OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE
ITG/JESG/Trg/11/09
14 May 14
AG
Copy to:
ARTD DRT (Ops)* / DM(A)* / D Ed Cap* / D Trg(A)*Comdt SCHINF* / ARTD COS* / ARTD AD Strat* / ARTD AD Trg Ops*
ARTD RG CAR* / ARTD Hd RP&F* / DM(A) AD Man Analysis* / D Ed Cap AD Cap*
Comd ARMCEN* / D Trg(A) AD Itrg* / CO AFC(H)*
ARMY JUNIOR ENTRY (JE) TRAINING – COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS[1]
Issue
1. To examine the Junior Entry cost benefit analysis[2].
Recommendations
2. AG is invited to note that:
a. Junior Entry (JE) is marginally cheaper (circa £1M pa) than Standard Entry (SE); calculated on a collective through career investment[3]. (para 5)
b. There are no PFI financial benefits gained from transferring JE training to SE training. (paras 6 &7)
c. JE is required in order to fully man the Army against the A2020 demand[4]. (para 10)
d. JE investment builds stronger cultural, emotional, physical and educational foundations than SE training which improves the return of service. (paras 12-15)
And Agree that JE offers better value for money than SE in the longer run whilst also being essential for manning the Army.
Timing
3. Routine. AG was asked to reply to CDP by 31 May 14[5].
Background
Training
4. Training Costs[6]. JE and SE courses deliver recruits to the same standard set by the single Operational Performance Statement (OPS)[7]. The cost per recruit on the SE course (14 weeks) is £21K; for the JE (Long) course (52 weeks) it is £67K and for the JE (Short) (26 weeks) it is £38K. If SE were trained at AFC(H) it is estimated that the cost per recruit would be circa £28.6K. In parallel with this it is noted that JE average wastage rates are greater than SE by an average of 11% over the past four years. However the most recent statistics show an encouraging downward trend and ITG are continuing to refine their approach to reduce this further; see Annex A. Whilst JE is more expensive during initial training, in cost and wastage, they have a greater Length of Service (LoS) compared to SE. In 2013[8] TESRR, using Def Strat Stat statistics from TY11/12 observed that: ‘There are indicators of longer Lengths of Service (LoS) and higher performance, based on earlier promotion, from those joining the Army as U18s’. Def Strat Stat (formerly DASA) has completed three medium scale studies on JE, the most recent in 2010[9]. This finding was also reinforced by a response to a PQ in Jan 13[10] which found that the mean LoS for a soldier who joined under 18 was approximately three years longer than a soldier who joined when over 18. Therefore, assessing the overall training costs to sustain the long term manpower capability requires an assessment of inflow, wastage in training and LoS; see Table 1.
EntryType / Input
Training
Numbers required / Recruiting Costs / Ph 1 Training Cost[11] / Average LoS (years) / Through career
cost per head pa
((c+d)/e) / Cost distribution across the LoS
(bxf) / Total
(a) / (b) / (c) / (d) / (e) / (f) / (g) / (h)
AFC Long / 800 / £10k / £67k / 8.2 / £9.4K / £7.5M / £10M
AFC Short / 590 / £38k / 11.4 / £4.2K / £2.5M
Or SE at AFC(H)
SE (Long Capbadge equiv) / 1032 / £28.6k / 5.4 / £7.1K / £7.3M / £11.1M
SE (Short Capbadge equiv) / 807 / £28.6k / 8.1 / £4.7K / £3.8M
Table 1. Recruitment and Initial Training Cost investment shown against LoS per year of Service[12]
5. Training Cost Analysis. Table 1 demonstrates that whilst it may be cheaper to train SE individually (column f) the Army would need to train far greater numbers (column b) in order to make up for the difference for the JE cohort who have a greater LoS (Column e). Therefore the overall Army training through career costs are more efficient for JE than SE by circa £1M pa. The recruitment costs have been shown as neutral, however it is likely that costs would rise if greater SE numbers were required. AFC(H) retention analysis is at Annex B.
