Mariam Shadid / 10
Timeline – Cuban Missile Crisis
Date / Event
January 1st 1959 / Batista flees Cuba
February 16th 1959 / Fidel Castro (Marxist Leninist) assumes power and becomes Premier of Cuba
October 28th 1959 / NATO signatories, Turkey and US jointly agree to deploy 15 Jupiter missiles to Turkey as a defence against Soviet invasion
February 1960 / Russians sign a trade agreement with Cuba to exchange Cuban sugar or Soviet oil, machinery and technicians
May 7th 1960 / Cuba and USSR establish diplomatic relations
July 8th 1960 / Eisenhower administration responds by cutting back Cuba’s sugar exports by 80%. This was followed by a US trade embargo on Cuba’s imports
December 19th 1960 / Cuba openly aligns its foreign and domestic policies with that of Russia
August 1960 / US begin to mobilise opposition towards Cuba
January 3rd 1961 / Cuban and US diplomatic relations are severed
Early 1961 / CIA begin training a group of 1400 Cuban rebels to overthrow Castro
April 12th 1961 / US president Kennedy states that the US will not intervene militarily in overthrowing Castro
April 17th 1961 / Cuban rebels invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. It was a failure.
October 21st 1961 / Kennedy publicises the absence of a conceived “missile gap”. Where the US possessed several hundred ICBMs, the Soviets only had 25. This highlighted Russia’s nuclear ineptitude
May 21st 1962 / Khrushchev suggests that the USSR should deploy missiles to Cuba
June 10th 1962 / Russian leaders all vote in favour to deploy missiles to Cuba. Castro agrees with the deployment and claims that it would act as a deterrent from a possible US invasion
July 1962 / Khrushchev’s rapid deployment of missiles leads to the installation of 36 MRBMs (Medium Range Ballistic Missiles) and 24 IRMs (Immediate Range Missiles)
August 16th 1962 / CIA director, John McCone suggests to Kennedy that the Soviets are installing MRBMs in Cuba.
October 14th 1962 / A U2 spy plane reconnaissance mission took photographs of missile sites in Western Cuba. By this stage, 42 000 Soviet troops are stationed in Cuba and 80 cruise missiles are in place
October 15th 1962 / National Photographic Intelligence Centre confirms the existence of surface-to-air missiles
October 16th 1962
(Day 1) / McGeorge Bundy informs Kennedy of the presence of MRBMs in Cuba. Kennedy immediately establishes EX-COMM: Executive Committee of the National Security Council. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence outlines the diplomatic and military courses of action to take.
October 17th 1962
(Day 2) / The majority of EX-COMM strongly advocate for a military air strike on Cuba, rather than a blockade. Further U2 flights that night reveal IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) capable of hitting all of continental US except for Washington and Oregon
October 18th 1962
(Day 3) / Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrie Gromyko meet. Kennedy advises Gromyko that missiles in Cuba will not be tolerated by the US
October 19th 1962
(Day 4) / Kennedy is torn between imposing a naval blockade on Cuba or to have a military air strike
October 20th 1962
(Day 5) / Kennedy is leaning towards a blockade. It would enable American naval vessels to encircle Cuba and prevent any ship carrying military equipment from reaching the island until the missiles were removed. A blockade would also enable the US to start with minimal action and increase pressure if needed, and possibly avoid armed conflict.
October 21st 1962
(Day 6) / Kennedy decides on a naval blockade, however is advised to use the word “quarantine” instead of “blockade”. A blockade, under international law is considered as an act of war, and by using the word “quarantine”, it made the Soviets appear to be the aggressors
October 22nd 1962
(Day 7) / Kennedy addresses the missile deployment in a 17 minute speech which is televised nationally. He reveals the presence of missiles and states that in order to “halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated”. He received an overwhelmingly positive reaction towards his speech. Khrushchev replied to Kennedy in a letter that day, claiming that the missiles are for defensive purposes
October 23rd 1962
(Day 8) / The Organization of American States (OAS) approves the quarantine on Cuba
October 24th 1962
(Day 9) / Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, proposes a “cooling off period” and the Kennedy administration reject this proposal. In a UN meeting, Soviet ambassador, Valerian Zorian denied the presence of missiles in Cuba, whilst US ambassador Adlai Stevenson presented photographs of missile sites, humiliating the Soviets and winning over the UN. Kennedy decides to enact the quarantine the following day. Meanwhile, Soviet ships continue to approach the quarantine line, 805km away from the Cuban coast and the US military alert is raised to DEFCON 2; the highest level ever in US history. Kennedy ordered the navy to give "the highest priority to tracking the submarines and to put into effect the greatest possible safety measures to protect our own aircraft carriers and other vessels."
