Eggs in both baskets? Explaining individual multiple office-holding in Belgian assemblies.
Nicolas Van de Voorde, UGent, Centre for Local Politics
Nicolas.vandevoorde(at)ugent.be
Abstract
This paper investigates possible mechanisms to explain why members of parliament complement their national or regional office with a position at the local level. Existing research primarily focussed on comparative and aggregate country-specific explanations, while leaving individual mechanisms untouched. We propose that the institutional opportunity structure and personal incentive might stimulate or discourage the practice. We collected data from all Belgian members of parliament between 1995 and 2014 in order to perform multiple logistic regressions. The results show that both incentives influence individual politicians to a certain degree, but do so more effectively for mayor-MPs. Finally, the potential hindrances do not dissuade the practice which demonstrates that the expected electoral opportunities for both party and individual are indispensable to explain its frequency.
Introduction
This contribution aims to explain multiple office-holding based on individual level data. We argue that both the institutional opportunity structure and personal characteristics might incentivize politicians to accumulate political mandates. Institutionally, we expect the region, municipal context and the organizational strength of the political party to influence the likelihood of holding two mandates. Second, national and local experience might facilitate acquiring or maintaining both.
Multiple office-holding, or the French cumul des mandats, ascribes the simultaneous exercise of at least two directly elected political mandates (Navarro, 2009).We only focus on the vertical type which implies a combination of directly elected representative functions along several levels of government and disregard the horizontal type of multiple office-holding[1]. More specifically, in this Belgian case study multiple office-holding always entails the combination of seat in the national or regional assembly with one elected municipal mandate, therefore we will use the term dual mandate-holding interchangeably.
This phenomenon however does not invoke much international academic attention. François and Navarro (2013a, p. 15) contribute the lack of a global theoretical framework around cumul to the engaged French literature, without empirical assessments. This academic apathy is somewhat surprising. First of all, because the phenomenon is not a French or Belgian peculiarity. On the contrary, cumul is effectively practiced in at least 16 West-European countries (Navarro, 2013). Secondly, research on multiple office-holding could provide a valuable addition to several theoretical strands. It could contribute to the recruitment and selection of political candidates, and therefore in understanding the mechanisms of political careers (Pilet & Fiers, 2013). Cumul is also an attribute to characterize intergovernmental relation, and more specifically the link between the centre and its subordinate authorities (Goldsmith & Page, 2010). In another application, Mueller (2013) uses it to better comprehend Swiss federalism. Lastly, there are important negative side effects to consider, such as a power concentration in the hands of a small elite, a conflict of interests, the incongruence of two workloads etc. Existing literature focusses on describing the degree of dual mandate-holding (Caille, 2000; Knapp, 1991) and its evolution (Bach, 2011). Recently the literature shifted toward potential consequences, predominantly to electoral effects (Foucault, 2006; François, 2006; Ragouet & Phélippea, 2013).
However, what we continue to lack is understanding the basic mechanisms of multiple office-holding. Authors tried to explain why multiple office-holding is ubiquitous in France, while completely absent in similar countries (Boudon, 2010; Caille, 2000; Navarro, 2009). Therefore, an aggregated comparative framework was more appropriate. However, with the exception of Dewoghélaëre (2006), there have not been efforts in explaining individual level variations. This paper focusses on this question: why does a politician accumulate multiple offices? What stimulates or discourages a member of parliament to attain a local position? We propose two possible mechanisms, institutional and individual incentives, to affect whether someone combines two offices. Quantitative data based on official records will be employed to assess the impact of both. We composed a dataset of all Belgian national and regional MPs between 1995 and 2014 and furthermore we will differentiate between three types of cumul, i.e. the councillor-, alderman- and mayor-MP combination for a fine-grained analysis.
A particular tradition
In Belgium holding a local and national function at the same timeis extremely widespread, partly because legal restrictions are modest. There is a broad variety of opportunities for representatives, who wish to accumulate two elected mandates. For example, all municipal councillors, aldermen and mayors,are allowed to reside in the regional or federal parliament. Councillors are even allowed to have a national executive function. On the contrary, if aldermen or mayors accept a ministerial office, they will be replaced in their locality. They do not actually have to resign but keep their function ‘in title’ and can be reinstalled once their national term has ended.The Walloon regional parliament has recently voted an exception to this general rule. In the 2010 they accepted a new decree that severely restricts the possibilities to combine political mandates. Starting in 2014, three quarters of each parliamentary fraction will not be allowed to practice a local executive function, both aldermen and mayor. One quarter with the highest penetration rate, the highest proportion of individual votes within their constituency, can keep both functions (Dodeigne & Vandeleene, 2013). Previous research has shown that the effect will only be visible after the next regional elections in 2018. Due to a transition period representatives are allowed to keep their local executive function in title and are not considered cumulards. Also, members of the provincial council, the second governmental tier, are prohibited to exercise any regional or national function and will therefore be excluded from our analysis.Thirdly, regional MP’s cannot simultaneously hold a federal mandate and vice versa. To conclude, all Belgian local representatives may exercise any supralocal legislative function with some restrictions in the Walloon parliament. They are also allowed to take on a ministerial office, but then a special mechanism is implemented.
