Securities Regulation 2005

Table of Contents

Introduction

Regulation

Provincial Regulation

National v. Provincial Regulator

Foundational Concepts:

Prospectus Process

Exempt Market Transactions

Continuous Disclosure

Corporate Governance

Insider Trading

Takeover Bids

Civil Liability

Enforcement

Introduction

Prospectus (stages)

  1. Preliminary (red herring)
  2. Get receipt from regulator
  3. Waiting period
  4. Register securities
  5. Start doing advertising
  6. Do “road shows” to get interest in offering
  7. Make revisions
  8. Haven’t decided on price at this point
  9. Final prospectus
  10. Distribute

Then becomes a public company:

  1. Reporting issuer
  2. Obligation to file reports and documents
  3. Need an auditor, lawyer
  4. Must hold annual meetings
  5. Deal w/ shareholders
  6. May want to issue dividends
  7. Need board of directors
  8. Corporate governance
  9. Management is now an insider  risk b/c must not disclose or sell shares based on info
  10. Civil liability to public/ shareholders

If need more money can do secondary offering (Secondary Market)

-initial offering is Primary Market

-Secondary Market is b/n public

-Want deep secondary market and liquid

Registrants

-“gatekeepers”

-accountants, lawyers, broker dealers, sales people

Regulation

Pros and Cons of national regulation:

Con to decentralized reg

-if bad actor in one prov can move to another prov

Pro

-more tuned to specific market in prov (eg. tech, mining)

-“multiple laboratories” to run experiments to see what works best

Provincial Regulation

R v. W. McKenzie

 does not matter where you are located, must register where you want to trade

F: securities broker out of Ont, investor from Man – buys securities – Ont charged w/ unlawfully trading in Man b/c not registered in Man – accused argued Man act didn’t apply b/c fed jurisdiction (interprov trade)

H:

-Man sec Act not designed to regulate interprov trade

-P&S (intent test) is not to regulate outside prov

-Can’t trade in securities in Man unless registered in Man (prov/prov tension)

A:

-increases power of provs to regulate what goes on in prov

-doesn’t matter where business is, must register everywhere want to sell securities

Quebec v. OSC (Asbestos)

 regulator can reach outside its province to enforce a law that affects investors in their jurisdiction

-flip side of McKenzie case

F:

-const valid Act

-has effects outside region

I:

-can regulator reach outside jurisdiction

H:

-only law of Ont is the question in Ont

-it would be wrong if Ont had to figure out these other effects when enacting law

-Ont can enforce Act generally in its own prov

-Ontario can regulate Quebec co in Ont jurisdiction if co acting in Ont capital markets

National v. Provincial Regulator

Wise Persons’ Committee Report

-most ambitious proposal

-no longer opt-in

-invites constitutional clash

-components

  • new securities legislation at national level
  • new CSC (administration) run federally
  • find common threads b/n provs regulations
  • regulated by single CSC w/ nine representatives from different regions
  • amendments to leg done through majority of provs representatives
  • in Ottawa as opposed to Toronto
  • new policy committee
  • designed to address various concerns
  • accountability
  • more responsive to regional concerns and fed gov’t representation concerns
  • various offices

-concerns

  • whether it will happen
  • passport system

WPC

-6 reasons why better than passport system (p. 73-74)

  • policy development
  • fees for jurisdictions centralized
  • accountability b/c all regions components of system
  • passport system not a significant improvement in regulation

Passport System

-described by Harris to have all advantages of WPC report

  • single regulator contact
  • local presence
  • ease of implementation

-criticism

  • doesn’t protect investors in place of trading (eg. case from last day)

Fortier (p. 75)

WPC

-whether Parliament has power to enact

  • yes, fed trade and commerce
  • must be of national concern

-want provs to agree

-if one or more provs don’t go along, do feds have power to use paramountcy

  • Fortier says yes

-Multiple Access v. McCutcheon case is important

-Argument that feds and provs have joint jurisdiction

-McIntosh says will have another fed layer

How Securities Markets Structured

3 levels:

