The Papal Peace Note - August 1917

The Main Points identified in the Papal Notice.

"We wish now to come to more concrete and practical proposals, and to invite the Governments of the belligerent peoples to come to an agreement upon the following points, which it would seem should be the bases of a just and lasting peace, leaving it to them to settle and complete the details."

  • Disarmament: "A simultaneous and reciprocal reduction of armaments according to rules and guarantees to be established."
  • Arbitration: "according to standards to be agreed upon and sanctions to be determined against the State which should refuse either to submit international questions to arbitration or to accept the decision."
  • "The true liberty and community of the seas, which on the one hand would eliminate numerous causes of conflict, and, on the other hand, would open to everybody new sources of prosperity and progress." [11]
  • Each side to pay for its own reconstruction to be funded by the reduction in armaments. "It would be impossible to understand the continuation of such carnage solely for economic reasons." Where special cases exist they "should be considered in the light of justice and equity." So, disarmament would pay for reconstruction of damaged areas except in special cases.
  • Reciprocal restitution of occupied territories. Germany should totally evacuate Belgium and French territory and Germany's colonies should be returned. [12]
  • In the contested territories [such as Alsace-Lorraine and between Italy and Austria] the aspirations of the people should be taken into account. [ie. by plebiscite] Armenia, the Balkan States and Poland should also be examined in a "conciliatory spirit."

A settlement on these principles would "render impossible a repetition of similar conflicts, and to prepare the way for the solution of the economic question, which is of so much importance for the future and the material well-being of all the belligerent States." [13]

The Papal Peace Note

Most people have heard of Pope Pius XII and the controversy surrounding his inaction in regard to the Holocaust in the Second World War. In 1999 John Cornwell reignited the controversy with the publication of a book on Pius. However, few people have heard of the Pope of the First World War, Benedict XV, or his Peace Note of August 1917. Few people know that Benedict's peace initiative was perhaps the most significant attempt by a neutral to end the Great War by negotiation.

The Papal Peace Note was not the first peace move in the First World War, but it was the first one that included concrete proposals for a settlement. It was to be another six months before anyone else was publicly to state firm proposals to end the conflict, when President Wilson made his famous 'Fourteen Points' speech.

Though Benedict's peace move attracted widespread attention during 1917, and was an ongoing news item in the European and American press in the second half of 1917, it has received little recognition in many texts on the First World War. This is not to say that historians have ignored the Papal Peace Note. There has been some historical writing on the Papal Peace Note in the context of war aims and peace diplomacy, however, general histories of the war have tended to overlook Pope Benedict's role in attempting to secure peace in 1917. Also, general histories have tended to accept the slurs made against Benedict's character by the right-wing press and some Allied government leaders during the war.

Early biographies on Benedict XV were sympathetic to the Pope and his peace efforts, but because people within the Catholic hierarchy wrote them, have had little impact on World War One historians. The British historian, John Pollard, writing from outside the Catholic tradition, has attempted to redress this imbalance and has written a biography on Benedict titled appropriately, The Unknown Pope.

In September 1914 Della Chiesa was elected to the papacy and took the name of Benedict XV. From the outset Benedict was concerned about the war, and from 1914 to 1916 was involved in humanitarian efforts to alleviate the effects of the war as well as peace discussions with other neutrals and various peace activists. After the failure of the American and German peace moves at the end of 1916 and with the growing strength of socialist attempts to end the war, Benedict began preparations for a public appeal for peace in 1917.

Benedict wanted his peace appeal to include specific proposals. Between May and July 1917 Benedict used his diplomatic contacts with Austria-Hungary and Germany to try to get the Central Powers' commitment to a number of key points which would lend credibility to the peace move. The Pope was also careful to include other items in his Note such as the "liberty and community of the seas" which were aimed to appeal to President Wilson who constantly mentioned the need to secure the "freedom of the seas" at the end of the war. Benedict was hoping that the public nature of his planned appeal would lead to an irresistible popular pressure on all the belligerent governments to come to the negotiating table.

What considertions or issues influenced the Pope to Act?

The Pope was motivated by the following considerations in his desire to seek a negotiated end to the Great War:

  • humanitarian concern for all those suffering, especially innocent civilians
  • interest in the survival of Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, as it was a bastion of Catholicism in Europe and a counter-balance to Germany in Central Europe
  • fear that socialist attempts to end the war, currently under way (i.e., the Stockholm Conference), would increase the influence of socialism in the post-war world
  • fear that if the war did not end soon then the future of European civilisation (and Catholicism) would be at risk and violent revolution would engulf Europe.

What had been done about this Papal Note in Germany?

In Germany some groundwork had been done to prepare the way for the Papal Note.

  • Matthias Erzberger, a Centre Party (Catholic) politician working on his own initiative, had been instrumental in getting the Reichstag Peace Resolution passed on 19 July 1917. 62% of Germany's Reichstag deputies voted in favour of a "peace with no annexations" similar to the declaration made by the Russian socialists in April 1917 (i.e., the "Petrograd Formula").
  • Eugenio Pacelli, the Pope's representative in Germany (later to become Pius XII), conducted a number of discussions with the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and his successor, Michaelis, in an attempt to get a German undertaking that they would evacuate Belgium in the event of a peace settlement. Both made encouraging statements. Pacelli also had a discussion with the Kaiser. The results of Pacelli's diplomacy were inconclusive. However, Benedict decided to press ahead as he felt the time was ripe for a peace initiative.

