Control + 1 Block Headings s16
Afghanistan COIN Neg DDI 2010
Afghanistan COIN Case Neg
Afghanistan COIN Case Neg 1
Strat Sheet 3
1NC Drones CP 4
Drones CP – Hella Drones Now 5
Drones CP – RC of Backlash 6
Drones CP – Cause Backlash 7
Drones CP – Unnecessary and Comparatively Worst 8
CMR DA [1/2] 9
CMR DA [2/2] 10
CMR Irregular Warfare Module [1/2] 11
CMR Irregular Warfare Module [2/2] 12
2NC CMR Overview [1/2] 13
2NC CMR Overview [2/2] 14
PMC DA 1NC [1/3] 15
PMC DA 1NC [2/3] 16
PMC DA 1NC [3/3] 17
1NC NATO F/L 18
2NC NATO 19
1NC Heg Frontline [1/2] 20
1NC Heg Frontline [2/2] 21
AT Overstretch – Iraq Drawdown Extn. 22
1NC COIN Good – CT Fails 23
1NC COIN Good – Solves Historically 24
1NC COIN Good – Key to Intel 25
1NC COIN Good – Stability Possible 26
1NC COIN Good – Now 27
Withdrawal Bad - Women’s Rights 28
Withdrawal Bad – Taliban Takeover 29
COIN Good – Solves 30
COIN Good – AT Not Enough Troops 31
COIN Good – Key to COT 32
COIN Good – AT “Footprint” 33
COIN Good – Solves Backlash 34
COIN Good – New Strat 35
CT Fails 2NC – AT “Small Footprint” 36
CT Bad - Backlash 37
CT Bad – Pakistan Instability 38
CT Bad– History 39
CT Bad – AT “Central Government Impossible” 40
Stability Possible – Brink 1NC/2NC 41
Stability Possible – AT History (Russia/Britain) 42
Stability Possible – Iraq proves 43
Stability Possible – conditions better 44
Stability Possible – easier than Iraq 45
Impact Defense – Taliban Won’t Support al Qaeda 46
Impact Defense – al Qaeda Weak 47
Impact Defense – No Nuclear Terrorism 48
Impact Defense – No Nuclear Terrorism 49
Impact – Afghan Instability– OMG [1/2] 50
Impact – Afghan Instability – OMG [1/2] 51
Impact – Taliban Takeover à Pakistan 52
Impact – Taliban Takeover à Pakistan 53
Impact – Taliban Takeover – Indo-Pak Conflict 54
Impact – Taliban Takeover – Pakistan Nuclear Terrorism 55
1NC Security Kritik Link [1/3] 56
1NC Security Kritik Link [2/3] 57
1NC Security Kritik Link [3/3] 58
K – AT “We stop the Taliban, they’re bad” 59
Strat Sheet
Aite,
The premise of this strategy is to deal with the more global advantages (NATO, Heg) in one of three ways: win strong defense, a decent risk of the turns, or that local instability turns them. Then conquer on the COIN good case turns. If they don’t have a stability/terrorism impact, read it for them.
Winning your COIN good turns:
- Win that they will no longer be perceived negatively. The Drones CP should do this for you, or you can argue that Petraeus is changing his strategy.
- Win that counterterrorism requires COIN to work, because they need the intel which you only get through stability through presence.
- Win that only COIN has been historically successful, and the rest is BS hypothesizing.
- Win that CT independently triggers the links to the backlash impacts
Offcase options
- CMR DA is particularly true in this instance, and has a sick turns case.
- START Politics will give you a good external impact to all of the local/regional bidness.
- Security K is a good option, because the aff isn’t withdrawing all presence, so they can’t really answer the “ending the occupation” link turn story, and their justification for action is to preserve NATO (totally imperialist), to stop overstretch and allow the US to be more elastic in response to conflict (totally even more imperialist), and to stop the terrorism (that’s a link) arising from a failed state (another link).
- PMC’s is in the file, but the impact is really embroiled in the rest of the debate, so you may just want to read it as a backlash case turn
- Karzai local poltics is in the generic file, and again could function as a case turn.
Go BQ.
Tyler and Nolan
1NC Drones CP
Text: The United States federal government should cease all combat UAV bombings in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Drones in Pakistan and Afghanistan destroys the effectiveness of counterinsurgency and causes enormous support and recruitment for terrorists.
