Educ 746 Final Exam1

EDUC 746 FINAL EXAM1

EDUC 746 Final Exam:

Virginia Tech and Conflict Options

Deborah Davis

Liberty University

Abstract

One bright spring day, a troubled young man put into action a deadly plan he had been manifesting for years. The nexus of the environment was ripe for the vulnerabilities of those members of the campus, and the consequences were grave. Seung-Hui Cho was an extremely quiet and apparently highly disturbed man. A Korean born immigrant who showed a high intelligence and good grades in his schooling, Cho was never a prominent figure, but a shadowy creature who stalked women, threatened his own life, and, at 23 years of age, ultimately killed 32 others before killing himself. The security and technology in place at Virginia Polytechnical Institute was unprepared for the devastation he wrought. While we may never know how or if this tragedy could have been prevented, the legacy of heightened security is one all members of any school community must deal with as well as the public legislative consequences.

Keywords: Virginia Tech, shooting spree, immigrant mental health, mental health policy, mass shootings, campus security

Virginia Tech and Conflict Options

Some of the “whys” and some of the “how comes” may never really be answered. That would be the case in any event. The events that led to tragedy on the morning of April 16, 2007 on the campus of Virginia Polytechnical Institute and State University (VA Tech) are no different in that regard. The horror of Seung-Hui Cho as a mentally disturbed young man who was distraught enough to kill himself is only compounded by the horrid things that made him kill so many others in the process. While that is one of the unanswered questions, Kalish and Kimmel (2010) suggest, “framing one’s suicide with violence and aggression may serve to make it appear a more potent act” (p. 452).

On and Off Campus Reports

Litanies of reports from the campus and beyond provide a tale of drama and horror of that day in retrospection. One website, is dedicated completely to the events of that day. Other websites, news outlets, and journals have chronicled the events and speculated on the reasons behind the events of that sorrowful day.

The New York Times report from April 16, 2007 reported that a VA Tech shooting leaves 33 dead (Hauser, 2007, n.p.). The accountancy of 33 dead was eventually determined to be 32 murdered and the suicide of the killer.

A year later, the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) released its Overview of Virginia Tech Tragedy and Implications for Campus Safety IACLEA Blueprint for safer campuses (iaclea.com, 2008, pp. 1-14). Not surprisingly, the first point given is a recommendation for all campuses to review their own security systems. The bulk of the recommendations surround the issue of communicating a threat to personnel around the campus.

The New York Times then reported mistakes made in the procedures for security at the VA Tech campus (Urbina, 2009, n.p.). These also focused around the issue of disseminating the concerns. A third version of a report was released and disseminated according to USA Today (Jones, 2010, n.p.). This third version corrected an error where a prior report indicated the President of the University had been locked in his office, which was open at all times. Also, where a prior report had indicated board members had advised their families prior to advising staff and students of the emergency, this version reflected that it was administrative workers who contacted family members, and not decision makers. The report CNN posted in December of 2010, reflect more confusion about the order and method of notifications (Mungin, 2010). This report presumes that had notifications been timelier, the thirty deaths more than two hours after the first two shootings would likely have been prevented.

The reports from the Clery Act require timely notification and reporting of security issues and concerns. While they were widely published through the public news media, and the fines varied in costs from as low as $27,500 plus $5,000 for a total of $32,500 (WJLA.com) to $48.2 million (Johnson, 2012) which was later evaluated to be the total costs of the massacre including fines, fees, upgrades, and emergency response.

For whatever the discrepancies or facts presented in the many reports, there is no doubt that Seung-Hui Cho had issues, and those issues led to tragedy.

Upbringing and Family of Origin

“He was born in South Korea and immigrated to the United States at age eight” (Kim and Dickson, 2007, p. 939).“From elementary through high school, the shooter had been known as a child who never spoke” (Kim and Dickson, 2007, p. 940). Kleinfeld (2007) reported in the New York Times that Cho was an excessively quiet child whose parents had joined in an arrangedmarriage back in Seoul. The family immigrated in 1992 to Detroit and settled in Centreville, VA where the father worked as a presser in dry cleaning. Cho was exceedingly taciturn and consequently was teased and bullied. Video games and basketball occupied his free time and girls were only a distant focus.

In 2006, at age 22,three different female students were the focus of Cho’s attention to an excessive degree – a degree that led to campus police telling him to stop bothering them. A text message to a roommate let to a review for suicidal ideation at a Psychiatric hospital (Kleinfeld, 2007). He was held overnight, and seemed to emotionally retreat even further.

Indicators of Conflict, Aggression, and Mental Instability in Seung-Hui Cho’s Life

Before seventh grade, Cho received counseling at the recommendation of his sixth grade teacher. The diagnosis was selective mutism(Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). A further analysis showed a report of severe social anxiety disorder. By the eighth grade, writings indicate a fascination with the Columbine shooting. The writing was so compelling that his teachers got his parents involved and Cho was given a psychiatric evaluation and spent about a year on antidepressants.

