CHINA (Note to Editor a Lot of These Seem Pretty Repetitive I Think They Can Be Easily

EAST ASIA

CHINA (note to editor – a lot of these seem pretty repetitive – I think they can be easily combined – let me know if you need any input from me on where to cut. Thanks, Amanda)

Beijing will continue laying down pre-emptive measures against threats to the Olympic Games, limiting public protests, censoring media both foreign and domestic, tightening Internet controls. Stratfor expects seeming disparate activist campaigns (such as Save Darfur and Save Tibet) to coordinate their anti-Beijing activities in the hope of achieving linkage among many different regional and topical issues.
To counter, Beijing will undermine such activities by lobbying foreign governments and personalities to both reduce their reception for these groups, and to prepare the world for crackdowns on them. Geopolitical light-weights (e.g. Cambodia and smaller developing countries) and a few geopolitical mid-weights (e.g. economically developed but geopolitically less influential countries like Singapore) have already given their endorsement to the Chinese regime’s actions towards Tibet. Expect geopolitical heavy weights (e.g. Australia, United Kingdom) to lend their support towards Beijing over this issue closer to August.
With 4 months left until the Olympic Games, any and all politically contentious issues will be frozen/shelved/squashed until September – even the issue of China’s new super ministries, for which only superficial bureaucratic reshufflings and office space openings will occur.
No significant policies (beyond the most mundane administrative changes) will be made or discussed, including anything related to the proposed new Energy Law. The new energy bureau that was recently created as a substitute for the originally proposed Ministry of Energy will be kept under the tight control of the top state economic planner the NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission).
Multiple attempts to scupper the Chinese authorities’ security arrangements for protecting the Olympic Torch’s global tour will be made by activist groups (e.g. Hong Kong on May 2nd). Attempts to sabotage security arrangements inside China will unlikely succeed. But even if the Torch’s journey is not completed, it will not stall Beijing’s determination to push ahead as planned for the Games themselves.
Other issues that fan the patriotic flame will be used by Beijing to galvanize the population together behind a successful hosting of the Games, and to keep potentially socially volatile issues (e.g. food inflation) contained through August.

SOUTH KOREA

There will be more episodes of rhetorical sparring between North and South, as newly elected South Korean President Lee seeks to realign Seoul closer to Washington, as Pyongyang tries to create more episodes (e.g. missile tests) in order to stir up a sense of crisis before resuming talks -- a tactic it often uses of instigating a crisis before negotiating back to the status quo.

THAILAND

While tensions are still running high, the election results and Thaksin’s return to Bangkok signals some sort of compromise between the military and new government in shaping the country’s future.
There will be increasingly more restrictions (especially those imposed over the last year) imposed on foreign investment inside Thailand
Recent military and police raid successes at regaining control over the security situation Thailand’s volatile south look set to continue, as a compromise may have been reached between the new government (under the control of former Prime Minister Thaksin) and the military -- allowing the military to reinsert itself into the center of security operations in the south, in return for the military’s acceptance of Thaksin back into mainstream Thai politics. (i.e. without a military coup to overthrow the newly elected government)
Increased military and police activity in the south will mean a short-term increase in violence but eventual stability.

JAPAN

Political infighting will continue to mar the focus of effective governance inside Japan, as the incumbent Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda grapples with sliding public support. This is important given that a new fiscal year is about to start for Japan, and with little consensus within parliament over how state funds should be spent, there may be ramifications for both Japanese economic and defense issues. Examples may include abrupt tax policy changes, non-extension of government contracts contrary to private sector expectations, and longer timeframes for resolving red tape procedure inside the Japanese bureaucracy.
As Seoul continues to push for greater alignment with Washington, Tokyo may also start leaning closer in towards Beijing in diplomatic dealings, as a gentle reminder to America of Japan's strategic importance (as a long-standing ally) in the region. Tokyo has no intentions of ending its cooperative relationship with the US, far from it, but occasional friction points will continue emerging (e.g. parliament's recent failure to approve a budget for US bases in Japan) to send this message across the Atlantic over the next quarter.

EURASIA

RUSSIA

MEDVEDEV’S NOMINATION

As was expected without doubt, Russia selected in elections March 2 a new president, Dmitri Medvedev. Already Russia’s two largest rival clan assets—natural gas giant Gazprom and oil giant Rosneft-- have moved to secure their own people in the other’s company. On March 13, Yuri Petrov—a Gazprom supporter and one of Russian President-elect Dmitri Medvedev’s allies — was nominated to the board of energy firm Rosneft. The rivalry between state energy firms Gazprom and Rosneft is one of the major battles between the clans, and Petrov’s nomination is part of a personnel shuffle that could either increase tension between the clans and companies, or be a genius move by Putin to strike a balance and deal between the two clans that could tear Russia apart. April will see a continuation of such drama, though not much of substance will play out until Medvedev takes office in May.

