IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF BELIZE, A.D. 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8 of 2009
BETWEEN:
BELIZE ELECTRICITY LIMITED Appellant
AND
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION Respondent
BEFORE:
The Hon. Mr. Justice Mottley - President
The Hon. Mr. Justice Sosa - Justice of Appeal
The Hon. Mr. Justice Carey - Justice of Appeal
Mr. Vincent Nelson QC and Mr. Anthony Sylvester for the appellant.
Mr. Derek Courtenay SC and Ms. Vanessa Retreage for the respondent.
__
5, 8, 29 March and 8 October 2010.
MOTTLEY, P.
[1] Three questions were formulated by the attorneys-at-law who were then representing the Belize Electricity Limited (BEL) and Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and submitted to the Supreme Court for its determination. These questions were:
(1) Whether the PUC has the right, power or authority in law to order (whether or not in has done so) that BEL shall negotiate or enter into a contract or shall not negotiate or enter into a contract with a particular potential supplier of electricity.
(2) Whether in the exercise of its duties and statutory functions the PUC is in law entitled to give or without its approval of power purchase agreements (whether or not it has given or refused to give approval) between a licensee and a supplier of electricity by which the cost of power to consumers of electricity may be effected;
(3) Whether the PUC has the right power or authority in law to dictate any particular term or condition of a contract between BEL and any particular potential supplier.
[2] The judge answered these questions in the affirmative. BEL appealed against the determination by the judge. The appeal was heard by this Court with a panel constituted by Mottley P, Morrison and Barrow J. At the conclusion of the appeal, the Court dismissed the appeal and indicated that it would put into writing the reasons for so doing. These reasons have not been handed down in view of the application made by BEL that the appeal should be reheard.
[3] Having ruled that this Court does have jurisdiction to entertain the application for rehearing, the question for the consideration of this court is whether, having regard to the participation of Justice of Appeal Barrow in the determination of the appeal in which it is being alleged that his son Kimano Barrow is associated and/or is involved and/or has an interest as a Commissioner of the PUC. There was an appearance of bias on the part of Justice of Appeal Barrow. Mr. Vincent Nelson, QC on behalf of BEL made it abundantly clear that his client was not alleging that Barrow JA was indeed biased. The issue for this court to determine is whether having regard to the circumstances there is an appearance of bias on the part of Barrow JA.
[4] The test to be applied was laid down by the House of Lords in England in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 as whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased (per Lord Hope of Craighead at paragraphs 102 and 103).
[5] In Regina v Abdroikoi [2007] 1WLR 2679 the House of Lords had occasion to deal with the issue of apparent bias in three appeals which were heard together. In the first appeal, the foreman of the jury informed the judge that he was a serving police officer and was due to report for duty at a time when the jury was considering its verdict and would likely come into contact with the police officer involved in the case. In the second appeal, the defendant had been convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm on a police sergeant. After conviction, it was discovered that a member of the jury had served as a police officer in the same borough as one of the police officers who had arrested the defendant although they were not known to each other. In the third appeal, the judge permitted a solicitor employed by the Crown Prosecution Service to serve on the jury, overruling an objection raised by the defence. The issue in each case was whether a fair minded and informed observer would “conclude that there was a real possibility that a juror was biased merely because he was involved in some capacity in the administration of justice”.
[6] Lord Bingham of Cornhill dealing with the appearance of bias said at p. 2687:
“In his extempore judgment in R v Sussex Justices, Ex p McCarthy [1924] 1KB 256, 259, Lord Hewart CJ enunciated one of the best known principles of English law: “it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” This principle was quoted with approval by the European Court of Human Rights in one of its very early decisions: Delcourt v Belgium {1970} I EHRR 355, 369, para 31. There is, as Lord Steyn on behalf of the House ruled in Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd. [2003] ICR 856, para 14, now no difference between the common law test of bias and the requirement under article 6 of the European Convention of an independent and impartial tribunal. As Lord Hewart's aphorism recognises and later case law makes clear, justice is not done if the objective judgment of a judicial decision-maker (whether judge or juror) is shown to be vitiated by actual partiality or prejudice towards any of the parties. But actual bias, hard as it usually is to prove, is rarely alleged, and is not alleged in any of the cases before the House. Neither of the police officers, nor the Crown prosecutor, is alleged by the respective appellants to have leant in favour of the prosecution side for any improper reason. The appellants rely on the second part of Lord Hewart's aphorism: that justice should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. This condition, the appellants say, is not met where one of those charged to decide whether the appellant was guilty or not, is employed full-time by a body dedicated to promoting the success of one side in the adversarial trial process.
The test of apparent bias has been developed through a succession of cases. In R v Barnley Licensing, Ex p Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers’ Association [1960] 2 QB 167, 187, Devlin LJ recognised that:
“Bias is or may be an unconscious thing and a man may honestly say that he was not actually biased and did not allow his interest to affect his mind, although, nevertheless, he may have allowed it unconsciously to do so.”
