The Assassination of Mahmoud

Feb. 19, 2010

the assassination of mahmoud

al mabhouh: A closer look

Editor’s Note: This intelligence brief is based on information and insight that STRATFOR analysts believe would be of interest to our clients and aid them in their security planning.

Mahmoud al Mabhouh was found dead Jan. 20 in his room at the Al-Bustan hotel in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Al Mabhouh was a senior Hamas military commander and one of the founders of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. He was traveling to Dubai for an unknown meeting, presumably on sensitive Hamas business. According to STRATFOR sources, he had stopped in Dubai on his way to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials about prospective arms sales to Hamas. Al Mabhouh was traveling without security (according to one report, this was due to the inability to purchase airfare for his bodyguards), though we suspect there might have been an operational reason for him to have traveled alone.

Dubai law enforcement authorities have ruled out natural causes in al Mabhouh’s death and have identified as many as 17 individuals (15 men and two women) believed to have participated in the assassination on Jan. 19. Dubai law enforcement officials were able to track 11 of the 17 individuals through closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage back their arrival at the Dubai International Airport 19 hours before the hit. The 11 individuals travelled to Dubai on passports from Ireland, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. They arrived at different times from different locations around Europe approximately 14 hours before Mahmoud al Mabhouh arrived. The team also used several different high-pedestrian-traffic locations throughout Dubai, including at least three hotels and a shopping center, as meeting locations, logistics hubs and staging sites prior to the assassination operation.

Additionally, Dubai law enforcement officials were also able to identify several reportedly encrypted international phone calls made from the phones of the suspected members of the assassination team to numbers in Austria, where Dubai authorities suspect a command and control center for the operation was based. All the members of the teams had attempted to alter their physical appearance to varying degrees, from simply wearing a hat to donning wigs and glasses. Furthermore, the demeanor of the team members viewed in the CCTV footage did not deviate from that of any ordinary tourist or businessman who frequents Dubai, which indicates a high level of experience and professionalism.

Throughout the CCTV footage it is very clear that the 17 members of the team carried out very specific roles in the operation. At least four surveillance teams were identified; three of the four teams appeared to work in pairs while it seemed the fourth team consisted of a single individual. Another individual, who appeared to be the senior commander of the operation, apparently reserved the room across the hall from where al Mabhouh was staying. The remaining seven members of the group appeared to serve as lookouts outside al Mabhouh’s room and as the actual assassins.

The Operation Under Way

Prior to al Mabhouh’s arrival in Dubai, the surveillance teams were positioned at the airport and at two hotels that al Mabhouh was known to frequent when he travelled to Dubai. Once he arrived at the Al-Bustan, two surveillance operatives located in the lobby were seen following him to his room. Once his room number had been confirmed, the two surveillants contacted the rest of the team, who then moved to the Al-Bustan, where the hotel room across the hall from Mabhouh’s was reserved by the senior commander. Mabhouh then left the Al-Bustan for a meeting with an unknown individual. CCTV footage shows one of the surveillance operatives watching al Mabhouh get into a vehicle and then apparently describing the vehicle to others via cell phone.

After al Mabhouh’s departure, two men and a woman wearing wigs and glasses as well as two two-man assassin teams staged themselves in the room across the hall from Mabhouh’s room. Upon his return to the Al-Bustan, al Mabhouh is seen passing a disguised man and woman, who take up lookout positions near the elevator and outside al Mabhouh’s room. Al Mabhouh is intercepted and killed in his room by the two two-man assassin teams. The surveillance teams then leave the premises, followed by the two assassin teams and finally by the disguised team members. The 11 identified individuals flew out of Dubai International Airport between two and 10 hours after the assassination to several different locations -- such as South Africa, Hong Kong, Germany, France and Switzerland -- long before a hotel cleaning crew discovered al Mabhouh’s body at approximately 1:30 p.m. local time on Jan. 20.

The arrival of the team members some 19 hours ahead of the operation and 14 hours ahead of al Mabhouh indicates that the group or organization had prior knowledge of al Mabhouh’s travel plans. Additionally, the coordinated movements and logistics involved in the operation typically require an advance team to be in place ahead of the assassination team’s arrival. Throughout the CCTV footage, some members of the team, specifically the actual assassins, seemed very mindful of the surveillance cameras and moved in such away as to block a direct view of their faces, while others were not as careful.

The team’s movements throughout the operation were methodical, calculated and well-choreographed. Their outward demeanor immediately before and after the killing was smooth and did not deviate from that of regular Dubai visitors. The tactics, tradecraft and logistics involved in this operation were well beyond the capabilities of known terror organizations and all but a few national intelligence services. While the CCTV footage does not offer any clues as to who carried out the assassination, is does display a high and rare degree of professionalism.

Protection Concerns

While al Mabhouh was clearly engaged in questionable activities that made him a target for assassination, there are valuable lessons that can be learned from studying the tactics and tradecraft used in this operation as outlined in the videos found at these links: (Part 1) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JghQ0ZcRfQs;

(Part 2) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K8XDhnEJ-N0; and (Part 3) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RWxjxTaWytE.

Many executive protection (EP) teams spend a great deal of time with their principals in foreign four- and five-star hotels similar to the Al-Bustan. While these hotels offer a significantly higher level of security than some other venues, the assassination of al Mabouh is a clear example that there can be security risks inside the confines of even a high-end hotel.

Hotels are considered by many security teams to be relatively safe environments, and in a typical EP hotel scenario, designated members of the team, usually one close-protection agent (though occasionally two agents are used if the EP team is that large), escort the principal to and from his or her room. In some cases, the principle may even move around the hotel to use the gym, eat or attend meetings without his protection team.

The number of attackers involved in the assassination of al Mabhouh could easily have overpowered one or two close-protection agents, especially if the assassins were able to achieve the element of surprise and were skilled fighters or used weapons. Furthermore, in such a scenario, the close-protection agent(s) would likely be targeted first, to remove the danger they pose before focusing on the principal.

The skill and degree of surveillance exhibited in the al Mabhouh assassination would have been difficult for an EP team or targeted principal to detect and defend against. Frankly, it is very difficult for EP agents to focus much attention on surveillance detection, especially in the case of a one- or two-man team. This underscores the need for a comprehensive and professionally trained countersurveillance (CS) team in such situations. The CS team is focused on the events and actors surrounding the principal and the EP detail and by its very nature is in a far better position to detect hostile surveillance than close protection agents are.

The surveillance of al Mabhouh observed on the CCTV footage after the fact would likely have been picked up by a deployed CS team. The CS team could then have alerted the EP team to possible threats and allowed the EP team to increase the level of protection and/or notify the appropriate authorities. The very presence of a CS team could also serve to raise the risk of conducting such an operation to the point where another target would be selected.

The al Mabhou case also demonstrates the importance of EP teams keeping tabs on the individuals who occupy the hotel rooms in close proximity to their principal. Such rooms can be used as ambush sites when the principal walks through the hall, and in some cases they can be used to gain entry to the principal’s room through adjoining doorways or from the exterior of the building.