Infrastructure and Estate
6. PFI at AFC(H) and Value for Money. There is insufficient training capacity for the A2020 structure at ATC(P) and ATR(W) to permit the closure of AFC(H), even if the cost of ending the PFI early was acceptable. The original investment appraisal into the AFC(H) PFI project declared that the ‘value for money decision is quite clear cut’[13]. The continued relevance of the original IA is threefold; the recruiting and manning pressures that caused JE to be re-established still endure; the AFC(H) occupancy levels are now surpassed[14] and the PFI is market tested every 5/6[15] years to ensure continued commercial competitiveness. The current PFI contract makes the Army contractually obliged to pay for a minimum of 37440 Army Student Weeks (ASW) per financial year; the fixed costs of the PFI and establishment payroll element remain consistent at approx £34.7M per TY. The replacement of JE with SE at AFC(H) would only be possible and financially viable in terms of accommodation availability.
7. AFC(H) Facilities. Even if AFC(H) (Uniacke and Hildebrand Barracks) could accommodate these numbers of recruits and so be financially efficient for the PFI, there are insufficient training facilities. There are only 2 x 25m ranges on site, and no ‘back door’ training area which could cope with the increased throughput required of the shorter, higher tempo SE course. The training estate used currently for JE at AFC(H)[16] would continue to be available but the lack of time within 14 weeks to travel to these facilities would constrain SE training at AFC(H) to Ripon, Catterick and Otterburn, resulting in increased competition with other users; in each TY the requirement for FTX days on local training areas would increase from 150 to 319. The current annual recruit transport cost at ATR(W) and each ATC(P) training regiment is circa £200K and £250K respectively. AFC(H) currently run an annual recruit transport budget of £500K.
Recruiting
8. The Recruiting and Inflow Requirement. The cost benefit of JE versus SE must be seen in the context of the current and future recruiting climate. Currently RG assess that the DM(A) input demand plan could not be filled exclusively by SE[17]. Although it is too early to forecast in detail the likely fill of the SE and JE RAP in TY 14/15, the experience of TY13/14 offers an indication. In sum, 91% of the JE RAP (both long and short) was successfully filled, whilst only 64% of the SE RAP was filled[18]. The cessation of recruiting Foreign and Commonwealth soldiers makes recruiting of SE even more challenging. The recruitment of JE fulfils c15% of the annual DM(A) inflow requirement; if JE ceased, SE would have to cover the 15% shortfall to maintain DM(A) targets. Past inflow statistics show that the anticipated future inflow requirement has previously been generated entirely from within the SE cohort only once in the last seven years (TY 07/08). In short, the JE provides greater assurance that annual DM(A) inflow requirements can be met in order to man the A2020 proposition. An illustration of JE v SE inflow is at Annex C. To inform future judgement, further understanding is required regarding through life cost comparisons, Army manning structural requirements, predicted UK demographic trends and UK economic trends.
9. Infantry Requirement. Of the Arms and Services that recruit JE, it is judged that only RA would be able to meet recruiting targets with SE only. The largest recipient of JE is the Infantry c20% (most notably SCOTS, KINGS, PoW, QUEENS, GUARDS).
10. SE Main Target Audience (MTA). Other factors related to the MTA of recruits, specifically health and availability, are applicable in determining the ability of the DM(A) requirement to be met by SE recruits only. Analysis of the future MTA trends for availability, at Annex D, suggests that by 2025 there will be an increase in the UK population MTA, but there will be an upward increase in the age distribution. It is unclear whether this is reflected in DM(A) planning projections for inflow, and the place of the JE within this. In addition the likely obesity and body composition trends within the UK population will decrease the available SE MTA, thus making SE recruitment more challenging; 60% of men, 50% of women and 25% of U20 year olds could be obese by 2050[19]. Recruiting, training and educating younger individuals helps create the appropriate physical and mental approach.
11. RPP contractual limitations. Any changes to the current recruiting requirement will also incur Contract Variation Order (CVO) costs. If the parameters were changed, and recruiting became more challenging (because of an increased demand on the SE MTA), the current recruiting cost of approx £10K per recruit could increase; this represents decreasing cost effectiveness in the ‘attract’ phase.