Our study entails the entire period between the first direct elections of the regional parliaments in 1995 and the most recent coinciding elections of 2014. We included five Belgian parliaments in our analysis (see data and methods for further information). Figure 1 shows that multiple office-holding is the norm in all of them. On an aggregated level 70.86% of the national and regional MPs have a second local mandate. 35.71% simultaneously exercises the function of municipal councillor, 15.64% is alderman and 19.31% mayor. On the one hand, the general phenomenon is widespread in every parliament. Only the federal senate has proportionally less multiple-officeholders, probably because its limited decision-making power and functional scope. On the other hand, the frequency of the specific local function varies among parliaments. The Flemish and Brussels houses have the highest amount of municipal councillors and a limited number of mayors, whereas the federal and Walloon counterparts have proportionally more local executives. The proportion of cumulards only varies slightly throughout our reference period. In line with previous research (Ackaert, 1994; Fiers, 2001; Put, Smulders, & Maddens, 2014), there is a small but steady growth. Between 1995 and 2014 the percentage of multiple office-holders increased from 69.4% to 80.6%.This development conforms to the gradual growth since the early sixties. For example, in 1961 already 62% of the national MP’s had a local mandate. That positive trend continues to this day. Even more, the contemporary assemblies show the utmost number of dual mandate-holders ever recorded.
Figure 1.Percentage of multiple office holders in five Belgian parliaments between 1995 and 2015 (N = 2512)
Multiple office-holding is not confined to Belgium alone. Similar proportions have been measured in France, where the phenomenon is believed to originate, Finland, Luxemburg and Hungary (Bach, 2011; François & Navarro, 2013b; Sandberg, 2013; Várgnage, 2012). Around three quarters of the national MPs in those countries simultaneously exercise a local function. Even more, a double mandate is allowed in 13 other European countries such as Sweden, Germany of Spain, but is more marginally practiced (Navarro, 2013).
Is multiple office-holding country specific? An aggregated view.
International research was dominantly preoccupied with the question why cumul des mandats is so apparent in France (François & Navarro, 2013a)? That approach demands an aggregated perspective. The French political system, where double mandates thrive, was compared to several other countries. These efforts contributed the frequency in France to several typical characteristics of its political system (François & Navarro, 2013b; Knapp, 1991; Mény, 1992a). On the contrary, this paper will try to explain individual-level dual mandate-holding to answer the question why do Belgian MPs accumulate political functions? We argue that the incentives to combine offices varies based on the institutional opportunity structure and individual characteristics. First, we will briefly discuss some results of aggregated perspective. Thereafter, we continue with the individual perspective and work towards our own explanatory model.
In the comparative perspective, scholars traditionally pointed towards three explanations. Cumul des mandats is most prominently exercised in France due to its political culture, territorial organization and the strength of political parties. First, the French political culture is expected to stimulate the level of cumul. The culture is an expression of patriarchal power, a heritage from the Ancient Régime (Mény, 1992b). This idea persists until today, only now the power is not monopolized by the monarch but concentrated among a small accumulating elite. This thèse culturaliste has been disproven on several occasions.On the one hand the population does not tolerate the praxis, and on the other hand countries that share a similar culture do not share a similar degree of cumulards(François & Navarro, 2013b).
Other scholars contended that the territorial organization results in an extensive practice of cumul. More precisely the combination of a centralized state, strong local fragmentation and limited local autonomy leads to more cumul(Knapp, 1991). The centralized Jacobin state dominates its more than 36.000 communes (Knapp & Wright, 2006). Not surprisingly, local authorities have few competences and weak autonomy, consequently local politicians receive little to no prestige. A local mandate is a mere stepping stone, a necessary point of departure for a political career in the traditional cursus honorum. Dewoghélaëre (2006) nuanced the effect of centralization and found that the more autonomous French regions did not have significantly less dual mandates.
Third, the organizational weakness of French political parties was presumed to encourage strong local figures to take up a national mandate(Knapp, 1991; Mény, 1992a). Theoretically, parties are expected to oppose multiple office-holding. For example, cumul interferes with political renewal, cumulards are less active in parliament and more preoccupied with their own local interests (Bach, 2011; Cirone, 2015). Also, a local notable can monopolize all local power and resources, leaving the national party with less potential to discipline them in parliament (Knapp, 1991, p. 33). When political parties however lack the ability to control their membersor MPs. Given that there are no consequences, the latter has little incentive not to combine several offices.Dewoghélaëre and colleagues (2006)support this hypothesis and demonstrate that the strongest French parties indeed dissuade multiple office-holding.
