From Rahner: Foundations of Christian Faith, Chapter 6

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From Rahner: Foundations of Christian Faith, chapter 6,

pp. 285-93 some changes in trans.

7. The Content, Permanent Validity and Limits ofClassical Christology and Soteriology

a) The Content Of Classical Christology And Soteriology

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

The classical Christology and soteriology which was expressed in the greatCouncils of the early church (Nicaea, Ephesus, Chalcedon) and washanded on in the traditional theology of the schools without very muchfurther inquiry or deeper development will not be repeated here from thesesources. That would not be advisable for the purposes of this introductionand, should anyone wish to consult them, the texts are readily available toeveryone in the Enchiridion Symbolorum of Denziger-Schönmetzer. Wecan only give a brief summary of this classical Christology here.

It was mentioned earlier that the "late" New Testament Christology,which is a theological reflection upon the original experience of the discipleswith the crucified and risen Jesus, is going to be considered here alongwith the classical Christology of the church, and together they will bemeasured against the original experience of the risen Jesus. By "late" wemean in relation to the original experience of the risen Jesus. We are notmaintaining that this New Testament Christology, which is already foundin the earliest letters of Paul, was not written down until later in time thanthe gospels, which give us accounts of the experiences of the first discipleswith the risen Jesus. This is not to maintain, of course, that between the"late" Christology of the New Testament and the classical Christology ofthe church there exist no differences at all with regard to terminology,horizons of understanding, "metaphysical" presuppositions, and so on. Butif we may presuppose here that "functional" Christological statements inthe context of salvation history also and inevitably imply ontological statementseither implicitly or explicitly, and this simply presupposes that onecan think onto-logically and does not read ontic statements about personaland spiritual realities in a false and objectivistic way, then it is quitelegitimate here to disregard these indisputable differences between lateNew Testament Christology and the classical Christology of the church.This is true especially because if the New Testament statements are takenseriously and are not rendered innocuous (for example, the statement that"the Word became flesh") they express something about Jesus which is notsurpassed even by the classical Christology in its metaphysical terminology.At least this is the case if we do not absolutize the classical Christologyalong with its "metaphysics" in a way which is not required even ofsomeone who recognizes them as the binding norm of his faith. Anotherreason why nothing more than a summary of the classical Christology needbe offered here is the fact that we have already made an attempt towardsan essential and descending Christology by way of prelude in the fourthsection of this chapter.

THE OFFICIAL CHRISTOLOGY OF THE CHURCH

The official Christology of the church is a straightforward descendingChristology which develops the basic assertion: God in his Logos becomesman. This is the basic assertion which is developed and defended by furtherprecisions against misunderstandings which quite clearly were a threat. Itis the assertion to which they always returned and from which they alwaysset out as the primary assertion which was clear and taken for granted.

This descending or incarnational Christology presupposes the classicaltheology of the Trinity, although in their historical development the twomutually influenced each other. This trinitarian theology says: there arethree "persons" in God who are distinct from one another; one of them,the second person, is the "Logos" from all eternity and independently ofthe Incarnation of the "Son"; he is born of and expressed by the Fatherthrough an eternal "generation;" he is of the same essence as the Fatherand is distinct from him in a relational difference while sharing in the samedivine essence; he proceeds from the Father in the first of the innertrinitarianprocessions (processio), and through this generation he possessesthe divine essence or the divine "nature" from the Father.

This divine person of the Logos assumes a complete human reality calleda human "nature" as his own, namely, that of Jesus, and does this in a"union" which is "hypostatic," that is, it does not consist in a mingling ofthe "natures," but rather it has to do with the Son's "hypostasis" as such.The Logos joins this human nature with his hypostasis in such a way thatthis hypostasis is the substantial "bearer".of this "nature," and this humannature belongs inseparably to this hypostasis as the ultimate "subject" ofboth its being and its expression. Consequently, all of the predicates of thishuman nature can really and truly be expressed of this hypostasis or personof the Logos as the ultimate subject by which it is borne. This is so preciselybecause this nature is united with this person and subject "substantially"and is possessed by him, and hence it can arid must be predicated of him.

The official teaching of the church does not explain the essence of thissubstantial union and unity with the divine hypostasis of the Logos anyfurther. It simply clarifies it by saying that it allows and requires as anontological presupposition that the human be truly and genuinely predicatedof the Logos himself. Attempts were made to develop more exacttheories of this hypostatic union in the Middle Ages and in baroque theology,but they did not find universal acceptance, nor were they incorporatedinto the official teaching of the church.

