Ethical obligations toward genetically modified mosquitoes
Annie Coakley
April, 1st 2016
This paper will investigate the question of whether it is ethically justifiable to modify mosquitoes in such a way that they do not carry viruses that cause human disease. Though many types of genetic modification exist, I will only investigate the specific case of modifying mosquitoes such that they cannot carry viruses that are harmful for humans (e.g. Malaria, Dengue, Zika). I will first look at various approaches to the topic of genetic modified organisms in an attempt to clarify our moral obligations to insects. I will then argue that we do have a moral obligation to respect the teleological ends of mosquitoes but that the modification in question does not violate this obligation and is therefore justifiable.
Approach 1: Mosquitoes are sentient and can feel pleasure and pain
One way to assess our obligations to mosquitoes is to analyze insects’ sentience or their ability to feel pleasure of pain. The argument is that if an organism has the ability to feel pleasure or pain, then we have an obligation to not cause it unnecessary pain. Sentience can be considered grounds for including organisms in our moral consideration on the basis that sparing organism from unnecessary pain is a minimum condition for ethical action. It therefore follows that causing the death of an organism that is not sentient is not ethically problematic. Author Lockwood argues that considerable empirical evidence exists to support the conclusion that insects have the ability to feel pain (Lockwood, 205). He points to various experiments with honeybees to demonstrate that insects as a collective whole have consciousness. In particular, he suggests that the elaborate movements of insects demonstrate the existence of a sort of communication between insects. Further, he argues that an insect’s ability to adapt to changing environmental conditions demonstrate that a form of learning or problem solving exists between insects (Lockwood, 205). Lockwood concludes that it is unreasonable to assume that insects are unconscious given the behavioral complexity exhibited by insects in these experiments. While he acknowledges that it is challenging to practice these obligations on an individual insect basis, Lockwood nonetheless contends that the sentience of insects means that moral considerations of insect life are a relevant issue for large colonies (Lockwood, 209).In the case of mosquitoes then, the sentience of these organism clarifies the human obligation to not act in a way that causes pain to these insects.
Approach 2: Mosquitoes are teleological organisms
Another argument that is relevant to the discussion of genetically modified mosquitoes concerns the telos of mosquitoes. A teleological approach contends that there is a purpose and design in nature and that our actions playing a role in this larger plan. Each organism has its own telos and to alter this telos has profound implications on this overall purpose. Author Rollins defines a telos as “the way of living exhibited by that [organism], and whose fulfillment matter to that [organism]”(Rollin,162). Rollin further argues that we have an obligation to respect an organism’s telos because positive fulfillment of a telos leads to happiness whereas the thwarting of a telos leads to suffering. In accordance with this view, it is ethically unjustifiable to modify an organism's telos in such as way that the organism is unable to fulfill their telos (Rollin, 346). If each organism has its own unique telos, then genetic engineering has the potential to alter the telos, or end goal of that organism. To determine whether genetically modifying mosquitoes affects the fulfillment of their telos, we must first define what comprises a mosquitoes’ telos specifically. We will define the biological telos of a mosquito as a way of living that includes their abilities to bite humans, lay eggs, mate, die and serve as a food source for other organisms. Rollin acknowledges that there may be instances in which altering an organism’s telos is justified (Rollin, 347). We can then ask to what extent and for what purposes is altering the telos justified, and do genetically modified mosquitoes meet this criterion? Thus, a teleological perspective begs the question of to what extent humans should control nature or alter the “being-ness” of an organism.
Approach 3: Mosquitoes have intrinsic value
Another question we can ask to clarify our obligations toward insects is whether insects have intrinsic value. Intrinsic value refers to the value that an object has in and of itself or for its own sake. Objects with intrinsic value can also be considered an end-in-itself. The key question then in regards to genetically modified mosquitoes is whether there is an intrinsic value in the genetic integrity of a mosquito. Inherent value can be used a metric to determine our obligations because having inherent value gives an organism the right to be treated with respect (Macer, 652). If there is an intrinsic value in this genetic component of the organisms, then we can ask whether this intrinsic value is something that humans should not change. Macer argues that the permissibility of our genetic modifications can be determined by assessing whether the engineered DNA transfers would occur in nature between species and if that modification resembles the genetic flux that the genomes of mosquitoes experience in nature (Macer, 652). One of the challenges of this approach is determining what constitutes a “natural” gene flux and how this type of genetic modification differs from traditional methods of breeding. An intrinsic ethical approach emphasizes the value of a mosquito in and of itself and questions whether genetic modification has the potential to alter the intrinsic value of their genetic integrity.
