#5-359
Editorial Summary of Meetings with Chou En-lai and Chang Chih-chung
February 14–16, 18, 1946 Chungking, China
Chou En-lai, February 14, 3:00 P.M.
Prior to going to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s town house for the first formal meeting of the Military Sub-Committee, Chou En-lai came to Marshall’s house to inform him of Communist party headquarters’ response to various proposals on reorganization and integration. Yenan desired that the Communist party retain twenty divisions compared to the Nationalists’ ninety during the twelve-month initial stage of demobilization; during the six-month second stage the ratio would be 10:50. Yenan was not opposed to military integration occurring during the initial phase, but thought it better to do this during the second phase. They were also concerned about the allocation of supplies by the proposed Service Area directors, stipulating garrison areas for the new armies, and the management of military police and railroad guards. (Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 220.)
Military Sub-Committee, February 14, 4:00 P.M., Generalissimo’s Aide’s Office
Marshall began by asking for comments on the latest draft of “Basis of Reorganization of Communist Military Forces and Their Consolidation with the National Army of China.” (The draft from which the subcommittee members were working is ibid,, pp. 215–19.) Chang Chih-chung and Chou En-lai began with a discussion about the Chinese translation of the official English version. The subcommittee then began considering the plan’s articles in sequence. The first two articles (“Command” and “Employment”) were approved with minor changes. Article III (“Organization”) concerned the distribution of divisions by party and the organization and duties of the eight Service Areas into which China was to be divided. After considerable discussion, the Chinese accepted the proposal that, at the end of twelve months, the ratio of divisions would be ninety Nationalist to eighteen Communist. Marshall then explained at considerable length the importance and function of service areas in British, French, and American military organizations. “Now we are attending classes,” General Chang said. “General Marshall is our teacher.” With a few reservations, the Chinese leaders accepted the rest of Article III and the three-hour meeting ended. (Ibid., pp. 220–22.)
Chang Chih-chung, February 15, 10:00 A.M.
Marshall asked Chang to discuss some items that might come up in the afternoon Military Sub-Committee meeting. He thought that the Communists would ask for more than the four army commands the Nationalists were offering and also for a Service Area command; he thought that the Nationalists should find some way of making an agreeable compromise. Regarding the Nationalist-Communist division ratio, Marshall suggested that General Chang could use the support troop authorization (15 percent of the total) as a bargaining point. He still did not have a solution to the question of Military Police, Marshall said. (Ibid., pp. 222–23.)
Chou En-lai, February 15, 2:00 P.M.
General Chou asked for the meeting in order to discuss problems relative to Military Police organizations. There would be such organizations within the armies but they would have no authority over civil matters, Marshall said. How the gendarmes (which he likened to American state police) were to be regulated he did not yet know. Chou En-lai expressed concern with the eighteen regiments of railroad guards that were being organized and trained by Major General Tai Li, head of the Nationalist secret police (i.e., the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics of the National Commission of Military Affairs). Marshall said that he was aware of Tai’s activities, that he was opposed to one individual being in command of this force, and that some restrictions would have to be imposed on the units’ use. (Ibid., pp. 223–24.)
Military Sub-Committee, February 15, 3:30 P.M., Generalissimo’s Aide’s Office
Article IV (“Demobilization”) was the starting point for this session. Chang and Chou agreed on the 90:18 division ratio and that the two sides would have prepared, within three weeks of the promulgation of the agreement, lists of the units to be retained on active duty and within six weeks lists of organizations to be demobilized. Marshall then made a lengthy statement on Executive Headquarters’s role in handling the details of transferring arms and equipment from demobilizing to retained units and its need for power to act. Chang and Chou both quickly agreed. “I guess you are afraid I will make another speech,” Marshall said, and moved to the plan’s next paragraph.
Consideration of the fourth section of Article IV (stipulating that between the twelfth and eighteenth months after the promulgation of the agreement the total number of divisions in China would be further reduced to sixty, of which ten would be Communist) immediately recalled the divisive issues of power distribution, so after each side commented, Marshall suggested that further discussion on this be delayed until the following day.
The conferees proceeded to Article V (“Deployment”), which described how the sixty divisions remaining after the first year would have been integrated into thirty-six armies and where these armies would be deployed. Chou En-lai objected that the Communists had repeatedly insisted that such integration take place in a second stage beginning after the first twelve months in order that the units could be trained and mentally prepared for integration. Marshall said that attempting a true fusion of divisions into a true National Army, as opposed to a mere integration of divisions into armies, could probably not be accomplished in the short time the Political Consultative Conference delegates had hoped; contrariwise, he thought, delaying integration for eighteen months was politically unwise. He suggested that the next day’s discussion consider beginning the process in six months. (Ibid., pp. 224–35.)
