Keeping China at Bay: the US-India Nuclear Deal

Keeping China at bay: the US-India Nuclear Deal

Tim Beal

US attempts to construct and consolidate an alliance to contain China’s seemingly inexorable rise registered another milestone on 16 November 2006 with the Senate passing its bill to allow the government to transfer nuclear fuel and technology to India.[1] The nuclear deal with India flies in the face of long-standing US rhetoric about nuclear proliferation and is yet another blow for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. India had fused to sign the NPT because it decided it needed nuclear weapons. Pakistan, with good reason, did the same and they are the only two declared-nuclear states outside the Treaty. Israel, which is commonly supposed to have nuclear weapons, but which refuses either to confirm or deny, is also not a signatory.[2]North Korea was a member but withdrew in 2003 after the Bush Administration tore up the Agreed Framework which had been signed by the Clinton Administration in 1994.[3]

The NPT, originally signed in 1968, is basically a deal – a ‘grand bargain’ between the then nuclear weapons states (NWS) –United States, USSR, UK, France, and China – and the non nuclear weapons states.[4] It has ‘three pillars’ – non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.[5] Under the terms of the deal ,the non-NWS committed themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons and the NWS promised not to transfer weapons technology to non-NWS, to assist them to develop nuclear energy, and to move towards nuclear disarmament themselves.[6] Nuclear disarmament has become an empty promise and Kofi Annan has recently pointed out that for many non-nuclear states, ‘the NPT “grand bargain” has become a swindle. They note that the UN Security Council has often described the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a threat to international peace and security, but has never declared that nuclear weapons in and of themselves are such a threat. They see no serious movement towards nuclear disarmament, and claim that the lack of such movement presages a permanent “apartheid” between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” ‘[7] The US is developing new technologies, and adopting new nuclear doctrines.[8] Britain is hastening to replace its Trident missiles, leased from the US, with a new generation of nuclear weapons.[9] Russia has recently re-iterated that it must remain a major nuclear power.[10] The recent US-India deal is a further blow to the NPT.

To a large extent, India is a victim of timing, of just being a bit late for a crucial deadline. Had it been a nuclear weapons state when the NPT was being negotiated it would have become a member of the club and this particular issue would not have arisen. China got in just in time (1964) , India didn’t (1974).[11] The deal with the US gives it, in effect, retrospective membership. As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted in an address to the Indian parliament, ‘the United States implicitly acknowledged the existence of our nuclear weapons programme. There was also public recognition that as a responsible State with advanced nuclear technologies, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other States which have advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. The Joint Statement offered the possibility of decades-old restrictions being set aside to create space for India’s emergence as a full member of a new nuclear world order.’[12]

There has been a degree of opposition in the United States to the agreements with India deal. For example, in an op-ed in the Washington Post, former President Jimmy Carter was scathing about the ‘dangerous deal with India’.[13] It has frequently been said that the Administration would have a hard time pushing through something which was so flagrantly in conflict with its posturing on proliferation. Steven Weisman in the New York Times predicted that: ‘In concluding its nuclear deal with India, the Bush Administration faces significant opposition in Congress and tough questions from its allies on whether the arrangement could set a precedent encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons to Iran and other potential foes of the United States.’[14] But when it came to it, this ‘significant opposition’ faded away like the morning mist. In the Senate on 17 November it was decided by 85 votes to 12 that, in the words ofa New York Times correspondent, the ‘goal of nurturing India as an ally outweighed concerns over the risks of spreading nuclear skills and bomb-making materials.’[15]

The House passed its legislation in July, and the language of the two versions will need to be reconciled, but that will not be a major hindrance. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also has to fall in line. The IAEA administers the safeguards system of the NPT so being part of an arrangement which extends the benefits of NPT membership to a country which refused to sign the treaty cuts across that role. However, any embarrassment is likely to be temporary and Secretary-General Mohamed ElBaradei has already welcomed the US-India deal on the curious grounds that, “It would be a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime”.[16]

Why was the Bush Administration so keen to do a deal, and why did opposition melt away so easily?

