Self and Other in International Relations Theory:

Learning from Russian Civilizational Debates

In a special issue of International Studies Review “Responsible Scholarship in International Relations,” edited by J. Ann Tickner and Andrei P. Tsygankov, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2008, pp. 762-775.

Abstract

One important critique of the “West’s” hegemony in international relations theory has been this theory’s inability to come to terms with the problem of difference or the Self/Other dialectic. To further highlight the importance of the Self/Other relations, this article proposes to analyze Russian theoretical discourse of relating to Europe and the West. For centuries, Russia has participated in intense interactions among European, Asian and Middle Eastern regions, and it has developed a language and theories for relating to its various Others. Studying Russian debates can assist us in the task of reflecting on problematic epistemological and ethical assumptions behind international relations scholarship, as well as suggest some paths to a genuinely diverse and global IR theory. To research both continuity and progression of Russian arguments, I draw cases from imperial and post-Soviet historical periods and analyze their debates – Eurocentrism and Eurasia – in terms of assumptions their participants held about interacting with the Other. Although moving beyond viewing the East/West interaction as something mutually exclusive has been a challenge to Russian thinkers, some of them have found ways to conceptualize the two cultural entities as in dialogue with one another and to learn from opposing perspectives.

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Bio

Andrei P. Tsygankov is Professor at the departments of Political Science and International Relations at San FranciscoStateUniversity. He served as Program Chair of International Studies Association, 2006-07. His latest books are Russophobia: the Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy (Palgrave 2009 forthcoming) and Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Rawman & Littlefield, 2006).

Self and Other in InternationalRelations Theory:

Learning from Russian Civilizational Debates

By Andrei P. Tsygankov[1]

Resemblances are the shadows of differences. Different people see different similarities and similar differences.

- Vladimir Nabokov

1. Introduction

Scholars in the field of international relations acknowledge that their discipline remains largely ethnocentric and hegemonic reflecting various cultural biases of Western nations, particularly the United States (Hoffmann, 1995 [1977]; Alker and Biersteker, 1984; Holsti, 1985; Weaver, 1998; Crawford and Jarvis, 2001; Tickner, 2003). Despite various attempts to broaden and deepen the discipline, however, there remains a thick wall separating us from the rest of the world in terms of how “we do IR.” Graduate students coming to the United States from outside are typically surprised to learn that debates over relative power and democratic peace dominate this diverse field. Those trained to be sensitive to history, culture and ethics, find that top international relations programs offer a limited selection of courses in these areas, often at the expense of statistics and game theory. Area studies scholars rarely try to publish in international relations journals, and – when they do – they are not infrequently rejected on the ground that their work is “not really IR.” In the meantime, some of the “real” international relations scholars often equate understanding of the world with elaboration on perceived foreign policy concerns of their national governments.

One important critique of the “West’s” hegemony in international relations theory has been this theory’s inability to come to terms with the problem of difference (Inayatulla and Blaney 2004; Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Jones 2006) or the Self/Other dialectic. Scholars with interests in culture have argued that the discipline of international relations continues colonial practices of teaching at the periphery, rather than trying to learn from it. To further highlight the importance of Self/Other relations, this paper proposes to analyze Russian theoretical discourse of relating to Europe and the West. Russian civilizational debates, defined as sustained reflections on reproducing cultural ties across time and space, present an interesting case. For centuries, Russia has participated in intense interactions among European, Asian and Middle Eastern regions, and it has developed a language and theories for relating to its various Others. Studying Russian civilizational debates can, therefore, assist us in the task of reflecting on problematic epistemological and ethical assumptions behind international relations scholarship.

I argue that, as a European nation, Russians too had to face the challenge of “provincializing Europe” (Chakrabarty 2000) and overcoming the attitude of Eurocentrism in relations to significant Others. In the aftermath of the Crimean war, through the voices of Nikolai Danilevski and Konstantin Leontyev, Russians moved from not recognizing their distinctiveness from the European Self toward the recognition-threat attitude to it. With some modifications, the new attitude persisted throughout most of the twentieth century, but in the late 1970s-1980s, Russians developed new, more dialectical ways of relating to the Other. Rather than thinking about the East/West interaction as something mutually exclusive, the late socialist and then post-socialist thinkers came to conceptualize the two cultural entities as in dialogue with one another. Learning from opposing perspectives has been a major challenge for Russian civilizational theory which continues to be dominated by essentialist approaches. Still, some intellectual progress took place, evidence of which has been Russia’s new and increasingly diverse field of international relations. To research both continuity and progression of Russian civilizational arguments, I draw cases from imperial and post-Soviet historical periods. After reviewing scholarship on the Self/Other dialectic (section 2) and Russian key civilizational schools (section 3), I analyze two prominent debates – Eurocentrism and Eurasia – in terms of assumptions their participants hold about interacting with the Other (section 4). In conclusion, I summarize lessons of Russian engagement with the Other and its implications for global international relations theory.

