CONTRACTS OUTLINE
Prof. Schooner Fall 2009
Do Multiple Choice First! Double-check!
ESSAY – Organize, Analyze, Persuade!
- Answer the question asked (as plaintiff’s counsel, as a clerk, etc.)
- Spot issues and identify cases/Restatement BEFORE beginning writing
- Write an outline
- Use the word here
- Do not just cite case names – include the relevant facts!
- Make a conclusion – what DAMAGES would a party be entitled to?
UCC vs. Restatement?
Contract
- Offer
- Acceptance
- Consideration
- Issues
- Option contract and Firm offers
- Battle of the forms
- Agreement to agree
- Electronic contracting
- Breach
Promissory estoppel
- Promise
- Promisor reasonably expects reliance
- Reliance
- Injustice
Restitution
- Implied in fact
- Implied in law
- Promissory restitution
Statute of frauds
- Does contract require writing?
- If so, is there a sufficient writing?
- If not, is there an exception?
Basic interpretation
Contract – exchange of promises
Promise - manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made
Contract Formation
Mutual Assent – meeting of the minds; objective – party’s conduct, subjective – party’s intention
- Parties bound by contract they’ve signed whether read or not; objective intent is what matters
- Ray v. Eurice – parties confused over specs in signed contract
- UCC – contracts can be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement; contract can be found even if moment of its making is undetermined (§2-204)
- Harlow & Jones v. Advance Steel – parties negotiate for sale of steel over the phone; send sales form/purchase order back and forth but do not sign; contract was oral agreement and forms were confirmatory memoranda
- Related to §27 (if UCC did not apply) – written memorial can come after the contract is already formed; parties in Harlow agreed to all terms before the writings
Offer– manifestation of willingness to enter bargain; must give power of acceptance (§24)
- Determined by the objective person standard of a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the offeree.
- Longergan v. Scolnick – form letters are not offers; ads are solicitations
- Series of letters between buyer and seller; seller reserved right to sell to anyone; no offers – only preliminary negotiations
- Leonard v. Pepsico – no reasonable person would think Pepsi’s “offer” of a Harrier jet was real
- Ads are soliciations for offers but can be offers if part of bait-and-switch tactic (Izadi)
- Izadi – ad purporting to give $3k trade allowance had small print which provided qualifications; reasonable person would have thought ad an offer
- Key question – can offeree just say “yes?” If not, there is not an offer! (§24)
Acceptance– manifestation of assent to terms of offeree; by promise or performance
- Offeree’spower of acceptance
- §36 – Terminated by revocation, lapse of time, death or incapacity of offeror, or offeree’s counter-offer(§39)/rejection
- Revocation effective upon receipt/communication; can be indirect communication (§43)
- Normile v. Miller – broker informs Normile that property is already sold; their power of acceptance is terminated
- Counter-offer must be received by original offeror to terminate power of acceptance
- Methods of Acceptance
- How to accept - §60 – if offer mandates the time, place, or manner of acceptance, these terms must be complied with
- Mailbox Rule – acceptance effective upon being dispatched by offeree (§63)
- But under option contract, acceptance effective upon receipt by offeror
- Silence - §69– can operate as acceptance in certain circumstances
- Register.com v. Verio – Verio contractually bound to Register even though restrictive terms did not appear until after query run; Verio should have not run the queries if they didn’t accept
- Bilateral – promise for a promise; offeree is bound to the contract
- Unilateral – promise for performance; offeree not required to do anything
- Classical rule – can revoke offer anytime prior to completion of performance
- Offeror, aware that offeree is attempting to perform, can still revoke.
- Petterson v. Pattberg – Pattberg communicates he has sold the mortage before Petterson offers payment; the offer is revoked.
- Very unfair to offeree
- Restatement §45 – option contract created once offereetenders or begins the invited performance
- Offeror is bound when offeree renders substantial performance
- Cook v. Coldwell Banker – Cook renders substantial performance by earning sales commissions prior to defendant’s modification of contract. Offeror did not have power to revoke or modify. Coldwell Banker was bound.
- Bilateral vs.Unilateral - §32 – in case of doubt, offeree can accept by promise or by performance
Consideration– generally only need bargained-for exchange
- Bargained-for exchange- Restatement (§71) approach – consideration must be something the promisor is seeking
- Williston’s “Tramp” hypothetical – man tells homeless person that he will buy him a coat if he goes around the corner to a shop
- Conditional gift or a unilateral contract with consideration? Conditional gift because man is not bargaining for the homeless person’s trip to the store
- Benefit-detriment test - need benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee
- Waiver of any legal right at request of promisor is sufficient
- Hamer v. Sidway – nephew gives up smoking, drinking, swearing, and gambling in exchange for $500 on 21st birthday; sufficient consideration
- Promise must induce the detriment and detriment must induce the promise.