Firstly, India is the second fastest growing major economy in the world. According to the CIA its real GDP grew 7.6% in 2005, not far behind China’s 9.3% and over twice America’s 3.5%.[17] It is also, again according to the CIA, the fourth largest economy in the world on a purchasing power parity basis (China comes in a number two) and accounted for 1.1% of world imports. So India, in general, is a large and increasingly attractive market and economic partner.

The nuclear industry itself is big business and when they talk of ‘nuclear transfer’ they really mean sell. Then there are armaments of many different kinds. India is a major military power, with an appetite to match. In 2005 it was the largest buyer of arms in the developing world with purchases of US$5.4 billion. Russia, to America’s chagrin, was the largest seller to the developing world, and India is its principal market. [18] All this, the administration hopes, will change. According to the BBC, ‘US officials secretly admit they hope the nuclear deal will sweeten the Indian government in talks over a whopping $6bn contract to buy 124 fighter aircraft from America.’[19]

None of this, of course, will have any relationship with proliferation, because that is what countries like Russia, China, and North Korea do, not the United States. However, it is pertinent to recall that Bill Clinton, in his State of the Union speech in 1999 proclaimed, “We must increase our efforts to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons and missiles, from [North] Korea to India and Pakistan.”[20] The past is very much a different country.

But this is all about much more than money, though that is an important part of it. The US-India strategic relationship – and that’s what they are calling it - gives the US leverage over India in so many ways, or so it is hoped in Washington, and feared in Delhi. The Communist Party of India, a junior partner in Singh’s coalition government, has warned that , ‘the strategic relationship only means that India will be part of the US strategies of global policing and undermine its role in international politics and its resolve to promote multilateralism in international relations.’[21] United Progressive Alliance Chairperson Sonia Gandhi said that the UPA, and the Congress party, would not accept anything outside the original agreement of 18 July 2005. [22] One huge danger, which for obvious reasons is seldom articulated in public, is that India will become embroiled in America’s anti-Islamic crusade. India has, in the past, refused to send troops to Iraq, and that particular request is unlikely to surface again, because Indian troops going in would be passing American troops coming out, but as the relationship deepens, similar requests might be more difficult to reject.[23] 13.4% of India’s population is Muslim and inter-communal violence, and terrorism, is a constant concern.

At the moment it is unlikely that Washington is too anxious to deploy Indian troops, thought what may happen in the future is another matter; after all the British empire was sustained to quite a large degree by Indian forces, including in Iraq in an earlier invasion.[24] The US is after other things. Support against Iran, for one.

India has traditionally had good relations with Iran (it is a natural counterbalance to Pakistan). There are plans, discussed for a number of years, for a natural gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan. [25] The thought must produce palpitations in certain breasts in Washington; not merely would it provide revenue for Iran (and Pakistan), and give India (and Pakistan) a degree of energy security, away from the immediate attention of the US navy, but it would tie the three countries together in mutual benefit. Not the sort of scenario that would appeal to imperial planners whose basic strategy is divide and rule.

However for America, the real, and major, strategic target of the US-India relationship is China. How that will be implemented, and how successful it will be, is another matter. China has military, economic and diplomatic cards to play. India came off badly when it picked a fight with China in 1962. China overtook the US a couple of years ago as the major supplier to the Indian market. President Hu Jintao has just concluded a visit to South Asia where he appears to have pulled off quite an achievement in developing a better relationship with India without annoying Pakistan, something that Bush has not been able to do.[26] So the contest for India’s favour is by no means a forgone conclusion.

