Display: Getty Images # 89808383

[Display: Getty Images # 89808383

Caption: A police checkpoint on Highway 1 between Kabul and Kandahar]

Afghanistan: The Battle for the Ring Road

[Teaser:]Completion of a looping highway network connecting Afghanistan’s key cities is crucial to the U.S./NATO effort.

Summary

Afghanistan has never had particularly robust transportation infrastructure, but efforts are being made to improve it. Perhaps the highest-priority project is completion of the “Ring Road,” which will be of pivotal importance to the U.S./NATOwar effort, since it is designed to link for key population centers and facilitate the movement of military supplies. Once the final leg of the 2,000-mile loop is completed, the success of the campaign could hinge, at least in part, on how safe it is to travel the Ring Road.
Analysis

The transportation infrastructure in Afghanistanis notoriously abysmal. Roads are primitive and few, and regional rail networks do not even enter the country. And the U.S./NATO military machine is notoriously heavy andfuel-intensive, whichmakes for a mountain of logistical challenges. Although a <link nid="130477">northern distribution route</link> has opened up, operations are sustained by a<link nid="129064">[ragtag?]army of Pakistani truck drivers</link> who transport most of the supplies -- especially fuel-- for the U.S./NATO military effort.

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At the heart of what passes for a road network in Afghanistan is Highway 1, or the “Ring Road”[(also known as the Garland Highway)/],which is the central artery connecting the country’s four mainpopulation centers -- Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. [Was the roadway built from scratch in recent years by the U.S.? Or was there always some kind of roadway connecting these cities that the U.S. is only improving? We need to make this clear]In the last [?] years, completing the road has been a major effort, though the section from Leman and Maimana is still under construction, and a stretch from Kabul to Kandahar has had to be repaired due to neglect and damage from improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Asian Development Bank have spent some $ 2.5 billion on the project, but efforts have been hampered by attacks, kidnappings and other forms of intimidation [by insurgents and common criminals?]. Between 2003 and 2008, more than 160 contractors were killed working on the southern arch from Kabul to Heart in a still ongoing effort to complete the nearly 2,000-mile-long loop. Companies of police officers have had to be organized and dispatched at great expense to secure construction efforts.

At the same time, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military and civilian development efforts have identified 80 key districts as priorities. Governance, development and security programs are in the process of being implemented in these districts, which more or less correspond to the Ring Road.

This is no accident. Not only is the highway important logistically, but U.S. estimates put two thirds of the Afghan population within about thirty miles of theloop. While the Ring Road is of pivotal importance in sustaining surge operations, it is also crucial in facilitating the current U.S.<link nid="154510">population-centric strategy/link>, which is an economy of force move to focus efforts on key population centers.

But because almost everything in Afghanistan is an economy of force effort, not all sections of the Ring Road can be heavily protected. Some 800 Romanian troops are reportedly responsible for securing more than 100 miles of roadway through Zabul province, part of the critical link between Kabul and Kandahar.And because there are so few roads in Afghanistan, the ones that are heavily relied upon are easy targets for insurgents and IEDs.

The United States is working to deploy better off-road vehicles into the country to providemore logistical and tactical flexibility. But the Ring Road is also about nationaldevelopment and commerce. Afghanistan’s economy is minimal, but part of the U.S. strategy is to reshape public perceptions in the key population centers connected by the roadway. If the Ring Road is open and safe to travel for[do you mean from now until, say, Sept. 15, 2011? Or do you mean that if it becomes truly open and safe to travel sometime over the next 18 months? And you’re referring here to McChrystal’s timetable, correct?], it will greatly facilitate the development of economic and governmental links betweenand among Kabul and the other key cities. If it does not, the effort will be greatly hindered.

Another factor is history. Foreign powers have often tried to rule Afghanistan from the top down, to little avail. The political, demographic, ethnic and tribal realities of Afghanistan mean that it is best ruled from the bottom up. The U.S./NATO effort is focused on the district level[this is a bottom-up approach, correct?], but whether this approach can succeed in engaging people at the grass roots in any meaningful way -- especially on the short 18-month timetable -- is anything but certain. And success of the overall war strategy will depend on a lot more than just the safety of the Ring Road.
But both the roadway and the 80 critical districts that lie along or near it will bear considerable watching as ISAF strategy continues to unfold.