Notes
eAff:
The thesis of the affirmative, at least for the dialogue version and to a lesser extent the QPQ version, is that talking to China about nuclear weapons is good. That’s it. The U.S. and China have this really big problem where they don’t talk to each other and thus don’t know what the other side intends, which leads to paranoia and distrust, which means we talk to them less, etc. It’s a vicious cycle that would be remedied by talking to China.
There are multiple 1ACs highlighted and ready to read. I would recommend the Miscalculation version. As you can tell by the header, that 1AC is the truth. It would be extremely difficult for a 1NC to disprove enough of the advantage to make it useless in the 2AR. Reading this version also allows you to read the other two as advantages in the 2AC (which you should always do in a CP/DA debate). The dialogue 1AC is fine if you can get through it, but you would be stuck with only two add-ons (US Prolif and Arms Control) which don’t have impacts (which you should cut). I think the QPQ version of the aff is the least likely to solve, given that the US is really really attached to its BMD. But if you know that a team likes to go for T-Must be QPQ, its fine to read.
Ks are good for the aff, the thesis of the aff is that the way China and the US relate to each other now is bad (which is what their link cards will talk about) and that talking would be a way to resolve that. Listening probably no links most Ks
Neg:
Basically every generic DA links to the aff. India, Russia, China internal politics, elections, etc. Though there aren’t specific link cards in the file, most generic co-op with China link cards are applicable to the aff. For CPs I would go with CPGS because it most sharply provides competition with the aff through DAs. I think forcing a deterrence(neg) vs cooperation debate(aff) is good, because you get the block to card dump and explode your warrants, which makes it near impossible for the 1AR to answer all of it. Spending a solid amount of time developing a deterrence good file would be extremely useful against this aff, and most others on the topic for that matter.
Cut BMD good turns to the QPQ aff.
Emmanuel Ruiz- Dallas Jesuit
1ACs
Miscalulation 1AC (The Truth)
Miscalculation Advantage
We isolate 4 internal links to miscalculation-
1. Strategic distrust- stability is weakening as strategic distrust threatens to undermine peace
Ford, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, ’12 (Christopher A., “Information-based Arms Control and Sino-American Trust, Hudson Institute, December 2012, Accessed 6-26-16, ER @ RKS)
Among those who study Sino-American relations, increasing attention is being¶ given to the issue of “strategic distrust,” which is said to be growing.1¶Officials, scholars,¶ and commentatorsin People’s Republic of China (PRC) have certainly viewedthe United¶Stateswith “strategic distrust” for many years. This was true under Mao Zedong, of¶ course, but PRC “America-watchers” have been describing the United States as a¶ dangerous hegemon –determined both to exert coercive dominance over other nations¶ and to constrain China’s own “return” to status and power – since early in the period of¶ Dengist “reform and opening.”2¶ This story of American hegemony was amplified in¶ Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda narratives after the June 1989 killings on¶ Tiananmen Square, and has persisted ever since. When I was in Beijing doing research¶ for my upcoming book, I heard numerous Chinese say that the U.S. “hegemon” wished to¶ “contain” China, and this theme appears repeatedly in PRC writings.¶Strategic “distrust” by China, therefore, is nothing new. Indeed, there are¶ interesting parallels between present-day CCP thinking and the conclusions of the late¶ Qing Dynasty reformer and political theorist Liang Qichao. More than a century ago, for¶ instance, Liang wrote that “[t]he general trend of world affairs is daily concentrating¶ more and more on the Pacific.” He felt, moreover, that China was “the nation that will be¶ most severely victimized” by the naval and military power of the United States – power¶ which he felt stood in the way of China’s destiny there, as well as more broadly in the¶ world.3¶ These are antagonistic Chinese strategic assumptions that seem to have survived¶ all sorts of changes in the actual behavior and circumstances of the countries in question.¶What is thus perhaps more interesting, therefore, is the degree to which American¶ strategic distrust has been growing – or, more specifically, the degree to which distrust¶ has been seeping out of hawkish circles into the more conciliation-minded U.S. “China¶ policy” thinking that has been the American mainstream since the beginning of Dengist¶ reforms. Many factors have contributed to this, including the PRC’s development of¶ increasingly sophisticated military capabilities seen to be aimed at precluding the United States from coming to the aid of its friends and allies in the Western Pacific, Beijing’s¶ ongoing nuclear build-up, the PRC’s development of anti-satellite weaponry, Beijing’s¶ newfound assertiveness in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and ongoing Chinese¶ cyber-espionage campaigns against American companies and the U.S. Government.¶Americansare also, I suspect, intrinsically uncomfortable with seeing any autocracy¶ become so powerful and ambitious, regarding the PRC with greater unease as its regional¶ and global strength increases while its leaders remain determined to deny its population¶ civil and political rights.¶America’s China policy thinking is today in a state of flux.It has not fully¶ crystallized around hawkish themes, but it has clearly left behind much of its earlier,¶ fairly uncritical approach to congenial engagement– which is now increasingly felt to¶ have been rather naïve. Even some of our more prominent so-called “Panda huggers”¶ now voice concerns about regionally aggressive PRC policies and “misbehavior,” about¶ hardened Chinese attitudes of anti-American animosity, and about the implications of the¶ PRC’s domestic rigidity, official corruption, and entrenched political oligarchy. In short,¶ there is in today’s Washington much less of the optimism of earlier years that¶ development would bring not just economic but also behavioral stability and political and¶ human rights progress to China, making it a “normal” state and a respected and honored¶ member of the international community.¶Everyone acknowledges that our two countries have important common interests,¶ that they are economically interdependent, and that they need to cooperate on many¶ critical issues. But there is also an increasing understanding that the Sino-American¶ relationship has significant competitive aspects – not least in the political and security¶ arenas – and that this competition is sharpening. We Americans, in other words, seem to¶ be beginning to catch up to the endemic suspicion that has been apparent for so many¶ years, in the PRC, in looking at us.
