Northwestern Debate Institute 2010 36

Seniors Deterrence DA

Deterrence DA---Link---Withdrawal General

Withdrawal kills US leadership – perception of forward projection atrophe destroys soft power, the commitment of our allies and global stability, creating a vacuum of power

Holmes 9 – PhD from Georgetown University, former Senior Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former member of its Washington Advisory Committee, for the Defense Department, author and editor of many foreign policy publications and books, Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at Heritage (Kim R., “Sustaining American Leadership with Military Power”, The Heritage Foundation, 6/1/09, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/sr0052.cfm)

To witness the consequences when policymakers and politicians believe that hard and soft power are disconnected, one need look no further than Europe. The Europeans--many of whom believe that the peace that has broken out on their continent is the model for a post-sovereign world order--have become convinced that the anarchic order of the Westphalian system of nation-states can be breached through the exercise of soft power alone. In their view, bridging the often hardened differences between states and shaping their decisions requires only negotiation and common understanding. Many liberals are now pressing the U.S. government to adopt this vision, but the futility of this approach can be seen everywhere, from the failure of negotiations to deter both Iran and North Korea from their nuclear programs over the past five years--a period in which their efforts have only matured--to the lackluster response to Russia's invasion of Georgian territory. Whether it is states like Iran and North Korea that believe a nuclear weapons program is central to regime survival, or human-rights abusers like Sudan, Burma, and Zimbabwe, or rising powers like China, which continues to use its military to emphasize its sovereignty in the South China Sea, diplomacy alone has not been enough to bring about change in a direction that is favorable to America's interests. At times, America and its leaders have also been guilty of this type of strategic myopia. After applying pressure on North Korea so diligently in 2006, the Bush Administration relaxed its posture in early 2007, and North Korea concluded that it was again free to backslide on its commitments. Two years later, this weak diplomatic approach, which the Obama Administration continued even after North Korea's April 5 missile test, has only brought North Korea to believe that it can get away with more missile tests and nuclear weapons detonations. And so far, it has. Backing Carrots with Sticks Works In the past, when America chose to flex its diplomatic muscle with the backing of its military might, the results were clear. During the Cold War, the foundational document for U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union, NSC-68, concluded that military power is "one of the most important ingredients" of America's national power. This power gave the U.S. the ability not just to contain and, if necessary, wage war against the Soviet Union and its proxies, but also, during tense diplomatic stand-offs like the Cuban Missile Crisis, to reinforce its political objectives with robust strength. This same equation of military-diplomatic power proved effective in easing tensions during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996, when President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to demonstrate America's firm commitment to the Taiwanese democracy. Similarly, the display of America's military strength against a defiant Saddam Hussein in 2003 convinced Libyan President Moammar Qadhafi to abandon his weapons of mass destruction program. Obama's Risky "Rebalancing" Act Before he became President, Barack Obama raised the important connection between our hard and soft power, arguing that America must "combine military power with strengthened diplomacy" while also building and forging "stronger alliances around the world so that we're not carrying the burdens and these challenges by ourselves."[1] While his statements are correct, his actions as President have done little to demonstrate actual commitment to forging a policy that combines America's military power with its diplomatic authority. For America to be an effective leader and arbiter of the international order, it must be willing to invest in a world-class military by spending no less than 4 percent of the nation's gross domestic product on defense.[2] Unfortunately, President Obama's FY 2010 proposed defense budget and Secretary Robert Gates's vision for "rebalancing" the military are drastically disconnected from the broad range of strategic priorities that a superpower like the United States must influence and achieve. Instead of seeking a military force with core capabilities for the conventional sphere to the unconventional--including a comprehensive global missile defense system[3]--in order to deter, hedge against, and if necessary defeat any threat, Secretary Gates argues that "we have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight."[4] He is echoing the view of President Obama, who has argued that we must "reform" the defense budget "so that we're not paying for Cold War-era weapons systems we don't use."[5]vBut the conventional Cold War capabilities that this Administration believes we are unlikely to use are the same platforms that provide America with both the air dominance and the blue-water access that is necessary to project power globally and maintain extended deterrence, not to mention free trade. The Importance of Sustaining Military Power The consequences of hard-power atrophy will be a direct deterioration of America's diplomatic clout. This is already on display in the western Pacific Ocean, where America's ability to hedge against the growing ambitions of a rising China is being called into question by some of our key Asian allies. Recently, Australia released a defense White Paper that is concerned primarily with the potential decline of U.S. military primacy and the implications that this decline would have for Australian security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. These developments are anything but reassuring. The ability of the United States to reassure friends, deter competitors, coerce belligerent states, and defeat enemies does not rest on the strength of our political leaders' commitment to diplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military. Only by retaining a "big stick" can the United States succeed in advancing its diplomatic priorities. Only by building a full-spectrum military force can America reassure its many friends and allies and count on their future support.


