Comments:
Last updated: 8 August 1996
Copyright 1996. All rights reserved.
Bibliography of Rules and Norms
Compiled by Charlotte Hess
August 1996
Agrawal, Arun (1992) "Rules, Rule Making and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use." (Working Paper)*
Alland, Alexander, and Bonnie J. McCay (1973) "The Concept of Adaptation in Biological and Cultural Evolution." In Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology. J. J. Honigmann, ed. Chicago: Rand McNally.*
Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane (1985) "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." World Politics 38(1):226-254.*
Axelrod, Robert (1986) "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms." American Political Science Review 80(4):1095-1111.*
Banana, Abwoli Y., and William Gombya-Ssembajjwe (1996) "Successful Forestry Management: The Importance of Security of Tenure and Rule Enforcement in Ugandan Forests." In Forest Resources and Institutions. C. Gibson, M. McKean, and E. Ostrom, eds. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (Forests, Trees and People Programme, Phase II, Working Paper no. 3).*
Banks, Jeffrey S. (1986) "Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlement." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Papers, no. 608).*
Bennett, James, and Stuart Thorson "Are All Rules Effectively Computable?" Presented at the meeting of the International Studies Association, 1986, Anaheim, CA.
Berger, Charles R. (1977) "The Covering Law Perspective as a Theoretical Basis for the Study of Human Communication." Communication Quarterly 25(1):7-18.*
Billet, L. (1975) "Political Order and Economic Development: Reflections on Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations." Political Studies 23(4):430-441.*
Bilmes, Jack (1976) "Rules and Rhetoric: Negotiating the Social Order in a Thai Village." Journal of Anthropological Research 32:44-57.*
Blomquist, William (1992?) "Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater Systems in Southern California." (Working Paper)*
Bohnet, Iris, and Bruno S. Frey (1994) "Direct-Democratic Rules: The Role of Discussion." Kyklos 47:341-354.*
Bonacich, Phillip (1972) "Norms and Cohesion as Adaptive Responses to Potential Conflict: An Experimental Study." Sociometry 35:357-375.**
Bordley, Robert F. (1985) "Systems Simulation Comparing Different Decision Rules." Behavioral Science 30:230-239.*
Brams, Steven J. (1994) Theory of Moves. New York: Cambridge University Press.*
Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan (1981) "The Tax System as Social Overhead Capital; A Constitutional Perspective on Fiscal Norms." Presented at the 37th I.I.P.F. Congress on Public Finance and Growth, Tokyo, Japan.*
Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan (1985) The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.**
Bromley, Daniel W. (1978) "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Economics." Journal of Economic Issues 12(1):43-60.*
Buchanan, James M. (1979) "The Economic Constitution and the New Deal: Lessons from Late Learners." Center for Study of Public Choice, Dept. of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA. (Working Paper, no. 78-2-3).*
Buchanan, James M. (1983) "Individual Choice Behavior in Private, Agency, and Collective Decision Roles." Center for Study of Public Choice. Presented at the Conference "Nutamento Conservazione", Torino, Italy, January 1983.*
Buckner, Taylor H. (1970) "Transormations of Reality in the Legal Process." Social Research 37:88-101.*
Bull, Hedley (1996) "How is Order Maintained in World Politics?" In The International Political Economy and International Institutions; Vol. 2. O. R. Young, ed. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar. (The Library of International Political Economy, no. 10).*
Burns, Tom R., and Thomas Dietz (1991) "Institutional Dynamics: An Evolutionary Perspective." Presented at the XVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, July 21-25, 1991, Buenos Aires, Argentina.*
Burns, Tom R., and Thomas Dietz (1992) "Cultural Evolution: Social Rule Systems, Selection and Human Agency." International Sociology 7(3):259-283.*
Calvert, Randall L. (1994) "Explaining Social Order: Internalization, External Enforcement, or Equilibrium?" Presented at the Conference "What is Institutionalism Now?" University of Maryland, October 14-15, 1994.*
Cheffins, R. I., and R. N. Tucker (1976) The Constitutional Process in Canada. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.*
Coleman, James S. (1991) "Constructed Organization: First Principles." The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 7:7-23.*
Coleman, James S. (1987) "Norms as Social Capital." In Economic Imperialism. The Economic Approach Applied Outside the Field of Economics. G. Radnitzky and P. Bernholz, eds. New York: Paragon House.*
Comaroff, John L., and Simon Roberts (1981) Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic of Dispute in an African Context. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.**
Crawford, Sue, and Elinor Ostrom (1992) "Studying Rules: Linking Individuals and Systems." Presented at the Individual/System Seminar, Champaign, IL, February 14-16, 1992.*
Crawford, Sue, and Elinor Ostrom (1993) "A Grammar of Institutions." (Working Paper)*
Crawford, Sue E. S., and Elinor Ostrom (1995) "A Grammar of Institutions." American Political Science Review 89(3):582-600.*
Doubleday, Nancy (1991) "Competing Value Systems: Evolution of Norms, State Control and Traditional Ecological Knowledge." Presented at the second annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Winnipeg, Manitoba, September 26-30, 1991.
