Federalist 53, 56, 57, 58: House of Representatives

CHAPTER 8:

Congress

48. James Madison

Federalist 62, 63: Senate

Federalist 53:

Anti-federalists had argued that one-year House terms would be more "democratic" or "representative."

* Madison argues that Representatives in the House will need some knowledge of national affairs (how things work in the different states), as well as some minimal knowledge of foreign affairs. Because experience in the House counts here, two-year terms are appropriate.

Federalist 56, 57, 58:

Critics had charged that the House would be too small to be truly representative, or to have "...due knowledge of the interests of its constituents."

* Madison counters that the proposed size is appropriate because:

(a) the objects of concern (areas of legislation) will be limited, not total (# 56);

(b) above a certain size, demagoguery ("passion") will replace deliberation and choice ("reason") (# 58).

(c) even at this distance, the House is still closest to the people. Two-year terms ensure the House's "dependence" on the people (#57).

#62 and 63:

* Madison contrasts the Senate with the House in the course of discussing the Senate's intended role in the system.

Important structural differences in the Senate include:

(1) the selection of Senators by the state legislatures--Senators are only indirectly accountable to the people [the 17th Amendment (1913) provided for the direct election of Senators];

(2) Senators will serve for six-year terms;

(3) equality of representation by states is one way that federalism (the recognition of the sovereignty and importance of states as states) is embodied in the new national government.

These characteristics give the Senate different responsibilities:

(1) to act as a conservative brake on the House (to provide "stability"--a generally conservative or more deliberate check on the more popularly-based House);

(2) related to (1), the Senate will help protect the people from themselves;

(3) to pursue longer-term projects requiring a longer time frame;

(4) to provide greater knowledge and skills in crafting laws, individually and in relation to other laws;

(5) to provide a greater sense of "national character."

Sample Question

According to Madison, the Senate:

a) is closer to the people than the House

b) has shorter electoral terms than the House

c) will encourage deliberation and reason more so than the House

d) should be similar to the House in most respects

49. Morris P. Fiorina

The Rise of the Washington Establishment

Main Argument:

* For members of Congress, "the primary goal...is reelection."

Reelection is at the very least necessary and, for Fiorina, it is very often predominant. We should expect members of Congress, as individuals, to act accordingly, and we should expect members of Congress "to devise and maintain institutional arrangements which facilitate their electoral activities..."

Fiorina's Reasoning:

1. Fiorina begins with what he calls the "self-interest axiom" (human beings seek their own ends).

-- For bureaucrats, this means trying to expand their agencies (budgets, personnel, mission). For voters, this means trying to get benefits for themselves and have the costs fall on others.

2. Members of Congress engage in three types of activities:

(1) lawmaking

(2) pork barreling

(3) casework

3. Lawmaking is Congress's main function. However, members will view lawmaking in light of their reelection incentive, and they find that governance often involves hard choices and ensures making enemies. It is difficult to claim credit of most forms of lawmaking (since many hands are involved and policies are usually of general applicability).

4. Pork barreling and casework "are relatively less controversial," and better for credit-claiming.

Conclusion:

5. The growth of an activist federal government has stimulated a change in the mix of congressional activities: less effort is spent on programmatic activities (lawmaking), and more on porkbarrel and casework. This leads to increased bureaucratic activity.

Therefore, not the bureaucracy but Congress itself should be the target of criticism aimed at Washington. "Congress is the linchpin of the Washington establishment. . .Congress does not just react to big government, it creates it."

The "general, long-term welfare of the United States is no more than an incidental by-product of the system."

Sample Question

Fiorina writes that the primary incentive for members of Congress is:

a) good public policy in the interests of the nation

b) reelection

c) taking stands on difficult issues

d) fundraising

50. Lawrence Dodd

Congress and the Quest for Power

Main Argument:

Congress is like a kaleidoscope: a constantly shifting pattern of discrete pieces.

* Dodd argues that the multiplication of committees to satisfy individual incentives for power undermines the ability of Congress, as an institution, to make coordinated and longterm decisions in the national interest.

In turn, this encourages the executive to intervene and provide coordination and leadership; Congress, Dodd argues, will reorganize and centralize to a degree, to counter the challenge for power from the President; the President will, in turn, back off; and Congress reverts to satisfying individual incentives by decentralizing power.

Dodd's Reasoning:

1. Motive for members of Congress: the quest for personal power; 2. This requires reelection:

a) reelection confers formal status as a representative, and signals the representative's acceptance of the system and thus legitimates the person as a power-seeker;

b) reelection creates an aura of personal legitimacy (especially when elected by large margins);

c) longterm success confers experience and expertise on the representative -- Because reelection is important and difficult, it can become all-consuming.

3. But reelection is usually not the sole preoccupation (this contrasts Fiorina); security comes from constituency-building (not from party).

Dodd and the Congressional Career:

4. Dodd argues that members of Congress climb a four-stage "power ladder" over the course of their careers:

1) junior members concentrate on casework, to solidify their constituency and gain favor within Congress;

2) they then seek spots on key policy committees, and draft legislation;

3) they then serve on power committees;

4) lastly, and rarely, members do service in party leadership as a floor leader or Speaker.

