18

Prof. John Parratt

Professor of Third World Theologies, University of Birmingham

23 Nov 2000

CHRISTIANS AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE: THE NORTH EAST INDIA CASE

1. INTRODUCTION: INDIA’S NORTH EAST

Since the late 1980s there has been a growing volume of literature on the problems of the northeastern region of India. In particular the question is at last being openly addressed why it is that this ‘periphery of the periphery on the road to nowhere’ as Verghese , in his brilliant survey of the region (1997) aptly describes them, contain by far the greatest percentage of so-called ‘insurgent’ hostiles, and why civil unrest and consequent military repression have become endemic. While each of the seven states of the north east has its own peculiarities, there are a number of general considerations which apply to region as a whole and which to a greater or lesser degree affect its several disparate parts.

Historically the region was never part of any of the great empires of the sub-continent and was scarcely brought under the umbrella of the construct of ‘India’ until the British advances into Assam at the beginning of the 19th century.

Historical difference was reinforced by geographical isolation when in 1947 East Bengal was excised from the remainder of the region. The loss of east Bengal may have seemed relatively insigificant to India as a whole, but for the north eastern region it meant the loss of its main route to sea and the disruption of a regional economy which had been built up over more than a century. The region henceforth remained joined to India by the tenuous link of the Siliguri corridor, a narrow neck 14kms wide, so that less than 1% of its total borders were now with the remainder of India. This geographical isolation successive Congress governments made no proper attempts to address. Communication by air developed only slowly (despite the airfields which had been built in the region during the Second World War), and the rail link was grossly inadequate to service so large a region.

Its isolation was reinforced by a form of narrow ethnocenticism which assumed the Hindi speaking ‘Aryan’ tradition represented the only valid form of Indianness. The resulting ‘integrationist’ policies, which lasted until comparatively recently, thus presssurised a region which is ethnically and linguistically quite different to conform to what has been called the culture of the Hindi cow-belt. While the distinctiveness of the ‘Dravidian’ south had to be recognised, the peculiarities of the Mongoloid cultures of the north east (which have an equally great cultural history) have never yet been fully acknowledged. As Verghese comments: ‘the dominant Aryan bent of national thinking has accommodated the Dravidian reality but has yet to appreciate the Mongoloid feature of the Indian ethos’ (Verghese (1997:281). It is symptomatic that though the Mongoloid languages are the largest single language group in India, none was listed in the 8th schedule as an official language until as late as 1993, when Manipuri (after years of demonstrations) was finally included.

The claim of an underlying Hindu religious tradition is no more convincing. It is only the Brahmaputra valley and the Valley of Manipur which were extensively hinduised. Even in the latter Hinduism is a comparatively recent importation, and Meitei society now shows many signs of becoming post-Hindu, as political identity has become entangled with religious identity. As long ago as 1980 Sarin (1980:116) could claim that ‘of late Meiteis are refusing to be recognised as Hindus’, and the revival of the pre-Hindu Sanamahi religion continues to apace (Parratt & Parratt 1999). The hills, which were never hinduised, are today mainly Christian, with Mizoram and Nagaland being around 80% Christian, and Maghalaya also having a large Christian population. Arunachal’s peoples seem largely to have withstood the efforts of Hindu missionaries, and it also has a substantial minority of Chakma Buddhists (resettled there after 1947).

What lies behind all these factors is what one might call the fallacy of concept of the ‘mainstream.’ Naorem Sanajaoba (1988:262) quotes a telling comment of Sunanda K. Datta-Ray: speaking of the ignorance of Indians in general about the ‘Mongolian’ heritage of the north east, Datta-Ray writes: ‘Deep in the Indian psyche lies the belief, lately encouraged by obscurantist political groups, that Bharat is really Aryavrata, or the Hindi heartland, and that outlying districts which do not conform to its manners.. Customs, language and religion are colonial possessions and must be ruled as such until they can be absorbed in a superior code.’ The Mongoloid peoples of the north east frequently claim that in the rest of the country they are regarded as foreigners and that an attitude of misplaced racial superiority and disdain has characterised their treatment by ‘mainstream’ Indians. The parochialism of successive Delhi governments and the widespread ignorance about the region, even on the part of educated Indians, has created a ‘them and us’ mentality on both sides which has been one contributory factor to civil unrest and armed conflict. As late as 1988 one of the Government’s own reports could speak of a ‘two way deficit of understanding with the rest of the country.’ It is therefore no surprise that an area as large as the north east, separated as it is from the bulk of the subcontinent by its geography, history, ethnicity, languages, and for a majority by its religion, and which was only marginally affected by the independence struggle, should regard itself as not part of the so-called ‘mainstream’ as defined by the Delhi-wallah.

Unfortunately, to the contrary, central governments have deliberately reinforced the marginalisation of the region by a policy of isolation. It is the only area of India for which special permits are required (1). It is true that these restrictions (like much other oppressive legislation) built upon colonial regulations, in this case the ‘inner line.’ The inner line restrictions were originally meant to preserve tribals from exploitation by Indians from the rest of the subcontinent. Its present operation certainly does not succeed in doing that, and there are justifiable complaints (especially from Manipur) that outsiders dominate the economy out of all proportion to their numbers and flood the region unwanted unskilled labour. The modern version of the inner line, ‘restricted areas’, functions simply to prevent outside access to sensitive areas and thus prevent the dissemination in the media of the true conditions in those states. Foreign journalists are not admitted and representatives of human rights organisations explicitly excluded. In effect these states are virtually closed to all outside investigation. The situation is made worse in that (as we shall discuss further below) from soon after 1947 large tracts have been classified as ‘disturbed areas’ and subject to oppressive military occupation, without however the formal declaration of an emergency.

