The PCE(R)s

THE DECKS RAN

RED!

The grimmest of all wartime shipboard duty was experienced by the valiant

medical corpsmen who manned the PCE (R) rescue ships

the Naval equivalent of seagoing ambulances

One of the least-known but most significant warship variants of WWII was the PCE(R) - the Navy’s equivalent of a seagoing ambulance. Only 13 were commissioned and these saw extensive duty only in the later campaigns of the Pacific. Though few in number the heroic role

of the PCE(R)s in Pacific invasions was truly remarkable for had they not existed thousands of

wounded aboard the smaller vessels of the amphibious fleets may have perished before adequate

medical aid reached them.

Born to battle, the PCE(R)s proved war at best is a nasty business. Saving as many lives as possible in the bloody arena of battle became an urgent priority in the island-hopping phase of the Pacific War where heavy casualties were frequently taken far at sea thousands of miles from

hospital facilities. While large hospital ships assigned to invasion fleets did their best to expedite

front-line medical aid they were not always available in adequate enough numbers to be

everywhere when needed. This shortcoming became especially critical to those who sustained

serious wounds aboard the smaller ships of the fast moving battle fleets, and with amphibious

landing craft which existed in large numbers but whose diminutive size precluded the inclusion

of sick bays or emergency facilities for medical personnel.

He Who Receives Prompt Medical Attention is Likely to Survive

America’s Civil War, the first conflict to experience the terrible wounds caused by explosive shells and high volume musketry, early proved that recovery of the seriously injured largely depended upon how quickly proper medical aid could be obtained. By the onset of WWII, the US Army had addressed this problem by inserting trained medics in every infantry unit. The medics were in turn supported by mobile front line dressing stations and these in turn were networked with mobile field hospitals which were served by corps of motorized ambulances. In this manner during the European War it was not uncommon for a wounded soldier to often find himself in a full-blown hospital bed within hours after being injured. But not so at sea where the vastness of the ocean often spelled the difference between life and death. Sailors and seamen severely injured on merchant ship in convoy, on patrol craft or aboard vessels involved in rear area combats, were forced to depend on whatever limited medical facility was available. Emergency medical aid was frequently nonexistent or, at best, limited to small pharmacist manned dispensaries of destroyers or destroyer-escorts and LSTs. Small escorts such as PCs, AMs and landing craft like LCIs, LCTs, LCMs, and LCVPs - backbones of the amphibious fleets - generally carried no medical personnel.

To correct this dilemma in the far-flung Pacific the Navy, late in 1943, decided to create

what was tantamount to a special sea-going ambulance staffed with doctors and trained corpsmen who could provide adequate emergency aid to smaller vessels during amphibious operations. The early success of two field modified Army Headquarters ships assigned to Gen. Mac Arthur’s command provided the inspiration for the rescue ship/ambulance program. By the time the waterborne ambulance concept took organizational form in the Pentagon the advent of the deathbound Japanese kamikazes - who especially sought out lucrative humanity intense targets like troopships and landing craft - made the need for the emergency medical aid afloat all the more acute.

A Very Special Vessel for Inter-Island Mercy Missions

The vessel chosen for this salubrious task was a specially modified 185-ft long patrol craft based on the well-proven diesel-powered all steel Admirable-class mine-sweeper. Capable of making 15 - 16 kts, a number of AM hulls had been converted into ocean-going patrol craft whose 8,000 mile range, sea keeping ability and imposing armament made them well-suited to the Pacific. Based on a design originally ordered by the General Board in 1941 to include British specifications, the 795-ton AM hull proved itself readily adaptable to a multitude of uses within the patrol craft escort (PCE) role. Of the 49 AMs completed as PCEs, ten were converted to amphibious PCE(C) control ships, eleven were altered in weather ships, two became ACM minelayers, two others morphed into Coast Guard cutters, three became YDG degaussing vessels, and 13 were altered in the rescue ship configuration as PCE(R)s.