Other institutional factors might also influence the degree of accumulation. Restrictive legislation on multiple office-holding is an obvious limitation. However, Navarro(2013) argues that regulation might not be as important as assumed. For example, the highest level of cumulards are found both in countries with a partial ban (like France or Belgium) and countries without any restrictions (like Finland or Luxemburg). The opportunity structure, often interpreted as the structure of local government or the number of local positions, can also enhance accumulation (Sandberg, 2013). Both factors increase the opportunities to combine several offices. Plenty local positions, potentially spread out over multiple local tiers, positively relates to accumulation (Navarro, 2009)Lastly, electoral systems emphasizing individualization are conceived more sensitive to multiple office-holding.For example, voters are expected to be more ideological orientated in list systems and consider party cues, whereas in single-member districts personal qualities prevail. Voting systems where the party in central office is powerful will have a limited number of dual mandate-holders because parties oppose the practice(Dewoghélaëre et al., 2006; Navarro, 2009).
The explanatory framework
The comparative perspective reveals determinants of multiple office-holding on the macro level. Yet,all efforts fail to understand why institutional similar countries do not share a comparable degree of cumul. For example, several West-European countries have a strong centralized state and a fragmented local government with ample competences and weak autonomy. Southern countries like Greece, Spain or Italy come to mind, but none of them shares a similar level of cumul(Navarro, 2013). However, this paper focusses on members of national and regional parliaments and aims to explain why individuals, and not countries, combine several directly elected mandates. We believe politicians are guided by institutional stimuli and individual incentives.
Institutional opportunity structure
Political actors surely are influenced by the institutional setting they work in.In the same way, certain institutional factors will assist or hinder politicians to combine mandates. First, we expect regional variation. For example, regional variation can be expected here. Although the Belgium state is divided between three communities and three regions, there are multiple reasons to believe that the main difference lies between the two biggest language groups, the Dutch and the Francophones. Billiet et al. (2006) argue that the federalization process captured and institutionalized this duality, that none the less continues to dominate political life. Also, there are two cultural paradigms in looking at local democracy(Wayenberg et al., 2011). The Flemish region (Dutch-speaking) puts less emphasis on political localism compared to the Walloon or Brussels region (mostly Francophone-speaking). Both Walloon and Brussels municipalities are less autonomous due to a more conditional and ear-marked financial transfer system. As a result, they are far more dependent on the centre. Second, the Walloon mayor is also primarily perceived as a lobbyist for his municipality (Steyvers & Reynaert, 2005). Furthermore, Flemish communes can rely on a strong local interest organization to defend their interests on a supra local level (Steyvers, 2015). Consequently, local councillors from Wallonia and Brussels will be more easily drawn to the double mandate in order to represent the interests of their commune. Flemish councillors on the other hand, have alternative routes to advocacy and have more financial freedom. Time is also an important element to consider here. The competence to organize local authorities was only regionalized in 2002. Therefore, we will control whether the regional variation became more apparent after the transfer of competence in 2002.
H1: Francophone councillors will more frequently combines offices compared to Dutch councillors.
Another part of the institutional opportunity structure that might affect representatives is the municipal context. Some scholars argue that the nature of the municipal context is directional for multiple office-holding (Dewoghélaëre et al., 2006). Representatives from small municipalities could combine offices more easily compared to city representatives. This negative correlation would suggest that city councillors prefer their local mandate above the national one. A high workload and more political recognition dissuades them to pursue a national career, while councillors from smaller communes would seek out national positions. Other authors challenge the linear career development and expect a positive relation between municipal size and dual mandate-holding. They reason that national figureheads are more inclined to pursue a local position in larger communes becausethey are perceived more rewarding. For example, city councillors are attributed with increased power, resources, a larger network and a bigger national election bonus (François & Navarro, 2013a; Sandberg, 2013). This ambivalence compels us to propose rival hypotheses.
H2a:Municipal size is negatively related to multiple office-holding.
H2b: Municipal size is positively related to multiple office-holding.
Adherence to a certain political party can also increase or decrease the odds to combine offices. French scholars expect that powerful parties oppose cumul des mandats(Knapp, 1991; Mény, 1992a). A strictly organized party in central office will attempt to preserve its power. Cumulards on the other hand could potentially become powerful actors too, insofar that they would no longer need party support to get re-elected. This is a realistic possibility in single-member districts. In this scenario the balance between party and individual tips clearly in favour of the latter and the party in central office has no way to control and discipline their MPs in parliament. A politician from a weakly organized party will strive to combine as many functions, and all its benefits, as possible because there is no disadvantage. Members from strong parties on the other hand are dissuaded to accumulate. When they antagonize national party wishes, the party can punish them by lowering the chances to get re-elected. We propose to measure this organizational strength based on the control of the candidate selection process. This is even more important in a flexible list proportional system, where a position on top of the list is indispensable to get (re-)elected. A more inclusive selectorate in the candidate selection process indicates an open procedure as all party members have a say in the definitive list composition (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Pilet & Wauters, 2013). The party elite thus hands over important levers to control their representatives. Where party delegates or the party leadership composes and approves the list, the party organization keeps power into their own hands and potentially allows the leadership to discipline their MPs.