Introduction to Political Science Methods, and Data I

Support for Strong Non-democratic Leadership and Confusion with Democracy: Explaining Variation in Support for NAFTA in Mexico

Introduction to Political Science Methods, and Data I

December 14, 2015

Abstract

This paper examines Mexican citizens’ confidence level in NAFTA using the 2010-2014 wave of the World Values Survey. While previous literature on citizen support for Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) has found that identity and cultural factors play a major role (Rankin 2004, Inglehart 1996), and that support for other institutions is closely related few have considered the psychology behind preference for the more simple direct decision making process they represent. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, (2001) found that U.S. citizens do not like democratic deliberation. This distaste for the democratic process could cause RTA support. I find a positive relationship between support for a strong unaccountable leader and confidence in NAFTA after controlling for the factors of tendency to approve and North American Identity. I also find that being confused about what democracy means is positively related to confidence in NAFTA after controlling. My analysis provides further evidence for the global trend in democratic backsliding in favor of more efficient decision making and I contribute that RTAs are another manifestation of public desire for results rather than democratic process.

In recent decades Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) have become not only nearly ubiquitous but also increasingly powerful (diao et al. 2002). The EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, the Arab league, and the like are drivers of increased regional economic (and sometimes other) integration. They have shown reasonable effectiveness at preventing regional conflict and facilitating growth (Martin et al., 2012). As their bodies of policy become increasingly large, the impact their policy has on citizens in the region increases. Such regional organizations are a major instance of globalization’s reach in the 21st century.

RTA’s are commonly criticized for their lack of democratic accountability (Lord, 2008). They tend to be lead efficiently rather than democratically. Therefore, we would expect for citizens with high levels of support for democracy to be more likely to dislike RTAS. Yet many RTA’s claim that they promote democracy in their member states and in many developing countries, such a Mexico, the case I shall examine, political discourse about joining an RTA has been inextricably linked with the goal of a more democratic regime type. Before NAFTA was ratified, many Mexicans believed that the foreign direct investment and other growth creating benefits would help end Mexico’s one party rule (Castañeda, 1993).

This creates a major puzzle. Would we expect democrats to support or oppose RTAs? In this paper, I hypothesis that those who would support a strong non-democratic leader are more likely to support NAFTA because they find the efficient, non-deliberative process, refreshingly expedient. I global trend seems to exist toward efficient leadership styles at the expense of democratic process (Freedom House, 2013, Sinykin, 2015).

Additionally, I expect that for those respondents who do not understand the nature of democracy an RTA will be more appealing than for those who understand democracy. This is because they find democratic deliberation confusing and unnecessary since they do not understand its purpose or meaning. Compared to the public discourse in domestic democracy the closure and certainty that NAFTA brings about policy will be desirable for those who are confused with democracy.

This study is worth doing because it helps us understand what causes support for globalization. For the average citizen, RTAs are among the most obvious, unified, and relevant institutions that represent globalization. They are also a policy choice by the national government, taken with or without public approval. This is important, because unlike the actions of Multinational Corporations or more global International Governmental Organizations, RTAs are much more well-known to citizens and likely to be influenced by national governments. Citizen approval for RTAs is one good way of examining approval of globalization.

It is important to understand what circumstances lead to citizens feeling that globalization is favorable or unfavorable. Many extremist movements, instances of xenophobia, and other violent political events are a result of citizens disapproving of globalization in one way or another. Bussmann and Schneider (2007) show that globalization can cause violent instability within a country when those who perceive themselves as being hurt by changes are likely to become politically violent. Similarly, Appadurai (1998) shows that interethnic violence intensifies and becomes more rage-driven as a result of globalization. Again, the conflict is initiated by those who feel uncertain about the future under the context of globalization. Understanding why citizens hold these feelings toward globalization may help explain these reactions and ultimately aid in preventing ethnic violence and instability.

Confidence in RTAs has primarily been explained through economic and cultural lenses. The material gain of a respondent from globalization has been shown to be a major predictor of support. Those with more openness to diversity and other cultures also have a higher level of confidence while those with more national pride are less likely to have

It is well documented that those who support one institution are more likely to support others(Easton, 1975). Therefore I have developed a measure of tendency to support institutions in order to control for this trait and see the relationship between regime type support and confidence in NAFTA without this spurious relationship.