By extending the long forecastle almost to the stern, the planners at Pullman-Standard Car Co. - designers and builders of the 185-footers - were able to created a large hospital bay able to accommodate beds for 80 patients. A complete surgery, X-ray and pharmacy were provided along with quarters for a medical officer, and a staff of 15 pharmacist mates, including lab

technicians. Quarters were also made available for additional doctors who augmented the staff as

the need arose. The rescue Peecee’s complement numbered 120 men and eight officers, generally all reservists or inductees. Unlike hospital ships, which by international law carried no armament, the PCE(R) retained its full gunboat-type weaponry of a single 3-in/50 DP gun on the foredeck, two single 40mm, and six 20mm. As the kamikaze became more of a threat it was not uncommon for PCE(R)s to add a variety of single and dual-mount .50-cal machine guns readily made available from the Army by unrecorded trades of “medicinal” brandy for Brownings.

Although the Brits refused to accept the AM versions built for them under Lend-Lease because they did not include diesel-electric power, the PCE design retained the raised open bridge wherein an enclosed wheel-house was provided in the deck below. Late model sonar and a variety of VHF/HF communications, plus a modified Combat Information Center (CIC) gave these hybrid vessels the ability to provide escort duty enroute to an invasion and upon arrival at an enemy beach quickly transformed into the rescue role.

To better appreciate the type of war these unique vessels fought, let’s trace the exploits of the PCE(R)-851, one of a trio of newly commissioned rescue ships which arrived in the Pacific shortly before the 1944 invasion of Leyte after many dull months of patrol duty out of Bermuda.

PCE(R)s -851, -852 and -853 arrived at Manus in time to report to DesRon54 just before the destroyer’s departure for Leyte. Having traveled as a team en route from Hawaii, the trio of

young captains had evolved a number of plans for various types of rescue work which they felt

would prove the life-saving potential of their vessels. Among these specially developed

procedures was the ability to transfer wounded quickly via Stokes litters, methods of identifying

and classifying required medical attention and , above all, procedures to assure maximum

survivability of those in their care. Although extremely pleased with their innovative

accomplishments, the officers and their medical staffs were due for an unfortunate rude

awakening. It seems no one deigned to inform them that the Navy had failed to advise the 7th

Fleet of the new ships’ purpose, existence, or presence.

Acting as spokesman for the trio, Cmdr. F.S. Bayley, USNR, a Harvard educated attorney

form Seattle who commanded -851, did his best to explain to the destroyermen the variety of

rescue services his vessels were capable of performing. However, the officer Bayley addressed

lacked an y comprehension of what the weird new ships were able to do. Worse yet, he confused

the stubby-looking gunboats with high speed Air-Sea Rescue boats, advised them not to race

about the harbor at 35-kts, that there was little flying activity and ordered all three to tie-up to

harbor buoys and await further orders.

Proving their Value as The Wounded Lay Dying

After days of inactivity as the invasion of Leyte progressed as planned, Bayley and his fellow PCE(R) skippers took matters into their own hands. Going ashore, they consulted with the very harried beachmaster and convinced him they could expedite the transfer of seriously wounded GIs. In a matter of hours several boat loads of Army wounded were transferred from the exposed well decks of sun-baked landing craft to the well-ordered facilities of the PCE(R)s. For their efforts the Army gave the trio a well done. With that, the PCE(R)s were in business. The next day, Bayley’s 851 received a signal from a nearby Liberty ship asking for medical assistance to aid a number of Army Air Force personnel, including four P-38 fighter pilots wounded by friendly fire in an early morning air raid. Going directly alongside the Liberty’s warlike hull the highly maneuverable rescue ship proved - thanks to its high freeboard and multiple deck levels - that it was easier to transfer the wounded from deck to deck rather than by sling or via boats, a procedure they would follow from then on whenever sea conditions allowed..