2. International Relations Theory and the Self/Other Dialectic

Scholars who are interested in culture have long argued that international relations ought not be viewed as a product of Western discourse alone – such an approach would reflect a status quo bias and deprive us of the same transformative logic that John Ruggie (1983) found missing in static neorealist thinking. Over time, a number of scholars have issued a strong challenge to western intellectual hegemony in international studies. For example, critics of modernization theory revealed its unilinear and progressive pro-Western bias (Wiarda 1981; Oren 2000). Much like modernization theory, that historically assisted the state in justifying its colonial practices, international relations theory tends to offer no reciprocal engagement with the Other merely expecting it to follow the West’s lead. By allowing little conceptual space for “non-western” theorists, western IR treats them as dependent subjects (“subalterns”) and consumers of already developed knowledge. Taking the Other seriously, or engaging in a dialogue with it, means committing to assumptions of the Other’s equality to the Self in terms of defining parameters and boundaries of knowledge. By contrast, ethnocentric, or excessively pro-Western theories proclaim their commitment to exclusively defined values of their environment and are closed for possible fertilization from the external environment. Such theories assume superiority of the Self and its moral community, and inferiority of the Other thereby justifying the legitimacy of hegemonic actions toward the Other. The authors of ethnocentric ideas are willing to promote their visions outside their social universe because they are firmly committed to their concept of “virtue” and “good.” Post-colonial scholarship argues that, in contrast to eeeeeedsdthnocentrism, production of a more global knowledge requires defining the Self and its moral values as something open to negotiation, rather than absolute, exclusive, and essentialist; and viewing the Other as different, but morally equal and, for that reason, as a source of potential learning. In practical terms, such an approach would promote negotiations to establish mutually acceptable norms and reduce space for hegemonic actions.

Engaging in a dialogue with the Other also requires a particular sense of ethics as mutual empowerment of the Self and the Other. In the West, the tradition of communitarian thought in the humanities has long been engaged in debates about inclusiveness and recognition in building order and community (MacIntyre 1981, 1987; Walzer 1977; Taylor 1983, 1991, 1992). The principal accomplishment of these debates has been justification of the ethics of responsibility as that to/for the Other(s) and distinction between such ethics and that of rules/regulations for pre-given, autonomous subjects.[2] Non-western thinkers have also generated important ideas about dialogue, mutual engagement, and responsiveness for our words and actions. For instance, one might mention the Russian religious philosophical tradition of acknowledging guilt/responsibility by intellectuals for contributing to a discourse of social violence. In the early twentieth century, a group of former Marxist sympathizers responded to the revolution of 1905 by publishing the collective volume Vekhi (1991) (Signposts) and calling for the Russian intelligentsia to be constructive, rather than “nihilist,” in its social criticism. The authors of the volume held the Russian radical intelligentsia responsible for the revolutionary violence giving a new turn to the old tradition of intellectuals’ reflections on their engagements with social reality.[3] If we are to adequately address challenges of a global multicultural world, we need a notion of responsibility that involves both the Self and the Other. In this world, it it important to sustain a discourse of constructive tensions in which “local” and “global” both conflict and cooperate for the purpose of dialectical engagement and negotiating a mutually acceptable norms and solutions.

Such mutual engagement or dialogical perspective should be distinguished from realist and cosmopolitan perspectives, each of which is refusing to engage the Other. For realists, the image of anarchy and competition remains the key metaphor in describing the nature of world order. Although some realists appreciate the role of culture in international politics, most of them deny that the world is becoming more globalized. This group is explicit about defining its cultural community as local,[4] and its vision of responsibility is, therefore, highly reductionist. Realists emphasize anarchy as the key force in the world. They perceive the Other as a threat and typically limit their recommendations for the Self to those of a defensive nature. The cosmopolitan writers are fully aware of the increasingly globalized character of world politics, but they maintain an image of a progressively culturally homogeneous global society and overlook the forces of identity and diversity. Most typically, this cultural development in global society is linked to the progress of western civilization. Both conservative and radical cosmopolitan writers tend to view cultural development as a worldwide spread of westernized modernity and its norms of nation-states, market economy, political democracy, etc., rather than as a dialectical interaction of diverse local communities.[5] Whether supportive or critical of the Westernization process, cosmopolitans trace how the norms of a dominant civilization transcend the values of different cultural communities, rather than studying non-unproblematic receptions of “dominant” values by local cultures and emerging dialectic syntheses of global and local.

These biases hidden in hegemonic international relations theories reveal themselves in multiple research agendas. Hegemonic theories avoid asking crucial questions: Who is the Other that may react to their theories? How different is the Other from the Self in its previous experience? How distinct is the Other in its present concerns? Such ethical and epistemological agenda tend to produce knowledge that is didactic and ethnocentric, rather than dialogical and dialectical. One can hardly be surprised, for instance, by highly critical reactions to the familiar west-centered theories of the end of history or clash of civilizations from non-western Others, such as Russia and China (Tsygankov 2004). These theories bear an excessive imprint of western culture and, by insisting on their universal applicability, they contribute to the hegemony/dependence relationships in the global context. Therefore, cultural biases hidden in international relations theory remain a deep-seated obstacle for establishing robust institutions of world peace. In a world that is multicultural and discourse-sensitive, not giving the Other the consideration it deserves means not describing the world’s problems adequately, much less offering sensible solutions.

