Cuban Baseball: Ideology, Politics, and Market Forces

Cuban Baseball: Ideology, Politics, and Market Forces

Katherine E. Baird

Assistant Professor of Economics

Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences

University of Washington Tacoma

1900 Commerce St.

Tacoma, Washington 98402-3100

Phone: 253-692-5854

Fax: 253-692-5718

July 2004

Forthcoming, Journal of Sport and Social Issues

The author would like to thank participants of the Sports Economics session at the 2003 annual meetings of the Western Economic Association International, Dave Corbett, Peter Donnelly, Mary Groebner, Milton Jamail, and Oscar Soule. Two anonymous JSSI referees also provided especially useful suggestions.

Cuban Baseball: Ideology, Politics, and Market Forces

Abstract

The organization of baseball in Cuba offers a stark contrast with the organization of baseball in the U.S. Whereas baseball in the U.S. is largely coordinated by market forces, in Cuba, political decisions account for the determination of player salary, team composition, team location, and the distribution of player talent. This paper examines the operation and outcomes associated with the organization of Cuban baseball. Although the Cuban model avoids some of the problems afflicting professional baseball in the U.S., a close analysis reveals the inequities and disadvantages in the Cuban model. The case study illustrates that organizing sporting leagues through non-market rules has its own drawbacks.

Cuban Baseball: Ideology, Politics, and Market Forces

In the U.S., the business of professional baseball is mostly driven by the ideology of a free market economy. Teams are privately held and purchased in a competitive market; teams compete for the best players, with players going to the highest bidder; and player pay tracks each player’s marginal revenue of product (how much money he generates for owners). Almost all business decisions reflect the profit motive, be it in the pricing of tickets, giveaways at the park, the marketing of teams overseas, the development of player and team persona, the contraction and expansion of teams, and what cities teams play in.

The organization of Cuban baseball offers a sharp contrast to the organization of professional U.S. baseball. In Cuba, insofar as the concept of team “ownership” applies, teams belong to the state; players earn a minimal state salary; players play for their regional team with virtually no player mobility; there is no advertising in the stadia, on radio, or on TV; and games cost just pennies to attend. Despite or because of these differences, the caliber of play in Cuba is remarkable, especially given its size (population 11 million). Until 1997, the Cuban national team went decades without losing an international competition. Today, knowledge that a Cuban is playing in a game is enough to attract professional scouts.[1]

Seen in contrast with baseball in the U.S., some suggest that Cuban baseball represents a superior way to organize and structure the game. Fans of U.S. baseball increasingly criticize the seemingly perpetual imbalance among teams, the huge player salaries (now averaging more than $2.5 million a year), taxpayer-financed stadia, and the frequent labor disputes between extremely wealthy players and the even more wealthy team owners. Not surprisingly, some MLB fans point approvingly to the lack of commercialization in Cuban baseball, the absence of gimmicks and distractions at the ballpark, and the greater access the average fan has to players. Even players seem fresher, more enthusiastic. As one U.S. observer of Cuban baseball notes: “the players seemed exuberant, enjoying simple games of catch and pepper” (Cummings, 2003). Whitesmith (2001) writes about the thrill of discovering the past in Cuban baseball: “To the devout baseball fan, it’s a trip to the pure well of a kind of baseball the rest of the world has strayed from – the veritable Vatican of baseball: Cuba.”

The paper address the question of whether the Cuban model of organizing baseball along less market-driven criteria leads to more desirable outcomes. Many analysts (not to mention fans) believe the answer is yes.[2] Richards (2003), for example, proposes a quite radical transformation of MLB that would give ownership of teams to the public; would severely limit player mobility; would introduce a salary structure based on seniority; and would assure affordable tickets. His proposal thus addresses the most commonly-heard fan complaints of the game; it would at the same time, however, require a level of state regulation over baseball that would make it look more like Cuba’s than the current system. With that in mind, a close analysis of the Cuban system – how it works, what outcomes it generates – can be instructive. Not only is such an analysis interesting in its own right because sports leagues in socialist countries are much less studied and understood than those in market-oriented countries, it also elucidates the relationship between the political economy in which leagues operate, and the outcomes that the leagues generate. Understanding these linkages is crucial to evaluating proposals such as those that Richards advances.

To this end, this paper examines baseball in Cuba, as Cuba offers one example of league play that purports to uphold egalitarian rather than market values. This case study is not meant to be generalizable to all examples (real or hypothetical) of league play under non-market rules. To some extent, the Cuban story is a unique one. However, the paper is meant to demonstrate that alternatives to market-driven sports leagues inevitably have their own downside. Evaluating these tradeoffs is necessary to assess whether alternative ways of organizing league play can, in the end, be advantageous for citizens. In the case of Cuba, the paper shows that the attributes of the Cuban baseball system that observers most approve of – regionally-based teams, high caliber play, players motivated by the love of the game, and a seeming lack of profit motive – are achieved through the government’s exploitation of players, its extreme control over the choices of players, and a persistent imbalance in team composition.