- Pennsy Supply v. American Ash - Pennsy suffered a detriment (assumption of disposal responsibilities for American Ash’s agg-rite), which is what American Ash wanted. Sufficient consideration even though agg-rite was “free.”
- §79 – no need for benefit/detriment once you have bargained-for exchange
- EXCEPT Pennsy Supply v. American Ash wants both benefit/detriment and bargained-for exchange
- Gifts - A gift is generally not consideration. Mere fact that parties state consideration was given does not make it so.
- Dougherty v. Salt – aunt promises $3000 to nephew; note contains the words “value received”; no consideration for the promise; aunt makes a future promise of a gift
- If aunt wanted nephew to have money, she could have made executed gift now or testamentary gift or gift in trust
- Charitable donation can have implied promise and bargained-for exchange.
- Allegheny College – pledge to college by donor to be paid at death is enforceable bilateral contract; donor bargained for the memorialization of his name
- Adequacy– mere inadequacy of consideration does not void a contract (§79(b)); need not have equivalent values
- Batsakis v. Demotsis – In WW2 Greece, Demotsis contracts with Batsakis for 500k drachmae, which she thinks is $2000 US. She promises to pay back $2000, when in reality it’s only worth $25 due to inflation. Enforceable contract. It’s defendant’s own fault for not getting a better deal.
- Possibly Demotsis was under duress or coercion or Batsakis misrepresented – all would have invalidated the contract
- Past consideration– generally does not count for a contract
- Plowman v. Indian Refining – employees forced to retire but told they will be paid pension due to their years of service; all they have to do is pick up the checks; years of service is past consideration and doesn’t count; picking up their checks doesn’t count because it wasn’t bargained for
- May be part of promissory restitution claim
Issues of Contract Formation
Agency – party must have power to enter into contract and bind the principal through actual or apparent authority
- Plowman v. Indian Refining – VP/GM did not have power to enter into contract with employees, even if there was consideration, contract would be invalid
Option contracts and situations when offers may not be revoked
- Time provisions in initial offer do not necessarily carry over to counter-offer
- Normile v. Miller – Normile’s initial offer to Miller has time provisions; Miller marks up offer and counter-offers but time provisions do not carry over; Normile did not have first option on the property
- §87(1)(a) – contract in writing and signed by offeror with purported consideration is binding as option contract
- May conflict with Dougherty v. Salt, which held just saying there was consideration was not enough
- Pre-acceptance reliance – offer is revoked after offeree relies
- General construction bid rule – Prime contractor is not bound to subcontractor’s bid at time it is used, but subcontractor is bound to general contractor for its bid.
- Contrary case - James Baird v. Gimbel Bros – Baird’s bid on building made in reliance on Gimbel’s bid; Gimbel’s offer states acceptance can only come after Baird’s bid is accepted; no option contract because there was no consideration; no promissory estoppel either. Neither party is bound.
- Drennan v. Star Paving – Drennan relies on Star’s bid; Star made a mistake and informs Drennan; Star argues they revoked before acceptance and that their price error should have been obvious; Court finds no true exchange of promises, no option or bilateral contract.
- But there is promissory estoppel
- Option contract must be supported by consideration.