2. Chinese deterrence operations- lack of mutual understanding causes Chinese attempts at deterrence to be misinterpreted – this triggers escalation
Warden, Executive Director of the Working Group on U.S.-China Nuclear Dynamics @ CSIS, et al ’13 (John K., Elbridge A. Colby, Abraham M. Denmark, “Nuclear Weapons and U.S. China Relations: A Way Forward”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2013, Accessed 6-25-16, ER @ RKS)
Some of China’s thinking on using its missile force to conduct deterrence operationsthat send signals aimed at influencing an adversary also raises the possibility of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation in a crisis or conflict scenario. Miscalculation in the midst of a crisis is a particularly troubling possibility—one that could be heightened by uncertainty over the message that one side is trying to convey to the other or by overconfidence in the ability to control escalation.25 The most serious concern is that some of the signaling activities described in Chinese publications could easily be interpreted not as a demonstration of resolve or as a warning, but as preparation to conduct actual nuclear missile strikes, possibly decreasing crisis stability or even triggering escalation rather than strengthening deterrence. Indeed, some Chinese sources contain references that raise troubling questions about potential miscalculations that could result from attempts to increase the intensity of deterrence during a crisis or in the midst of a conventional conflict.26 Although Chinese authors appear to demonstrate at least some awareness of the danger that actions intended to deter an adversary could instead trigger escalation, the discussions of these risks in the relevant publications are quite limited.27
3. No-first-use ambiguity- Chinese ambiguity over NFU incentivizes first strikes and escalation - US needs pursue
Cunningham, member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ‘15 (Fiona S. and M. Taylor, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability”, International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2, Fall 2015, Accessed 6-30-16, ER @ RKS)
China’s reliance on limited ambiguity regarding no-first-use hastwoimportant¶ consequences, both of which conªrm the strength of its commitment to¶ maintaining an assured retaliation posture. First, China’s reliance on limited¶ ambiguitysuggests that China is either ignoring or is prepared to accept a¶ greater risk of crisis instability to avoid building a larger nuclear arsenal,¶ which would be the other most likely alternative option for deterring U.S. offensive¶ strikes on its nuclear forces. As Yao Yunzhu explains, “For a state¶ adopting a no-ªrst-use policy and intending not to waste too much money on¶ unusable weapons, dependence on opaqueness to bring about greater deterrent¶ value is a wise choice.”172 The United States, however, might be tempted¶ to attack Chinese nuclear forces sooner or more decisively if it is unsure¶ whether China will adhere to its no-first-use policy. For example, some U.S.¶ analysts worry that the United States might mistake one of China’s conventional¶ DF-21 ballistic missile for its nuclear-tipped variant. Some Western analysts,¶ such as Aaron Friedberg, conclude, for example, that such ambiguity means that China might even conduct limited nuclear warning strikes in the¶ Pacific theater, escalating the conflict to de-escalate it.173¶ The United States would have much less reason to worry about and prepare¶ for such contingencies if China had an unambiguous no-first-use policy. Moreover,¶ Chinese strategists appear to be aware of this trade-off. As one AMS¶ scholar notes, the United States is seeking “to enrich and improve its nuclear¶ policy in order to effectively counter China’s so-called ‘nuclear ambiguity¶ policy,’ while at the same time preventing China’s ‘unintentional use of nuclear¶ weapons,’ ensuring the confrontation remains limited.”174 Thus, even¶ though China is relatively optimistic about crisis stability, its desire to deter¶ conventional strikes on nuclear forces through limited ambiguity about no-¶ first-use could backfire. In particular, if the United States believes that China¶ has expanded the roles its nuclear weapons are intended to play beyond deterring¶ nuclear attacks or coercion, then the United States would have a greater¶ incentive to pursue strategic primacy and even a more offensive conventional¶ doctrine to counter Chinese nuclear forces.