Military Sub-Committee, February 16, 3:00 P.M., Generalissimo’s Aide’s Office
“The class is now in session,” General Chang Chih-chung said, and the group again took up Article V (“Deployment”) of the draft demobilization-reorganization agreement for the new Chinese army. The Chinese negotiators vigorously restated their positions from the previous meeting. The government, Chang Chih-chung explained, preferred to begin integration after four or six months and work toward fusion of the armies in which there would be no distinction between Communist and Nationalist units. Chou En-lai reiterated that during the first twelve months following promulgation of the agreement only demobilization would occur; during the succeeding six months further demobilization and integration of armies would occur. “I must admit,” Marshall interjected, “that today I have a very much better impression of the difficulties involved in integration that I had two months ago. I think I recognize more than has been said here in regard to the difficulties of reorganizing and developing the training of the units of the Communist armies, and equipment to bring them on a parity with the divisions already equipped and carefully trained of the National armies.” Key points to weigh, Marshall said, were “the hazards of the delay in initiating integration with the hazards of a long continued period following the development of the coalition government and during a constitutional reorganization of large forces totally separate in effect, in control.” The inevitable Nationalist-Communist disputes in the interim period were bound to affect military morale. Marshall proposed a compromise: integration would begin at the level of the army group (i.e., one three-Communist-division army and one three-Nationalist-division army) with a new army group formed each month beginning in the seventh month; after the twelfth month, integration would begin at the army level. General Chang said that he would accept this if General Chou did. Chou En-lai said that he would consider it and report to party headquarters in Yenan.
The negotiators then moved to Article VI concerning the militia, which was not to exceed fifteen thousand in any one province and was to be limited to light arms. “Militia” was the wrong concept, the Chinese agreed; the “Peace Preservation Corps”—professional soldiers under provincial authority—was what should be considered in this article. Marshall was worried by some of the suggested wording changes that seemed to him to permit unlimited use of this force by local officials. “In a military force in a democracy there is always a limit, there are certain qualifications.” General Chang accepted the article, as did General Chou, although he reserved the right to discuss further the issue of military police.
Article VII concerned six points of somewhat lesser importance (i.e., the role of Executive Headquarters, uniforms, personnel system, secret police, political affiliations, and puppet and irregular troops). The negotiators agreed on several points, but soon decided that the meeting had run long enough and adjourned. (Ibid., pp. 235– 47.)
Military Sub-Committee, February 18, 3:30 P.M., Generalissimo’s Aide’s Office
The Communists were suspicious of the militarized police forces: the twenty-plus regiments of Military Police and the proposed eighteen regiments of railroad guards. After demobilization and reorganization, Chou En-lai argued, they could be concentrated as an independent force of division size or larger. The Military Police, Chang Chih-chung argued, were at half strength, widely disbursed, usually in squad-sized units, and lightly armed. The conferees agreed to discuss this later and to move on.
The Chinese agreed to omit the section of Article VII prohibiting army officers from holding membership in a political party. Puppet and irregular troops were to be disbanded and disarmed “as soon as practicable,” and the Chinese agreed that the meeting’s minutes would show agreement between them that restrictions should be worked out that would prevent these units from switching from side to side. (“They are very amphibious,” General Chang said.)
There were some wording changes in the final article of the agreement (VIII: “General”), and it was accepted. To save time, Marshall said, he had a team of American staff officers already at work on detailed plans to implement the agreement; this group would prepare a tentative outline of issues to discuss with Chinese forces staff officers. As the meeting ended, Marshall asked if Chou En-lai would remain for a few minutes. (Ibid., pp. 248–58.)
Chou En-lai, February 18, 8:00 P.M.
Marshall outlined “his ideas with respect to assisting the Communists in giving selected officers and non-commissioned officers basic training prior to integration of the armies.” This brief (about four weeks) training would cover only basic principles and “was an expedient in order to overcome the Communist objection to a more hasty integration.” Chou En-lai seemed to agree that this idea had merit. Marshall said that his mission would probably terminate in August or September; in the meantime, he would make a trip to Washington, D.C., to handle loan and surplus property issues. He could arrange to have General Wedemeyer made the U.S. ambassador to China.
Concerning the up-coming trip by the Committee of Three, Marshall said that he did not wish to “precipitate a new crisis” by making an “untimely visit” to Manchuria. Chou En-lai asserted that the Chinese Communists were anxious to have Executive Headquarters teams in Manchuria “to settle the question in order to facilitate the taking over of Manchuria by the government.” Chou did not think that the Russians would object and “he could not understand why the Nationalists did not want to go in.” (Ibid., pp. 258–59.)
Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945–January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 454–457.