- Berryman v. Kmoch – Berryman promises option on the land in exchange for $10 and other valuable consideration; $10 never paid; Kmoch incurs expenses garnering interest in the land, but this provided no benefit to Berryman; no consideration found
- Also considers promissory estoppel but not found
- Pop’s Cones v. Resorts International – no option contract because there was no official offer, but Resorts’ assurances that a contract was 95% there was sufficient to consider a promissory estoppel claim
- §87(2) creates option contract from an offer, which can give expectation damages
- §90 creates enforceable promise, which can only give reliance damages
- Firm offers – offers made irrevocable
- Restatement §87(1)(b) – irrevocable by statute
- UCC §2-205 – firm offer irrevocability – need 1) offer 2) by merchant 3) for sale of goods 4) in signed record 5) with assurance to leave open 6) for stated time or reasonable time but no longer than 3 months (unless there is consideration)
- Offeree does not have to rely
- If offeree supplies form, offeror must separately sign provision
Qualified acceptance – battle of the forms
- Common law mirror-image – §58 – promise/performance in acceptance must be the same as in the offer
- Common law last-shot – whoever sends the last form has their terms govern
- UCC §2-207 – change mirror image and avoid last-shot
- Additional – original agreement silent on topic
- Different – not silent; one party inconsistent with the other
- Need conflicting offer/acceptance
- Brower v. Gateway - §2-207 doesn’t apply because court doesn’t consider phone order to constitute an offer
- (1) even if form has additional/different terms, still an acceptance, unless offeree’s acceptance is conditional upon offeror’s assent to these terms
- Can apply to exchange of writings or oral agreement confirmed in writing
- (2) Additional terms are proposals for addition
- Between merchants – automatically part of contract unless
- Offer limits acceptance to its terms
- Terms materially alter (surprising terms)
- Objection already given or given within reasonable time
- Brown Machine v. Hercules – Hercules’s PO without indemnity is an offer expressly limiting acceptance to its terms; so Brown had to accept
- Brown’s Order Ackn. with different terms was proposal for modification; Hercules needed to expressly assent to indemnity clause; Hercules saying “the other specifications are correct” does not apply to indemnity provision; Hercules’s terms govern – no indemnity
- Different terms – courts disagree because they are not in 2-207(2)
- Some exclude; some consider the same as additional based on Comment 3; some use knock-out rule where all conflicting terms are thrown out of contract
- (3) If both parties are acting like there is a contract, there is one even if writings don’t show it. (Rejects common law approach)
- §59 – purported acceptance conditional on offeror’s assent to additional or different terms is a counter-offer; Comment – new terms can be proposals for modification
- Princess Cruises v. GE – GE’s price quote altered terms of Princess’s PO; counter-offer accepted by Princess’s actions (phone call, payment, and inaction); GE’s terms applied, limiting their liability
Postponed Bargaining – agreements to agree
- Contract to enter into future agreement must specify all material and essential terms. Need reasonably certain terms (§33).
- But UCC §2-204 – if parties intend to make a contract, there is one even if one or more terms are left open
- Walker v. Keith – rent was not specified with certainty in renewal option of lease; not business of courts to fix rent; no agreed-upon price or agreed-upon method to fix the price; lessee did not have option
- May have reliance/restitution remedy though
- Lots of courts disagree with this rule!
- If parties intended to be bound, contract should be enforced
- Renewal clause may have been consideration for original agreement; should be enforced
- UCC §2-305 – contract enforced even with open price term if parties intended to be bound; uses “reasonable price”
- Letters of intent not enforceable unless parties intend them to be binding.
- Quake Construction v. American Airlines – LoI to Quake awarded them contract and authorized the work; But contract agreement was being prepared and Jones reserved right to cancel if parties could not fully agree; LoI is ambiguous – question for factfinder
- Concurring – LoI is contract to negotiate in good faith; middle ground between binding and non-binding
- Making written memorial does not mean there isn’t already a contract, but could indicate preliminary negotiations (§27)
- Quake Construction – Jones’s intent to create a written contract later does not mean their LoI did not already create a contract
Electronic Contracting– no negotiation; no face-to-face; disparities in bargaining power
- Shrinkwrap terms – see terms after tearing off shrinkwrap; if you don’t like them, return the product
- Offer is shipment of the product; acceptance is not returning within specified time period
- Brower v. Gateway 2000 – customer receives computer; contract formed after 30 days and computer not returned; critics argue contract on basis of phone order of computer
- Not practical for company to have to disclose all terms over phone
- Contract of adhesion valid. If consumer doesn’t like terms, can shop elsewhere.
- UCC §2-302 – Unconscionable clauses can be voided.