Maleeha lodhi, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to US, 09 (“the Future of pakistan-U.S. Relations: opportunities and challenges “, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April, 2009, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA497485)
Terrorism and Extremism President Obama’s new strategy acknowledges Pakistan’s pivotal importance in achieving the goal of defeating terrorism and its stability as the key to regional and global security. Before considering the implications of Washington’s policy review, it is important to examine how and why Islamabad’s security challenges have intensified over the years. This will help to highlight the different narratives of the two countries about how we have reached the present point. The years 2007 and 2008 were the deadliest in Pakistan’s history, with a record number of suicide bombings and casualties from terrorist violence. According to one unofficial estimate, 6,000 lives were lost last year alone in bombings and terrorist attacks. Since 2001, 15,000 people have been killed in terrorist violence. The deterioration of the security situation in Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and the challenge of rising militancy are the cumulative outcome of the double blowback effect. First was the blowback from the post-1979 joint struggle that Pakistan waged with the U.S.-led international coalition against the Soviet occupation. This famously relied on Islamic fighters to eject the Russians from Afghanistan. This war of unintended consequences bequeathed to Pakistan a witches’ brew of problems that continue to plague the nation today, weakening the traditional fabric of society in its western provinces. The explosive legacy of the Afghan jihad included militancy and violent extremism, millions of Afghan refugees, and the exponential growth of madrassas, narcotics, and proliferation of arms. The most dangerous aspect of this legacy was that some 40,000 Islamic radicals were imported from across the Arab world to fight alongside the Afghan mujahideen. They later became the core of al Qaeda. The second blowback followed 9/11 and the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan. The 2001 intervention relied on the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance to oust the Pashtun Taliban regime, which provoked opposition from the Pashtun tribes that straddled both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border known as the Durand Line. The way the war was waged in Afghanistan, and especially the lack of any hammer and anvil strategy during the crucial military attack on Tora Bora, increasingly pushed al Qaeda militants and Taliban fight- ers into Pakistan’s frontier regions, where many melted away into Afghan refugee camps. The overmilitarized approach pursued in Afghanistan involved heavy reliance on aerial bombings and high collateral damage of civilian casualties. This fueled support for the growing insurgency and gave the Taliban a rationale to rally traditional resistance against foreign occupation. The slow and under-resourced reconstruction effort stymied any significant campaign to win hearts and minds while corruption and ineffectual governance widened the gap between Kabul and the countryside, especially in the Pashtun south and east. Lack of clarity about the goals pursued by coalition forces in the past 7 years and the inability to distinguish between al Qaeda and Taliban began to result in the growing confusion about the aims of the war effort. It also led to the growing fusion between Pashtun nationalism and Muslim radicalism, which in turn strengthened the insurgency. The fatal distraction of the Iraq War and the consequential diversion of resources and attention compounded all these problems. The downward trajectory in Afghanistan caused a devastating fallout on Pakistan, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where it spread militancy and radicalized some of the tribes in South and North Waziristan. This in turn accentuated the threat of the Talibanization of Pakistan. Much like the war in Vietnam was pushed into Cambodia, the escalation of the military campaign and failure to contain and subdue the Taliban in Afghanistan pushed the conflict into Pakistan’s tribal formulating policy only through the prism of Afghanistan ignores the reality that Pakistan is a much bigger and strategically more important country belt. Meanwhile, intensified missile strikes by unmanned U.S. Predator drones inside Pakistani border territory not only killed a number of al Qaeda targets, but also inflamed public opinion in the country, undercut Pakistan’s own counterinsurgency efforts, and further reinforced support from local tribes for the militants. The deterioration in the security situation in FATA has been a consequence and not a cause of the collapse of security in Afghanistan. It follows that containing the insurgency in Afghanistan, together with Pakistan’s help in curbing the support it receives from militants using its territory, would have a salutary effect in FATA and on its ability to defeat the Pakistani Taliban. Once a disparate group, the Pakistani Taliban are now united by the goal of assisting the Afghan Taliban against the U.S. military surge expected in the coming months.
Drones CP – Hella Drones Now
Obama increasing commitment to drones now
Jane Mayer, Political Staff Writer, The New Yorker, October 26, 2009, “The Predator War,” http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer#ixzz0rsb2Mhvw TP
Since then, the C.I.A. bombardments have continued at a rapid pace. According to a just completed study by the New America Foundation, the number of drone strikes has risen dramatically since Obama became President. During his first nine and a half months in office, he has authorized as many C.I.A. aerial attacks in Pakistan as George W. Bush did in his final three years in office. The study’s authors, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, report that the Obama Administration has sanctioned at least forty-one C.I.A. missile strikes in Pakistan since taking office—a rate of approximately one bombing a week. So far this year, various estimates suggest, the C.I.A. attacks have killed between three hundred and twenty-six and five hundred and thirty-eight people. Critics say that many of the victims have been innocent bystanders, including children
Drone presence in afghanistan doubled this past year – no signs of let-up
NYTimes, 2/19/2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/world/asia/20drones.html
The use of the drones has expanded quickly and virtually unnoticed in Afghanistan. The Air Force now flies at least 20 Predator drones — twice as many as a year ago — over vast stretches of hostile Afghan territory each day. They are mostly used for surveillance, but have also carried out more than 200 missile and bomb strikes over the last year, including 14 strikes near Marja in the last few days, newly released military records show. That is three times as many strikes in the past year as in Pakistan, where the drones have gotten far more attention and proved more controversial for their use in a country where the United States does not have combat forces.