El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., and David M. Grether (1993) "Uncovering Behavioral Strategies: Likelihood-Based Experimental Data Mining." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, No. 850).*
El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., and David M. Grether (1995) "Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 919).*
Elster, Jon, and Rune Slagstad, eds. (1993) Constitutionalism and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Studies in Rationality and Social Change).*
Farkas, George (1973) "Specification, Residuals and Contextual Effects." Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, New Haven, CT. (Working Paper, No. W3-30).*
Fehr, Ernst, Erich Kirchler, and Andreas Weichbold (n.d.) "When Social Forces Remove the Impact of Competition: Social Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets." (Working Paper)*
Field, Alexander J. (1979) "Microeconomics, Socialization, and Norms." Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance, School of Education, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. (Program Report, no. 79-A15).*
Field, Alexander James (1979) "On the Explanation of Rules Using Rational Choice Models." Journal of Economic Issues 13(1):49-72.*
Fishburn, Peter C. "Lexicographic Orders, Utilities and Decision Rules; A Survey." (Working Paper) The Pennsylvania State University, College of Business Administration, University Park, PA. (Technical Report, no. 4).*
Forsythe, Robert, and Gerry L. Suchanek (1981) "Collective Decision Mechanisms and Efficient Stock Market Allocations; Existence of a Participation Equilibrium." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 371).*
Gardner, Roy, and Elinor Ostrom (1987) "Rules and Games." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, No. W87-16).*
Gardner, Roy, and Elinor Ostrom (1991) "Rules and Games." Public Choice 70(2):121-149.*
Gibbard, Allan (1984) "The Psychological Nature of Norms." (Working Paper) Department of Puilosophy, University of Michigan.*
Gibson, Clark (1995) "Multiparty Democracy and Wildlife: Rules, Animals and Patronage in Zambia, 1964-1972." Presented at the Workshop Mini-Conference, April 29 and May 1,1995, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.*
Gilligan, Thomas W. (1986) "Rules, Subjurisdictional Choice, and Congresssional Outcomes; An Event Study of Energy Taxation Legislation in the 93rd Congress." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 594).*
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel (1989) "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with Heterogeneous Committee." American Journal of Politcal Science 33(2):459-490.*
Gluckman, Max (1962) "The Crisis in the Folk Societies." In Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political and Military. H. D. Lasswell and H. Cleveland, eds. New York: The Conference; distributed by Harper. (The Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life).*
Gouldner, Alvin W. (1954) "About the Functions of Bureaucratic Rules." In Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. New York: The Free Press.*
Graham, George Jackson (1965) "Consensus: An Explication for Normative and Empirical Political Theory." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Indiana University, 1965).*
GЃth, Werner, P. Ockenfels, and M. Wendel (1991) "Efficiency by Trust in Fairness? Multiperiod Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments with an Increasing Cake." (Working Paper)*
Hammond, Peter J. "Consequentialist Social Norms for Public Decisions." (Working Paper)*
Hackett, Steven, Edella Schlager, and James M. Walker (1992) "The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriations." Presented at a Workshop Colloquium of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Bloomington, IN, September 21, 1992.*
Hechter, Michael, Debra Friedman, and Satoshi Kanazawa (1992) "The Attainment of Global Order in Heterogeneous Societies." Presented at the Public Choice Society Meetings, New Orleans, LA, March 20-22, 1992.*
Hechter, Michael, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler, eds. (1990) Social Institutions; Their Emergence, Maintenance, and Effects. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. (Sociology and Economics: Controversy and Integration).*
Heiner, Ronald A. (1990) "Rule-Governed Behavior in Evolution and Human Society." Constitutional Political Economy 1:19-46.*
Holland, John H. (1975) "The General Setting." In Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems: An Introductory Analysis with Applications to Biology, Control, and Artificial Intelligence. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.*
Holland, John H. et al (1986) "Modeling the Physical and Social Worlds." In Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.*
Holland, John H. et al (1986) "Rule-Based Mental Models." In Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.*
Humes, Brian D. (1987) "The Choice of Germaneness Rules: Impossibility Theorems and Some Possibilities." (Working Paper)*
