Deterrence DASUDI ‘10
Grayson/Lewis/Bell-Ard1
Deterrence DA
1NC – Deterrence (1/2)......
1NC – Deterrence (2/2)......
*****Uniqueness*****......
UQ – Deterrence......
UQ - Deterrence......
UQ – Germany......
UQ – Umbrella strong now......
UQ – Troop deployment in ME high......
UQ – Troop deployment in ME high......
*****Links*****......
2NC – Link - Deterrence......
2NC –Link - Deterrence......
2NC - Link – Asian relations......
2NC - Link – Chinese Expansion......
2NC - Link – Forward deployed troops......
2NC - Link – Deployment in Europe......
2NC - Link – Power projection......
2NC - Link – troop presence......
2NC - Link – Troop Withdrawal – HEG I/L......
2NC – I/L – Extended Deterrence – German Prolif......
2NC - I/L – regional stability......
2NC - I/L – Extended deterrence key to Europe prolif......
2NC – I/L - Alliance key to Asian stability......
2NC - I/L – Heg collapse causes Chinese modernization......
2NC – I/L – Extended Deterrence key to solve Terrorism......
2NC – I/L - Alliance key to power projection......
2NC – I/L –SoKo Econ......
2NC – I/L – Extended Deterrence solves Japn rearm......
2NC – I/L – NoKo prolif......
2NC – I/L - Alliance key to terror, pandemics, warming......
*****2NC – Impacts*****......
2NC – Impact – Noko Prolif......
2NC – Impact – Chinese expansion......
2NC – Impact – China modernization......
2NC – Impacts - Terrormism......
2nc – Impacts - Disease......
2NC – Impact - Warming......
2NC – Impacts – Prolif......
2NC – Impacts - Prolif......
2NC – Impacts – SoKo Econ......
2NC – Impacts – Japan rearm causes Asia Prolif and War......
2NC – Impact – Japan RearmProlif......
2NC – Impacts - HEG......
2NC – Impact - HEG......
*****2NC – Answers To*****......
2NC - A2 – Alliance is resilient......
2NC – A2 – nuke deterrence Key......
2NC – A2 – Nuke weaps deterr......
2NC - A2 – Nukes solve deterrence......
2NC - Conventional Deterrence Key......
2NC – A2 Nukes key......
2NC – Conventional deterrent key......
*****AFF ANSWERS*****......
Aff – NUQ – Deterrent not credible now......
Aff - Impact turn......
Aff – a2 – Heg G/ Impact......
Aff – Link/Turn......
1NC – Deterrence (1/2)
(_/_) A – Uniqueness - Despite concerns regarding US leadership, the commitment to extended deterrence is perceived as strong by allies
Frühling. June 16, 2010. [Stephan The Odd Ally: US Extended Deterrence and Australian Strategic Policy. Nautilus Institute. Stephan Frühling is a Lecturer in SDSC's Graduate Studies in Strategy & Defence Program and managing editor of the journal Security Challenges. He received a PhD in Strategic Studies from the ANU, working on defence planning concepts. He also received a Master of Science in Defense & Strategic Studies from Missouri State University, and studied Economics at the Sorbonne in Paris and Christian Albrechts Universität in Kiel.
However, despite the confidence expressed in these judgments, the White Paper is more equivocal on the conditions that ultimately underpin the US position in Asia. On the one hand, it states thatthe “United States will remain the most powerful and influential strategic actor over the period to 2030—politically, economically and militarily”,45and that Within the timeframe of this White Paper, the UnitedStateswill continue to rely on itsnuclear deterrencecapability to underpin US strategic power, deter attack or coercion by other nuclear powers, and sustain allied confidence in US security commitments by way of extended deterrence.46 On the other hand, the White Paper also remarks that “[a]s other powers rise, and the primacy of the United States is increasingly tested, power relations will inevitably change”,47 and it makes a number of comments that highlight the conditionality of Australian strategic planning on the assumption of US primacy, or state that “of particular concern would be any diminution in the willingness or capacity of the United States to act as a stabilising force”.48 The consequences of these concerns for the reliability of US extended deterrence, however, are not spelled out.
(_/_)B – Link - Troop presence is crucial to assuring allies and flexible response to escalating crises
Frühling. June 16, 2010.[Stephan The Odd Ally: US Extended Deterrence and Australian Strategic Policy. Nautilus Institute. Dr Stephan Frühling is a Lecturer in SDSC's Graduate Studies in Strategy & Defence Program and managing editor of the journal Security Challenges. He received a PhD in Strategic Studies from the ANU, working on defence planning concepts. He also received a Master of Science in Defense & Strategic Studies from Missouri State University, and studied Economics at the Sorbonne in Paris and Christian Albrechts Universität in Kiel.