And, deployment of UAVs is set to double in 2011.
Chris Jenks, Chief of the International Law Branch Office of The Judge Advocate General, 2009, University of North Dakota Law Review, “Law From Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use Of Force, And The Law Of Armed Conflict” http://www.law.und.nodak.edu/LawReview/issues/web_assets/pdf/85-3/85NDLR649.pdf
In September 2009, the United States Air Force (USAF) graduated its first pilot training class that did not receive flight training.1 These pilots are not headed for the cockpit but to the controls of an unmanned aircraft system (UAS). In 2009, the USAF trained more UAS pilots than fighter or bomber pilots in an attempt to meet what the former commander of United States Central Command labeled an “insatiable need” for UAS.3 While the UAS “surge” began under President Bush, President Obama is expanding both UAS acquisition and their use.4 The proposed 2011 defense budget would double UAS production and for the first time the USAF will order more UAS than manned aircraft.5 While UAS are now ubiquitous on the modern day battlefield,6 the disagreement and controversy surrounding them continues to grow. One commentator referred to UAS as “armed robotic killers,”7 while a senior analyst at Human Rights Watch described them as the weapon system most capable of destruction he has ever seen.8 Much of the recent controversy and associated disagreement involves armed UAS launching missile attacks at al Qaeda and Taliban targets in the northwest portion of Pakistan.9 The disagreements manifest themselves in varying conclusions on the legality of a given UAS strike in Pakistan. Yet, that overt disagreement on the answer to the legality question masks that the various participants in the discussion are utilizing wholesale different methodologies and talking past each other in the process. Some speak in terms of how the United Nations Charter governs the overarching question of legality; others claim that the Charter provides only some of the framework; and still others posit that the Charter does not meaningfully apply at all.10 This divergence leads to correspondingly varied answers as to what extent the law of armed conflict (LOAC) or human rights law applies to the use of force through the United States engaging targets in Pakistan. These answers range from the characterization of the conflict in Pakistan as a war and UAS strikes as “just the killing of the enemy, wherever and however found” to the same strike being labeled extrajudicial killings, targeted assassination, and outright murder
Drones CP – RC of Backlash
Drones are the root of opposition to troops – families fear destruction the sky which leads to radicalization.
AFP S.H. Khan 1-9-10 “US drone war delivers results, but at what price?”
President Barack Obama has ordered 51,000 extra US troops to Afghanistan, hoping to turn the tide in the war and deny Al-Qaeda sanctuary, but tribal experts fear drone attacks could spawn a war of revenge for years. The bomber, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, appeared posthumously in a video broadcast Saturday, vowing to avenge Baitullah Mehsud's death. "The way they are now attacking with their drones, trying to hit local militants -- maybe local militants are not a big threat to America but in the future they could become a threat," said tribal expert Rahimullah Yusufzai. Local residents contacted by AFP in North Waziristan -- a district where 22 of the last 24 attacks have struck -- said families lived in fear over the prospect of a Hellfire missile annihilating their home without warning. Yet speaking from Mir Ali, one of the main towns in the Pakistani tribal district, one shopkeeper said the drones did appear to have deterred foreign fighters. "There seems to be only one advantage -- the number of foreigners who used to roam markets in the region freely has reduced considerably," Noor Mohammad told AFP by telephone. Pakistan's unpopular president, Asif Ali Zardari, says the drone attacks undermine the nation's consensus against militants as it struggles with bombings that have killed nearly 3,000 people in less than three years. "Drone attacks are radicalising other people who may not have supported the Taliban," warned Yusufzai. But Lisa Curtis, a research fellow at Washington's conservative Heritage Foundation, said the US administration was more reliant than ever on drones after fears of Al-Qaeda were renewed by the failed Christmas Day plot to blow up an airliner over Detroit.
"The long-term costs are that it's raising anti-Americanism in Pakistan, which in turn makes it more difficult for us to cooperate with Pakistan," she said.