October 25th 1962
(Day 10) / EX-COMM discusses a proposal to remove missiles in Turkey, in exchange for the withdrawal of Cuban missiles
October 26th 1962
(Day 11) / EX-COMM receive a letter from Khrushchev, stating that the Soviets will withdraw their missiles if the US pledge never to invade Cuba again. On Khrushchev’s part, this letter was seen as a willingness to resolving the dispute. However, a CIA report reveals that missile sites are continually being developed and that the Soviets attempted to camouflage them
October 27th 1962
(Day 12) / A U2 spy plane flies off track and drifts into Soviet air space on what was reported to be a “routine air sampling mission”. The Soviets manage to shoot it down. Meanwhile, Khrushchev sends Kennedy another letter, demanding that the US withdraw their missiles in Turkey. The White House was “in hysteria”. Domestic pressures led Kennedy to respond only to Khrushchev’s first letter, and that way, he avoided publicly withdrawing Jupiter missiles in Turkey
October 28th 1962
(Day 13) / Khrushchev announces over the radio that the missiles will finally be removed from Cuba. That night, the Presidium gathered in Khrushchev’s office to write a letter, signifying the retreat of the Kremlin and the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis
October 29th 1962 / Kennedy orders that the quarantine remains and also orders the continuation of low level reconnaissance flights
November 21st 1962 / Kennedy lifts the quarantine on Cuba, after being reassured by the Soviets that all missiles will be dismantled
Late November 1962 / US withdrawal of Jupiter nuclear missiles in Turkey
Explain
The deployment of missiles to Cuba was influenced by several factors. Khrushchev’s need to redress the strategic imbalance of power which was initially tipped in favour of the US and his emotional investment in the Cuban revolution motivated him to deploy missiles to Cuba. This, coupled with the US’ reaction to the deployment of missiles culminated into the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
Khrushchev’s need to redress the strategic imbalance which was in the United States’ favour was a contributing factor to his deployment of missiles in Cuba. As Gaddis explains, the Cuban Missile Crisis arose because Khrushchev understood more clearly than Kennedy that the West was winning the Cold War[1]. The installation of US Jupiter missiles in a bordering country of the Soviet Union[2] was a politically[3] and militarily threatening prospect for Khrushchev. With the missiles in close proximity, the Soviet Union was vulnerable to US nuclear attack which effectively disrupted the balance of power and as a result, the strategic balance tipped in favour of the US. This posed serious problems for Khrushchev who relied heavily on the notion of “Potemkinism”[4] to conceal the presence of a missile gap. While Khrushchev led the US to believe that the Soviet Union were turning “missiles like sausages”, in reality, the Soviet Union only possessed 25 ICBMs, as opposed to several hundreds that the US had produced. However, Khrushchev’s primary objective in redressing the strategic imbalance was to enhance the Soviets’ ability to launch nuclear attacks on the US. By deploying medium and intermediate range missiles for “defensive purposes” to Cuba only 90 miles off the coast of Florida, Khrushchev had effectively changed the military situation. This is supported by Gaddis who states “IRBM + Cuba = ICBM”. Post revisionist historians James Daniel and John Hubbell further this idea by arguing that “by moving intermediate-range missiles to Cuba… Russia was rapidly narrowing the gap... The presence of Russian missiles in Cuba had drastically altered the balance of world power.” Thus, by placing missiles in America’s “backyard”, Khrushchev had changed the military situation and as a result, corrected the strategic imbalance of power.