B.K. Roy Burman (1997:26) has pointed out that claims of neo-colonialism are justified and that there has been a sharp suppression of talk of self-determination. Resentment at political subjection, and economic and social neglect, has understandably given rise to protest, both civil and insurgent, both peaceful and violent. This has resulted in turn in the attempt by Delhi to impose its will by military force. Some political advance has been made, notably in Mizoram. But half a century of severe military repression has in the main solved nothing, but rather increased a feeling of alienation, even on the part of peaceloving civil populations. There sadly seems to be little political will on either side to create a climate of basic human rights which alone would make development a possibility.

2. CHRISTIANITY IN NAGALAND AND MANIPUR

Protestant Christianity in these states is dominated by the Baptists, and was largely established by the American Baptists, who traditionally have a strongly evangelical and biblicist approach. Catholicism was introduced much later, but has grown in importance largely due to its emphasis on educational work. The removal of foreign missionaries in the 1960s affected the Baptists more than the Catholics, who rely upon a large contingent of south Indian priests, mainly Silesians.

The earliest presence of missions in the north east, both Catholic and Protestant, was almost incdental. By the early 1800s western missions were seeking an overland route into China, as access through the eastern sea coast of China was becoming more difficult. [There is ample evidence both from early traditions and from documentary sources that a land route through Assam to Yunnan via northern Burma existed from pre-Christian times. There appears to have been two main routes, one through the northern end of the Brahmaputra Valley and another, more southerly route, through the Valley of Manipur, and it was no doubt along these routes that the earliest Mongoloid Thai-Shan settlers to north east India entered.] In pursuance of this land route into south western China the Baptists established a short lived mission in Guwahati in 1829, and later a more permanent one further east at Sadiya. The first mission contact with the Naga tribes was in 1838, and the first Naga Christian community was established, by an Assamese evangelist, among the Ao sub-tribe in 1872. Thereafter other groups were gradually contacted and Kohima (present capital of Nagaland) and Wokha became important centres for Christianity among the Angami Nagas. The other main tribal grouping the Kukis, only began to convert to Christianity in the first decade of the 20th century.

Manipur, as an independent princely state was closed to missionaries until after the Anglo-Manipuri war of 1891. Subsequently mission work was permitted only in the hills (over which the British retained some control after the war), but was forbidden among the hinduised plains Meiteis. The first evangelism was carried out among the Tangkhul Nagas in Ukhrul, and subsequently at Kangpokpi (which became a centre for Kuki Christianity).

Despite early reluctance Christianity spread among both tribal groups. There was a substantial increase due to the so called Manipur revival which began in 1916. This actually began in the Chin (Lushai) Hills (the present Mizoram) and at first affected mainly the Kukis, but by the 1920s had spread to Manipuri Nagas. In the beginning there was some persecution of Christians by the traditionalists, and mutual suspicion between the Naga subgroups was only slowly broken down. Despite the acceptance of a common faith the age old antagonism between Naga and Kuki continued, fuelled by such anti-colonial movements as the Kuki rebellion and the Jadonong-Gaidinlui cult. While it is true, as Downs (1992:132) indicates, that Christianity has been a unifying factor , it has nonetheless been singularly unsuccessful in eradicating completely inter- and intra-tribal conflict [most recent in Kuki-Naga massacres of the 1990s, and the in-fighting among different sub-groups in the NSCN]. The relationship between the evangelical Baptists of the CBNEI and the Catholics has not been smooth, though they have cooperated on a few issues [not so much on human rights as far as the evidence goes, indeed Syiemlieh (1990:75) claims that a persecution of Catholic Nagas was provoked by the largely Baptist NSCN underground].

While figures are difficult to assess, there can be no doubt that Christianity has become the ‘official religion’ (Downs) of Nagaland and Mizoram, and probably 80% of the population of these states would regard themselves as Christian. In Manipur most of the Naga and Kuki tribals, who make up around a third of the population of some 2 million, may also be regarded as Christian. There is also a small, but growing, interest in Christianity among the Meiteis. This may in part be a political, as well as a religious, protest against the Indian mainstream. K.M.Singh (1991:421) rightly points out that the dramatic impact of the Second World War on Manipur had the effect of breaking down the barriers between Hindus and others and bringing the about greater understanding of Christianity on the part of the Meiteis. However Manipur, like other parts of the northeast, has been the recipient in recent years of a wholly counterproductive proliferation of fundamentalist splinter groups, usually financed from America, which has resulted in the emergence of a confusing (to the non-Christian) number of mini-churches.

3. POLITICAL RESISTANCE

The area known as the Naga Hills (the present Nagaland less the Tuenseng tract) was only loosely administered by the British. On the independence of India in 1947, Naga leaders made it clear that in their view the Naga people had never historically been part of India and that they did not wish to join the Indian Union. The Hydari agreement recognised their right to develope separately during a ten year period under the general superintendence of the governor of Assam, and that the final decision regarding union or independence would be made thereafter. The Indian Government unilaterally reinterpreted this to mean that after that period full integration would be effected. Meantime in August 1947 the National Nagaland Council declared independence for the region, and held a plebiscite which gave absolute support for this declaration. India naturally rejected the plebiscite, and the Nagas then boycotted the Indian elections. Nehru paid a flying visit to both Nagaland and Manipur in 1953, but ignored the voice of the people in both states. Integration, master minded by Sirdar Patel and his henchman V.P. Menon, was put into brutal effect. Repressive measures began in 1953. Three years later the Indian army occupied towns and villages, some civilians were shot and their corpses displayed publicly as a warning to insurgents. That same year the NNC set up its rival government. The Indian Government gave some ground. The Tuenseng tract was joined to the Naga Hills in 1956 and the region given some autonomy. Nagaland became the first of the smaller northeastern regions to be granted statehood in 1963.