Additional benefits
12. Value over Cost. Articulating the benefits of JE initial training in pure value for money terms masks the wider benefits to the Army, the individual and society as a whole. JE provides the Army a unique opportunity to ensure individuals are imbued with the Army Values and Standards in order to deliver a more rounded and confident character[20]. In addition, the Army is the largest provider of apprenticeships in the UK. The education content in the JE programme provides the grounding from which all recruits progress onto trade specific apprenticeships. 85% of JE leave AFC(H) with Level 2 qualifications in literacy and numeracy, so achieving the standard necessary for promotion to Sergeant.[21] Furthermore, the provision of education and training for 16 year old school leavers provides a governmentally compliant[22] route into Army service, whilst also offering a number of wider benefits for the individual, the Army and society, as noted in the Deepcut Review. JE training provides significant foundation for emotional, physical and educational development throughout an individual’s career. There are significant wider benefits beyond costs associated with this developmental programme.
13. Benefits for the individual. The precise measurement of the benefits accrued for the individual who has undergone training as a JS is challenging, but it is apparent that JE training provides emotional, physical and educational development. This is most obviously manifest in the recognition afforded to AFC(H) by OFSTED in 2012 with a grade of Outstanding as a result of the excellent standard of training, education and welfare provided.
a. The JE education offer. The Army is the largest provider of apprenticeships in the UK. The education content in the JE programme provides the grounding from which all recruits progress onto trade specific apprenticeships. A key theme in the Richards Review[23] was that all young people should reach a good level in English and maths before they undertake their apprenticeship. The JE education programme provides Functional Skills (FS) in maths, English and ICT at L1 and L2, plus an IT diploma. Within the JE(L) course, most recent stats show that 73% arrive with an English qualification below L1. After Ph1, 100% of the JS hold L1, and 85% also achieve L2. Within maths, 74% arrive with qualifications below L1. On completion of Ph1, 96% of JS achieve L1 and 72% also achieve L2.
b. Raising the Participation Age (RPA)[24]. The JE route fully complies with the Education and Skills Act 2008. The JE opportunity gives 16 and 17 year olds an additional (and sometimes critical) avenue through which they can comply with RPA direction.
14. Deepcut Review. The societal benefits generated for the JE are unlikely to ever be statistically or financially evidenced. However, JE receive 50% more lessons on Values and Standards than SE. In addition, the increased time spent in training allows PS to offer more role modelling, and thus engender a deeper understanding of appropriate moral awareness. The Deepcut Review highlighted this important area, and firmly recommended the continuation of JE.
a. The Deepcut Review para 12.39. “Civilian society has not been notably successful in providing the opportunities for rewarding life-long careers for young people whose talents are not in the field of GCSEs and higher academic qualifications but lie, rather, in the technical trades or other careers offered by the Army. To deny these young people the chance to start training for such a career when they are of school-leaving age may deprive them of the opportunity they need to get away from difficult social circumstances and acquire new skills, and social discipline, before it is too late to adapt.”
b. The Deepcut Review para 12.40. “Until educational opportunity for 16-18 year olds in the UK becomes so diverse and well-resourced that it provides everyone the opportunity of acquiring better life skills in civilian society, this Review is of the opinion that there is not a sufficient case to prevent the recruitment to the Army of those over 16 but under 18………”
Enduring Constraints and Limitations
15. Age. Trained soldiers become a true capability on completion of Ph2 training and on turning 18 years old. The current JE model of Ph1 Long/Ph2 Short or Ph1 Short/Ph2 Long[25] ensures that the fixed amount of time imposed upon JE recruits prior to moving into the Field Army is most efficiently used.
16. ‘Exclusive’ training environment for JE[26]. Nicholas Blake QC made an explicit recommendation that recruits U17 should be trained in establishments exclusive to this age group. This limits the locations available to ARTD in which JE can be trained. The location must generate the right numerical throughput, but also be exclusive to JE training. The delivery of JE on one site at AFC(H) addresses this recommendation.