At college, he was quiet, and wrote constantly and secretively, submitting a book idea that was rejected near the end of his sophomore year. By October of 2005 his writing was upsetting faculty and he was taking surreptitious pictures of classmates. This behavior led to evaluation by counselors and he was advised to stop. In November and December, complaints of stalking were filed but the women declined to press charges. By mid-December he was triaged thrice by phone and finally in person where he was referred for in-patient evaluation. The intake psychiatrist determines such was unneeded, and Cho is released with follow-up suggested, but not arranged, nor medication assigned. By April of 2006, Cho was dropped from technical writing for inappropriate content. In his creative writing class, his writing was characterized as “remarkable for violence.” In the fall of 2006, his playwriting leads staff to refer him, again, for counseling, which he declines. He started purchasing firearms and ammunition in early 2007, and recorded his videos during early Spring of that year. All of this information is reported in Virginia Tech Review Panel (2007).

A third or more of those who commit suicide are seen by a mental health provider within two years (Silvermand & Berman, 2013, p. 420). Suicidal ideation is a nebulous construct, and generally a better indicator of suicide attempts than of death by suicide (ibid). Belli and Ural (2012) indicate that schizophrenia and other mental disorders are drastically higher in the population of those committing aggressive violent acts, including homicides (p. 539). However, that indicator does not necessarily indicate a direct linkage.

The severe isolationism Cho dwelt in, as evidenced by his excessively quiet nature and lack of indication may indeed be an indicator of any number of mental disorders. However, his mental health records reflect little more than a possible suicidal ideation in December 2005 that was obviated by the psychiatric review prior to admission to hospital for a complete in-patient evaluation (Leinwand, 2009).

His cognition of his actions was never in question; he knew what he was doing. Despite his video, media packets, and notes, we may never know if or how much he understood the effects of his actions. “Cho understood the power of brand establishment, evidenced by his sending between his attacks the aforementioned media packet to NBC, which contained twenty-five minutes of video, forty-three photographs in a number of violent and armed poses, as well as twenty-three pages of writing” (Kolenic, 2009, p. 1034).

FIGURE 1.Final theoretical model of serious youth aggression (Ferguson, San Miguel, & Hartley, 2009).

As seen above, Ferguson, San Miguel, and Hartley (2009) have lain out a diagram of factors that influence aggressive behavior. This drawing sets out a perceived desire to find and answer for such behavior, and while neat and tidy, it may or may not be a diagram of factual truth (Harwood, 2011). Harwood (2011) presents many examples in the writings and reports about the VA Tech shooting where the issue presented is one of connecting the disparate dots recognized by individuals to include: faculty, family, roommates, medical services, campus security, and a plethora of other individuals and agencies. Each had a piece of the puzzle, but none enough to see the whole picture. “The credible exercise of this metaphor implies two premises: firstly thatthe dots are facts, and secondly, that these facts can and must be drawntogether to detect the troubled student” (Harwood, 2011, p. 599).

Timeline of the Shooting

Apparently, Cho rose before 5 AM on the day of the shooting. His normal grooming routine proceeded – shower, shave, etc.(Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).He then went to West Ambler Johnston (WAJ) Residence Hall where he followed Emily Hirscher to her room and killed her and Resident Aide Ryan Clark, who apparently came to investigate the noise (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). After this, he returns to his dorm, closing his computer account, changing his clothes, and packaging the media kit he had previously prepared and later mailed to NBC News. By 7:30, Cho’s accounts are closed, and the VA Tech Police Department (VTPD) is aware of the first shootings. The Vice President for Student Affairs, Dr. Spencer, is notified of the murders by a housekeeper. President Steiger is notified at 8:10 by which time, the Blacksburg Police Department (BPD) has detectives on scene, the WAJ Hall is secured, and the Professional and Continuing Education Center has locked down itself(Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).

The 8 AM and 9 AM classes are held with some students advised of the shootings via casual communication and most unaware. Policy Board members did get information posted before 9 AM within the community, locking down the local public schools. By 9 AM, the Veterinary College at VA Tech is in lock down mode. When 9 AM classes are beginning, the trash pickup is cancelled by the school. The media package is time-stamped at 9:01 for mailing to the NBC News, and Cho is observed around Norris Hall between 9:15 and 9:30. At Norris Hall, of the Engineering School, the doors are chained (Cho’s fingerprints were found on the chains) and a bomb threat is found and sent to the dean’s office about 9:30. By 9:30, a broadcast email is sent to advise campus members of the shooting in WAJ hall. By 9:50, Cho has shot students and staff members in four classrooms, police officers are entering in Norris Hall through an outer door that could not be chained then blocked by an inner door that is chained, and announcements play on the loudspeakers to warn everyone to stay inside and away from windows. Cho shoots himself(Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). Cho used 174 rounds to murder 25 students, 5 faculty members, and injure 17 others.He killed himself by gunshot as the police shot their way through the chains and into the Hall (Powell & Self, 2011).