The Power Incentive and Congressional Committees

1. The Power incentive affects Congressional structure:

1) Encourages the multiplication of committees,

-- because they are discrete and relatively autonomous, committees can give everybody an individual power-center;

-- most members spend most of their time and effort in their power domains, in Washington.

2) Types of committees differ according to individual representative's incentive:

-- Authorization committees create policies and programs, and are good for doing constituency service;

-- Policy committees deal with broad policy issues;

-- Power committees make decisions on rules, schedules, revenues, and appropriations (Rules, Ways and Means, Finance, Appropriations, Senate Foreign Relations).

There are constraints on the committee system:

1) there are a limited number of attractive committee slots, which creates competition among representatives;

-- advancement is achieved by following behavioral norms: courtesy, hard work, adherence to the party leadership on key issues/decisions;

2) more powerful committees are more controversial,

-- it becomes harder to mend political fences, actions are more visible;

-- life becomes more unpredictable, and is thus better for senior members with secure individual constituencies.

There are several liabilities to the committee system:

1) It lacks centralized leadership, and is therefore unable to provide the nation with a unified, comprehensible, or persuasive leadership on national policy;

2) It lacks fiscal coordination, because committees are isolated without any mechanism to insure reasonable relationships on fiscal issues;

-- this creates high and unrealistic expectations and budget deficits;

-- it also encourages the Executive to intervene and provide coordinating leadership, thus diminishing Congressional control over monetary and budget issues.

3) It lacks accountability or responsibility: the number of committees and the fact that leadership of power committees still goes to senior members results in uncoordinated policy designed by representatives who have lost touch with the outside world;

-- this undermines popular support for the system and decreases government's responsiveness.

4) It leads to the insulation of Congressional decisionmaking;

-- committee sessions are closed, in order to protect individual power within committees;

-- the multiplication of committees make their activities difficult to follow;

-- there are no clear jurisdictional boundaries.

5) It undermines the ability of Congress to perform aggressive oversight of administration and the bureaucracy.

Sample Question

According to Lawrence Dodd, which of the following is not an effect of the power incentive?

a) the committee system

b) strong leadership in Congress

c) "the power ladder"

d) a lack of responsibility in Congress as a body

51. Timothy E. Cook

Media Power and Congressional Power

Main Argument:

* Cook suggests that reporters and members of Congress, both "elites" of sorts, are engaged in a mutually beneficial relationship. "Making news...has become a crucial component of making laws."

This can lead the media and government to become "detached" from the people. Cook's solution involves what he calls "the democratization of political news," and, more generally, "more participation by the people themselves in shaping the options and decisions of government."

Cook's Reasoning:

1. Making news has become more and more important to members and to the media.

2. Members use the media

-- to provide publicity to help them get reelected,

-- in actual policymaking,

-- to gain prestige and power within Congress,

-- to shape the legislative agenda as well as public opinion

3. The media uses members of Congress in generating the news.

Significance:

1. Media Dependence on Congress

-- Good relations with Congress helps ensure inside information, but congressional staff can manipulate the translation of complex concepts into a form appropriate for the TV age.

-- This helps explain (a) relatively greater media attention to incumbents; and (b) the fact that, more often than not, this attention tends to be sympathetic or favorable, thereby adding to the incumbency effect.

2. Effect on Lawmaking:

-- Bargaining, negotiation and compromise become more difficult when the press is always watching;

-- The range of perspectives and the scope of debate narrows: "Washington news gathering. . .is an interaction among elites. . .One elite reports on another elite."

Sample Question

Cook argues that:

a) Members of Congress depend on the media

b) the media depends on members of Congress

c) both A and B

d) the media's reporting of the news is insulated from Congressional influence

52. Norman Ornstein

The New Republican Congress

Main Argument:

* Norman Ornstein suggests that the Republicans' return to power in both houses of Congress injects contemporary politics with exciting uncertainties.

Ornstein's Reasoning:

1. Events at the outset of the Republicans' majority tenure in Congress indicate the rough path ahead for the Gingrich-led "revolution": these include:

-- controversies surrounding Gingrich; -- delays in the Senate due to decentralization and individualism.

2. Ornstein suggests several issues that need to be addressed in watching the course of the new Congress:

-- The prospects for continued Republican control in the future;

-- popular opinions about the results of the Republican Congress: are Republicans better off if they succeed, or does failure raise their prospects of regaining the White House in 1996?

-- The relationship between the Republican Congress and a Democratic President: do compromises across parties, leading to the passage of new policies, signal success or auger failure for future Republican (and Democratic) prospects?

-- The relationship between a House and a Senate both controlled by the Republicans: do personality conflicts and institutional differences promise high tension between the two houses?

-- The future of independent and third-party candidacies in the near future: would Republican failures encourage new efforts to succeed outside the two major parties? Would Republican success dampen the fires that drove Ross Perot's candidacy in 1992?

