions for profit-making institutions. Consequently Hobby Lobby filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunction on the grounds that the contraceptive provision of the ACA was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).
Question: Does the Free Exercise Clause, and its statutory expression through the RFRA, prohibit the government from compelling a private company to provide employee health coverage for contraception based on the religious objections of the company’s owners?
Conclusion: Yes. The Court held that Congress intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they are not abstract entities but groups of individuals in full possession of Constitutional rights and liberties. Because the contraception requirement forces those individuals to violate their religious principles, or face significant fines, it creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the government's interests. In fact, a less restrictive method exists in the form of the exemption for non-profit religious organizations, which the Court held can and should be applied to for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby. Decision: 5 votes for Hobby Lobby, 4 votes against.
Syllabus Topic D2: Is the government ever permitted to promote salutary religious beliefs?
Stone v. Graham (1980)
Facts of the Case: Sydell Stone and a number of other parents challenged a Kentucky state law that required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in each public school classroom. They filed a claim against James Graham, the superintendent of public schools in Kentucky.
Question: Did the Kentucky statute violate the Establishment Clause?
Conclusion: Yes. The Kentucky law violated the first part of the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and thus violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The Court found that the requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted “had no secular legislative purpose” and was “plainly religious in nature.” The Court noted that the Commandments did not confine themselves to arguably secular matters (such as murder, stealing, etc.), but rather concerned matters such as the worship of God and the observance of the Sabbath Day. Decision: 5 votes for Stone, 2 votes against.
Van Orden v. Perry (2005)
Facts of the Case: Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Question: Did the monument on the grounds of the Texas state capitol building violate the Establishment Clause?
Conclusion: No. The Court held that the monument is part of the nation’s tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the court argued, “simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause.” Decision: 5 votes for Texas (Perry), 4 votes against.
Marsh v. Chambers (1983)
Facts of the Case: Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska legislature, challenged the legislature's chaplaincy practice in federal court. This practice involves the offering of a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session by a chaplain chosen by the state and paid out of public funds. The district court supported Chambers on the use of public funds. The appeals court supported Chambers on the prayer practice. Both parties appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Question: Does the chaplaincy practice of the Nebraska legislature violate the Establishment Clause?
Conclusion: No. The Court upheld the chaplaincy practice. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger abandoned the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which had been the touchstone for cases involving the Establishment Clause. In its place, Burger rested the Court's opinion on historical custom. Prayers by tax-supported legislative chaplains could be traced to the First Continental Congress and to the First Congress that framed the Bill of Rights. As a consequence, the chaplaincy practice had become “part of the fabric of our society.” In such circumstances, an invocation for Divine guidance is not an establishment of religion. “It is,” wrote Burger, “simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.” Decision: 6 votes for Marsh, 3 votes against.
Lynch v. Donnelly (1984)
Facts of the Case: The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading “Seasons Greetings,” and a nativity scene. The crèche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket.
Question: Did the inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's display violate the Establishment Clause?
Conclusion: No. The Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the crèche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had “legitimate secular purposes.” The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was “far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country.” Decision: 5 votes for Lynch, 4 votes against.
McGowan v. Maryland (1961)
Facts of the Case: Several employees of a discount department store in Maryland sold a few items, such as floor wax and loose-leaf notebooks, to customers on a Sunday. By doing so, they violated Maryland's “blue laws,” which prohibit selling such items on a Sunday.
Question: Do Maryland’s blue laws violate the Establishment Clause?
Conclusion: No. Sunday closing laws started out to facilitate church attendance in colonial America; however, the present Maryland laws are based on secular rather than religious state interests. The laws are to improve the "health, safety, recreation, and general well-being" of citizens. The present purpose of the laws is to provide a uniform day of rest for all. The fact that this day is of particular significance for Christians does not prohibit the state from achieving its secular goals. Decision: 8 votes for Maryland, 1 vote against.
Syllabus Topic D3: Is the government ever permitted to prohibit harmful religious beliefs?
Reynolds v. U.S. (1879)
Facts of the Case: George Reynolds, secretary to Mormon Church leader Brigham Young, challenged the federal anti-bigamy statute, arguing that plural marriage is a part of his religious practice. Reynolds was convicted in a Utah territorial district court. His conviction was affirmed by the Utah territorial Supreme Court.
Question: Does the territorial anti-bigamy statute violate the Free Exercise Clause?
Conclusion: No. Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, writing for a unanimous court, held that the statute can punish criminal activity without regard to religious belief. The First Amendment protected religious belief, but it did not protect religious practices that were judged to be criminal such as bigamy. Criminality was defined by the court, in part, as those actions which “violate social duties or are subversive of good order.” In the court’s judgment, according to this standard, those who practice polygamy could no more be exempt from the law than those who may wish to practice human sacrifice as part of their religious belief. Decision: unanimous for the U.S.
Lawson, et. al. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (1942)
Facts of the Case: In a section labeled “Offenses against Public Peace--Conspiracies,” Kentucky state law specifically outlaws religious snake handling, which is a practice derived from the gospel according to Mark, chapter 16: “And these signs shall follow them that believe: In my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues. They shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them.” The statute states: “Any person who displays, handles or uses any kind of reptile in connection with any religious service or gathering shall be fined not less than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars.” Tom Lawson and several others were convicted under this statute. Claiming that their actions were protected by the First Amendment, they brought suit in the state of Kentucky.
Question: Does the prohibition of snake handling constitute a violation of the Free Exercise Cause?
Conclusion: No. The court quoted from an earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision, Jones v. City of Opelika: “Courts, no more than Constitutions, can intrude into the consciences of men or compel them to believe contrary to their faith or think contrary to their convictions, but courts are competent to adjudge the acts men do … and to determine whether the claimed right is limited by other recognized powers, equally precious to mankind. So the mind and spirit of man remain forever free, while his actions rest subject to necessary accommodation to the competing needs of his fellows.” One of these needs is the protection of the health and welfare of the citizens of Kentucky, and since only a trained “zoologist, herpetologist, or experienced woodsman” is capable of distinguishing poisonous from non-poisonous snakes, the state’s statue was appropriate.