This paper is presented in three sections. After a brief history of Cuban baseball, the paper focuses on the organization of baseball in Cuba today. In this section, three specific issues are examined: the operation of player labor markets, player pay and exploitation, and competitive balance in the Cuban League. A third section concludes that, as shown in the Cuban case, the use of political systems to pursue organized sporting goals that are at odds with market forces, inevitably have their own downside. The case that government regulation of sporting leagues can improve on market outcomes still needs to be made.

A. A Brief History of Baseball in Cuba

Baseball in Cuba has a long history, as organized league-play dates to 1878 (roughly the same time as U.S. baseball). From Cuba’s independence from Spain in 1898 through the first half of the 20th century, American interests dominated Cuban politics; one result was that during this period the two countries developed close political, economic, and cultural ties. Among many other aspects of Cuban life, this link with the U.S. was evident in organized baseball. Before Cuba’s revolution in 1959, professional baseball in Cuba baseball was closely associated with professional baseball in the U.S.. For example, many MLB teams played exhibition games or their entire spring training schedule in Cuba. The best (white) Cuban players played in the major leagues, Americans often played for Cuban teams, and major league players would often play in Cuba’s winter league. In 1946, the Havana Cubans joined the Florida International League as an affiliate of MLB's Washington Senators, and thus Cuba then became a direct participant in U.S. professional baseball. In 1954, the Cubans’ owner moved the Havana team over to the Triple-A International League, renaming the team the Cuban Sugar Kings. The team was affiliated with the Cincinnati Reds, and was so successful that in 1959 it won the minor league World Series.[3] Many Cubans hoped that there would one day be a Cuban MLB franchise.

Cuba’s 1959 revolution dramatically changed baseball in Cuba. The revolution struck at the heart of American interests in Cuba in that most private property became state property; this, coupled with Cuba’s emerging ties with the Soviet Union led to growing hostility between the two countries. First to change in baseball were the formal relationships between Cuba and MLB. In 1960, the International League voted to relocate the Cuban Sugar Kings to Jersey City. Eleven Cuban players, faced with the option of remaining in their country or playing professional baseball, chose the latter and left their country (Rucker and Bjarkman, 1999: 8). Shortly after the loss of the Sugar Kings, Cuba’s winter league circuit was forced out of business (Rucker and Bjarkman, 1999: 185).

Second to change in Cuban baseball was its organizational structure. Part of Castro’s plan for revolutionizing Cuba entailed revolutionizing sports – baseball in particular. This eventually led to the country’s adoption of a model of “physical culture” prevalent in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries (Pettavino and Pye, 1994: 10-12). This model emphasizes both mass participation in sports, and the development of champions. According to both Marx and Lenin, an individual’s physical and mental development are linked, and must be shaped by socialist society to assure strong character and values. Mass physical culture is one way to accomplish this, which also serves as an additional means of promoting state ideology among the masses (Pettavino and Pye, 1994). Mass physical culture in Cuba today remains important, and involves a highly structured system of physical education within the schools, as well as an extensive system of special sports schools where talented young athletes develop skill in dozens of sports (Pettavino, 2004).

Unlike mass participation in sports, the socialist emphasis on developing champions is done largely for strategic and nationalist reasons. State Pettavino and Pye (1994: 14): “Through competition in sports, the other peoples of the world could observe the differences between the socialist and capitalist systems, and compare them. The hope, of course, was that such a comparison would show the superiority of communism.” Under socialism, it was believed that talented athletes (as well as scientists, teachers and janitors) would be motivated by patriotic duty to perform for their country, not by money. A new socialist basis for the relationships among players, fans and the sport would result in a higher caliber play, greater fan appreciation, and a stronger public identity with sports – in short, a superior system.

Castro’s aversion to professional baseball – the yanquie’s favorite sport –has been particularly acute. Since the revolution, Cuban officials have characterized professional sports in the U.S. as a “capitalist perversion of athletics” (Jamail, 2000: 49). Castro himself has likened professional sports to slavery (Jamail, 2000: 29)[4], and sought to remake Cuban baseball reflecting the values of the revolution (Pettavino and Pye, 1994). For several reasons, achieving excellence in baseball has been especially important to Cuban officials.[5] For one, the prospect of beating Americans at their own game has long held special appeal to Cuba’s leaders (González Echevarría, 1999: 354).[6] Excellence in baseball has been seen as a way to showcase for Americans the successes of the revolution. Second, Cubans have historically been among the most fervent of baseball fans, and have long been demanding of high caliber play.

Over the decades, the particular role of baseball in Cuban ideology and politics has remained obvious in the public pronouncements of officials and in the public statements of players. Cuba’s vice president recently was quoted as saying that in Cuba, sports are “not only the fruit, but also the symbol of our Socialist revolution” (Price, 2000: 35); and Castro regularly links the performance of Cuban athletes with the status of the Cuban revolution (PBS, 2000). In Cuba, athletes are expected to be political as well as athletic examples for others to emulate, and athletic training is combined with political training; moreover, promotion within the sports system is based not only on talent, but on the degree of an individual’s perceived support of the government (Pettavino and Pye, 1994). One of Cuba’s best baseball players, Antonio Pacheco, is the epitome of the ideal athlete. Not only is he athletically gifted, but his public pronouncements lend strong support to the Cuban government. In 2000, he made the following statement in a program aired in the U.S., in response to questions about why he does not defect:

I think I represent to the fans the athlete formed by my country; the athlete that all Cubans want to see; the athlete who is a role model for all the Cubans who put their trust in me; the athlete who will never leave his people; the athlete who will never betray them; the athlete who will defend his flag with love and dignity. I think that is where the fan’s admiration and respect come from….Cuba for me is like my mother, and I will never abandon my mother (PBS, 2000).