Hurwicz, Leonid (1993) "Implementation and Enforcement in Institutional Modeling." In Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich, and N. J. Schofield, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics).*
Johnson, Ronald N., and Gary D. Libecap (1989) "Bureaucratic Rules, Supervisor Behavior, and the Effect on Salaries in the Federal Government." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5(1):53-82.*
Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (1974?) Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.*
Kandori, Michihiro (1992) "Social Norms and Community Enforcement." Review of Economic Studies 59(1):63-80.**
Kaufmann, Arnold (1974) The Science of Decision-making: An Introduction to Praxeology. New York: McGraw-Hill Book. (World University Library).*
Kaufmann, F. X., G. Majone, and V. Ostrom, eds. (1986) Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector; The
Bielefeld Interdisciplinary Project. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. (de Gruyter Studies in Organization, 4).*
Keech, William R. (1992) "Rules, Discretion, and Accountability in Macroeconomic Policymaking." Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. (Social Sciences Working Paper, No. 789).*
Kegley, Charles W., and Gregory Raymond (1990) When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. (Studies in International Relations).*
Kiesling, Herbert J. "A Criticism of the Potential Costs of Alternative Decision-Making Rules as Constructed by Buchanan and Tullock in Their Book, The Calculus of Consent." (Working Paper)*
Kiesling, Herbert J. (1968) "Potential Costs of Alternative Decision-Making Rules." Public Choice 4:51-58.*
Kiser, Larry L. (1980) "A Conceptual Apparatus for Institutional Analysis." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, no. W80-4).*
Kiser, Larry L. (1986) "Goods, Rules, and Transaction Costs." Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Baltimore, MD, March 21-23, 1986.*
Kliemt, H., and B. Schauenberg (1986) "Coalitions and Hierarchies: Some Observations on the Fundamentals of Human Cooperation." In Coalitions and Collective Action. M. J. Holler, ed. Wuerzburg, Germany: Physika-Verlag.*
Koford, Kenneth J., and Jeffery B. Miller, eds. (1991) Social Norms and Economic Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.*
Kormendi, Roger C., and Charles R. Plott (1980) "Committee Decisions under Alternative Procedural Rules; An Experimental Study Applying a New Nonmonetary Method of Preference Inducement." California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Pasadena, CA. (Social Science Working Paper, no. 346).*
Krehbiel, Keith (1991) Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. (Michigan Studies in Political Analysis).
*
Kurokawa, Kazuyoshi "'Rules Make Some Goods Public:' Some Suggestions to the Normative Theme 'Which Goods Should be Public?"." (Working Paper)*
Laar, Aart van de (1990) "A Framework for the Analysis of Common Pool Natural Resources." Management of Common Pool Resource Project, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands. (Working Paper, no. 77).*
Lee, Myungsuk (1990) "Policy and Rule Configuration: Korean Rural Development Movement; Saemaul Undong." Presented at the Spring Mini-Conference, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, April 28-30, 1990, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.*
Levi, Margaret (1981) "The Predatory Theory of Rule." Politics & Society 10(4):431-65.*
Levi, Margaret (1983) "Towards a Theory of Rule and Revenue Production: The Case of Roman Tax Farming." (Working Paper) Presented at the Public Choice Society Meetings in Savannah, GA and Western Political Science Meetings in Seattle, WA in March, 1983.*
Levi, Margaret (1984) "Rule and Revenue Production." Presented at the Western Political Science Association Meetings, Sacramento, CA, March 1984.*
Levi, Margaret (1987) "Creating Compliance." In Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California.*
Levi, Margaret (1988) Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy; 13).*
Levi, Margaret (1989) "The Politics of Contigent Consent." (Working Paper)*
Levi, Margaret, and Shane Fricks (1992) "Refusing Consent: Francophone Opposition to the Introduction of Conscription in Canada." Presented at the Public Choice Society Meetings, New Orleans, LA, March 20-22, 1992.*
Litt, Edgar (1966) The Political Imagination: Dialogues in Politics and Political Behavior. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.*
Llewellyn, Karl N., and E. Adamson Hoebel (1941) "A Theory of Investigation." In The Cheyenne Way. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.*
Luchins, A. S. (1947) "A Conflict in Norms; Metric Versus English Units of Linear Measurement." The Journal of Social Psychology 25:193-206.*
Majone, Giandomenico (1991) "Market Integration and Regulation: Europe After 1992." Presented at the Conference on "Production Organization, Dynamic Efficiency and Social Norms", April 4-6, 1991, Rome, Italy.*