Three days later, Virginia Governor Timothy M. Kaine commissioned a panel of experts to investigate the tragedy and recommend improvements to Virginia laws, policies, procedures, systems and institutions to help prevent similar incidents in the future. The panel was officially established in June through executive order. (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007, p. 5)

Mental Health Providers

“At least one mental health professional thought he was potentially dangerous to himself, and a judge regarded him as greatly needy of even involuntary treatment” (Lipsitt, 2007, p. 8). One mental health professions was apparently not enough. Cho “might have had autism, bipolar disorder, or even schizophrenia” (Kim & Dickson, 2007, p. 940). Addressing mental health issues through retrospect is difficult at best and impossible at worst. Some would have interpreted his shyness as Asian reserve, and others did not care, but simply teased him about it. Cho did aid in the creation of a system for “intervening in the life of troubled students” (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007, p. 70).

Faculty

It is noteworthy that "as many as eight of his teachers in the [previous] 18 months had formed what one called a task force' to discuss how to handle him," and this group made at least two pleas to University officials to take action” (Reiss, 2010, p. 25). Also, “one professor considered him to be hazardous to her class” (Lipsitt, 2007, p. 8).

The head of the English Department was notified by a professor of writing that seemed to be a “veiled threat.” She was advised to drop the student or tutor him privately, and she did tutor him, but with a caution to an assistant to call security if she mentioned the name of a dead professor. Further, he wrote two excessively violent plays that were submitted for review, but no action was taken (Fernandez & Santora, 2007).

Law Enforcement

The first notice that VA Tech Police Department (VTPD) had of anything wrong was at 7:20 AM on April 16, 2007. Advised that a student may have fallen from a loft bed, an officer went to investigate at 7:24 and discovered the shooting victims, then requesting further assistance (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). By 7:30, VTPD officers were arriving at WAJ hall. By 7:51, Blacksburg Police Department (BPD) was involved and investigating. By 8AM, the Virginia State Police (VSP) were en route to aid in the investigation. Logically, VTOD and BSP soughtHirshner’s boyfriend for questioning as a person of interest.

At 9:15, Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) were staged to intervene as needed. The first 9-1-1 call from Norris Hall was received at 9:42 and officers were there by 9:45. It took a full five minutes for them to shoot through the chains and access the building. The shooting took place between 9:40 and 9:50. The last recorded shot, Cho’s suicide, was at 9:51 just as officers entered the building. By then, the body count was 32, and Cho’s suicide made 33 dead (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).

University Administration

The first person of administration who was aware of the shooting was Resident Aide (RA) Ryan Clark. He went to investigate the noise in the next room and discovered Hilscher dead, and Cho shot Clark. The time was about 7:15 (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). The next administrative note is at 7:30 when a housekeeper contacted Dr. Spencer (Associate Vice President for Student Affairs and member of the Policy Board). Dr. Spencer walked to WAJ and called Dr. Hikes (Vice President for Student Affairs). It was 8:10 before a secretary notified University President Steger (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).

Apparently by 8:45, the Policy Board knew enough to share the information, with a caution not to release the information. While Blacksburg Public Schools locked down at 8:52, there is no information about how they knew what was going on at VA Tech. While Byers (Executive Director of Government Relations) locks his doors on campus, President Steger does not. Emails to all students, faculty, and staff go out at 9:26, 9:50, 10:17, and 10:52 (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).

The administration’s post-incident activities could be a model for tragedy everywhere. That same day, classes were cancelled for the remainder of the week. A family assistance center is opened;convocation is held, and a candlelight vigil is held (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). Students were allowed, even encouraged, to grieve and to meet with counselors.

Local/State Law

Schildkraut and Hernandez (2014) stated “As a result of the failed reporting to the NICS of Cho’s temporary detention order andcourt-ordered outpatient treatment, he was not flagged when he went to purchase hisfirearms.” Under Virginia law, those voluntarily or involuntarily admitted to a hospital for mental health issues, or subject of a temporary detention order was to alert the Central Criminal Records Exchange (CCRE) which would in turn alert the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Cho fell through the cracks because his recommendation to inpatient status was usurped by the psychiatrist who deemed him not a threat to himself or others (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). A NICS Improvement Amendments Act was designed to better coordinate between state and federal agencies with an eye toward rapid handling of situations like Cho(Schildkraut & Hernandez, 2014). Again, however, Cho was inpatient for mental health only the night of December 13, 2006, prior to being screened by the psychiatrist and therefore unlikely to have been highlighted under the law to preclude purchase of firearms. Schildkraut and Hernandez (2014) posit that “Cho violated the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the Brady Law by purchasing gunsafter multiple members of the medical community had declared him mentally ill” (p. 370). While NICS would highlight those who were adjudicated as mentally ill, presuming reported according to existing legislation, there is a question requiring limiting the rights of those who experience mental illness. If, indeed, mental illness is disease, then a cure should restore rights to those otherwise limited. While not inclusive to the issue of the VA Tech shooting, this point would be appropriate for further research.