-Global

  • Global capital markets have generated competition for capital
  • Countries compete for global capital
  • Canada is currently only 3% global
  • Must be protected
  • Must have efficient procedures in place
  • William Hess
  • Technology has provided cheaper access to capital markets
  • Erasing boundaries of regional and national capital markets
  • Permitted 24/7 trading

-National Scope

  • P89-91 WPC benefits of national v. prov regulator
  • Foreign investment – possibly should be national regulator
  • Bond market mostly in cdn gov’t bonds
  • Capital in Canada is very concentrated
  • Small number of companies contain most capital

-Regional Markets

  • Poonam Puri
  • LICR’s (local infrastructures for capital raising)
  • Alta for oil and gas, BC for micro-cap issuers, Ont for financial services
  • Localized markets but not good enough reason for prov regulations b/c stocks trade nationally
  • National v. centralized  84% of entrepreneurs and raising capital reside in same prov  argument for centralized?

Primary Markets

-primary market transaction, called a distribution , takes effect where the issuer sells its own securities or sells them through the services of an underwriter

-eg. IPO

-Prospectus – document containing comprehensive disclosure

-Follow-on – raising additional capital

Secondary Markets

-in which shares and other securities are traded after being issued by the issuer for the first time

Marketplace Operation

-an exchange, a quotation and trade reporting system (QTRS), or an alternative trading system (ATS)

-refer back to p19-21 Numbering System for Policy Reformulation Project

  • so many  have a numbering system for these national instruments

Marketplace

ExchangesQTRSATS (National Instrument 21-101)

National Instrument 21 – 101 talks about exchanges, QTRS and ATS

Exchanges

-provides a listing function

-must enter into agreement w/ exchange

-guarantees a two sided market

-“market makers” ensure always a buyer for a seller

-make money on the spread (what they buy at and what they sell at)

-can impose fines, pull you from market, etc

QTRS (quotation and trade reporting systems)

-provides price quotations and reports

-can set own rules

ATS (alternative trading system)

-can’t provide quotations

-can’t set own rules

SRO (self-regulating organizations)

-required to maintain records

-can make rules and regulations

-eg. exchanges

National instrument 23-101

-sets trading rules

-eg. closing times (hard closes)

-“double jeopardy”

  • if being regulated by prov and exchange, must follow exchange

To monitor people following rules (Exchange or QTRS):

-do it yourself

-farm it out to a regulation services provider

-ATS must farm it out to a regulation services provider (the rules set out in 23-101 – ie. not their own rules)

Market regulation services inc.

-regulation service provider

-“RS”

Regulation Service Provider (RS)

-regulatory outsourcing

-not independent actors

-enforcing rules exchanges and QTRS’s are giving them

-owned by TSX and IDA

Securities Regulators

-regulating the whole marketplace

-delegate to exchanges, QTRS and ATS

Other SRO’s:

-IDA (investment dealers association)

-MFDA (mutual fund dealers association)

IOSCO (international order of securities commissions)

-like the united nations of securities regulators

CSA (Canadian Securities Administrators)

-forum for different regulators to meet to talk about things like national regulation

-coordinative

-deal w/ securities regulators

-don’t have any powers

TSX (main exchange in Canada)

-senior equities (big companies)

-went public in 2002 (spun off its RS)

TSX Venture

-until 2001 was the Canadian Venture Exchange

-microcap and small cap issuers

-head office in Calgary now (was in Vancouver)

Bourse (Quebec)

-canada’s oldest exchange

-deals in derivatives

-derivatives

  • futures, options
  • Options
  • Deal that you will buy or sell a stock at a particular date and price
  • Futures
  • Binds person to a price
  • Used to hedge investments (balancing risk)

CNQ (canadian trading a quotation system)

-became an exchange in 2004

-aimed at early stage companies

-have market makers

-all automatic based on limit orders

NASDAQ Canada

QTRS

-there are no QTRS’s now

-there was one but now an exchange (CNQ)

ATS

-tons of them in the US

-eg. E-trade, Ameritrade

-in Canada  Instinet

p. 112-122

Securities Regulators

Pearson v. Boliden

-securities laws like consumer protection laws

-if you are BC resident you can sue under BC law and bring action in BC

-means nothing for harmonization and passport system (MI 11-101)