***South Korea***


Deterrence DA---South Korea---1NC

US withdrawal emboldens North Korea to take the initiative and attack at the South’s weakest moment

O’Hanlon 4 - senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (Michael, “WHY THE U.S. FORCES/KOREA PLAN MAKES SENSE,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 6/15/04, http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/ohanlon/20040615.pdf)

This does not make it safe for America to dissolve the security alliance with South Korea or take all of its forces off the peninsula. Such a drastic move could embolden North Korea to attack the South again, in the hope that surprise and perhaps its new nuclear arsenal could produce the reunification it still formally aspires to. As members of this committee know well, the stronger side does not always win in war. Luck and surprise and such intangibles play a role as well, so North Korea might elect to gamble if it thought it had a chance of success (as Georgetown scholar Victor Cha has lucidly argued). That said, South Korea probably does now have the capacity to hold off any attempted North Korean invasion largely on its own (with the support of American airpower, to be sure) until a major American reinforcement could occur. That reinforcement would then prepare the way for a joint, rapid, and decisive (though still quite bloody) U.S.-South Korea counteroffensive to overthrow the North Korean government.


Deterrence DA---South Korea---Japanese Prolif---1NC

Korea withdrawal destabilizes the region, causing Japanese nuclear armament

Dao, 03 ( James, “Why Keep U.S. Troops in South Korea?”NYTimes, 1/5/03, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/weekinreview/05JDAO.html)

Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's presumptive supercop. Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and beyond, raising questions in an already jittery region about Washington's willingness to maintain stability in Asia. "In the present mood, the Japanese reaction could be quite strong," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinese might respond." In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by post-Vietnam doubts about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says. A secure Korea makes Japan more confident, he contends. An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about the United States' commitment to the 40,000 troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons, he argues. "If we did it, we would stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said. Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troop withdrawal as a reduction of American power, no matter how much the United States asserts its commitment to the region. China might take the opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea could feel emboldened to continue its efforts to build nuclear arms. "Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China in the long term." "Mind-sets in Asia are profoundly traditional," he said. "They calculate political will by the numbers of soldiers, ships and airplanes that they see in the region."

Japan nuclear armament causes a chain reaction of counterbalancing proliferation

Halloran, 2009

[Richard, Military correspondent for The New York Times for ten years, 5-24, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Japan,” Real Clear Politics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/24/nuclear_japan_96638.html]

That anxiety has reinvigorated a debate about whether Japan should acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own and reduce its reliance on the US. Japan has the technology, finances, industrial capacity, and skilled personnel to build a nuclear force, although it would be costly and take many years. The consequences of that decision would be earthshaking. It would likely cause opponents to riot in the streets and could bring down a government. South Korea, having sought at least once to acquire nuclear weapons, would almost certainly do so. Any hope of dissuading North Korea from building a nuclear force would disappear. China would redouble its nuclear programs. And for the only nation ever to experience atomic bombing to acquire nuclear arms would surely shatter the already fragile international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The main reason Japan has not acquired nuclear arms so far has been a lack of political will. After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Japanese experienced a deep-seated nuclear allergy. That and the threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War kept Japan huddled under the US nuclear umbrella.

Extinction

Utgoff 2 , survival v. 44 no 2 summer 2002, p. 90

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.


***Japan***


Deterrence DA---Japan---1NC

US-Japan Relations High-Deters Conflict in the region

Talmadge 6/22. [Eric. Associated Press Writer. “US-Japan Security Pact Turns 50, faces new strains” Associated Press. June 22, 2010. http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/06/22/us_japan_security_pact_turns_50_faces_new_strains/]

"Keeping our alliance with the United States contributes to peace in the region," Kan said in a televised question-and-answer session with other party leaders. "Stability helps the U.S.-Japan relationship, and that between China and Japan and, in turn, China and the United States." The U.S.-Japan alliance, formalized over violent protests in 1960, provides for the defense of Japan while assuring the U.S. has regional bases that serve as a significant deterrent to hostilities over the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan. Under the pact, promulgated 50 years ago Wednesday, nearly 50,000 American troops are deployed throughout Japan. The U.S. forces include a key naval base south of Tokyo where the only permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier has its home port; Kadena Air Base, which is one of the largest in Asia; and more than 10,000 U.S. Marines on the southern island of Okinawa. The large U.S. presence over the past five decades has allowed Japan to keep its own defense spending low, to about 1 percent of its GDP, and focus its spending elsewhere -- a factor that helped it rebuild after World War II to become the world's second-largest economy. "Even though there are some small problems here and there, in the bigger sense the relationship remains strong," said Jun Iio, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. "Very few people think that it is actually necessary to make major changes in the alliance." But while the alliance is one of the strongest Washington has anywhere in the world, it has come under intense pressure lately over a plan to make sweeping reforms that would pull back roughly 8,600 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. The move was conceived in response to opposition on Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there -- more than half of the U.S. troops in Japan are on Okinawa, which was one of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II. Though welcomed by many at first, the relocation plan has led to renewed Okinawan protests over the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried out unless a new base is built on Okinawa to replace one that has been set for closing for more than a decade. A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo over the future of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station was a major factor in the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. It could well plague Kan as well. Kan has vowed to build a replacement facility on Okinawa, as the U.S. demanded, but details are undecided. Implementing the agreement would need the support of the local governor, who has expressed opposition to it. Kan was scheduled to visit Okinawa on Wednesday for ceremonies marking the end of the 1945 battle there that hastened Japan's surrender. Recent tension on the Korean peninsula and China's growing military assertiveness have undoubtedly driven home the importance of the U.S. security pact with Japanese leaders.