#5-552
Editorial Summary of Meetings with John Leighton Stuart,
Chou En-lai, and Yu Ta-wei
September 10–12, 1946 Nanking, China
John Leighton Stuart, September 10, 7:00 P.M.
Shortly after arriving in Kuling on September 6, Marshall reported, he told Madame Chiang Kai-shek “that the Generalissimo’s generals had a sense of false power because of U. S. equipment which they had received and that in their enthusiasm over little problems such as North Kiangsu, they are putting the U. S. in a very difficult, almost untenable, position in China.”
At their September 9 meeting, the Generalissimo made an important concession: the local administration question (i.e., who would run the areas that the Communists evacuated) could be referred to the State Council for resolution rather than being a prerequisite for establishing the council. Marshall thought that this “should, unless the Communists adopt new tactics designed to delay negotiations, permit progress in the current negotiations.” Stuart and Marshall agreed that it was extremely important to get the Five-Man Committee into operation. (Foreign Relations, 1946, 10: 169–70.)
Chou En-lai, September 11, 10:35 A.M.
Marshall had sent Chou a memorandum summarizing the results of his September 9 talk with Chiang Kai-shek. (See ibid., pp. 168–69.) Marshall elaborated on his understanding of the Generalissimo’s ideas, impressions of Chiang’s intentions, and methods of conducting discussions with him. The Communists’ reluctance to implement the Five-Man Committee had made it harder to persuade the Generalissimo to accept it, Marshall noted, but he had accepted it. Chiang indicated that military terms should be settled in the Committee of Three, but Marshall admitted that his understanding of what the Generalissimo really meant by this was imprecise.
Chou said that Marshall’s memorandum indicated that he had made a great effort to explain to the Generalissimo all the Communists’ positions, but it also seemed to show that Chiang was adding new conditions to his old ones, and if the Communist party also brought forth new conditions “we may well anticipate that the war will just go on indefinitely.” Chou was not sanguine about the Committee of Three’s ability to resolve the military issues or the likelihood of governmental reform, given the government’s attitude toward the Communists. Without a cease-fire, the Five-Man Committee would be useless.
Marshall replied that if Committee of Three meetings “are not at least paralleled if not preceded by, an effort to organize the State Council, we are back exactly where we were on June 30, which is a rather hopeless position. . . . I do not now know where to turn.” (Ibid., pp. 171–82.)
Yu Ta-wei, September 11, 6:00 P.M.
“The negotiations at present have resulted in a stalemate,” Marshall said, and “the Communists were very apprehensive over the good intentions of the Government.” He believed that “General Chou was making a mistake by not going ahead but that General Chou was filled with inhibitions.” Yu thought that the key was to solve the Government-Communist troop ratio. “Attempts to resolve this problem,” Marshall replied, “had in fact led to the present stalemate in that is [it] brought up the five conditions by the Generalissimo and the civil administration problem which thus far had been unresolvable.” (Ibid., pp. 182–84.)
John Leighton Stuart, September 12, 7:00 P.M.
Stuart reported on his afternoon meeting with Chou En-lai, who had merely reiterated known Communist views and proposed that the Committee of Three meet to settle all military issues. Marshall thought that since the government probably wanted “all the time it can get as time is to its advantage,” Chou’s stand was “harmful to the Communists.” Convening the Committee of Three was useless “since the Government Representative would be unable to discuss practically anything.” The last time the committee met, Marshall stated, he had needed a month and a half to get the two sides ready for a three-day session. “What if we cease our efforts, don’t mediate and don’t say anything to anybody,” Marshall asked. Stuart agreed that “it would probably be a good idea to wait quietly for a few days.” (Ibid., pp. 185–86.)
Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945–January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 682–684.