-prov regulator has ability to protect their own

Chart (p. 117)

Key to note:

-Commission on top and then staff

Commission

-appointed

-make policy decisions

-ultimately responsible for all decisions regulators make

-does registration for companies, brokers, dealers

-can investigate (can supine documents, etc)

-strong public interest power (ie. can wade in if public interest concern)

-enforcement

-rule-making power

Staff

-lots of sections: enforcement, risk analysis, etc

-do the work of the commission

Mutual Reliance Review System (MRRS)

-as of today (sept 19, 2005) augmented by MI 11-101

-different securities regulators have reached agreement to have principal regulator system

-similar to passport system

-biggest problem: multilateral, not national (ie. Ont is not participating b/c don’t want momentum for passport system)

Distinction b/n regulation and punitive

-public interest power is regulatory and not penal

-protection of investors and efficiency of markets

-preventive in perspective and not punitive  forward looking

Asbestos v. OSC

-prior jurisprudence

-s. 127

  • seriousness and severity of the sanction
  • effect of that sanction on efficiency and public confidence
  • reluctance to use open-ended powers
  • powers were preventative and not remedial

-found it was not justified

-if connection to your jurisdiction is not so strong then shouldn’t use broad, sweeping powers

-what does it say about harmonization?

  • Anti-harmonization
  • If reason to not use sweeping powers is b/c somebody else might say something different

-What does it say about investors? For minority shareholders?

  • Not a good decision for them b/c they are not being protected by their own Act
  • Said they were mislead

-OSC – it is an attempt to put the brake on things

Re Cartaway

-insider trading fraud case

-Cartaway was a mining co – announced a huge fined in Boisy Bay – share price soared overnight – insiders traded Cartaway shares made $5 million – find wasn’t real – share price went down to $1 from in the $20’s – securities commission hit them w/ the biggest fine

-Reason: general deterrence, protecting securities market (general interest power)

-Issue: can court use general deterrence to impose fine?

-S. 162 Securities Act

  • Power to impose penalties up to $100,000
  • Now it is $250,000

-R: endorse Asbestos case

  • Find general deterrence is appropriate and maybe even necessary for prevention

RS (Market Regulation Services Inc)

-owned jointly by TSX and IDA

-rules  UMIR (Universal Market Integrity Rules)

  • developed primarily by TSX
  • apply to exchanges and ATS’s

-follow insider trading, how the shares are trading, etc

-note: the securities commissions of the provs still look after prospectuses, etc

Clearing houses

-work w/ exchanges

-process trades

-validation – buyer has money in bank, etc

Financial professionals

- IDA, MFDA

CPAB

-regulate financial market professionals that make things run smoothly

-gatekeepers

Critiques

-4 initiatives

  • Uniform legislation
  • WPC
  • Passport system
  • BC Securities Act

Uniform Legislation project

-run by Canadian securities regulators (CSA)

-goal: a model Act or set of rules that provs can implement themselves

-talking about harmonization and not substantial change (not from ground up)

-platform piece of legislation b/c then can change as fast as capital markets change

  • also, platform leg’n lets off steam b/n different prov rules
  • different provs can then act w/ their own prov rules but still agree w/ platform leg’n

-similar to Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the US

-like to see

  • ability to delegate to another regulator
  • streamline registration system
  • civil liability for secondary market participants

WPC

-will talk more about later

Passport System

-Sept 30, 2004 memorandum of understanding b/n provs except Ontario

-Newfoundland dropped out and new Brunswick joined

-MI 11-101

-Territories and PEI are participating but not signed on

-One stop shop for regulators  only file prospectuses w/ one prov regulator

-Still have to pay fees to every prov and follow each prov’s rules

-The host prov regulator is still responsible for enforcement

-Host

  • Where may be doing business other than in primary jurisdiction
  • Still pay fees to all host regulators (provs)

-Primary

  • Use indicators (head office location, where incorporated, where primary business centered) to determine who is primary regulator

-Requires some harmonization of prov laws

Note: (differ from passport system)