NATO SUMMIT

The NATO summit April 2-4 will lay the course for the future months’ relations between the West and Russia in everything concerning diplomatic and political relations to economic and energy matters. This comes off of the March developments where U.S. President George W. Bush announced that he was pursuing not only the expected NATO expansion to Croatia, Macedonia and Albania, but also the former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine. In April, we will finally the answer to how far the West is willing to take pushing Russia with possible membership for Georgia and Ukraine.

This brings up a myriad of issues. First off, the U.S. and Europe do not agree on pursuing a tough stance of accepting Georgia and Ukraine. The main reason is that Europe knows that if Russia lashes out in revenge, then Europe will be hit hard and not the U.S. The second issue is how Russia will respond. Moscow has a slew of options on its plate from actively pursuing Ukraine or Georgia’s governmental collapse to shutting off natural gas supplies to Europe. Lastly, the moves by the Washington and Moscow’s reply is very reminiscent of a new Cold War—one that isn’t brewing but is already here. Nonetheless, April will lay the course for atleast the next six months of relations between Russia and the West.

BP vs. Russia

Russia’s Federal Security Bureau (FSB) on March 19 raided the Moscow offices of the BP joint venture in Russia, TNK-BP. Gazprom has long has its eye on taking over joint Russo-British venture TNK-BP. The process by which Russia’s energy giants devour a company owned by foreigners and Russian oligarchs has been repeated often in the ongoing consolidation of Russia’s energy sector. Meanwhile, the tension between the Kremlin’s two powerful factions increases.

But to raise the stakes in the TNK-BP situation, Russian authorities on March 20 arrested a BP employee and a man linked to the British Council, on charges of industrial espionage. The latter arrests signal a move beyond mere Russian energy consolidation toward Moscow lashing out at London in the Cold War mold.

April will see a continuation of not only the moves against BP, TNK-BP and the UK, but it is suppose to also be the month in which Russian courts will hear evidence on whether to charge BP with tax evasion or not. The tit-for-tat between Russia and the UK will continue.

BELARUS

Belarus and the U.S. are locked in a diplomatic row over sanctions and human rights within Belarus. The U.S. Embassy in Minsk has reduced its staffing with the ambassador to Belarus, Karen Stuart, having left and returned countless times over the past month. Over March, nearly 50 percent of the U.S. Embassy staff has left Belarus, leaving only 17 people in Minsk. In return the Belarusian Embassy in Washington is planning on also reducing its staff in April. The U.S. and European Union have long imposed sanctions on Belarus over human rights concerns, even banning President Alexander Lukashenko from traveling to their territory.

During the last week in March, Belarusian security forces broke up an opposition rally and jailed dozens of activists, pushing both the U.S. and E.U. to more sanctions. Stuart is urging Washington to implement new sanctions on oil products firm Belneftekhim. Sanctions against Belneftkhim were also implemented in 2007, but lifted once Minsk sought for better ties to the West—before once again abandoning those ties. Belneftekhim's activities account for about a third of Belarus' foreign currency earnings and sanctions would freeze the accounts of the Belneftekhim’s U.S. subsidiaries.

TURKMENISTAN

Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov will become the first Turkmen leader to attend a NATO summit when he goes to the alliance’s upcoming heads-of-state meeting in Bucharest, Romania, on April 2-4. The move indicates that Berdimukhammedov is looking to balance his country between the West and Russia while both sides try to pull Turkmenistan off the fence.

MESA

EGYPT:

Egypt will be holding municipal elections on April 8, which are important for a number of reasons. First, is the timing – they take place at a time when the country’s main opposition and largest Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), has enhanced its electoral power. The MB increased its seats in the 454-member parliament from 17 to 88 in the 2005 elections, despite the fact that the polls were marred by significant irregularities. The MB performance forced the government to postpone the municipal elections in 2006 for a period of two years. Second, the MB, given its social network of schools, clinics, charities, and professional syndicates, in a relatively free and fair local level, could secure some major gains. Third, a 2005 constitutional amendment requires presidential candidates to obtain endorsements from 250 parliament and local council members. Finally, these elections come at a time when there is significant labor and social unrest in which people from many walks of life are protesting rising prices.