Manns, Alphonso (1977) "The Problem of Constitutional Choice." (Working Paper)*
March, James G. (1957) "Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Influence." The Journal of Politics 19:202-226.*
Martin, Dolores Tremewan, and Dale G. Bails (n.d.) "Expenditure Consequences of Institutional Rules: A Cross-Sectional Study of Local Governments." (Working Paper)*
Martin, Michael W., and Jane Sell (1986) "Rejection of Authority: The Importance of Type of Distribution Rule and Extent of Benefit." Social Science Quarterly 67(4):855-868.*
Mayntz, Renate (1989) "Social Norms in the Institutional Culture of the German Federal Parliament." Max-Planck-Institut fЃr Gesellschaftsforschung, Cologne, Germany. (MPIFG Discussion Paper, No. 89/5).*
McKelvey, Richard D. "A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design." California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. Presented at the Institute Management Science Meetings, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 18-22, 1979. (Social Science Working Papers, no.).*
McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook (1984) "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior." Journal of Politics 48:182-205.*
Meltzer, Leo (1963) "Comparing Relationships of Individual and Average Variables to Individual Response." American Sociological Review 28:117-123.*
Milner, Henry (1992) "Rational Choice and the Reduction of Inequality: Toward a Theory of Institutional Arrangements in the Nordic Countries." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 3-6, 1992.*
Mozaffar, Shaheen (1993?) "A New Institutionalism Perspective on Regime Change in Africa." (Working Paper)*
Muller, Harald (1996) "The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes." In The International Political Economy and International Institutions; Vol. 2. O. R. Young, ed. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar. (The Library of International Political Economy, no. 10).*
Nau, Dana S. (1987) "Hierarchical Abstraction for Process Planning." (Working Paper)*
Nosofsky, Robert M. (1990) "Typicality in Logically-Defined Categories: Exemplar-Similarity Versus Rule Instantiation." Indiana University Cognitive Science. (Research Report, No. 15).*
Nosofsky, Robert M. et al (1993) "Comparing Models of Rule-Based Classification Learning: A Replication and Extension of Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961)." Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Research Report, No. 2).*
Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (1989) World of Our Marking: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press. (Studies in International Relations).*
Orbell, John M., Alphons van de Kragt, and Robyn M. Dawes (1991) "Covenants without the Sword: The Role of Promises in Social Dilemma Circumstances." In Social Norms and Economic Institutions. K. J. Koford and J. B. Miller, eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.**
Ostrom, Elinor (1985) "Actions and Rules." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, no. W85-4).*
Ostrom, Elinor (1991) "A Framework for Institutional Analysis." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, no. W91-14).*
Ostrom, Elinor (1991) "A Method of Institutional Analysis and an Application to Multiorganizational Arrangements." In The Public Sector -- Challenge for Coordination and Learning. F. Kaufmann, ed. New York: Walter de Gruyter.*
Ostrom, Elinor (1995) "Incentives, Rules of the Game, and Development." Presented at the World Bank's Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, May 1-2, 1995.*
Ostrom, Elinor (1995) "Self-Organization and Social Capital." Industrial and Corporate Change 4(1):131-159.*
Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker (1991) Rules and Games: Institutions and Common Pool Resources. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University.*
Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker (1992) Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (draft). Bloomington, IN: Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis.*
Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James M. Walker (1994) Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.*
Ostrom, Vincent (1995) "The Constitutive Character of Norms in Human Societies." Hong Kong Public Administration 4(2):161-79.*
Ostrom, Vincent (1979) "Constitutional Level of Analysis: Problems and Prospects." Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN. (Working Paper, No. W79-4).*
Ostrom, Vincent (1986) "A Fallabilist's Approach to Norms and Criteria of Choice." In Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector. F. X. Kaufmann, G. Majone, and V. Ostrom, eds. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.*
Ostrom, Vincent (1984) "Why Governments Fail: An Inquiry into the Use of Instruments of Evil to do Good." In The Theory of Public Choice -- II. J. M. Buchanan and R. D. Tollison, eds. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.*