Nevertheless, there is a natural overlap between the strategic interests of India and America in respect of China. Any increase in India’s ability to project military power in Asia would probably be viewed favourably in Washington. The US-India agreements allow for closer cooperation in defense and in areas such as satellites and space exploration. It is not clear to what degree the US will help India develop its nuclear missile capability, and it will certainly not be made public. It is not the sort of thing that the fine words of the New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship of June 2005 mention.[27] A test in July of India’s Agni III missile, which has a design range of 3,500 kms, was not very successful, and it only reached 1000 kms.[28] Another test is scheduled for 2007 and this time it is claimed that a special steel will increase its design range between 15-30 per cent.[29] The distance between Delhi and Beijing is 3,800 kms so the improved Agni III, if successful, will bring all of China within range. How much help are Indian scientists getting from their new friends? We don’t know, but it is interesting to note that one area of missile cooperation the New Framework did specifically mention was ‘missile defense’. On November 27 India claimed to have successfully tested an anti-missile test, intercepting one (nuclear-capable) Prithvi with another.[30]

There are all sorts of ramifications to this developing US-India friendship. It impacts, for instance, on America’s relationship with Pakistan, and the US needs Pakistan in its increasingly difficulty struggle to control Afghanistan. However, this willingness to accept risk elsewhere indicates just how central is the containment of China to US strategic policy.

Tim Beal teaches at VictoriaUniversity of Wellington. He is the author of ‘North Korea: The Struggle Against American Power’ (Pluto Press, London and Ann Arbor) and is currently working on a study of the impact of China and India on international political economy. His personal site is at

"Agni missile to be tested next year: DRDO." Times of India, 9 November 2006.

Annan, Kofi. "Lecture at Princeton University calling for progress on both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation." United Nations, 28 November 2006.

Baruah, Amit "Government welcomes Senate vote " The Hindu, 18 November 2006.

Carter, Jimmy. "A Dangerous Deal With India." Washington Post, 29 March 2006.

Central Secretariat of the Communist Party of India. " New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship Criticized " PoliticalAffairs.net, 30 June 2005.

Clinton, Bill. "State of the Union." CNN, 19 January 1999.

Cohen, Avner. Israel and the Bomb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

ElBaradei, Mohamed "IAEA Director General Welcomes U.S. and India Nuclear Deal." International Atomic Energy Agency, 2 March 2006.

Gentleman, Amelia. "U.S. Senate Vote on Nuclear Deal Draws Guarded Praise by India " New York Times, 17 November 2006.

"India rejects Iraq troop request." BBC 2003.

"KCNA Report on Circumstances of DPRK’s Withdrawal From NPT." KCNA, 21 January 2003 2003.

Kortunov, Sergei "Russia must remain a major nuclear power." RIA Novosti, 27 November 2006.

Kristensen, Hans M. Global Strike Report: A Chronology of the Pentagon's new Offensive Strike Plan. Washington: Federation of American Scientists, 2006.

Linzer, Dafna. "Senate Backs White House Plan for India Nuclear Deal." Washington Post, 17 November 2006.

Malhotra, Jyoti. "Whoops of delight greet nuclear deal " BBC, 17 November 2006.

"New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship." Indian embassy, 28 June 2005.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] Federation of American Scientists, 2006 [Accessed 1 December 2006]. Available from

Nuclear Testing Chronology AtomicArchive.com, 2006 [Accessed 1 December 2006]. Available from

Parnohadiningrat, Sudjadnan "Opening Statement (2005 NPT Review Conference)." United Nations, 26 April 2004.

Pincus, Walter. "U.S. Plans to Modernize Nuclear Arsenal." Washington Post, 4 March 2006.

Rabinowitz, Gavin. "India Carries Out Anti-Missile Test." Washington Post, 27 November 2006.

Ramesh, Randeep. "Imperial history repeats itself." Guardian, 3 July 2003.

Reuters. "Hu Ends South Asian Trip Focused on Trade Diplomacy " New York Times, 26 November 2006.

Shanker, Thom. "Nuclear Deal With India Wins Senate Backing " New York Times, 17 November 2006.