MRRU system worked for exemption for requirements

-could apply for exemptions

-narrower than Passport System (memorandum)

-Passport system is a mandatory reliance system (ie. once agreed, not supposed to opt out)

BC approach to securities law reform

-outcome based approach

-getting rid of detailed rules that have plugged up system

-streamlined  back to first principles

-idea: rolling rules to see what works

-substantive overhaul of securities regulation

-based on same fundamental principles

-reduce cost of compliance and increase investor protection

-five major changes

  • continuous market access
  • when you issue securities for the first time must file prospectus but then not again
  • creating code of conduct for advisors to replace detailed rules of procedure
  • firm only registration (brokers, dealers, advisors)
  • cost savings for firm
  • as of Aug, decided not to do this! (the book is not up to date)
  • ???
  • increased enforcement powers
  • fines are higher – want to be able to fine $1,000,000
  • broader powers to ban people from being directors, etc

-people are worried that this may lead to less investor protection and not more

-may create less certainty for investors

  • don’t know what you can and can’t do
  • this system has a lot of vague wording (eg. “inappropriate”, “inadequate”)

Foundational Concepts:

-security

-trade

-distribution

-investment K

***Note: refer to “Essentials” notes

Subject to disclosure requirements:

-Must be a security, must be a trade, must be a distribution and must be a reporting issuer

SEC v. Howey

-SEC wanted to stop Howey from selling land and marketing product to public

-Howey – owns land

-Howey-Hills – services

-Investor could buy piece of land and can also get second K to service land and sell fruit for profit although did not have to get service K

-People invested in this in expectation of profit

-Co found customers through resort next door and through the mail

-Get under Fed umbrella by doing cross state activities like using the mail

-Issue: whether this whole sale and service K is considered an “investment K” which falls under securities regulation, s. 2(1)

-Analysis:

  • Use broad “purposive” approach to protect investor
  • Look at blue sky laws in the states
  • Def’n (p. 193): K, transaction or scheme whereby person invests money in common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from efforts of promoter or 3rd party
  • Court: doesn’t matter if shares are evidenced by formal certificates or not
  • Court: it is more than just buying fee simple in land
  • Court: relative that investors were out of state, not farmers and expecting profit
  • Court: does not matter that not everybody bought whole package, co cannot offer the package (security)

-Important: flexible way to interpret regulations to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits

-If you are going to solicit money from people you have obligations

-test for existence of investment K:

  1. a K, transaction or scheme, whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a 3rd party

State of Hawaii v. Hawaii Market Center

-“risk capital” case

-state law case

-not bound by Howey case b/c not interpreting fed law (Howey was a state decision)

-combination b/n co-op and “pyramid” scheme

-retail store catering to members needed to raise money so recruited founder members (distributors and supervisors)

-distributors must put in $320 for a sewing machine ($70 wholesale value)

-supervisors pay $820 for sewing machine and cookware set

-founder members get commissions and payments when others join

-Issue: is this an investment K?

-Court: Broaden def’n from Howey so that “solely” is not read so narrowly

-Court: Advocate a more purposive approach

-Look at:

  • Statute – broad protection to investors
  • Remedial purposes of Act – meant to be interpreted broadly b/c meant to fix a problem (if read narrowly then undermine purposes)
  • Economic realities of transactions – more creative people get the more important it is to have broad def’n to catch them

-“investment K”  the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment in an enterprise

-K created whenever:

  • Offeree furnishes intial value to offeror
  • Portion of initial value is subject to risks of enterprise
  • Initial value is induced by offeror’s promises of benefit
  • Offeree does not receive right to exercise practical managerial control of enterprise

-How much involvement can you have before you fall outside of def’n?

  • P. 199 no power to influence the utilization of the accumulated capital nor any authority over decisions which affect operation of enterprise

-Fixed returns on money – doesn’t matter whether fixed

Pacific Coast Coin Exchange v. OSC

-offer bags of silver coins

-buy on margin or not

-pamphlet comes w/ investment saying how risky it is and that it is an “investment” saying price of silver will go up and good hedge against inflation

-to get out of K must sell to co offering coins and they take a commission on both ends