The USSR’s deployment of missiles was also influenced by Cuba’s need for protection from an imminent US invasion as well as Khrushchev’s emotional attachment to the Cuban Revolution. The attempted invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 saw the emergence of the subsequent plan “Operation Mongoose”[5]. Castro looked to the Soviet Union for protection from an imminent US invasion and Khrushchev responded by deploying missiles. Khrushchev’s emotional investment in Cuba is illustrated through his decision to deploy IRBMs to Cuba in response to Castro’s appeals and American aggression. It is important to note that Cuba represented a thriving communist revolution that had occurred in a developing country and Khrushchev needed to ensure that it was successful in order to maintain his credibility, as he was at the forefront of communism. Moreover, the suppression of the Cuban Revolution would have meant the defeat for the whole socialist camp[6], which directly influenced Khrushchev’s decision to protect Cuba from US imperialist aggression[7], and consequently deploy missiles. Post revisionist historian Gaddis supports this notion, by claiming that the deployment of missiles to Cuba was “…both an old Bolshevik’s romantic response to Castro and to the Cuban revolution and an old soldier’s stratagem to defend an endangered outpost and ally.”[8] Hence, the deployment of missiles was partially in response to American provocations and Cuba’s need for protection, as well as Khrushchev’s emotional attachment to the Cuban revolution.
It can be argued that what essentially transformed the Cuban Missile Crisis into one of the most perilous of the Cold War crises was the response of the US to the deployment of missiles to Cuba. While Khrushchev’s first intention was to protect Cuba from American invasion, the US perceived the Soviet sphere of influence to be rapidly expanding into a neighbouring American nation. The discovery of missiles in the U.S’ figurative backyard was an alarming prospect for the White House and with the volatile congressional elections only three weeks away[9] Kennedy needed to ensure he acted decisively as “such news would undermine the Democrat’s legitimacy in preserving the country’s security.”[10] However, in response to the deployment of missiles to Cuba, EX-COMM advocated heavily for military retaliation, which effectively transformed the situation into a crisis.
Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis arose as a result of Khrushchev’s gamble as he deployed missiles to the U.S’ figurative “backyard”. Khrushchev was motivated by a need to redress the strategic imbalance which was in the United State’s favour and Castro’s acceptance of the missiles influenced the US to respond militarily. All these factors culminated into the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; when the world teetered on the edge of nuclear precipice[11].
AsSess
The Cuban Missile Crisis had an immense and significant impact on US-Soviet relations and essentially laid the foundations for the beginning of détente. The two superpowers acknowledged the importance of effective communication and flexible response during the crisis and this saw the establishment of a direct hotline between Moscow and Washington, which exemplified their willingness to manage and resolve future conflict. Moreover, the recognition of MAD prevented a full-scale conflict from occurring between the superpowers, thus reducing tensions. Paradoxically, MAD provoked an escalation of the arms race which resulted in the propagation of a number of bilateral treaties to manage nuclear disarmament and hence, saw an easing of tensions between the superpowers.
The Cuban Missile Crisis led to improved diplomatic relations between the US and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers recognised the importance of effective communication and flexible response[12] which was indicative of their willingness to manage and resolve future conflict. Historian Walter LaFeber stated that immediately after the crisis, Khrushchev began to try to prevent another such confrontation[13] from occurring. However, in order to achieve this, an effective means of communication was needed to eliminate misunderstanding between the political protagonists, and this resulted in the establishment of a direct hotline between Moscow and Washington in 1963. The hotline was symbolic of improved US-Soviet relations and resulted in greater cooperation between Moscow and Washington. The aftermath of the Missile Crisis further saw the mutual recognition of each superpower’s sphere of influence, which impacted significantly on their later associations with one another, as evident in the lack of U.S intervention during the Czechoslovakia crisis of 1968. This notion is supported by historian Michael Dobbs who stated that “the United States and the Soviet Union would never again become involved in a direct military confrontation of the scale and intensity of the Cuban Missile Crisis.”[14] Moreover, the significance of flexible response and compromise was also an important milestone in alleviating tensions between the US and the Soviet Union. Khrushchev’s letters to Kennedy, negotiating the dismantling of Jupiter missiles in Turkey, signalled a willingness to resolve the conflict. Similarly, Kennedy negotiated the conditions under which missiles would be removed from Turkey[15] without “plunging the world into a catastrophic war”[16] revealing the significance of compromise during the crisis. Hence, through the recognition of the importance of effective communication and negotiation, relations between the two superpowers improved significantly.