———. "Russia Led Arms Sales to Developing World in ’05 " New York Times, 29 October 2006.

Singh, Manmohan. "Suo-motu Statement by the PM on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States." Indian Department of Atomic Energy, 27 February 2006.

"Top Indian scientists probe Agni-III glitch." Times of India, 10 July 2006.

Weisman, Steven R. "Dissenting on Atomic Deal With India " New York Times, 3 March 2006.

Wintour, Patrick. "Cabinet unites behind decision to seek Trident replacement." Guardian, 27 November 2006.

[1]Amelia Gentleman, "U.S. Senate Vote on Nuclear Deal Draws Guarded Praise by India " New York Times, 17 November 2006.

[2]Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

[3]"KCNA Report on Circumstances of DPRK’s Withdrawal From NPT," KCNA, 21 January 2003 2003.

[4]Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] (Federation of American Scientists, 2006 [accessed 1 December 2006]); available from

[5]Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat, "Opening Statement (2005 NPT Review Conference)," United Nations, 26 April 2004.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Kofi Annan, "Lecture at PrincetonUniversity calling for progress on both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation," United Nations, 28 November 2006.

[8]Hans M. Kristensen, Global Strike Report: A Chronology of the Pentagon's new Offensive Strike Plan (Washington: Federation of American Scientists, 2006), Walter Pincus, "U.S. Plans to Modernize Nuclear Arsenal," Washington Post, 4 March 2006. Kristensen, Global Strike Report: A Chronology of the Pentagon's new Offensive Strike Plan.

[9]Patrick Wintour, "Cabinet unites behind decision to seek Trident replacement," Guardian, 27 November 2006.

[10]Sergei Kortunov, "Russia must remain a major nuclear power," RIA Novosti, 27 November 2006.

[11]Nuclear Testing Chronology (AtomicArchive.com, 2006 [accessed 1 December 2006]); available from

[12]Manmohan Singh, "Suo-motu Statement by the PM on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States," Indian Department of Atomic Energy, 27 February 2006.

[13]Jimmy Carter, "A Dangerous Deal With India," Washington Post, 29 March 2006.

[14]Steven R. Weisman, "Dissenting on Atomic Deal With India " New York Times, 3 March 2006.

[15]Thom Shanker, "Nuclear Deal With India Wins Senate Backing " New York Times, 17 November 2006.

[16]Mohamed ElBaradei, "IAEA Director General Welcomes U.S. and India Nuclear Deal," International Atomic Energy Agency, 2 March 2006.

[17]CIA World Factbook, updated 29 March 2006, accessed 11 April 2006

[18]Thom Shanker, "Russia Led Arms Sales to Developing World in ’05 " New York Times, 29 October 2006.

[19]Jyoti Malhotra, "Whoops of delight greet nuclear deal " BBC, 17 November 2006.

[20]Bill Clinton, "State of the Union," CNN, 19 January 1999.

[21]Central Secretariat of the Communist Party of India, " New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship Criticized " PoliticalAffairs.net, 30 June 2005.

[22]Amit Baruah, "Government welcomes Senate vote " The Hindu, 18 November 2006.

[23]"India rejects Iraq troop request," BBC 2003.

[24]Randeep Ramesh, "Imperial history repeats itself," Guardian, 3 July 2003.

[25]Dafna Linzer, "Senate Backs White House Plan for India Nuclear Deal," Washington Post, 17 November 2006.

[26]Reuters, "Hu Ends South Asian Trip Focused on Trade Diplomacy " New York Times, 26 November 2006.

[27]"New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship," Indian embassy, 28 June 2005.

[28]"Top Indian scientists probe Agni-III glitch," Times of India, 10 July 2006.

[29]"Agni missile to be tested next year: DRDO," Times of India, 9 November 2006.

[30]Gavin Rabinowitz, "India Carries Out Anti-Missile Test," Washington Post, 27 November 2006.