This hypostatic union allows a real difference to exist between the two"natures" of the single divine hypostasis of the Logos. These natures do notmerge into a third "nature," but rather they exist "unseparated" from theLogos and "unmixed" between themselves. Hence the real ontic and logicalsubject does not arise out of the "natures" through their union, but ratheris the subject of the Logos which pre-exists prior to the union. This shouldbe noted to counter a "nestorian" understanding of the word "Christ." Inaccordance with the fact that the natures are unmixed, basically the active influence of the Logos in the human "nature" in Jesus in a physical sensemay not be understood in any other way except the way this influence isexercised by God on free creatures elsewhere. This of course is frequentlyforgotten in a piety and a theology which are tinged with monophysitism.All too often they understand the humanity of Jesus as a thing and as an"instrument" which is moved by the subjectivity of the Logos.In view of the fact that the natures are unmixed and that the wholenessof the human nature is not diminished, the insight must be preserved inorder to counter monothelitism, or it must be acquired again and again inorder to counter a piety and a theology which are tinged with monophysitism and in which the genuine subjectivity of the man Jesus even vis-a.visGod is constantly forgotten, the insight, namely, that the human natureof Jesus is a created, conscious and free reality to which there belongs acreated “subjectivity" at least in the sense of a created will, a createdenergeia. This created subiectivity is distinct from the subjectivity of theLogos and faces God at a created distance in freedom, in obedience andin prayer, and it is not omniscient.

The whole doctrine of the hypostatic union reaches its goal, and this wasalso its religious point of departure, in the doctrine of the communicatioidiomatum or the interchange of predicates in both an ontic and a logicalsense: because one and the same Logos-subject or person or hypostasispossesses and bears both "natures" substantially, there can be predicatedof that which is named according to one of the two natures the characteristicsof the other nature. Thus, for example, we can say not only that theeternal, divine Son is omniscient, but also that the eternal Son of God died,that Jesus of Nazareth is God, and so on. And conversely: because faith'sexperience of the unique presence of God in Jesus requires such an interchangeof predicates, it justifies the doctrine of the hypostatic union as itsindispensable presupposition, and as a defence of the legitimacy of the titlesof majesty which are already applied to Jesus in the New Testament.

CLASSICAL SOTERIOLOGY

The classical soteriology is hardly developed beyond the statements of theNew Testament, if indeed it really even does justice to them at all. Prescindingfrom a "doctrine of physical redemption" which is found in theGreek Fathers, and according to which the world appears as saved becauseit is physically and inseparably united with the Godhead in the humanityof Jesus, and prescinding from a few images of a more visual kind in theFathers (for example, the ransoming of man by Christ from the initiallylegitimate power of the devil, or the outwitting of the devil who unlawfullyseizes Christ by mistake), in the Middle Ages since the time of Anselm ofCanterbury the attempt was made to clarify the biblical notion of redemptionby a sacrifice of expiation or by the "blood" of Jesus. The clarificationran as follows: because of the divine and therefore infinite dignity of hisperson, the obedience of Jesus which was confirmed in the sacrifice of thecross represents infinite satisfaction vis-a.-vis the God who was offended bysin, and this sin is measured by the dignity of the God who was offended.Consequently, it satisfies God's "justice" and liberates us from it if andbecause God accepts this satisfaction of Christ for the human race. Sincethe Middle Ages this theory of satisfaction has been current (and easilyunderstandable for German ways of thinking). It also appears on the peripheryof official church statements, but the extraordinary magisterium ofthe church did not take a position on it in any detailed way.

b) The Legitimacy Of The Classical Doctrine Of Incarnation

The legitimacy and the permanent validity of the classical Christology lies,first of all negatively, in the fact that when it is presupposed it preventsJesus unambiguously from being reduced merely to someone in a line ofprophets, religious geniuses and reformers, and from being incorporatedwithin the course of an ongoing history of religion; and, positively, itclarifies the fact that in Jesus God has turned to us in such a unique andunsurpassable way that in him he has given himself absolutely. In Jesus Godis not represented by something other and different from himself just likeevery other creature is different from God, so that this mediation wouldnot mediate an immediacy to God in his own self. Anyone who cannotunderstand what the hypostatic union and the interchange of predicatesmean (as we have explained them) in any other concepts except those ofthis classical theology of Incarnation will judge this classical Christology tobe in a direct sense the only way of expressing our faith in the true relationshipbetween Jesus and God, and our faith in our relationship to him, andhence he will retain it. However, especially today, he may not overlook whatis still to be said about the limits of this classical Christology. Moreover, andthis is not as easy a task as many believe in their all too traditionalistic ways ofthinking, he has to learn how to express this classical Christology and toexplain it especially to those who have reservations about this doctrine andsuspect it of being mythological, although they profess in their Christianfaith that Jesus is the indispensable and definitive way to God.

