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MAFSC COURSE 33/2004

COMD 4 EX 1

EX WIRA GAGAH

WW2 – MALAYA: BATTLE OF JITRA 1941

INTRODUCTION

  1. This service paper is a battle study of Jitra in the Malayan Campaign 1941 to 1942. Malayan campaign is major land operations conducted by Japanese forces as part of World War II(WW II). Jitra Line is the most forward British defence positions to counter the Japanese invasion. The Battle of Jitra became significant as Jitra Line was overwhelmed by the Japanese in less than 36 hours instead of the two months its planners had hoped that it could withstand.
  2. This paper would examine the importance of the battle in Jitra to the history of the WW II in our country. This is because Jitra was Malaya’s first lineof defence and it was a line, which supposed to remain standing for three months, but it fell in just in three days. Its failure had allowed the Japanese to push through the Peninsula and reach Singapore in 60 days.
  3. The occupation of Kuala Lumpur on the other hand, was completely ahead of schedule on 11 January 1942 instead of the planned 14/15 January 1942. However their arrival in Johore went according to plan on 31 January 1942. If Jitra could be held for at least two months, then Japanese plans would have been held back and Singapore would not have fallen so soon.

AIM

4. This paper was aimed to identify and analyse the planning, execution and lesson learnt from the battle including relationships between command and control, application of principle of war and logistic application on both forces.

SCOPE

5.The scope of this paper will be as follows:

  1. Background.
  2. The Japanese Invasion of Malaya.
  3. Japanese Strategy.
  4. British Strategy.
  5. Analyses of the Battle.

(1)Japanese Success.

(2)Weakness of British Strategy.

  1. Lesson Learnt.
  2. Conclusion.

BACKGROUND

6.In 1938, Japan devised a plan for establishing a “New Order” in Asia. It said that the time had come for the Europeans and Americans to be expelled and for the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity to be put into operation. In reality, it meant Japan gaining control of Asia and exploiting Asian raw materials for its own use. By 1941, the Japanese had concluded that they needed to take military action to win the raw materials of Asia.On 8 December 1941, the Japanese declared war on the United States of America and Britain. Japan began by attacking PearlHarbour. Meanwhile in the Asian region the Japanese leader, Lt General Yamashita, Commander of 25th Japanese Army Battle group, headed an army of 60,000 Japanese officers and men left Indo-China in 18 transport ships for Thailand.

7.The other force of more than 500 fighter bombers under command of Lt General Sugawara from Japanese Air Force 3rd Group based in Indo-China also took-off for Malaya.

JAPANESE INVASION OF MALAYA

8.Midnight of 7 December 1941, Japan began its invasion of the Malay Peninsula from the East Coast. The invasion force landed at Singora, Pattani and Kota Bharu. The 25th Army consisting of 3 Infantry Divisions of 60,000 men, a tank group of 80 medium and 100 light tanks, a strong artillery group and 450 planes. To meet the special requirement imposed by the Malaya terrain, additional heavy engineer elements including several units specifically organized and equipped to replace and repair bridges, were allocated.

9.At 0050 hours8 December 1941, troops from the 15th and 18th Divisions began landing in Singora and Patani, respectively. The invasion force given the task of invading Kelantan landed at Kota Bharu on 8 December 1941. This force, the Japanese Army's 5th Division was commanded by Lt Gen Takaro Matsui. In Singora, the Japanese were allowed to land safely by Thai’s authority and made preparations for their advance across the Malayan border. The Japanese troops were faced by 88,000 British troops, made up of the 9th and the 11th Indian Infantry Divisions and the Australian Army's 8th Division.

10.In the afternoon of December 8, 1941, the 6th and the 15th Brigade of Japanese Army moved into Jitra to take their defensive positions. The British tried to deter the Japanese Army movement by moving across the border into Thailand. Among the troops sent towards Thailand were two companies from the 1/8 Punjab Regiment, which was supposed to be a reserve battalion. The British also sent its air defence force to bomb the landing Japanese army.

11.On 9 December 1941, Japanese Air Force 3rd Group attacked air bases in the north of the Peninsula. The Japanese air attacks caused great psychological pressure to the British troops. The Japanese air force was already in command of the air in north Malaya and hence could provide the air support necessary for the Japanese Army's advance to the south.

12.Meanwhile, to the north of Thai border, Lt Col Saeki, with a tank detachment, assisted by a reconnaissance force, raced south to counter the British force from Changlun. The battle between these two forces took place during the night of 10 December . The British troops in the northern and Perlis were forced to withdraw to Jitra. During their retreat, the British Army demolished many small bridges along the Jitra-Kodiang road.The Japanese crossed the Malayan border unopposed on 10 December 1941. The Japanese 25th Army deployment in the Malayan Campaign as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The 25th Japanese Army Deployment in Malayan Campaign

JAPANESE STRATEGY

13.Use of Air Power.Japanese had greater air strength compared to the British. This gave the Japanese the advantage in giving air protection for the speedy movement of the troops. They had fully utilised the concept of air power envisioned by famous air power strategist; Mitchell and Douhet. The sank of two British ships (Repulse and Wales) showed the victory of Japanese air power.

