GSM
176 GSM 13 E rev.1
Original: English
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Mediterranean and Middle East
Special Group
The Iranian Challenge to Middle Eastern and Global Security
Draft Report*
Raynell ANDREYCHUK (Canada)
Rapporteur
www.nato-pa.int 23 October 2013
* The Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM) will consider adoption of this report in 2014.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) AND THE COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT (CSA) WITH IRAN 2
III. IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS 6
IV. TEHRAN’S WORLD VIEW, REGIONAL POLITICS AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS 8
V. THE RISKS OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR ACQUISITION 12
VI. A TWO TRACK APPROACH: ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF SANCTIONS 14
VII. THE EFFORTS OF THE P5+1 GROUP 17
VIII. IS THERE A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS? 18
IX. CONCLUSION 19
BIBLIOGRAPHY 21
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. Iran’s nuclear programme ranks very high in any list of challenges to global peace and security. The matter has become a central concern for the international community, and although the NATO Alliance is not today a key protagonist in the matter, several European and North American governments are actively engaged in efforts to resolve the problem. That effort will invariably condition the security environment in which the Alliance operates and, in this sense, the stakes are very high. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is fast becoming a textbook case of international crisis management, although the protagonists have yet to write the conclusion. Indeed, at this writing, unanticipated political developments in Iran are helping to revivify diplomatic efforts to resolve this vexing problem.
2. Every international crisis differs, but analysts are looking closely at past crises to derive rules of the road for handling the nuclear stand-off with Iran. In contrast with the Cuban Missile crisis, for example, the Iranian crisis involves a plethora of players with overlapping and competing interests. The world today is more multipolar than in 1961, and the capacity of the great powers to work out solutions is accordingly diminished. Indeed, a very sharp debate among defence intellectuals about what is to be done has added a layer of uncertainty to the game. Moreover, the moves each player makes on this multi-dimensional chessboard have consequences for all the other players. The extraordinarily opaque and uncertain nature of highly factionalised and fluid Iranian politics and decision-making adds yet another layer of complexity. Those engaged in negotiations must factor in how the regime and other actors in Iranian society, including factions within the ruling elite and even the regime’s oppressed opponents, will respond to particular offers, threats and actions. They must also consider the concerns and possible responses of other key actors in the Gulf, the broader Middle East, Russia and China. The variable geometry of post-Cold War inter-state relations imposes a colossally difficult structure for settling high stakes nuclear disputes.
3. For the United States, its European Allies and Canada, Iran’s resistance to inspections of its nuclear facilities violates international law, and there is evidence that its nuclear program has matured significantly in recent years. As a result, many governments and analysts feel that Iran poses a very serious proliferation threat with serious strategic implications. If Iran succeeds in building a usable nuclear weapon, it would theoretically provide a shield behind which the regime might implement a more coercive kind of diplomacy in an already volatile region. It could also increase the risk that nuclear capabilities might be funneled to other international actors including, in worst case scenarios, sub-state actors (Kroenig). Israel sees Iran’s nuclear programme as a direct and potentially existential military threat and the change of government has not assuaged Israeli concerns. The UnitedStates and Europe also take these threats seriously and have sought to provide reassurance to Israel so that it does not feel isolated and compelled to act on its own. Although Canada is not directly engaged in the nuclear talks, it too has a high stake in the outcome and strongly supports what the United States and its European partners are seeking to achieve.
4. Iranian officials are well aware that until recently there has been little international consensus about how to best manage this crisis. The agreement of both the United States and the EU to impose very tough sanctions, however, suggested that at least the West has managed to agree on a tough line which many believe has helped convince Iranian authorities to change the tone and possibly the substance of their diplomacy. There is now a general consensus that the international community must follow up on the overtures the new Iranian government have extended and, once again, to look for a way out of the nuclear impasse. Indeed, the recent election of HassanRouhani, a moderate cleric open to dialogue with the West represents an important potential opportunity to back away from conflict, but it is still too early to fathom how far the the Rouhani government will move toward the international community’s demands. Lively domestic debates about how to manage this crisis continue both in Iran and in key countries like the United States. One thing is clear at this juncture Rouhani’s election and his words are opening up new diplomatic opportunities although the international community will very likely continue to call for concrete measures to accompany Tehran’s changing rhetoric.
5. This report will explore several components of this complex and ongoing diplomatic and security challenge. It will explore its legal dimensions, identify some of the concerns, pressures and strategic stakes key players confront, and examine the assumptions informing their respective approaches. It will also discuss the ways in which domestic politics are shaping the Iranian regime’s nuclear ambitions and consider how Hassan Rouhani’s election could be a game changer if, of course, he is able to leverage his popular mandate to alter Iran’s long-standing approach to the nuclear question. Finally, it will lay out several policy options that the key players must now consider.
II. THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT)
6. Iran acceded to the NPT in 1970, and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force in 1974. Although the Islamic Republic is entitled to employ nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, representatives of the international community have long charged that its covert efforts violate the nuclear safeguards commitments it has undertaken as a member of the IAEA. Tehran's consistent failure to report significant elements of its programme to the IAEA has heightened international concerns over its nuclear capabilities and intentions (NTI, The Nuclear Threat Initiative). Although the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) officially oversees the development of Iran’s nuclear programme, final decisions lie with the Supreme Leader (SL) Ali Khamenei. At the moment, there is no concrete evidence that the SL has actually decided to produce a nuclear weapon, although it is clear that Iran is rapidly accumulating the necessary resources and technologies that may provide the SL with a so-called break out option (Takeyh, 2012).
7. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) plays a special role in protecting Iran’s nuclear programme and is often understood as constituting a barrier to a breakthrough in international negotiations as that program confers it status and leverage. The IRGC comprises an estimated 125,000 personnel, ground, naval, and aviation branches acting independently of the regular armed forces (Global Security). It is also a major financial power within Iran and has forged ties with firms producing critical nuclear technology. Should Iran’s nuclear programme or nuclear facilities come under threat, the IRGC, and especially its Qods special forces, could defend the programme by mounting intelligence operations abroad, possibly attacking critical regional and Western infrastructure and mobilising affiliated militant organisations to act against a range of international interests/assets in the region (Bruno & Bajoria).
8. Iran’s decision-making process and the chain of command governing the nuclear programme are complex and opaque. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, and a relatively small group of senior leaders and advisors, including members of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) take all the key nuclear decisions. Major decisions concerning nuclear policy require the SL’s approval.Officially, the Iran Atomic Energy Council directs Iran’s general nuclear policy. Created in 1974, the Council together with the AEOI approves national nuclear policy, while laying out the regulations and directives guiding those programmes. The 15-member Atomic Energy Council is composed of the president, cabinet ministers, head of the AEOI, and four nuclear scientists.The SNSC is concerned mainly with defence and national security policies, comprising leading members of the military, the IRGC, the secret service, the Foreign Minister, representatives of the Supreme Leader, and other ministers as required.
9. It is important to note that Iran’s nuclear programme predates the 1979 Iranian revolution. Shah Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi established that programme in the late 1950s with the support of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace programme. This was part of a US effort to increase its military, economic and civilian assistance to Iran. Two years later the Shah established the Tehran Nuclear Research Center and negotiated with the United States for support in building a US designed five-megawatt reactor (Newsweek, 2008). Over the next decade the United States provided Iran with nuclear fuel and equipment for research purposes. The US goal was to assist Iran in developing its nuclear energy capacity while discouraging Tehran from conducting its own fuel-cycle research. On 1 July 1968, Iran signed the NPT. Six years later Iran completed its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. By the 1970s, France and Germany had joined the United States in providing assistance to the Iranian nuclear programme.
10. There were, however, already concerns about the Shah’s nuclear ambitions. In August 1974, a US special national intelligence estimate noted that although "Iran's much publicised nuclear power intentions are entirely in the planning stage," the Shah could lead Iran to pursue a nuclear weapons programme, especially in the shadow of India's successful nuclear test in May 1974. By that time, France had signed a deal to build two reactors at Darkhovin, while Germany’s Kraftwerk Union had begun to construct two reactors at Bushehr in 1975. Both projects were subsequently cancelled due to concerns about Iranian ambitions (Newsweek).
11. After the Shah’s fall, the revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini initially cut back or cancelled much of the Shah’s nuclear programme including plans for power reactors. The devastating Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) during which chemical weapons were used, however, galvanised Iran’s revolutionary leaders to revisit what was, in effect, a nuclear moratorium. The discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme in 1991, as well as a growing US presence in the region during the Gulf War, provided additional justifications for rebuilding Iran’s civilian nuclear programme.
12. Since the 1990s Iran has made steady progress in developing capacities covering the full nuclear fuel cycle. It has developed uranium-mining infrastructure, constructed a broad based research capacity, built uranium conversion and enrichment facilities, and produced its own fuel. In 2002 the IAEA began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted a range of clandestine nuclear activities. France, Germany and the United Kingdom, referred to as the EU-3 in the context of international negotiations, agreed to launch a diplomatic effort to persuade Iran to disclose the full scope of its nuclear programme and to forgo its uranium enrichment and reprocessing-related activities.
13. International pressure following the 2002-2003 revelations led Iran to suspend temporarily its enrichment-related activities and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Additional Protocol in 2003 allowing the IAEA greater access to nuclear sites. Negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 began in 2004 with Iran signing the Paris Agreement to extend a temporary suspension of selected nuclear activities. While suspending enrichment-related work for roughly two years, Iran continued to develop and manufacture centrifuges.
14. In a 2004 report, the IAEA charged Iran with failing to declare the following major activities: laser isotope and plutonium enrichment experiments, uranium imports from China, tests of uranium conversion processes, uranium enrichment and its introduction into centrifuges, the associated production of enriched and depleted uranium, the existence of a pilot enrichment facilities at the Kalaye Electric Company Workshop and laser enrichment plants at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center and at Lashkar Ab’ad. Experiments at these sites involved nuclear material that Iran was legally obliged to declare to the IAEA. In August 2005, Tehran announced it was resuming uranium conversion at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. By early 2006, IAEA inspectors confirmed that Iran had once again resumed its enrichment programme. The IAEA Board of Governors subsequently referred Iran’s case to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Shortly thereafter, Tehran announced that it would stop implementing the Additional Protocol.
15. Since 2003, the IAEA has not received sufficient information from Iran to fully gauge the extent of its nuclear programme and its compliance, or lack thereof, with the NPT. A November 2011 IAEA report expressed “concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme”, though most activities described dated to the pre-2003 period. While Iran questioned the report’s evidence as well as the IAEA's legal authority to investigate non-nuclear activities, the report helped trigger a series of US and EU sanctions. A February 2012 IAEA report then revealed that Tehran was continuing to advance its capacity to enrich uranium.
16. The Additional Protocol, to which Iran agreed in February 2003, requires Tehran to provide design information on new nuclear facilities. Iran has challenged this and refused to provide the IAEA with information such as details on its heavy-water reactor under construction at Arak or explanations about a February 2010 Iranian announcement that it “possessed laser enrichment technology”. Iran may also have violated its CSA when it decided to construct new enrichment facilities without informing the IAEA. It also failed to notify the IAEA of its decision to enrich uranium. Article45 of the agreement requires that Tehran notify the IAEA “with design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary” (IAEA, 1974).