Anyone who thinks that he is able to express what is meant in theclassical Christology of the Incarnation in another way without doingviolence to what is meant, he may express it differently. This presupposesthat he respects the official teaching of the church as a critical norm forhis own way of expressing it, and that he knows that this teaching has tobe an indispensable norm for him when he enters into the public discourseof the church. But neither must he make its significance absolute. Hisrecognition of this does not banish him from the public discourse of thechurch because the official teaching of the church must also be interpretedand brought into contact with contemporary ways of thinking, and thiscannot be done by merely repeating this official teaching.

c) The Limits Of Classical Chnstology And Soteriology

It does not contradict the character of an absolutely binding doctrine ofthe church to call attention to the limits which accompany a particulardogmatic statement.

THE PROBLEM OF HORIZONS OF UNDERSTANDING

In earlier times which thought more "mythologically" in their horizonofunderstanding, a merely descending doctrine of the Incarnation mightmore easily have been sufficient by itself than it is today. In· its explicitassertion about Jesus it jumps over the point which gives us access to theultimate mystery about him which the doctrine of the Incarnation expresses:from the outset it is the incarnate Word of God who has comedown to us. Consequently, everything is seen and understood as comingfrom above, and not as going towards that point. But then it really is nolonger so easy to exclude mythological misunderstandings from the correctand orthodox doctrine in our consciousness and in our piety. The humanityof Jesus is thought unreflexively to be the livery which God donned andin which he discloses himself and at the same time hides himself. Whatis still left and accepted of the humanity understood as the livery and bodyof God appears as pure accommodation and c6ndescension on God's partfor our benefit.

THE PROBLEM OF THE "IS” FORMULAS

When the orthodox descending Christology of the Incarnation says thatthis Jesus "is" God, this is an abiding truth of the faith if the statementis understood correctly. But as the statement reads it can also he understoodin a monophysitic sense, and hence in a heretical sense. For such statementsare constructed according to the rules for the interchange of predicatesand are meant in this sense, and nothing about them indicatesexplicitly that this copula "is" appears and should be understood in a quitedifferent sense than it is in.other familiar statements with apparently thesame copula "is." For when we say that Peter is a man, the statementexpresses a real identification in the content of the subject and predicatenouns. But the meaning of "is" in statements involving an interchange ofpredicates in Christology is not based on such a real identification. It isbased rather on a unique, otherwise unknown and deeply mysterious unitybetween realities which are really different and which are at an infinitedistance from each other. For in and according to the humanity which wesee when we say "Jesus," Jesus "is" not God, and in and according to hisdivinity God "is" not man in the sense of a real identification. The Chalcedonianadiairetos (unseparated) which this "is" intends to express (D.S.302) expresses it in such a way that the asynchytos (unmixed) of the sameformula does not come to expression. Consequently, the statement is alwaysin danger of being understood in a "monophysitic" sense, that is, as a formula which simply identifies the subject and predicate.

These formulas do not intend this, but neither do they prevent it positively,and they are formulas which are thought to be shibboleths of orthodoxy:"Do you believe that Jesus is God, yes or no?" The misunderstandings with which these formulas resonate do not harm the pious in theirtraditional piety, They think rather that these misunderstandings are themost radical form of orthodox faith. But people today are inclined in manyways to understand these misunderstandings as parts of orthodox faith, andto reject it as mythology. This is only fair under this supposition. We shouldadmit this and in pastoral matters take account of the fact that not everyonewho has problems with the statement "Jesus is God" must for thisreason be heterodox.

Hence as presumed parallels to "is'” statements elsewhere in our everydayuse of language; the Christological "is" formulas (for example, "the same"person is God and man) are constantly in danger of being interpreted falsely,a danger which flows from these parallels. The identity which they suggestbut do not really mean is not excluded clearly and early enough by an explanation given sometime later quite apart from the fact that the explanation is quickly forgotten. This is not to question the legitimacy andthe permanent validity of these Christological "is" statements. But we haveto recognize that they are fraught with the danger of a monophysitic andhence a mythological misunderstanding. If, for example, someone says, "Icannot really believe that a man is God and that God has become a man,"the first correct and Christian response to such a declaration would not beto say that this is a rejection of a basic Christian dogma. The correctresponse is rather that the interpretation presumably given to the rejectedstatement does not correspond to the really Christian sense of the statement.

The real Incarnation of the Logos is indeed a mystery which calls for anact of faith. But this should not be burdened with a lot of mythologicalmisunderstandings. Although the Christian dogma in itself has nothing todo with the divine man myths of antiquity, we can readily admit thatcertain formulations of the dogma which are situated within the realm ofthis concrete and historical horizon of understanding (for example, thatGod "came down," that he "appears," and so on) were more easily takenfor granted and accepted and used as a help towards interpretation in earliertimes than is possible for us today. Today too Christology has an urgenttask, a task which is not accomplished by merely repeating literally theancient formulas and their explanation, something which is usually doneanyhow only in learned theological circles. And for a variety of reasonswhich we are not going to go into here, neither can this task consist inabolishing the ancient formulas. But it is an urgent necessity that webroaden the horizons, the modes of expression and the different aspectsfor expressing the ancient Christian dogmas.