The Peace Note was dated 1 August but may not have been fully composed until 8 August. The Allied governments were given advance notice via cable of the gist of the Note sometime after 11 August. The news of the Note caused panic in Allied government circles because its publication could lead to a public debate on war aims, something the Allied governments were not prepared to do at this stage. In Britain an emergency meeting of the War Cabinet was held to discuss the Papal Peace Note and how best it could be handled. The governments of Britain, France and Italy were concerned about the following:

  • Coming up with a reply to the Papal Note would entail a discussion of their war aims and perhaps a disclosure of their secret treaties.
  • Many of the Pope's proposals were similar to President Wilson's peace statements made, as a neutral, in December 1916 and January 1917. If Wilson gave any backing to the Papal Note, then the Allied governments would be under enormous pressure to revise their war aims and consider a negotiated peace.
  • Public pressure for peace at a time when war weariness is at its height. What would be the reaction of Catholics in Britain? What about Catholic reaction in Ireland?
  • The Russians feared that a negotiated peace made on the basis of the Papal Note would be at the expense of Russia. They were quick to urge Wilson to reject the Pope's proposals. Note there was always a level of religious rivalry between the Vatican and orthodox Russia and a certain amount of mistrust.

As a result of their secret discussions the British War Cabinet decided to make no official response to the Papal Note and wait for the replies of the Central Powers.

When was the Papal Note issued or published?

Sometime after 15 August all the belligerent governments received the full text of the Papal Note as did the press. Newspapers across Europe and America carried headlines about the Papal Note and contained the full text of the Note (see a summary of the Note below). There was much public discussion about the Pope's proposals. In the US and in Britain the patriotic press attacked the Papal Note with the slur that it was "Austrian-inspired" and that the Pope's neutrality and even-handedness were suspect. Therefore, the right-wing patriotic press reasoned that the Note must be shunned. The left-wing liberal and the socialist press in Britain, however, saw the Papal Note as a great opportunity for the Allies to reformulate their war aims and make a positive reply. This, the liberals and socialists reasoned, would put pressure on the Central Powers to respond positively to the Note or risk social unrest.

The key to the whole affair hinged on the response of President Wilson. Since many of the Pope's statements were similar to pronouncements President Wilson had made about the war while still a neutral, it seemed feasible that the American president might respond positively to the Vatican peace initiative. Surprisingly, President Wilson expressed annoyance at the Pope's appeal and told his advisers that he was inclined to make no reply at all. However, after canvassing the opinions of numerous senators and members of his own staff, Wilson became convinced of the propaganda value of making a public reply. On 27 August 1917 President Wilson's reply to the Pope was impressive, and its impact was as dramatic as the Papal Note had been (see the summary of Wilson's reply below). However, Wilson rejected a peace based on the Pope's proposals and implied that there was no chance of peace until the German people overthrew their government.

The Allied governments were relieved at Wilson's rejection of Benedict's peace initiative and were content to allow Wilson's reply to be theirs also, although they were not happy about Wilson's condemnation of secret treaties and economic war, which were directed at the Allied governments. Britain, France, Italy and Russia therefore made no formal reply, preferring to allow President Wilson to be their spokesman on this occasion.

In Germany the Papal Note caused intense discussions in the Reichstag. A "Committee of Seven" was formed to discuss the Papal Note with the Chancellor Michaelis. After weeks of further discussion in government circles the German and Austrian governments made official replies to the Papal Note on 19 and 20 September. However, they were sufficiently vague on details (particularly about Belgium) that they were open to attack by the Allied governments for being insincere. The Central Powers thus failed to take the diplomatic initiative by making a clear positive reply which would have put the Allied governments under pressure from their people to negotiate on the Pope's proposals.

Historians generally agree that Wilson's rejection of Benedict's peace initiative was the main reason for its failure. The Central Powers' replies to the Note did not mark the end of the affair. There were two secret peace feelers, one from Britain and France and the other from Germany, that grew out of this affair. Also the British and Italian governments were constantly called to account by opposition groups in parliament for their failure to reply to the Papal Note. Even more dramatic was the revelation late in 1917 that there existed a secret clause in the Treaty of London (1915) in which Britain, France and Russia pledged to work with Italy to reject any Vatican peace initiative.

It is interesting to consider whether a Papal Peace in 1917 would have led to a more lasting settlement than the peace that was negotiated at Versailles in 1919.

President Wilson's (the Founder of the League of Nations) Reply to the Pope's Peace Note, 27 August 1917.

  • The Pope's plan would not deliver a stable peace. "This agony must not be gone through again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against it." In other words, if Germany is not thoroughly beaten now it will have to be done all over again later.
  • Rejected Pope's proposal to return to the status quo ante bellum. This means returning to Europe's pre-war borders. Wilson wanted a thorough revision of borders to prevent future disputes.
  • The object of the war is to destroy the German Government because:
  • it started the war and secretly planned to dominate the world.
  • "it is the ruthless master of the German people."
  • their word cannot be trusted.
  • Germany could regain its strength after a period of peace and so a "permanent hostile combination of nations" would have to be created against Germany to keep it in check.
  • "New-born Russia" would be abandoned to German influence and suffer a counter-revolution.
  • "No peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury."
  • The test of a peace plan is whether it is based on the will of the people or "merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government" [ie. the German government]. The present rulers of Germany cannot be trusted to guarantee anything. There must be "conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves."
  • The United States Government seeks no material advantage of any kind.
  • The United States Government is opposed to "punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues", which are "in the end futile" and "no proper basis for a peace of any kind, lest of all an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind."