Maori Kowledge, Language and Participation in Mathematics and Science Education

Maori Kowledge, Language and Participation in Mathematics and Science Education

Literature Review

Introduction

Debates about Maori knowledge, language and participation in mathematics and science education can be located within an international literature that explores the relationship between both indigenous and minority relationships with Western scientific and mathematical knowledge in a Western educational context. There is a large body of literature about the nature of science and mathematics with respect to culture. There is significant debate about the conception of science between ‘universalists’ and ‘multiculturalists’, with a systemic positioning at whatever point on the ‘universalist’/‘multiculuturalist’ continuum having significant pedagogic implications. A positioning on this continuum must be informed by a conception of the scientific and mathematical nature of traditional knowledge. There is a significant literature which considers the similarities and differences between Western Modern Science (WMS) and traditional indigenous knowledge bases. This debate is significant in terms of understanding the nature and extent of cognitive conflict for those who might experience a cultural conflict between the cultures of the home and school. It is also important when set alongside the relationship of the physical to the metaphysical in indigenous thought and the suggestion that conflict between the physical and metaphysical could make WMS threatening to indigenous cultures.

If it is accepted, as it is by several Maori scholars, that the threat of WMS to indigenous cultures is overstated and that Maori scientific and mathematical education is desirable issues of language, culture and pedagogy arise. There is a literature which argues strongly that Maori participation and performance in mathematics and science is undermined by low teacher efficacy and low student self-expectation, inadequate teacher subject, pedagogic and cultural knowledge and conflict between the culture of home and school. This Maori experience is consistent with those of both indigenous and other ethnic minority groups elsewhere and contributes to an explanation of why Maori achievement in the National Education Monitoring Project (NEMP) and the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) was poorer than that of other cultural groups in New Zealand.

There has been some research on successful teaching and professional development practices both in New Zealand and overseas which has implications for this project as well as work considering the impact on classroom practice of the language of instruction, indigenous knowledge and cultural stereotypes. It is strongly argued that when cultural stereotypes influence classroom practice there is created a significant barrier to Maori achievement.

Finally, there is a small but significant literature concerning what Maori want from mathematics and science generally in terms of the disciplines’ connections to Maori development and specifically what Maori want from mathematics and science education.

This review focuses specifically on Maori interests with supporting material from international contexts. It notes however the substantial review of Hipkins et al (undated) which considers New Zealand science education in a much wider sense than is the purpose of this review.

Indigenous Knowledge and Science and Mathematics Education

Universalist versus multiculturalist conceptions of science

Debate about the nature of science and whether it can properly be understood as a universal body of knowledge arises from ‘competing accounts of natural phenomena’(Cobern and Loving, 2000: 50).Irzik (2000: 71-72)explains that the debate between universalists and multiculturalists consists, on the one hand, of the universalist position that both scientific inquiry and scientific knowledge have a universal nature, found in Western Modern Science (WMS), which is ‘a far more superior form of knowledge than any other traditional sciences’. On the other hand, Irzik points out, is a multiculturalist position which dismisses the universalist assumption on philosophical, but also political and moral grounds, because it serves the ‘politics of exclusion’, and rejects any notion of alternative sciences ‘which suit the purposes of a “good life” better than WMS’ (Irzik, 2000: 71). Multiculturalists do not accept that science must by definition maintain a ‘universal common core’ and argue for the inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) in science curriculum, and it is Irzik’s view that there are sufficient similarities between TEK and IK and WMS to justify the inclusion of both in science curriculums (2000: 72).

Semali and Kincheloe (1999: 29) argue that it is the ability of WMS to present its findings as universal that gives it an imperialistic power dismissive of indigenous knowledge as ‘inadequate and inferior’. WMS has this effect because it produces

universal histories, defines civilisation, and determines reality…such capabilities legitimate particular ways of seeing and, concurrently, delegitimate others(Semali and Kincheloe,1999: 29).

In contrast, multiculturalists believe that all knowledge, including that of WMS, exist within a cultural context and that

the language, issues, methods and meanings used by a scholar to depict a reality both reflect and constitute the cultural values, ideas and beliefs and practices familiar to the author (McGovern, 1999: 188).

Semali and Kincheloe (1999: 29) therefore argue that the cultural context of WMS makes it ‘white’ rather than ‘universal’ science and that the conception of a universal science only arises when one fails ‘to appreciate the ways modernist scientific universalism excludes “white science” as a cultural knowledge, a local way of seeing’.

Semali and Kincheloe’s position is dismissed byTaylor and MacPherson (1997: 194)who outline Shahn’s (1990)questioning of a ‘white’ science argument on the grounds that women and non-white non-Europeans have made significant contributions to scientific knowledge. He also suggests that as a group white men are ‘alienated, confused and intimidated’ by science to the same extent as other groups.

Shahn’s position is supported by Ezeife’sdrawing on the work of Hatfield, Edwards and Bitter (1997) in the field of mathematical knowledge. Hatfield et al illustrate the range of cultural contexts from which contemporary ‘Western’ mathematics has developed. They note that it was Africans who first used numerals and invented rectangular coordinates. It was the ancient Egyptians who first developed symbols for 10 and 100 and who first used unit fractions. Negative numbers were first understood by Chinese mathematicians and Native Americans first used a symbol for zero.Further,

the word algebra is Arabic in origin.... The first concepts of congruence were developed in Africa and Asia.... Cotangents and similar triangle principles we used in the building of Africa pyramids... Mozambicans built rectangular houses by using equal-length ropes as the diagonals. The Babylonians used the right angle theorem 1500 years before Pythagoras was born... and the modern method of using the so-called Pascal’s triangle was actually invented in Asia by the Chinese and the Persians 500 years before Pascal was born (Hatfield, Edwards and Bitter, 1997 quoted in Ezeife, 2002: 181).

The co-option of such knowledge into a ‘universal’ paradigm has concerned Cobern and Loving (2000: 50) with respect to contemporary indigenous scientific knowledge. Coburn and Loving suggest that although

good science explanations will always be universal... Western science would co-opt and dominate indigenous knowledge if it were incorporated as science. Therefore, indigenous knowledge is better off as a different kind of knowledge that can be valued for its own merits, play a vital role in science education, and maintain a position of independence from which it can critique the practices of science and the standard account.

For Coburn and Loving IK is therefore not science. That they argue, does not devalue IK, just as art, history, economics, and religion are not devalued by their exclusion from the scientific domain. Exclusion from science protects indigenous knowledge from co-option and manipulation which is important because ‘truth is never under the sole proprietorship of any single domain of knowledge - not even science’(2000: 65).Yet Taylor and MacPherson argue that the very notion of a Western science is a ‘debatable point’ because the modifier Western suggests that it is practiced and culturally rooted only in the West – ‘neither of which are true’(Taylor and McPherson, 1997: 202). Whereas, Zaslavskey (1994) suggests that students should understand that in non-Western cultures mathematical practices developed from the ‘real needs and interests’ of people and that a great deal of the mathematical knowledge that is taught as Western knowledge in schools was in fact developed in Asia and Africa

centuries before Europeans were aware of more than the most elementary aspects of mathematics.. Students of many different backgrounds can take pride in the achievements of their people, whereas the failure to include such contributions in the curriculum implies that they do not exist (Zaslavsky, 1994: 6).

Corsiglia and Snively (2000: 82)note Cobern and Loving’s (2000: 50) acknowledgement of the place of TEK in the science classroom, but observe that it is an acknowledgement made with reservation. It is an acknowledgement only to the extent that some of the insights of science can be arrived at by other ‘epistemological pathways’ (Cobern and Loving, 2001: 16). In contrast, it is Corsiglia and Snively’s (2000: 235) view that

indigenous science offers important science knowledge that WMS has not yet learned to produce, and that IK and TEK are being increasingly researched in Africa because they can contribute to the eradication of poverty, disease and hunger where modern techniques are deficient.

If IK and TEK can make valid observations then it is not legitimate for the science classroom to present conventional science as the only way of

contemplating the universe... The point is not to establish that one form of science is superior to another, but to develop scientific thinking and to enable students to examine their own assumptions by distinguishing between the relative merits of different sciences to understand science concepts, and allow the existence of alternative perspectives (2000: 84-85).

It is however the tendency for Western science to establish itself as the only way of knowing that Jegede argues denigrates IK and creates difficulties for the ‘thought processes of African learners’ ((Jegede, 1995: 97).

Waiti and Hipkins (2002: 232)argue a need to align ‘Western science with other knowledge systems’. They suggest that New Zealand’s ‘inclusive’ science curriculum may in fact produce stereotypes, appropriate minority cultural backgrounds and thus alienate students from the learning that might encourage science related careers and participation in public science debate.They support McKinley’s (McKinley, 1999: 39) view that social cohesion and a knowledge-based society requires the enabling of Maori children to participate fully in science.They reaffirm Waiti’s previous (McPherson Waiti, 1990: 185-186) assertion that ‘Maori people do not want to live in the past... this provides a challenge for educators to get beyond indigenizing Maori education’.Waiti and Hipkins note

a growing awareness of the need to take account of diverse cultural views and community concerns about the products of science, especially ‘cutting-edge’ biological and biotechnology research. This points to the need for greater participation of those from other cultures and science, as scientists and as actively involved citizens in the community.

The relevance of whakapapa to genetic engineering and indigenous ideas about sustainable management ‘when managing for biodiversity’ are examples of the interaction between cultural values and possibilities of WMS(Waiti and Hipkins, 2002).

The relevance of the universalist/multiculturalist debate is that it is the universalist understanding of science that informs the assumptions school curriculums make about the nature of science and how science should be taught (Stanley and Brickhouse, 2000: 44). These assumptions include the notion that WMS provides a superior understanding of the natural world and overlooks the impact of cultural influences and assumptions on teaching and learning(Stanley and Brickhouse, 2000: 36).Atwater and Crockett (2003)argue against the tendency for WMS to understate the significance of culture in conceptions of science:

people interpret the world and their experiences differently. Their worldviews are explicit culturally dependent internal models found in their cognitive structures and are the result of their life experiences (Borden, 1991).... Therefore, the views of people about reality are socioculturally constructed and are given personal meaning by their sociocultural experiences. Their world views are the very skeletons of concrete cognitive assumptions on which their decisions and actions are founded (Kearney, 1984; Wallace, 1970). It is in this ‘socioconstructed world’ that the ‘agency of schooling’ is located (Atwater, 2003: 56-57).

Stanley and Brickhouse (2000: 39)extend the significance of social construction to suggest that it ‘plays a role in the scientific account of physical reality’ and endorse Harding’s (1998) assertion that the ‘cognitive content of the sciences is shaped by culturally different forms and social organisation of research’(Harding in Stanley and Brickhouse, 2000: 39). Stanley and Brickhouse also note the significance of cultural and economic factors in determining the type of scientific question asked and therefore the nature of the knowledge that is gained (2000: 44). Stanley and Brickhouse therefore adopt ‘a more “local” view of science than a universalist position would admit’(Stanley, 2000: 39).

If WMS is not in fact universal but deeply rooted in the cultural norms of the West then it is likely to influence how non-Western peoples view school science. In an African-American context Key argues that school science may even be seen as ‘something foreign’ to ‘students, who study science for years before reading about a scientist or inventor of their own ethnic group’. Key goes on to add a further dimension to the universalist/multiculturalist argument by suggesting that science processes are ‘generic’ or ‘culture free’, yet

if students cannot and do not identify with those who are “processing,” they may internalise the notion that they cannot perform science or are not expected to process scientific information and thus negate the content being taught (Key, 2003: 88).

Multiculturalists generally accept that

WMS is an unusually effective and reliable knowledge system, but it is not the same as saying it has a reality independent of human conceptions (Stanley and Brickhouse, 2000: 40-41).

If WMS is an ‘effective and reliable knowledge system’and‘independent of human conceptions’, then there is an assumption that it should be part of the school curriculum for all peoples. But questions arise from that assumption as Lewis and Aikenhead (Lewis and Aikenhead, 2000: 4)indicate. ‘How should non-Western ideas be viewed in relation to Western science’? If non-Western ideas are not inferior should they be ‘accepted in science classrooms’? In contrast for the universalist there is no place for indigenous knowledge unless it has been subsumed into the body of knowledge referred to as Western Modern Science.

The Scientific Nature of Traditional Knowledge

Multiculturalists maintain that there is a place in science curriculums for indigenous knowledge, which poses questions about the scientific nature of traditional indigenous bodies of knowledge. Roberts takes the view that indigenous knowledge can be taught alongside Western science ‘as distinct but not entirely dissimilar knowledge systems within a single curriculum framework’(Roberts, 1996: 59). This is not withstanding Rikihana’s view that ‘there is a disparity between Western science and Maori science’ because as Rikihana himself notes

Western science and Maori indigenous knowledge overlap but are not identical. Education should start with the common elements and move out from there (Rikihana, 1996: 25).

Lomax argues that the difference between traditional Maori knowledge and Western science is one of methodology

which does not render [Maori]… knowledge invalid, but may require that we re-interpret the knowledge using new technology and in light of knowledge obtained from Western science(Lomax, 1996: 12).

Roberts’ approach to indigenous knowledge and Western science is to compare the similarities and differences from the perspective of Pacific knowledge bases. Aikenhead undertakes a similar project with respect to Canadian First Nations knowledge bases (Aikenhead, 1997: 15-16).Roberts maintains that both have an empirical data base with observations of the natural world having provided information which has been ‘accumulated over time, systemised, stored and transmitted, either orally or in written form’.

There are however differences in the creation of empirical data bases between the two forms of knowledge. In many cases IK data bases have been built up over thousands of years and include qualitative as well as quantitative information because ‘all observations and interactions are considered relevant’. In contrast, Roberts argues

Western science data bases are comparatively short term (e.g., a one-year master’s degree, or a three-year PhD); primarily quantitative, and frequently obtained and/or supplemented by experimental data gathered under controlled rather than natural conditions, whereby only certain variables are observed, manipulated and measured (Roberts, 1996: 62).

Roberts continues to suggest that while Western science and indigenous knowledge share ‘an ability to construct theories (models) and make predictions’ there are similarities and differences in approach. Both systems make predictions but there are differences in the framing and testing of predictions and in the treatment of results (Roberts, 1996: 63). Both sets of databases are subject to verification by testing over time, although in the case of Western science

generally only after having successfully undergone controlled experimentation, peer review and publication. Tests of IK primarily involve ‘trial and error “experiments” under natural, uncontrolled conditions

while Western science generally tests its predictions

under laboratory conditions, involving manipulation of certain variables only and including the use of a control or, if in the field, involving preselected parameters (Roberts, 1996: 63).

Explanations of cause and effect are also important features of both knowledge systems. Unlike Western science, which Roberts points out, abandoned the supernatural as a source of information and explanation in the 17th century, IK systems frequently use the supernatural, religious ‘and other subjective sources’ of information to assist in the understanding of natural phenomena (Roberts, 1996: 64). Although Roberts notes significant similarities between indigenous and Western knowledge systems she suggests that there are few such similarities with respect to the function of each system. Western science, she argues, places great importance on its claim to be objective and ‘value free’, while IK is