14.Use of Tank.The use of tank in the battle gave the Japanese with speed and protection during attack against British. The visit by General Yamasita to German in Feb, 1941 had brought the idea of using the mechanised and armoured forces in the war.

15.Use of Fire Power.The Japanese made full use of its artillery units in providing fire power that were proven in destroying the British defence. This strategist had been used by Napoleon, Liddle Hart and other great thinkers.

16.Rapid Advance.The Japanese used special unique tactics as shown in Figure 2 that enabled its troop move rapidly and uninterrupted momentum. They took advantage of the fading light of dusks and of heavy rain. This surprised and demoralized the British. This tactic was envisioned by Sun Tzu that war must be won in the most shortest time in order to keep the cost of war under control.

Figure 2: The Japanese Unique Tactics

17.Combined Arm Concept.The Japanese sent as its front line force, a joint force under the command of Lt Col Saeki. In history books, this force was referred to Saeki Detachment. This detachment had a strength of 500 made up of:

a.One company of Light Armoured Unit.

b.One company of Light Tank Unit.

c.Two companies of motorized cavalry.

d.Two mountain guns.

e.A platoon of Engineers.

f.A section of signallers.

g.A section of Medical Unit.

The strength of Japanese invading forces compared to British forces as per Annex A.

BRITISH STRATEGY

18.Technically, British did not leave Singapore defenceless. In fact, evidence showed that Britain developed Singapore as a fortress. This fortress was capable of sheltering the entire British fleet[1]. The planning for the base was carried out in the belief that if there were to be any naval assault,[2]Singapore would be defended.

19.On August 1941, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke Popham formulated a plan by considering the possibility of occupying part of Isthmus of Kra. The narrow land of Isthmus of Kra posed certain advantages to his plan. He believed that by advancing into the Southern of Thailand, they would be able to meet the Japanese on the beaches in order to forestall their advancement to Singgora and Pattani. The Matador Plan was formulated based on this assumption.[3]

20.The task of executing the plan was shouldered by Major General Murray Lyon's of 11th Indian Div. It was his primary responsibility that the Matador Plan would be a success. At the same time, the 6th Brigade and 15th Brigade were instructed to concentrate their utmost force in Northern Kedah so that if there was a need to either strike onto Singgora or occupy a defensive position south of border at Jitra to protect Alor Setar airfield, they would be ready. The 15th Brigade at Kroh and a battalion drawn from Penang were to made up a column called Krohcol in order to protect their east flank and important task to hold Pattani - Kroh line and occupy position called "The Ledge".

21.Jitra was not a good location to be occupied in order to conduct a defensive battle. However, being the only tactical location that could be used to defence Alor Setar airfield, Jitra was nevertheless nominated. The plan consisted of two approaches toward Jitra; Singgora road and the road coming down from North West. Major Gen D.M Murray Lyon decided to take on two brigades; the III Corps Reserve, and the 28th Brigade commanded by Brigadier Carpendale. In support of this operation were two batteries of the 155th Field Regiment, a battery of the 22nd Mountain Regiment and three batteries of the 80th Anti-Tank Regiment. Finally, the division was deployed into Jitra on the evening of the 8th December1941.

22.On the right, the 15th Brigade was responsible for about a quarter of the Jitra distance. The Brigade was to cover jungle, swamps, and flooded paddy field and rubber estates. To the left, 6th Brigade was stretched thinly along the rest of the line, most of which consisted of deep swamp, with a single battalion extended some 5 1/2 miles inland from the coast. Of the two forward battalions, the 15th Brigade, the 2/9 Jats Regiments was extended to the right flank of the position to a point exclusive the main road.

23.On the left was the 1st Leicester, whose front included both the main road and Perlis roads. West of the latter they linked up with the 2nd East Surrey Regiment, the right battalion of the 6th Brigade whose front included the wooded Pisang salient forward of the Alor Changlih canal. On their left, 2/16 Punjab Regiment was responsible for the whole front from the railway to the sea. It had a permanent position on the railway and coast only and patrolled the several miles of paddy and marsh, which were joined together. The remaining battalion of the 15th Brigade, the 1/14 Punjab, had the role of delaying the enemy between the frontier and Asun and of occupying an outpost position at Asun, subsequently coming into brigade reserve. The outpost position of the 6th Brigade at Kampong Imam on the Perlis road was to be held by the reserve battalion, the 1/8 Punjab Regiment less two company which, had been sent forward into Thailand to make contact and delay the enemy. Several batteries of artilleries were to provide support; the 28th Brigade from the 3rd Corps, released to Murray Lyon when Matador was called off, was put as divisional reserve at Ipoh[4]. Order of battle for 11th British Indian Division is shown at Annex B. As a whole Gen Murray Lyons had put up an area defence with two brigades occupying Jitra line cover the road from Changlun and Perlis to Alor Star including the railway line on the left. British troops disposition are shown at Annex C.