B. Post-Revolutionary Baseball in Cuba Today

In 1962, the Castro government replaced Cuba’s professional baseball system with a new amateur baseball league called the Cuban League. Post-revolutionary baseball in Cuba was to be based on a socialist model of amateur sports not driven by money, but by national ideals. Cuba’s Commissioner of Baseball, Carlos Rodrίquez Acosta, underscores baseball’s association with nationalism:

The people have an incredible sense of ownership over Cuban baseball. It’s a symbol. I’d say like the flag, like the coat of arms, like the national anthem. Baseball has been a symbol of nationalism for more than 120 years. And therefore, when we’re organizing the championships, we have to be very aware that we’re not just dealing with some baseball game; but rather with the most important spectacle that exists in Cuba, the Cuban National Championship Series (PBS, 2000).

Organization of Play. The Cuban League remains relatively unchanged since 1962. It consists of 16 teams playing a 90 game schedule, beginning in November and ending in April. The teams are divided into an east and west sector, and after the regular season, post-season play leads to the Eastern champion playing the Western champion in a best of seven series.

Each of the 16 teams in the Cuban League represents a different Cuban province, with the exception of the province of Havana City, which hosts two teams. Teams do not move, nor, for the most part, do the players, who come from the province for which they play. The regional structure to games, with players originating from the province itself, is thought to heighten interest, rivalries, and the level of play. Rucker and Bjarkman (1999: 9) note that “regional pride and socialist ideals of sportsmanship have replaced professional salaries as the driving force of championship play”.

At the end of each playoff season, government officials from the Sports Ministry select the Cuban National Team. The national team engages in international tournaments, such as the Pan Am Games, the IBA World Championships, the Intercontinental Cup, and the Olympic Games, attesting to the success of Cuba’s system of developing talented athletes.[7] Cuba’s national team has won the vast majority of international baseball tournaments it has entered since the revolution. It is widely believed that Cuba has the most talented amateur players in the world, and professional teams throughout the world show intense interest in acquiring Cuban players.

In theory, the national team is comprised of the most talented Cuban players. However, team members are sometimes selected for political reasons rather than athletic performance, as players with outstanding records are not always guaranteed a place on the team (Rohter, 1997a; Jamail, 2000; Fainaru and Sánchez, 2001). Since international play outside Cuba gives players an opportunity to defect, players with “questionable” political loyalty may not be selected. With an eye on future Olympic competition, it is also frequently claimed that older players may be overlooked in favor of younger players with longer term prospects (Jamail, 2000). Commissioner Rodrίquez confirms that political factors figure into the government’s selection of the national team:

An athlete is selected to defend our country….If he doesn’t have an attitude where we…can have confidence in him, then he will never have the right to represent Cuba in an international event….On top of everything he must be patriotic, dignified, and participate like the athlete he is (Price, 2000: 109).

In evaluating the Cuban League, three issues central to the evaluation of any sports league are examined below. These are 1) the institutions governing labor markets; 2) the distribution of financial gain (if any) from the sport; and 3) the distribution of talent (competitive balance) among teams in the league.

1. Player Markets and Defections

As is true of talented athletes in many present and past socialist countries, baseball players in Cuba are developed through an extensive and highly organized player-development system run by the Sports Ministry. Talented players are identified as early as age 10, and move into one of the regional sports boarding academies that are found throughout the country.[8] Here they have access to specialized trainers, facilities, and coaches. The best players eventually earn a spot on their province’s team, or in rare cases are assigned to another province’s team.[9] As is true of all state workers in Cuba, changing jobs or location (team) is very difficult, and involves state approval. All players receive a salary from the state, which today generally ranges from about 250-350 pesos/month (currently $10-$15/month) (González, 2003). This pay is equivalent to that earned by the vast majority of the workforce that is likewise employed by the Cuban government. Officially, there is no difference in pay between the best and worst players, nor is there additional pay for outstanding performance. Informally, as is true throughout much of the government-controlled labor market, players (workers) identified by the government as deserving may receive additional gifts. This might include a vacation, a car, a washing machine, or smaller items like movie tickets, a restaurant meal, or a spare part for a broken television set. Renowned third baseman Omar Linares reportedly receives certain "fringe benefits" such as a Mercedes, an unlimited expense account at restaurants and hotels, plus the freedom to travel (Continental Baseball Association, 2002). However, such gifts are unpredictable, and players occasionally complain about their size (PBS, 2000; Fainaru and Sánchez, 2001).