Understanding the relationship between levels of support for democracy and RTAs in the context of developing economies and democratizing countries is vital for understanding development and democracy. It is normatively desirable for development and democratization to occur simultaneously. We need to know whether RTA’s are as good for democratic consolidation as they can be for trade. New democracies are the victims of the perverse fact that they have finally emerged as democracies at the time when their national sovereignty and therefore democracy will mean the least. In order to understand support for globalization we need to see if citizens have noticed and are upset by this situation.

If citizens view open trade and RTAs as compatible with democracy then this will look favorably for the international trend toward RTAs. However, if citizens do not see the two as compatible it will be negative for both the RTAs and the health of democracy. It would mean that governments had to make a conscious choice in rhetoric between the importance of free trade versus democracy and it could even lead to social unrest. This paper hopes to shed light on the relationship between being a democrat and having confidence in RTAs.

Explanation of Case Selection:

I will use the 2010-2014 Mexican section of the World Values Survey as my data in this analysis because Mexico is an interesting and helpful case to explore. Mexico is a recently democratized developing country. This makes it a perfect place to analyze citizens’ views on globalization and their new democracy. NAFTA was signed in 1994 by a non-democratically elected Mexican government, since the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) did not lose their single party control until 1997 (Polity IV). NAFTA is therefore not necessarily a democratically chosen institution from the perspective of a Mexican citizen. Mexico’s position in NAFTA is also especially weak because of the considerable power and economic differences between Mexico and its neighbors to the north. Mexico’s executive therefore lacks bargaining power and has little control over the terms of NAFTA. For example “Various proposals have been placed on the table to transfer resources from NAFTA-winners to NAFTA-losers: border transaction taxes, a windfall profit tax, a North American development bank, a European-style regional fund scheme and a deeper reduction in Mexico’s debt, among others. These proposals are viable because their proponents come from the two wealthier nations, who would have to foot most of the bill” (Castañeda, 1993). In other words, Mexico is widely assumed to be a NAFTA loser. Yet, public opinion within Mexico regarding NAFTA varies widely. Understanding why these citizens might approve or disapprove of a regional free trade zone will shed light on how citizens come to see themselves as winners or losers in globalization.

The World Values Survey is a good data set to use in exploring this question because it asks citizens about specific regime type preferences, policy and values and detailed demographic information. It asks about confidence in a wide range of institutions, identities, and experiences and this provides detailed information for all my variables, including tendency to support institutions. It also delves deeply into citizens’ views of regime type, which can help us to understand the relationship between globalization and democracy for Mexican citizens.

Measuring Confidence in NAFTA

The World Values Survey asks respondents to describe their confidence in the RTA in which they reside. The question reads: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?” Then NAFTA is listed as one of the organizations when interviewing North American respondents. This provides a measure for confidence in NAFTA.

This question is a valid measure for a variety of reasons. The question asks about confidence, which is different from support in important ways. Support would mean you agree with the existence and the policy of NAFTA. However, I am not interested in if a citizen supported the original creation of NAFTA or approves of its specific policy. I want to know if they view this organization as legitimate now, almost twenty years after its signing, and if they have faith in the institutional process to make policy. Confidence suggests faith in the process of this international institution rather than support for creating it or its policies themselves.

It also gives no middle option; the respondent is required to answer either in a positive or a negative way. Four categories give us more valid data and more information than if it were a binary question. Understanding that citizens in general know very little about NAFTA, I am not going to include the “Don’t Know” or missing responses in my analysis. Given the low information most citizens seem to have about NAFTAand politics in general (Converse,1964, Rankin, 2004), it seems that to assign ambiguous responses to the middle of the scale would be invalid. With higher levels of political information they might be able to tell us if they have confidence or not. With 2,000 observations, missing this data will not hurt my analysis.

Figure 1. Distribution of Confidence in NAFTA

How much confidence do you have in NAFTA? / Percent that answered
None at all / 26.7%
Not very much / 35.6%
Quite a lot / 28.5%
A Great Deal / 9.2%

As you can see from Figure 1, NAFTA is not particularly popular in Mexico. A majority, 62.3% of respondents, had either no confidence at all or not very much, and only 37.7% had quite a lot or a great deal of confidence. Given that Mexico is generally perceived to be, as a country, the single loser of NAFTA, this is unsurprising (Castañeda, 1993). Still, there is a great deal of variation. The mean is 2.2 and the standard deviation is 0.93. We have enough variation to explain in order to conduct this analysis.