3. Russian Civilizational Theory and Its Currents

Seeking to respond to their nation’s borderland location between European and Asian civilizations, Russian politicians and intellectuals have pursued diverse visions of relating to the Other. For the purpose of this article, civilization is defined as an idea-based community that extends beyond a nation and is reproduced across time and space in response to various historical developments.[6] Russian civilizational perspectives can be classified along two main axes: their identity - Europe/West versus non-West – and a degree of essentialism.

The argument that Russia is a part of Europe is centuries-old (Neumann 1996), and it figures prominently in the national discourse, at least since Czar Peter the Great. It was Europe that created the larger meaningful environment in which Russia's rulers defended their core values. Although Europe’s recognition of Russia as one of its own was never unproblematic (Neumann 1999; Malia 1999), all Russia’s leaders identified with European ideas. Some rulers––most prominently Alexander II––attempted to redefine the country's identity in line with the new European ideas of Enlightenment, constitutionalism, and capitalism. Others sought to defend the old Europe and preserve the basic features of the autocratic regime. Yet Russians disagreed on whether western Europe could serve as a role model or whether Russia itself should become the leader of European civilization. The disagreement lied at heart of the debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles.

Westernizers supported Peter the Great’s efforts to modernize Russia and went on to advocate the widespread application of European institutions on Russian soil. Influenced by the French Revolution, Westernizers grew critical of the Russian autocratic tradition and produced a variety of arguments in favor of social reform. The Decembrists of the early nineteenth century, for example, followed the lead of people like Speranski and advocated constitutionalism and the abolition of serfdom in Russia. Later, in the aftermath of Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, Westernizers split into two distinct camps. One group—Cadets, or constitutional democrats—continued to advocate Russia’s liberal reforms and constitutional development. Their most prominent spokesman was the historian turned politician Pavel Milyukov (1910). Other Westernizers emphasized the need for the country’s industrialization. For example, Minister of Finance Sergei Witte argued for a more radical break with the country’s rural tradition and the monarchy-led “energetic and decisive measures” to develop the industrial base and satisfy the needs of Russia (Neumann 1996:70, 213). Unlike Slavophiles, who often saw the industrialization of Russia as a sell-out to Europe, this group advocated rapid economic development.

In contrast to Westernizers, Slavophiles thought of Russia as a unique culture, rather than merely as an offspring of the European civilization.[7] Beginning with Ivan Kireyevski and Alexei Khomyakov, they saw their nation as a part of Europe while advocating Russia’s indigenous tradition, which they visualized as a genuine religious and social community. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the spiritual leader of Slavophiles was the philosopher Vladimir Solovyev (2000), who placed Christian religion at the center of his reflections about the role of Russia in Europe. In response to the crisis of European identity in the 1840s-1850s, even some prominent Westernizers, such as Alexander Herzen, grew disappointed with conservative restorations and adopted some of the ideas of the Slavophiles. Herzen (1946), proposed not to discard Russia’s communal cultural features, but instead, build on those features in order to take a development shortcut and “catch up” with the West. In an extreme way, the “catching up” line of thinking found its continuation in Bolshevism. Even for Slavophiles, however, the West (Europe) remained the significant Other, and they continued to make sense of Russian development by contrasting it to that of Europe. Like Westernizers, Slavophiles were thoroughly familiar with western religious, social, and political traditions, even though they were convinced that the West was finished its role as the world’s leader and that Russia must now become the capital of world civilization.

The East, on the other hand, was viewed by both currents in a typical European fashion – as barbaric, backward, and unworthy of acceptance. The attitude only began to change when philosophers, such as Nikolai Danilevski and Konstantin Leontyev, grew especially fearful of Europe in the aftermath of Russia’s humiliating defeat in the Crimean war. Lond before Samuel Huntington, the late Slavophile Danilevski (1869) asserted that Russia was a “special cultural-historical type” that could not see itself as a part of Europe. Leontyev went further and became known for his calls to embrace the East. He parted with his teacher’s belief in a kingdom of Slavs as a way to defend Russia’s distinctiveness and predicted that Russia would create a “neo-Byzantine”, rather than a Slavonic, cultural type (Leontyev 1875). Russia’s global mission, Leontyev believed, would be to draw on the moral force of Byzantine Orthodoxy and save Europe from herself by “uniting the Chinese state model with Indian religiousness, and subordinating European socialism to them” (Duncan 2000 42-43). At about the same time, Russia’s prominent writers and philosophers, such as Fedor Dostoyevski, were also reevaluating their original beliefs in Russia’s European destiny and arguing that “our future lies in Asia. It is time to part with ungrateful Europe. Russians are as much Asians as they are Europeans. The error of our recent policy was in attempting to convince peoples of Europe that we are genuine Europeans” (Utkin 2000, 135). Russians, therefore, turned to the East, but more as a result of their new hatred toward Europe than of eagerness to learn from different civilizations.