- Brower – clause requiring arbitration through ICC – too inaccessible and expensive an organization; filing fee > cost of computer
- Clickwrap terms – must agree to terms prior to purchase/downloading
- Generally valid but possibly coercive; convenient means to get products at low prices and high speed
- Browsewrap terms – no click button; but consumer put on notice; terms of use
- Register.com v. Verio – restrictive terms showed up after Verio runs query; once they see the terms, they can’t claim ignorance; can’t keep running the queries to get information for spam
- To be enforceable, need 1) adequate notice, 2) opportunity for review, 3) notice that action manifests assent, and 4) user takes the action
- Register – maybe the first query Verio ran, they were not bound
Liability without Consideration/Bargained-for Exchange
Promissory Estoppel– rarely successful argument
- Remedy relied upon when promisee’s actions are not bargained-for; no consideration but argument can often be made
- Arguments for consideration that are rejected:
- See pre-acceptance reliance cases (above)
- Kirksey v. Kirksey – plaintiff moving to defendant at his invitation
- Greiner v. Greiner – plaintiff moves at defendant’s request; mom wants to give son money after he was left out of father’s will
- Katz v. Danny Dare – employer bargains for employee’s voluntary resignation
- Elements - § 90
- Promise
- Pop’s Cones v. Resorts International – requires “clear and definite” promise (not in Restatement); this definition gets stretched
- King v. BU – give ownership of all papers to BU that they had in their possession at the time of his death
- Promise can be implicit
- Wright v. Newman – promise made by defendant putting name on child’s birth cert., giving child his surname, and acting as father
- Shoemaker v. Commonwealth – letter saying bank “might” have to buy insurance if Shoemakers don’t obtain it
- Promisor should reasonably expect promisee to rely
- Pop’s Cones–Resorts tells Pop’s contract is “95% there” and that they should not renew their current lease
- Should expect reliance when specifically telling/inviting someone to do something (e.g., moving – Kirksey, Greiner)
- Wright v. Newman – father should expect mother with child to rely on his promise to be the father
- Promisee does rely (inducing such action or forebearance)
- Must be reliance that the promisor reasonably expects
- Berryman v. Kmoch – Kmoch’s actions in garnering interest in buyers for the land was not what Berryman would reasonably expect; no promissory estoppel
- Pop’s Cones – Pop’s closed up their current shop, moved equipment to storage, got attorney, and laid off employees
- Wright v. Newman – mother doesn’t seek out real father based on “father’s” promise
- King v. BU – BU indexes King’s papers, provided staff to assist research, and held convocation regarding the papers
- But could argue this reliance was actually a benefit to BU
- Katz v. Danny Dare – Katz voluntarily resigns in reliance on pension; Dare argues no detrimental reliance because Katz would be fired otherwise
- Promise must come before reliance
- Hayes - Employee retires and then is promised pension; not enforceable
- Shoemaker – mortgagee doesn’t obtain insurance at bank’s promise; should they rely when their contract states they must get insurance?
- Bank argues Shoemaker didn’t rely because they weren’t going to get insurance anyway
- Elements 2 & 3 --> detrimental reliance
- Injustice avoided only by enforcement
- May be when parties do not negotiate in good faith or when parties are not equally sophisticated
- Pop’s Cones – Resorts negotiated behind their back while they were relying; Pop’s lost 2 years worth of business; Resorts took advantage of Pop’s with their greater bargaining power
- No injustice when promise that falls apart is part of your everyday job
- Berryman v. Kmoch – Kmoch as an investor in real estate knows what can go wrong with real estate deals
- Losing livelihood/home can constitute injustice
- Kirksey v. Kirksey, Greiner v. Greiner – plaintiff is homeless
- Katz v. Danny Dare – loss of pension when employee is too old to return to full-time work
- Shoemaker – plaintiffs are homeless and still have their mortgage to pay; consider reasonableness; homeowners were in best position to avoid this type of loss
- Wright v. Newman – loss of child support, inability to find real father, loss of father-child relationship
- BU v. King – BU’s energy/money wasted; they lose future earnings
- Within the family
- Gratuitous promise is unenforceable.
- Kirksey v. Kirksey – brother-in-law’s promise to give land is revocable; it was only a condition on the gift that Mrs. Kirksey had to move; case brought in anti-women’s rights time period
- Other courts find promise in family enforceable.
- Greiner v. Greiner – promissory estoppel does apply when mom promises son land; even though son may not have relied to his detriment; he may have received a benefit and been better off
- Moral argument sometimes made to justify enforceable promise.
- Wright v. Newman – immoral to let male partner renounce his voluntary obligation of fatherhood after 10 years
- Charitable subscriptions
- §90(2) eliminates reliance requirement (element 3); most courts do not adopt
- King v. Trustees of BU – promissory estoppel found where BU relied on King’s promise to donate his papers
- Bailor-bailee relationship – bailor passes possession but not ownership
- King – King, bailee, passes his papers to BU, bailor
- Commercial context
- Promises of pensions can be enforceable
- Katz v. Danny Dare–employee became permanently disabled for company; unfair to leave him with nothing
- Any change of position is sufficient to invoke promissory estoppel
- Vastoler – can even be financially beneficial; employee promised pension for promotion, which brought added stress and responsibility
- Promise by a mortgagee to obtain insurance are potentially actionable
- Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank – bank “promised” to get insurance via letter and phone call; didn’t specify duration; then house burns down when there wasn’t actually insurance
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment– liability for benefits received