Sample Question

In assessing the prospects of the new Republican Congress, Norman Ornstein suggests that we watch:

a) the House's relationship with the Senate

b) Congress' relationship with the President

c) how successes or failures resonate with public opinion

d) all of the above

53. Richard F. Fenno, Jr.

If, As Ralph Nader Says, Congress Is 'the Broken Branch", How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?

Main Argument: Polls show that the public holds Congress in low esteem; polls also show that voters tend to like their individual representatives more than they like the institution as a whole.

* Fenno argues that this is because a double standard exists in judging the institution and its members.

Fenno's Reasoning:

Fenno offers 3 reasons which help explain the answer to the public's split attitudes:

(1) "[W]e apply different standards of judgment, those that we apply to the individual being less demanding than those we apply to the institution."

-- For the individual, we think in terms of "representing" us (attention to local concerns, trust, good character, style, very general policy preferences, casework).

-- For the institution, we think in terms of primary responsibility for unsolved national problems. Also, public moods about the institution can change over time. While we sometimes want Congress to go along with or at least cooperate with the President, we also want Congress to check or counter-balance the President.

(2) These different standards reflect the fact that members of Congress "for their own reasons, spend a good deal more time and energy polishing and worrying about their individual performance than they do working at the institution=s performance."

-- Fenno posits three types of incentives held by members-- these are oriented toward the individual, not the institution:

(a) reelection (which is not always dominant)

(b) power in the body

(3) Hence, when "members think institutionally--as, of course, they must--they think in terms of a structure that will be most congenial to the pursuit of their individual concerns [the three types of individual incentives]. . .For these reasons, the members naturally think in terms of a very fragmented, decentralized institution, providing a maximum of opportunity for individual performance, individual influence, and individual credit.@ Congress' internal mechanisms are therefore very difficult to understand from the outside, and this helps explain public disenchantment.

Significance:

1. A more detailed or nuanced understanding can help us be more careful about what Congress' problems are and about how they might be solved. This leads to an analysis of the committee system, "the epitome of fragmentation and decentralization."

2. Following his three types of individual incentives, Fenno posits three types of committees:

(a) reelection

(b) power

3. Efforts at Congressional reform will have to harness individual incentives in the pursuit of institutional performance.

Sample Question

Fenno suggests that Congress:

a) and individual members are judged by different standards

b) is held in higher esteem than individual politicians

c) is too complex and must be restructured

d) is out of alignment with the incentives of members

54. Nelson W. Polsby

Congress-Bashing for Beginners

Main Argument:

* "Congress-bashing" depends to a very large extent on "whose ox is being gored." One strong motivation for Congress-bashing is substantive (ideological) disagreement with what Congress is doing. Liberals bashed Congress a generation or two ago, and now conservatives do it more.

Polsby's Concern:

1. Political disagreement ought not to lead to fooling around with the constitutional framework, especially devices central to the separation of powers.

2. Three such bad reform ideas are (1) the item veto and (2) term limitations (both would undermine the separation of powers, giving even more power over to the Executive); and (3) limits on congressional salaries.

Sample Question

According to Polsby, the line-item veto:

a) would limit congressional salaries

b) should be given only to state governors

c) would eliminate porkbarrel spending and other waste

d) would undermine Congressional perogatives under the Constitution

55. Richard Morin and David S. Broder

Why Americans Hate Congress

Main Argument:

* The public is more suspicious and skeptical of Congress than it was even a decade ago.

Morin and Broder's Reasoning:

1. Relying on survey data, Morin and Broder demonstrate that even though respondents continue to support their individual representatives more than Congress as a whole, support even for incumbents continues to decline.

2. The major cause of dissatisfaction is the perception of "partisanship" in Congress. Dissatisfaction increases among more informed survey respondents.

Sample Question

According to Morin and Broder, what do Americans hate most about Congress?

a) partisanship

b) complexity of issues

c) influence of PAC money

d) tenure of officeholders

56. David Mayhew

Congress: The Electoral Connection

Main Argument:

* For Mayhew, reelection is the paramount or overriding objective of members of Congress. Mayhew states: "Whether they are safe or marginal, cautious or audacious, congressmen must constantly engage in activities related to reelection."

Mayhew's Typology of Activities:

Members of Congress find it "electorally useful" to engage in three types of activities:

(1) Advertising: creating favorable name-recognition in messages having little to do with issues.

(2) Credit claiming: taking credit for causing the government to do something that constituents like. This is done by generating "particularized benefits", usually through casework or porkbarreling.

(3) Position taking: taking a stand on an issue. While the best or safest form of position taking is usually to go with what has worked in the past, a member facing a strong challenge may choose to be innovative.

Sample Question

According to Mayhew, members of Congress are most interested in:

a) advertising

b) credit-claiming

c) position-taking

d) reelection

57. Richard F. Fenno, Jr.

Home Style and Washington Career

Main Argument:

* Members of Congress need to be attentive both to their constituents and to politics in Washington.

Fenno notes two potentially competing orientations for members:

(1) "Home style": a focus on constituents, directing the member's attention to the local district or state. Here, the member is concerned with the reelection incentive.