Economics of Crime and Punishment

Economics of Crime and Punishment

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Cloninger, Dale O. 1992. ‘Capital Punishment and Deterrence: a Portfolio Approach’. Applied Economics 24(6):635-645. / Дьяченко А. (408)
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Craswell, Richard, and John E. Calfee. 1986. ‘Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2(2):279-303.
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Dharmapala, Dhammika, and Nuno Garoupa. 2004. ‘Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis’. American Law and Economics Review 6(1):185-207. / Голубев А. (411)
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Ehrlich, Isaac. 1975. ‘The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death’. American Economic Review 65(3):397-417. / Антонишина Э. (402) Личагина А. (402)
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Friehe, Tim. 2009. ‘Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders: A Note on the Role of Information’. Journal of Economics 97(2):165-183. / Шпилева Е. (402) Шепелькова К. (402)
Garoupa, Nuno. 1998. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information when Wealth Varies among Individuals’. Economica 65(260):479-490. / Сушко Я. (407)
Garoupa, Nuno. 1999. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information’. European Journal of Law and Economics 7(3):183-196. / Ощипов А. (408)
Garoupa, Nuno. 2000. ‘The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement’. Economic Inquiry 38(2):278-288. / Белугин А. (406) Ликанэ Р. (411)
Garoupa, Nuno. 2007. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization’. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 63(3):461-474. / Шпилева Е. (402) Шепелькова К. (402)
Garoupa, Nuno, and Mohamed Jellal. 2004. ‘Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 20(1):192-206.
Garoupa, Nuno, and Mohamed Jellal. 2007. ‘Further Notes on Information, Corruption, and Optimal Law Enforcement’. European Journal of Law and Economics 23(1):59-69. / Мерзлякова М. (412) Тарандовский А. (402)
Garoupa, Nuno, and Daniel M. Klerman. 2002. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government’. American Law and Economics Review 4(1):116-140. / Прокопец М. (403)
Garoupa, Nuno, and Daniel M. Klerman. 2010. ‘Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History’. Review of Law and Economics 6(1):75-96.
Garoupa, Nuno, and Jonathan Klick. 2008. ‘Differential Victimization: Efficiency and Fairness Justifications for the Felony Murder Rule’. Review of Law and Economics 4(1):407-418. / Пазухина Е. (411) Шинкаренко М. (412)
Garoupa, Nuno, Jonathan Klick, and Francesco Parisi. 2006. ‘A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism’. Public Choice 128(1-2):147-168. / Прокопец М. (403)
Garoupa, Nuno, and Marie Obidzinski. 2010. ‘The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory’. European Journal of Law and Economics Online First. / Сладкова Н. (411)
Glaeser, Edward L. and Sacerdote, Bruce. 1999. ‘Why Is There More Crime in Cities?’, 107 Journal of Political Economy, S225-S258. / Мелешкина А. (403) Сафронова А. (403)
Glaeser, Edward L. and Sacerdote, Bruce. 2000. ‘The Determinants of Punishment: Deterrence, Incapacitation and Vengeance’, NBER Working Paper No. W7676. / Рукавишникова Т. (410)
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Kaplow, Louis. 1990. ‘Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts are Subject to Sanctions’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6(1):93-128.
Kaplow, Louis. 1992. ‘The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts That Definitely Are Undesirable’. International Review of Law and Economics 12(1):3-11. / Фузик А. (405) Тарандовский А. (402)
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Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell. 1994b. ‘Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior’. Journal of Political Economy 102(3):583-606.
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