Approach 4: Mosquitoes have extrinsic value
A component of the genetically modified mosquito debate that should also be acknowledged is the extrinsic value of these organisms. Extrinsic value refers to the value that an organism has valuer-ers outside of the organism itself such as its value to other species, ecosystems, biomes, etc. Mosquitoes have extrinsic value in that they serve crucial roles in feeding and preserving diverse ecosystems (Resnik, 5). Many ecosystems would be critically harmed by the elimination of mosquitoes. In this way, mosquitoes have significance outside themselves because they are valuable in a variety of ecological, economic and social senses (Resnik, 5). The extrinsic value of mosquitos means that the release of genetically modification of mosquitoes is associated with potential ecological, environment and health risks. Macer defines some of the ecological risks associated with genetically modified insect risks as including the possibility of horizontal gene transfer of the modified gene to off-target organisms and the potential for significant ecological disturbances (Macer, 655). Other risks include the emergence of new diseases and changes in fundamental ecological relationships (Resnik, 6). The extrinsic valuing of genetically modified mosquitoes therefore leads us to consider the broader implications of their modification.
Approach 5: Non-human species with moral standing are subject to liberty equality
A significant challenge to the discussion of genetically modified mosquitoes is the need to compare human valued decisions to decisions that have nonhuman value. Determining which actions are right or wrong between humans and other organisms is challenging because these it requires use to compare a human derived value to a nonhuman derived value such as those held by other animals or organisms. Author Sterba provides one means of resolving this conflict through the notion of liberal justice (Sterba, 204). He starts with the assumption that humans and nonhuman species have moral standing; this moral standing in turn means that human and nonhuman species are subject to the same principles of justice that govern human relationships. In particular, he argues that both human and nonhuman species are subject to principle of liberal justice or the balance of liberty and equality. According to this principle, all species are equal in that they all have equal liberty to pursue his/her own interests (Sterba, 204). Sterba notes, however, that this type of equality does not give every member of a species the right to be treated equally but rather the right to be treated in such that they are free to fulfill their interests. This type of equality allows him to conclude that we can maintain liberal equality without actually treating humans identically. Similarly, Sterba argues that we can have the liberal equality among species without treating species exactly equally (Sterba, 205). This allows us to accept the moral responsibility of species equality without having to make unreasonable sacrifices on the part of our own species. Thus, Streba provides one model for resolving the conflict of how we can value and compare human and nonhuman good in the analysis of genetically modified mosquitoes.
The Argument in Support of Genetically Modified Mosquitoes
I will make the following argument in support of our moral obligations toward mosquitoes:
1. Mosquitoes have their own telos which can be harmed or benefited, giving them a good of their own.
2. If mosquitoes have their own good, then it would be wrong to harm them without sufficient reason.
3. We cannot assume human good supersedes the good of mosquitoes.
4. Mosquitoes have moral standing and should be subject to the principles that guide human relationships.
6. The proposed modification to mosquitoes does not interfere with our obligations to respect the interests of these organisms.
7. The proposed modification is therefore justified.
I will also argue that these obligations depend on the type of control method being used and that human suffering, though relevant, does not ground our moral obligations toward mosquitoes.I will then conclude that the particular type of genetic modification in which mosquitoes are unable to carry human disease-causing viruses is morally justifiable.
I will begin with the notion that mosquitoes are teleological centers of life whose actions are directed toward some distinctive goal. As previously defined, the telos of a mosquito can be described by their biological characteristics including the behaviors of biting humans, mating, laying eggs and dying. Though some mosquitoes may prefer breeding in certain areas or choose not to bite certain humans, the idea is that each mosquito is a variant of the overall biological telos. If mosquitoes have a telos, then this telos can either be fulfilled or not fulfilled. Fulfillment of a telos leads to happiness whereas the thwarting of a telos leads to suffering (4). Because mosquitoes can be harmed or benefited by the fulfillment/non fulfillment of their telos, this means mosquitoes have a good of their own. In recognizing that mosquitoes are teleological centers of life, we can understand that these organisms have a good or value in and of itself.