The government, concerned about the possibility outbreak of major street agitation is trying to bring relief by promising to increase the pay of 5.6 million civil servants, raising the minimum monthly salary, which is currently at $50, engage in additional spending more on food subsidies and adding millions of families to the list of people eligible to receive subsidized sugar, rice and oil. Rice exports have been banned for six months from April 1 as part of an effort to hold down local prices. There has reportedly been an increase in the number of Cabinet meetings being held to deal with the rising prices. Elsewhere, on a nearly daily basis, official pronouncements underscoring the government’s concern for those “on limited incomes” can be seen on the front pages of the newspapers.

Given these circumstances, the government has tried to block the MB from participating in the polls, and there has been a surge in arrests of MB affiliates which has triggered protests from the group. The economic conditions coupled with the April 8 vote has the potential of generating unrest in the country. Cairo’s security apparatus, though its ability to check opposition activities is not what it used to be, will likely to be able to contain any fallout.

GCC:

Several Gulf Cooperation Council states, over the past several months, have increasingly been faced with labor protests. In certain instances demonstrating foreign workers have gone on rampage destroying vehicles and facilities. On March 18, some 1500 Egyptian workers striking over pay torched offices and vehicles in Sharjah, UAE. The protest was the second reported in the Gulf country since October when South Asian laborers vandalized police vehicles and public property in Dubai. Unlike in the past, GCC authorities have been forced into a defensive posture to negotiate with workers, despite the fact that labor groups remain illegal. At a time when development work is booming in the Persian Gulf region and there is a high demand for labor, any concessions on the part of the governments or private firms are likely to further embolden other workers across the region. As a result, there could be additional unrest.

KUWAIT:

Kuwait's Ministry of Electricity and Water might cut electricity during the summer to ease demand on its power stations. Currently it is supplying 700 megawatts more than planned and applications for power connections to new residential and commercial buildings have been postponed. In addition, the ministry recently used some of its water reserves to meet shortages because distillation stations could not meet increasing demand. Though the ministry is denying that there will be power and water shortages this summer, Stratfor sources in the Persian Gulf country tell us that they are definitely expecting shortages.

ISRAEL, LEBANON:

The 40-day mourning period for assassinated Hezbollah operations chief Imad Mughniyah ended March 24, generating fears that the Lebanese Shia Islamist movement would attack Israeli interests in retaliation for the death of its leader. Stratfor’s position has been that a retaliatory attack from Hezbollah is unlikely to be imminent or obvious in any way so as to invite an Israeli attack on the group. Recently, our sources in Lebanon have informed us that the group is toning down the rhetoric as it realizes that another war with the Jewish state could significantly weaken it. Despite the fact that there is a concerted effort on part of Hezbollah to calm down tensions, Israel is still making the case for war, which increases the possibility of miscalculation, leading to a conflict.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, South Africa

Angola

The government of Angola is expected to begin a nation-wide civilian disarmament program in April. The first phase of disarmament will involve a public information campaign and voluntary surrender of weapons followed by mandatory confiscation. The move – ostensibly to improve security in the country by recovering tens of thousands of weapons leftover from the country’s civil wars – is a tactic by the country’s ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party to remove any potential security threats ahead of the country’s parliamentary elections that are anticipated to take place September 5-6. Though Luanda does not face an imminent insurgent threat, it is believed the ruling party under President Eduardo Dos Santos is taking security precautions – including maintaining an estimated 10,000+ troops in its oil-rich Cabinda province -- as it does not trust peace deals alone that are in place with Cabindan rebels or with supporters of the opposition National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) party (whom the MPLA defeated militarily in 2002).

Nigeria

The Nigerian government will hold a Niger Delta Peace Summit in April involving the participation of government officials, tribal elders, militants, and youth leaders all from the country’s Niger Delta region. The summit is aimed to reconcile grievances in the Niger Delta and reduce militancy, though the likelihood of reaching a lasting peace is practically impossible. At the same time the Nigerian government is moving forward with plans to prosecute suspected militant group leader Henry Okah on treason charges. No date has been set for the trial of Okah, however, who has been held in prison in Nigeria since he was extradited from Angola Feb. 14 (he was arrested in the Angolan capital on arms smuggling charges last Sept. 3). Gaining a conviction against Okah, a leader of the militant group Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), could trigger a backlash among fighters loyal to him. While MEND was responsible for carrying out attacks in 2006-07 that shuttered a quarter to a third of the country’s oil output, political patrons of the militant group are currently meeting their political and economic objectives and are therefore not interested – for the time being – in carrying out disruptive militancy against the region’s energy sector.