JAPANESE SUCCESS

24.Prior to the invasion on Malaya, Japanese had taken seriously prepared the ground for their invading force. These included the following:

a.Intelligence Gathering. The Research Department of Japanese Army had been formed up in Taiwan, taken over the task of reconnoitring all the enemy territories which will be invaded in the southern regions. The brain behind the planning and preparation into Malaya was Colonel Tsuji Masanobu by forming up the Doro Nawa Unit.[5] The unit was to accumulate the latest information on enemy military formation, equipment, weapons, medicine, supply and geographical situation. Close air recce also been conducted on Oct 1941 as far as Kota Bahru and Alor Setar and then continued until Taiping. Within six months that had been allotted, they succeed to get all information required and start to plan how to against British in Malaya.[6]

b.Rehearsal. The Japanese Army put emphasis on training and rehearsal. It was conducted at HainanIsland where an amphibious landing was launched. The training covered an area quite similar to Malaya and Thailand within a thousand kilometres which is the same distance from Thailand to Singapore and the training was carried out as nearly as possible under war condition.[7]

c.High Morale of Troop. The Japanese were trained and quick to improvise, fiercely brave and bitterly cruel. Japanese saw herself as fighting for her very existence, for without the oil her factories would grind to a halt and she would die. She also saw herself as the vanguard of the rest of Asia against the old colonial power. On both counts, the morale of her troops was high and their purpose to enter the war was clearly explained to their troops.[8]

25.During the Battle of Jitra, Japanese Army had succeeded to take a lot of advantages to them and make highly consideration to use the principles of war and basic consideration of advance and attack as the followings:

a.Surprise. The principle ingredient in the Japanese victory was the element of surprise. The breakthrough of the Jitra line was due to penetration tactics which is to deploy by night one battalion to assault from front and simultaneously one battalion to envelop into the rear of the enemy defence position. The Japanese also make use of medium and light tanks which are the British had appreciated that the Malaya terrain is not suitable for tank mobility.[9]

b.Offensive Action. Offensive action remained at the extreme and they kept on exploiting the chances without losing time. The tank commander was given the freedom of action to employ their resources to the best of their ability in order to achieve speed and shock action. The result from the first engagement lead by tank at Asun was the captured of a marked British map which shown in detail the British defence disposition vicinity of Changlun and Jitra.[10]

c.Air Support. The Japanese enjoy the air superiority over Malaya by four to one. The Japanese fighters and bombers had almost unobtrusive command of the skies and easy access to ground targets. The air superiority is the most important influence for Japanese to achieve speed to their land forces move to the south.

d.Maintenance of Morale. The Japanese commanders and soldiers were exposed by superior training, previous war experience, a high degree of discipline and morale, highly motivated and clearly given the aim of the war that they will be involved. The constant rotation of forward force and the little casualties also help to maintain their high morale.

e.Security. The Japanese kept their plan and strategy secret and they only revealed their plan at the last moment of the operation. They also deploy forward the security elements while their main body still conducting the landing at Singora and along the way their advance to south in order to gain information and provide early warning about the enemy actions.

26.Other factors which helped in the Japanese success were as follows:

a.Tactical Manoeuvre. The Japanese were well prepared and trained for night attack, close combat and use of penetration tactic by tanks. A post mortem of the Jitra battle conducted by the Japanese concluded if it had not been for these three, they would have taken more time and suffered more casualties to breakthrough the three layers defence position at Jitra line.

b.Good Leadership. The commander of the Japanese Army for Malaya was General Tomoyaki Yamashita, a bold and dependable commander noted for this determination, vision and courage. He was assisted by a group of soldiers that equally dedicated and experience in all levels of command.[11]

c.Previous War Experience. The 5th Division, composed of specially selected troops, previous war experience, fought heroically in China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905) had influenced their well disciplined and high morale. Its officers and men took precedence in battle and were brimming with self confidence.[12]

d.Decentralised Command. In order to maintain the momentum of advance, decentralised command had been heavily practiced during their operations. Ground commanders had been given freedom of action to decide form of action to be undertaken without referring to the next higher commanders.[13]

WEAKNESSES OF BRITISH STRATEGY.