4. Arms racing- Uncertainty from lack of knowledge leads to worst case scenario planning and arms racing
Ford, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute, ’12 (Christopher A., “Information-based Arms Control and Sino-American Trust, Hudson Institute, December 2012, Accessed 6-26-16, ER @ RKS)
Uncertainty, however, also has costs– particularly if a profound lack of knowledge about a party’s broad strategic intentions and/or the basic size and capability of its strategic force leads the other party to assume the worst and plan accordingly. In a now obscure but nonetheless interesting book published in 1965, Martin McGuire tried to use economic models to understand the role of information, secrecy, and uncertainty in strategic arms race behavior.19 His book contains a number of interesting ideas, but one important observation is that significant uncertainty – or uncertainty that can be overcome only at an exorbitant cost – may tend to drive a party toward “greater numbers of missiles, or greater yields, or accuracies, and so on, to compensate for one’s ignorance.”20 A great level of uncertainty, in other words, can exacerbate arms racing, because parties facing uncertainty have, in effect, higher incentives to adopt behavior that “hedges” aggressively against worst-case scenarios. This is an important insight. I would add, however, that this presents not just a force-planning problem, but also an operational and indeed a crisis-stability challenge. Uncertainties about the other party’s capabilities and intentions can also encourage assumptions about an adversary’s likely behavior that exacerbate instability in a crisis. Politico-psychological context naturally helps color what decision-makers will tend to conclude – or feel that they have to conclude out of prudence, for fear of being badly surprised – on the basis of incomplete or ambiguous information. By encouraging worstcase assumptions, strategic uncertainty can tend to push parties toward postures and behavioral choices that will be destabilizing in a crisis.21 It is these costs that I see as being particularly dangerous in the Sino-American¶ context, because Beijing’s strategic secretiveness has contributed to making it¶ increasingly easyfor Americans, and China’s own neighbors, to assume the worst about¶ the PRC’s strategic planning and the intentions such planning supports. If indeed the¶ PRC’s intentions are what other states would consider malign – such as if “harmonious¶ world” thinking really is, as so many prominent Chinese scholars have suggested, an¶ effort to replicate on the regional or global stage some analogue to the coercive¶ “harmony” one sees in PRC domestic society – perhaps strategic opacity really is¶ necessary. (Having others tend to assume the worst is presumably better than proving it¶ to them.) If that really is the case, however, opacity will likely be of only limited utility,¶ and the PRC should not be surprised if more and more members of the international¶ community draw dark conclusions and act accordingly anyway.
The plan solves - dialogue is key to prevent miscalc and escalation by clarifying intent, redlines, and deterrence
Colby, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, andWu, Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Renmin University, ‘16
(Elbridge A. and Riqiang, “Seeking Strategic Stability for U.S.-China Relations in the Nuclear Domain”, The National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #57: U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains, April 2016, Accessed 6-23-16, ER @ RKS)
The United States, therefore, has viewed with growing disquiet the substantial modernization¶ and expansion of China’s nuclear forces, and U.S. analystshave observed closely reports and¶ rumors that the PRC has considered shifting away from some of its cardinal policies.17 This¶ attention is likely to increase as China grows in strength and its military power waxes. Should such¶ growth not taper off, Washington’s concern could shift to alarm, with substantial implications for¶ U.S. strategic, defense, and nuclear policy.¶ For all these reasons, the United States is keenly interested in the evolving nuclear dynamics¶ with China, and is likely to become more so. In light of these factors, the United States has a¶ particularly significant interest in pursuing bilateral engagement on nuclear weapons issues with¶ China.The United States and its allies benefit in numerous ways from the relative restraint that¶ China has exhibited in its nuclear policy, both in terms of how Beijing states that it would employ¶ its nuclear forces and in terms of their size, sophistication, and diversity. Yet as China’s economy¶ continues to grow and its military continues to modernize, Beijing will increasingly have the choice¶ of greatly expanding its nuclear forces, improving their capability, and broadening their role in the¶ PRC’s national security strategy. The United States ultimately cannot realistically prevent Beijing¶ from pursuing such a course should it decide to do so, but in cooperation with its allies, the United¶States may be able to persuade Beijing that it is not in China’s interests to markedly expand its¶ nuclear forces or broaden the role of nuclear weapons in its planning and strategy. The United¶States also benefits from engagement with China (and vice versa), as such engagement can help¶ improve understanding of the other side’s red lines, understandings of escalation, and the like,¶thereby mitigating the possibility of inadvertent escalation or miscalculation.
Absent dialogue US-China war will escalate to nuclear war- even over conventional flashpoints
Cunningham, member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ‘15 (Fiona S. and M. Taylor, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability”, International Security, Vol. 40, No. 2, Fall 2015, Accessed 6-30-16, ER @ RKS)