Responding to the sinking of the escort carrier Gambier Bay the rescue PCE(R)s finally came to the attention of their own Navy, whose Fleet Medical Department up until then was not aware of the rescue ships’ existence. Notified that three new seagoing ambulances were nearby, the 7th Fleet Surgeon dispatched them post haste to aid the hundreds of injured and badly burned Gambier Bay survivors. With this mammoth effort soon accomplished the three rescue ships now found their services in high and continual demand as the dread kamikazes began to take

their toll.

The 851 and 852 soon evolved a teamwork method of supplementing each other with personnel and supplies, loaning doctors and medicines as needed. They anchored at short stay, with steaming watch set at all times, and as raids approached, the main engines were lit off and kept warm. They were able to get underway within three minutes, and frequently did so. In a short time the 851 had gone alongside Montpelier, New Orleans, Lamson, and numerous merchant ships and other Naval vessels, while the 852 was similarly engaged. No sooner were wounded treated and transferred to hospital ships than a new load would come aboard. In the surgery, operations of every kind were constantly performed, frequently while under fire.

Shortly before the Ormoc landing in December of 1944, the 852 and 853 were returned to Manus for overhaul and repairs, and the 851 stayed as the only rescue ship in the Philippines. She was damaged finally, in a minor way, at Mindoro, while going alongside the burning LST- 472, and also was flooded forward by a friendly shell hit. As a result, the 851 was allowed to proceed to Hollandia at the end of December for repairs. She had been under way or anchored at war cruising condition on five minute ready duty since leaving Pearl Harbor in September. The crew had not during this time been ashore, and after five months together in a small ship tempers were growing short. Much strain arose from the fact that the ship had no air search radar, and visual sighting of planes had to be relied on. In addition, lacking a TBS, the ship was unable to tune in on many of the warning from nearby vessels, which caused a feeling of being alone in the ocean.

The grim nature of the duty gave rise to humor or an equally grim sort. Returning at dusk from a Liberty ship that had been hit at sea, and anchored at the northern end of Surigao strait, the 851 had 60 burned and wounded men below and 15 dead stacked on the boat deck. Out of the shadows of the straits, without warning, came a string of Japanese Bettys, flying low on the water. They passed close aboard to starboard, while the ship’s gunners blasted without success at them. In the course of some violent (and probably un-needed) evasive action, the corpses rolled wildly about the boat deck. For the balance of the night the crew located bodies, and parts of bodies, by stumbling over them in the dark. The engine rooms complained when the bodies were stacked too close to the ventilator intakes, and as they were moved from place to place, different parts of the ship called the bridge to grouse. In the morning the ship went alongside a hospital LST to unload. Seamen on that ship were busily painting out its numbers, because Tokyo Rose had identified them by number as a target for the Kamikaze. She was also generally understood to have the 851 in mind when she accused our Navy of employing armed hospital ships to shoot down the “indomitable” Nipponese flyers.

On to the Okinawan Blood Bath

After repairs at Hollandia 851 found itself reassigned to the 5th Fleet’s DesRon 60 at Saipan for the upcoming invasion of Okinawa. At this point the ship fortuitously came under the command of Capt. C.B. Buchanan, USN, an officer who became enthralled with the vessel’s unique life-saving mission. Taking voluminous notes on rescue techniques for future reference, Buchanan’s interest would soon pay handsome dividends to those whose lives the ship saved. The screening position of the 851, while steaming to Okinawa, was directly ahead of Adm. Turner’s big AGC. As the force steamed at 14 to 15 kts, and the 851 had a maximum speed at that time of 15-kts, screening became of secondary importance. Captain Buchanan was aware of the predicament the ship was in and authorized a more or less straight course while the formation followed a zig-zag plan. This kept the ship out of harm’s way until at last, on the night before D-day, the Engineer gave the bridge a solemn warning on stack temperatures, pressures, and Diesel engines in general. At the same time, an LSD was falling astern, so Capt. Buchanan assigned the 851 as escort for the cripple, and as dawn came the two ships chugged alone toward Okinawa.