Existing explanations for RTA Support:

Identity Related Concepts

In a study of North American public opinion in all three countries Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basanez (1996) concluded that "free trade does not attract widespread public interest because the general public has suddenly developed a new appreciation for the intricacies of comparative economic advantage.... Free trade galvanizes public concern for a much wider set of issues, such as cultural integrity and national identity" (166). This hypothesis would say that support for trade organizations is actually about culture and identity rather than trade attitudes.

A large amount of the scholarship regarding attitudes toward NAFTA has beenconducted with Canadian and U.S. American respondents. Rankin’s Comparative study (2004) of U.S. American and Canadian public opinions on NAFTA found that “symbolic conceptions of national identity” were the greatest predictor of approval for NAFTA. He argues that these symbolic ideas help voters form policy positions in an environment with extremely limited information, and will have more explanatory power than self interest in trade(Rankin 2004). For both U.S. and Canadian respondents identities were important for predicting views of NAFTA in three ways: views of “North American” culture and unity, national pride, and openness to cultural diversity. These three concepts were stronger predictors of confidence in NAFTA than views on trade or social class. I will test to see if Mexican respondents share this pattern (Rankin 2004).

Mexican National Pride

This aspect of symbolic national identity is national pride. Rankin claims “Patriotism is a commonly identified dimension of national identity, composed of emotional attachment and devotion to one's country and its symbols”(337). It is hypothesized that a high level of patriotism will be related to low rates of confidence in NAFTA.

This variable is measured with the question: “How proud are you to be Mexican? Very proud, Quite proud, Not very proud, Not at all proud, I am not Mexican.” This question gives a gradient of options. It does come with the common problem that respondents may feel that they are obligated to give the interviewer a “correct” answer and will therefore say that they are more proud than they really are. However, generally, this question has excellent face validity and is worded in the way a typical citizens is likely to think about the concept.

Openness to cultural heterogeneity

The second variable Rankin uses is openness to cultural heterogeneity. This is relevant to attitudes of NAFTA because for many the concept of free trade is connected to increased immigration and the introduction of foreign cultures. Rankin explains that, “the liberalization of national borders exposes the nation's distinctive cultural attributes to diverse linguistic, ethnic, and immigrant influences, which may activate a cultural dimension of national identity in the symbolic processing of NAFTA” (337). Those who are more open to different identities and cultures will be more likely to support NAFTA. Rankin also states that “NAFTA's perceived impact on domestic culture and sovereignty”has been particularly important to the opposition of NAFTA and has been an emotional component to the debate in general(Rankin, 2004 338).

The question used to code openness to cultural heterogeneity is as follows: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?”Groups are coded dicotimously as mentioned or not mentioned. The groups listed are “people of a different race, Immigrants/foreign workers, people of a different religion, people who speak a different language.” I code this as a count of how many of these groups were not mentioned, meaning high values on this variable mean higher openness to cultural heterogeneity. I recognize that there is an argument to be made for including other groups such as those with HIV, homosexuals, unmarried couples, etc. However, I feel that the concept we want to get at here is about an openness to foreign cultures while sexual orientation etc. are not identities that are made more prevalent as borders become more porous. This measurement is most consistent with Rankin’s conceptualization of openness to cultural heterogeneity.

North American Identity

Rankin’s third dimension of identity that predicted confidence in NAFTA was identification with North America. It makes perfect sense that those who see themselves as citizens of a North America that is unified on some level will be more supportive of a regional free trade agreement. This not only makes sense symbolically but also instrumentally, as cultural goods from the co-member countries will be cheaper and more easily available as a result of NAFTA.

The World Values Survey measures identification with North America by proposing the statement “I see myself as a citizen of North America” and the options “strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.” This question has good face validity because it does not ask about NAFTA as a free trade agreement but rather the continent as a potential community. This helps maintain separability with the dependent variable.

The Tendency to Support Institutions

It iswidely understood that confidence in any institution is largely “related to confidence in other institutions”(Price and Romantan2004, Easton 1975). It is even unclear whether citizens are aware where the outputs of governments come from and therefore are able to separate the support for a single institution from support for the entire political system (Easton 1975). I will control for the tendency of individual respondents to answer questions of the survey in the affirmative. This will be important because those with this tendency will be both more likely to have confidence in NAFTA and more likely to answer in the affirmative to the rest of my independent variables. We don’t want this personality trait clouding the relationship between NAFTA and support for other things like strong authoritarian leadership, etc.