As earlier documents had done, the 2009 White Paper also highlights the importance of US engagement for stability in Asia, and the importance of reassurance through US forward deployed forces: While theUnited States will maintain the capability to project force globally from its own territory, it will likely continue to judge that its forward deployed forces, including in the Western Pacific, provide reassurance to allies ... as well as providing operational flexibility in crises.43Were Japan, for example, unable to rely on the US alliance, its strategic outlook would be dramatically different, “and it would be compelled to re-examine its strategic posture and capabilities.”44
1NC – Deterrence (2/2)
C – Internal Link - (_/_) US-Korea security alliance key to regional stability
Snyder 2009. (Scott, director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation and senior associate at Pacific Forum CSIS. Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the U.S.–South Korea Alliance
There is a need to ensure in practical terms that the alliance is making a direct contribution to regional stability. This can be done by ensuring that the bilateral security alliance is comple-mentary with two emerging forms of broader security cooperation. On the one hand, the U.S.-ROK security alliance should be actively integrated with U.S. security arrangements in the region, including the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-Australia alliance. These alliances have also begun to play broader roles in promoting global stability, and this common mission provides, to the possible, a basis for expanded cooperation and integration on a regional basis as well.
D-Impact - War in Asia escalates to global nuclear war and destroys the world economy
Jonathan S. Landay, national security and intelligence correspondent, March 10, 2000, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts,” p. Lexis
Few if any expertsthink China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, orIndia and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by anyof them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclearwar. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Koreamay have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations anddiplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades inCold War Europe.“Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the BrookingsInstitution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great powerinterest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalizedsecurity mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher.There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japanand South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled ifBeijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. WhileWashington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflictbetween the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons anddemolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime.In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets,cheap labor, exports and resources _ indispensable to the U.S. economy. NumerousU.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled$600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.
*****Uniqueness*****
UQ – Deterrence
In the face of NoKo aggression, Obama is reassuring allies over the nuclear umbrella
GODEMENT, 2009. (FRANÇOIS, Asian Survey, Vol. 50, Number 1, pp. 8–24. The United States andAsia in 2009. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Continuity
Obama’s stated long-term goal of aiming for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and an early decision to stop the deployment of ground-based anti-missile radars in Eastern and Southern Europe, will be hotly debated in Asia for their potential impact. At his second meeting with Lee Myung-bak inWashington, Obama pledged the “continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella” to defend South Korea.18Meant to be reassuring after North Korea’s second nuclear test in May and several missile launches, the president’s statement also gives solace to Japan’s defense establishment, which has been fretting about the increasing risks of decoupling American and Japanese security. Yet, it may also be read as an acknowledgement that North Korea’s accession to nuclear weapons cannot be undone in the foreseeable future. At the same time, retreat on the issue of anti-missile defense in Europe is seen in the same quarters as heralding a similar policy elsewhere.
Deterrence is on the brink. Reassurance is key.
Schoff ‘9 (James, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence”, March, p. ix)
Extended deterrence in the U.S.-Japan alliance is under pressure because it is more complicated than before (thanks largely to missile proliferation, China’s expansion of air and sea power, and nuclear modernization in the region), and this challenge comes at a time when America’s and Japan’s security priorities are diverging. For decades, extended deterrence was thought of in simple terms, characterized by robust U.S. security commitments to its allies overseas and underwritten predominately by the provision of a nuclear umbrella to deter war with the Soviet bloc. The U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little. Today, deterrence is still a primary concern for defense planners, but there is less consensus regarding exactly who is to be deterred and how. U.S. deterrence doctrine has become muddled, as some emphasize the role of defenses, some push for bigger and better conventional options or seek more assertive alliance partners, and others talk about deterrence tailored to fit different situations.It is time to bring clarity to this important subject, not by simplifying the policy but by realigning priorities and deepening Japan’s understanding of the policy. U.S. verbal assurances to Japan will continue to be useful, but increasingly a more concrete and common understanding about how deterrence functions in East Asia will also be necessary. The United States is deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in supporting extended deterrence, which is acceptable provided Washington works proactively with Tokyo to shore up the multiple other components of deterrence (strong political and economic relations, conventional air and sea power, missile defenses, intelligence sharing, and scenario-based planning involving military, diplomatic, and economic cooperation). Deterrence has always been about more than just the nuclear umbrella, but this fact is often overlooked, given the power and symbolism of those weapons. Deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons is a welcome development, but it should be accompanied by an intense period of political, diplomatic, and strategic consultations covering non-proliferation policies, regional diplomatic and security initiatives, and bilateral security cooperation.
UQ - Deterrence
Extended deterrence now. US conventional troops key.