Lord Denning MR, in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGG) Ltd. v. Lannon [1969] I QB 577, 599, said:
“The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand …”
Lord Goff of Chieveley in, R v Gough [1993] AC 646, formulated the test of apparent bias in terms a little different from those now accepted, but echoed, at p 659, Devlin LJ's observation in the Barnsley Licensing Justices case in referring to “the simple fact that bias is such an insidious thing that, even though a person may in good faith believe that he was acting impartially, his mind may unconsciously be affected by bias …”. Following the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] I WLR 700, the accepted test is that laid down in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357, para 103: “whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.” As the House pointed out in Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd. [2003] ICR 856, para 14, “Public perception of the possibility of unconscious bias is the key”, an observation endorsed by the Privy Council in Meerabux v Attorney General of Belize [2005] 2AC 513, para 22. The characteristics of the fair minded and informed observer are now well understood: he must adopt a balanced approach and will be taken to be a reasonable member of the public, neither unduly complacent or naïve nor unduly cynical or suspicious: see Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd. [2003] ICR 856, para 14; Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 , 509, para 53.
The analysis of the European court in Strasbourg has been to distinguish between a subjective test, directed to identification of actual bias, and what it calls an objective test, directed to what in this country would be called apparent bias: see, for instance, Hauschildt v Denmark (1989) 12 EHRR 266, 279, paras 46–49. The court has not regarded a defendant's perceptions as decisive, but has required that his suspicions of bias be objectively justified. By this is meant that there must be some demonstrable and rational basis for what he suspects. The court has accepted that appearances are not without importance: see, for instance, Hauschildt , above, para 48.
[7] In Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another [2008] 1 WLR 2416 Lord Hope of Craighead had occasion to make observations on the characteristic of the fair-minded and informed observer. His Lordship said at paragraph 2:
“The observer who is fair-minded is the sort of person who always reserves judgment on every point until she has seen and fully understood both sides of the argument. She is not unduly sensitive or suspicious, as Kirby J observed in Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 , 509, para 53. Her approach must not be confused with that of the person who has brought the complaint. The “real possibility” test ensures that there is this measure of detachment. The assumptions that the complainer makes are not to be attributed to the observer unless they can be justified objectively. But she is not complacent either. She knows that fairness requires that a judge must be, and must be seen to be, unbiased. She knows that judges, like anybody else, have their weaknesses. She will not shrink from the conclusion, if it can be justified objectively, that things that they have said or done or associations that they have formed may make it difficult for them to judge the case before them impartially.
Then there is the attribute that the observer is “informed”. It makes the point that, before she takes a balanced approach to any information she is given, she will take the trouble to inform herself on all matters that are relevant. She is the sort of person who takes the trouble to read the text of an article as well as the headlines. She is able to put whatever she has read or seen into its overall social, political or geographical context. She is fair-minded, so she will appreciate that the context forms an important part of the material which she must consider before passing judgment.”
[8] In determining what the fair-minded and informed observer knows when he is seeking to arrive at his conclusion, all the relevant facts must be taken into consideration. In order to do this, it is necessary to establish and examine all material facts. In Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No. 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR said at paragraph 85:
“85. The Court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It must then ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility or a real danger, the two being the same, that the tribunal was biased.”
“86. The material circumstances will include any explanation given by the Judge under review as to his knowledge or appreciation of those circumstances. Where the explanation is accepted by the applicant for review it can be treated as accurate. Where it is not accepted, it becomes a further matter to be considered from the view point of the fair-minded observer. The Court does not have to rule whether the explanation should be accepted or rejected. Rather, it has to decide whether or not the fair-minded observer would consider that there was a real danger of bias notwithstanding the explanation advanced.”
[9] How and by whom are these facts to be determined? In Tibbetts v The Attorney General of the Cayman Islands [2010] UK PC8 a judgment of the Privy Council which was issued 24 March 2010 after the hearing and decision of this appeal, Lord Clarke sought to identify “the correct approach to the observer’s knowledge of the facts”. In rejecting the submission that it was for the observer to conclude what the facts were, his Lordship adopted the summary of principles set out by Mummery LJ in AWG Group Ltd. v Morrison [2006] EWCA Civil [2006] 1 WLR 1163 where at para 7 the Lord Justice said:
“The test for apparent bias now settled by a line of recent decisions of this court and of the House of Lords is that, having ascertained all the circumstances bearing on the suggestion that the judge was (or would be) biased, the court must ask “whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility… that the tribunal was biased”: Taylor v Lawrence [2003] QB 528, para 60. See also R v Gough [1993] AC 646; In re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No. 2) [2001] I WLR 700; Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357; and Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd. [2003] ICR 856.”
[10] Lord Clarke concluded that it was for the Court to establish what are the facts. His Lordship said at para. 6:
“6. It is for the court to ascertain the circumstances. The court must approach the issues in two stages. First, it is for the court to find the facts on the balance of probabilities. It is then for the court to decide on a balance of probabilities whether, with knowledge of the facts so found, the putative observer would conclude that…..might accept…..evidence as a result of previous relationships and knowledge of him.”