Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)
Relevant Case Facts:
Escobedo was arrested for the murder of his brother-in-law. The police attempted to interrogate him, but Escobedo made no statement and was released. A week later, DiGerlando, in custody for the same crime, told the police that Escobedo had committed the murder. This time the police arrested Escobedo and his sister. At the police station Escobedo asked to see his attorney, but the police refused. His attorney came to the station, and repeatedly asked to see his client, but he was denied access. Instead, the police questioned Escobedo for fourteen and a half hours, until he made damaging statements. He was found guilty of murder.
Legal Question: Does the refusal by police to allow petitioner to consult with his lawyer during interrogation constitute a denial of the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment?
Holding: Yes. By a vote of 5-4 the Court ruled in favor of Escobedo.
Reasoning:
- When the petitioner requested and was denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of an unsolved crime. The petitioner had become the accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to “get him” to confess his guilt despite his constitutional right not to do so.
- Escobedo was clearly unaware that under Illinois law an admission of mere complicity in the murder plot was legally as damaging as an admission of firing the fatal shots. What happened at the interrogation could certainly affect the whole trial because rights, if not then and there asserted, may be irretrievably lost.
- We have learned the lesson of history . . . that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the confession will in the long run be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer he will become aware of and exercise his constitutional rights.
- Where an investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular subject, the suspect has been taken into custody, the police carry out an interrogation that lends itself to eliciting criminal statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with a lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Dissent (White, Clark, and Stewart):
This decision is another major step in the direction of the goal which the Court seemingly has in mind to bar from evidence all admissions obtained from an individual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made or not. . . . I reject this step an invitation to go farther which the Court has now issued. The right to counsel now not only entitles the accused to counsel’s advice and aid in preparing for trial, but stands as an impenetrable barrier to any interrogation once the accused becomes a suspect. From that very moment his right to counsel apparently attaches, a rule that is unworkable and impossible to administer unless police cars are equipped with public defenders.
Terry v. Ohio (1968)
Relevant Case Facts:
While patrolling in plain clothes, Officer McFadden observed two men he had never seen before. He saw them pace along the street and pause in front of the same store twenty-four times. After each pass they conferred, and the officer also saw a third man join the two briefly. Thinking the men were casing the store for a robbery, McFadden approached them and identified himself as a police officer. He asked them to identify themselves, and Terry mumbled something inaudible. The office then spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing and found a gun in his overcoat pocket. He also found a gun on one of the other men and arrested them on concealed weapons charges.
Legal Question: Is it always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest?
Holding: No. By a vote of 8-1 the Court ruled in favor of Ohio.
Reasoning:
1.We first must establish when the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant. There is some suggestion that stops and frisks are outside of the purview of the Fourth Amendment because they do not rise to the level of a search or a seizure. However, it must be recognized that a person is seized whenever he or she is restricted from walking away. Thus the Fourth Amendment comes into play even in the slightest search and seizure instance. Here, there is no question that the officer seized the petitioner and subjected him to a search. As such, we must determine if these actions were reasonable.
2.Because there is no ready test for reasonableness, we balance the need to search (the government interest) against the invasion it entails. One government interest is crime prevention. It is this interest that underlies the recognition that an officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person to investigate criminal activity even though there is no probable cause for an arrest. Based on the facts we have before us, the officer’s investigation was appropriate.
3.The question, however, is whether Officer McFadden could also invade Terry’s personal security. The officer clearly has an interest in his own safety. We cannot blind ourselves to the need for officers to protect themselves from violent situations. They need not be certain that a person is armed; they only need determine whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would believe that his safety or that of others was in danger.
Concurring (Harlan):
The search here was justified only because the circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to prevent or investigate a crime.
Dissenting (Douglas):
We must adhere to the probable cause standard. This is the only line that draws a reasonable distinction between an officer’s mere inkling and the presence of facts within the officer’s personal knowledge that would convince a reasonable man that a seized person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular crime. We enter a new regime if the police can simply search and seize a person because they do not like the cut of his jib.
Dickerson v. United States (2000)
Relevant Case Facts:
After Miranda v. Arizona was decided, Congress passed a law to blunt its effect. The law stated that any confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. In short, confessions are admissible even if Miranda warnings are not given. The Justice Department never made use of the law because it thought it was unconstitutional. However, in 1999 it was resurrected by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Dickerson was picked up and questioned about a robbery, without the issuance of Miranda warnings. There was also a dispute whether he was apprised of these warnings before a second interview. The statements led officers to search his apartment, and additional evidence was seized.
Legal Question: May Congress overturn Miranda v. Arizona, a constitutional decision, with a statute that limits this decision’s applicability?
Holding: No. By a vote of 7-2 the Court ruled in favor of Dickerson.
Reasoning:
- First, we decline to overrule Miranda and its progeny, and hold that these cases govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.
- Congress does not have the power to supersede Miranda. The law in this area is clear, as the Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts and may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedures that are binding in those tribunals. However, the power to judicially create and enforce nonconstitutional rules of procedure and evidence for federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant act of Congress.
- Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. We need not go further than Miranda to decide this case. Whether we agree with its decision or not, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now. Indeed, it has become imbedded in routine police practice to the point where warnings have now become part of our national culture. If anything Miranda’s progeny have reaffirmed its core principles even if they have limited its impact.
Dissent (Scalia and Thomas):
Miranda’s progeny have undermined its doctrinal underpinnings, denying it constitutional authority. Today’s judgment converts Miranda from a milestone of judicial overreaching to the very Cheops’ Pyramid of judicial arrogance. In imposing a court-made code on the states, the original opinion at least asserted that it was demanded by the Constitution. Today’s decision does not pretend that it is – and yet still asserts the right to impost it against the will of the people’s representatives in Congress.