Tomohiko ‘9 (Satake, PhD Candidate in IR – Australian National U., Nautilus Institute Austral Peace and Security Network, “Japan’s Nuclear Policy: Between Non-Nuclear Identity and US Extended Deterrence”, 5-21,
On the other hand, Japan has still preferred to be under the US nuclear umbrella, rather than become an independent power. An internal report of the Japan Defence Agency (JDA), which secretly studied the possibility of Japan’s nuclear armament in 1995, suggested that Japan should not go nuclear because of the enormous political and economic costs that would be caused by the opposition of other countries including the United States. Itconcluded that ‘the best way is to rely on the US nuclear deterrence capabilities’. [9] In April 1996, Tokyo reconfirmed the US-Japan alliance by concluding the ‘US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security’. The Joint Declaration clearly defined Japan’s greater alliance roles on both regional and global fields, by stressing that the US-Japan alliance is not only for the security of Japan and the Far East, but also for Asia-Pacific security in general.Because of this, many observers pointed out that the Joint Declaration ‘redefined’ the alliance, by expanding the alliance scope from a narrow focus on Japan and the Far East to the broader Asia-Pacific. Yet Japanese policymakers denied this kind of view, by stressing that the Joint Declaration did not ‘redefine’ the alliance, but simply ‘reconfirmed’ it. For them, the most important achievement of the Joint Declaration was not that the alliance expanded its scope, but thatthe US promised to keep providing extended deterrence to the region even in the post-Cold War era. Yet US extended deterrence cannot be gained without certain costs. These costs not only mean traditional ‘defence burden-sharing’ such as a significant amount of host nation support to US troops stationing in Japan. In exchange for the continuous US military commitment in the region, Japan became increasingly involved in US regional and global security objectives. After September 11, Japan contributed to US-led wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, by dispatching the SDF for the first time during war-time operations. While Tokyo clearly recognised the importance of terrorism and WMD issues, the central concern of Japanese policy elites were not those global problems, but how to keep the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, where Japan perceives a growing threat from North Korea and China. In fact, Japan’s military contributions to both the war in Afghanistan and the reconstruction effort in Iraq were never significant compared to other allies. Likewise, Japan has joined the US Missile Defence (MD) program and contributed to its Research & Development (R&D). Although Japan joined the MD system primarily for its own defence, Tokyo also recognised that Japan’s entry to the MD system would supplement the US global defence posture against the attack of terrorist or rogue states. By providing moderate but symbolic contributions to US global operations, Japan attempted to maintain a US credible nuclear extended deterrence in the Asia Pacific region, which is indispensable for Japanese security.
UQ – Germany
Germany currently wants disarmament
DDP News 9(“Germany's foreign minister hails Obama's nuclear non-proliferation move” DDP News, April 7, 2009. Via l/n AD: 7/30/09) DCR
US President Obama's promise of a "nuclear weapons free world" has raised great hopes, also in Germany. Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]) said in Berlin on Monday [6 April] that the window of history "has once again been opened up." The Greens and The Left, too, welcomed Obama's initiative and, first, called for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe. The United States and Russia play a key role in disarmament. Steinmeier stressed that a first important signal on the way towards a nuclear weapons free world was a new bilateral treaty between the two "most important possessors of nuclear weapons." He hoped that the negotiations would be finalized by the end of the year. The Greens called on the Federal Government to present its own proposals for nuclear disarmament as quickly as possible. The summit meetings of last week [30 March -3 April] had strengthened the impression that the German Federal Government, but also the European Union had "decided to hibernate," said Greens Chairman Cem Ozdemir. They should "accept Obama's extended hand and not leave him out in the cold." A first step would be the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Rhineland-Palatinate. "We want a world free of any kind of nuclear weapons," the Greens chief stressed.
Germany is pursing disarmament and fast international non-proliferation treaties.
Indo-Asian News Service 7/9(“India, Germany discuss nuclear disarmament” New Delhi. July 9, 2009. Lexis AD 7/29/09) DCR
India and GermanyThursdayheld talks on non-proliferation issues and underlined their commitment to nuclear disarmament,officials said here. Germany's Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control Peter Gottwald met Vivek Katju, Special Secretary (Political and International Organisations) in the external affairs ministry, and held talks on a range of nuclear issues. The talks took place against the backdrop of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May 2010 and multilateral efforts, involving Germany, EU and its NATO partners, to speed up the conclusion of an international arms control treaty. Besides issues relating to arms control, the Iranian nuclear issue and enforcement of the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea also figured prominently in the discussions. Katju reiterated India's position on the need for universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament, but reiterated New Delhi's opposition to signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India believes that the NPT is discriminatory and tends to divide the world into the nuclear haves and have-nots. Gottwald, the first high-ranking German official to visit India during the second tenure of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, held talks with Deputy National Security Adviser Shekhar Dutt Wednesday. Gottwald arrived here on a two-day visit Wednesday. Germany backed global consensus for India in the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) last year enabled the resumption of international nuclear trade with New Delhi. "Germany pursues a balanced approach aimed at both enhancing and developing the three pillars of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) - non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy,' the German embassy said here.
UQ – Umbrella strong now
US reasserting the nuclear umbrella in the squo
P. S. SURYANARAYANA . June 5 2010. The Hindu. U.S., Chinadiffer on nuclear posture.
The United States on Saturday pledged to keep its nuclear umbrellas for its allies in good shape, while China vowed against a nuclear arms race. With the nuclear arms issue figuring in two different plenary sessions of the ongoing Asia Security Summit here, U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates said allies and partners would continue to be covered under the doctrine of “extended deterrence”. Through conventional and nuclear capabilities, “we will extend [into the future] an umbrella of protection over our allies”.
The US is increasing it’s nuclear umbrella over Japan now
Reuters 7/16/2009 (“US wants to boost Japan’s Nuclear Umrbella: Paper”)