If mosquitoes have a good of their own, then it would be wrong to harm them if we did not have a justifiable reason for harming them. We can then ask whether the genetic modification in question would cause the mosquito harm by permanently changing its telos. Existing scientific literature indicates that genetically modifying mosquitoes such that they cannot carry disease-causing viruses does not alter the mosquito’s ability to bite, mate, die etc. (Resnik, 3). Current evidence therefore suggests that the genetic modification in question does not harm mosquitoes in the teleological sense. Because no harm is being caused to the mosquito, this type of genetic modification that alters a mosquito’s ability to carry human diseases is therefore justifiable. However, this line of reasoning does not justify all types of genetic modification to insects. We can therefore assess other common genetic modifications on from this teleological perspective to better understand this justification. Another type of insect genetic modification is the introduction of sterile genes into male members of the species. This makes some members of the population unable to reproduce and leads to an overall reduction in the species population size (Resnik, 3). Herein, we can understand that the telos of the mosquito is being significantly altered because this modification fundamentally changes the way these organisms mate and reproduce. In this same vein, we can even call into question whether conventional pesticides are justifiable given that they alter biting habits and the ability of mosquitoes to lay eggs. Thus, a teleological approach helps us to determine which types of insect control are more justifiable than others. A modification that alters the disease-carrying abilities of mosquitoes does not interfere with the fulfillment of its telos and is therefore justifiable.
One could argue that reducing mosquito populations using any type of insecticide control is justifiable on the grounds that it would decrease human suffering from mosquito-transmitted diseases. In truth, diseases such as malaria and dengue are responsible for immense human suffering in the form of sickness and death. Reducing disease burdens via insect control is justified on the grounds that human life is worth saving and that humans have a fundamental right to be free of disease. The challenge with this argument though is that it requires us to compare the human good of improved human health to the nonhuman good of mosquito life. The prioritization of human interests over insect interests rests on the assumption that the good of humans overrides the good of insects. Though we can understand that humans, like mosquitoes, have telos that give them inherent good, there are no reasons that do not rely on previous philosophical assumptions to justify the conclusion that human good always overrides the good of mosquitoes. We therefore cannot reasonably claim that the good of improved human health always overrules the good of mosquito life. Justifying mosquito control solely on the grounds of human suffering is therefore insupportable because it requires the comparison of human and nonhuman good, which is impossible to directly equate.
Author Sterba offers a potential resolution to this tension by analyzing the moral standing of humans and mosquitoes. Sterba contends that the teleological purpose of mosquitoes and their inherent good give them moral standing. He argues that the moral standing of mosquitoes subjects them to the same principles that govern the human moral standing, namely liberal justice. Sterba’s notion of liberal justice claims that equality means every individual has an equal liberty to pursue his or her individual interests. Though individuals of a species are afforded equal liberty, this does not require each member of a species to treat other members of that species equally (Sterba, 204). This theory helps explain how an individual is justified in placing his/her own goals over those of other species members without necessarily treating other members as unequal. We can therefore claim that humans as a species are equal but treat individual members of the species differently. Sterba broadens this conclusion to say that we can consider species to be equal without treating them exactly the same (Sterba, 204). Recognizing the good of mosquitoes brings them into a realm of moral standing with humans in which we can acknowledge their equal status to pursue their own individual interests. However, this recognition of equity does not thereby require us to treat mosquitos as human equivalents but rather only obligates us to respect their given ends. We can therefore resolve the conflict of comparing human and a nonhuman good by recognizing the moral standing that should be extended to insects, which obligates us to respect their own goals or telos. The proposed modification of mosquitoes is therefore justified because it satisfies our obligation to uphold the goals or telos of this organism.
An additional criticism of my argument could be that it fails to acknowledge the uncertainties involved in the development and release of genetically modified mosquitoes. Though existing scientific literature indicates that genetically modifying mosquitoes will not fundamentally change their lifecycle or affect the larger ecosystem, these theories cannot be confirmed until these modified mosquitoes are released into the wild. The Precautionary Principle embodies this concern in its statement that the introduction of new species should be avoided when the ultimate effects of this introduction are disputed or unknown. Applying this principle to the case of genetically modified mosquitoes directs us to not release these mosquitoes into the wild because the outcomes of this release are still unclear. The effects of this release on both the mosquito and ecosystems as a whole are uncertain and therefore should not be allowed. However, one of the challenges with the Precautionary Principle is that it is challenging to apply to real life scenarios. For example, how we we determine what amount of evidence constitutes as “certain evidence”? And can this information gathering process be completed in a timeframe that is suitable for responding to pressing issues? We can therefore see that decisions involving novel technologies will always involve a potential risks rather than definitive conclusions. Though we cannot fully predict the outcomes of the release of genetically modified mosquitoes, all existing evidence suggests that the risks of interfering with mosquito life and their role in the ecosystem is low. Because eliminating risk entirely is impossible, we can understand that actions that seek to minimize risk are ethically justifiable. Thus, the uncertainties associated with the release of genetically modified mosquitoes are valid though not substantial enough to suggest that the act of releasing them is morally unsupportable.