CMSDL Core Files 2013/14
P1
Chicago Middle School Debate League
2013/14
Core Files
Researched by Brian Peterson
Edited by Les Lynn and Cydney Edwards
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement toward Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela.
2013/14 Core Files2
Table of Contents (1/2)
I. AFFIRMATIVE CASES AND CASE NEGATIVES
Mexico Security Affirmative4 - 27
Mexico SecurityNegative 28 - 43
Venezuela Democracy Affirmative 44 - 78
Venezuela Democracy Negative 79 - 94
Cuba Ethanol Affirmative 95 - 124
Cuba EthanolNegative 125 - 144
II. DISADVANTAGES
Diplomatic Capital Negative 145 - 160
Diplomatic Capital Affirmative 161 - 166
China Negative 167 - 185
China Affirmative 186 - 191
Politics Negative 192 - 216
Politics Affirmative 217 - 227
Corruption Negative 228 - 248
Corruption Affirmative 249 - 259
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Table of Contents (2/2)
III. COUNTERPLAN
European Union Counterplan Negative 260 - 273
European Union Counterplan Affirmative 274 - 283
IV. TOPICALITY VIOLATIONS
Mexico SecurityTopicality Negative 284 - 291
Venezuela DemocracyTopicality Negative 292-298
Cuba EthanolTopicality Negative 299 - 305
Mexico Security TopicalityAffirmative 306-308
Venezuela Democracy Topicality Affirmative 309-312
Cuba Ethanol Topicality Affirmative 313-315
CMSDL Core Files 2013/14Index
Mexico Security Case 1/1
AFF
Mexico Security Affirmative4
1AC: Mexico Security Affirmative...... 5
2AC Harms: A/t - #1 “Cooperation Now” [1/2]3
2AC Harms: A/t - #2 “No Nuclear Terrorism” [1/3]...... 15
2AC Harms: A/t - #3 “Violence is Decreasing” [1/3]...... 18
2AC Harms: A/t - #4 “Drugs are Decreasing” [1/2]...... 21
2AC Solvency: A/t - #1 “Immigration From Everywhere”...... 23
2AC Solvency: A/t - #2 “Mexico Won’t Reform” [1/2]...... 24
2AC Solvency: A/t - #3 “Economy is Biggest Factor”...... 26
2AC Solvency: A/t - #4 “Geography Prevents Cooperation”...... 27
CMSDL Core Files 2013/141AC
Mexico Security Case 1/8
AFF
1AC: Mexico Security Affirmative5
Contention One is Harms: Drug-related crimes in Mexico are leading to mass killings and anarchic violence, even threatening to cause nuclear terrorism.
1) Mexico’s inability to control cross-border violence without assistance is threatening the US-Mexico relationship and damaging Mexico politically and economically.
ROBERTS AND WALSER, 13
[James, Research Fellow for Economic Freedom and Growth in the Center for International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation; and Ray, PhD., Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at Heritage Foundation; “The Hagel, Kerry, and Brennan Senate Confirmation Hearings: U.S. Policy for the Western Hemisphere,” 1/18,
Mexico’s fight against organized crime has cast a doleful shadow over U.S.–Mexican relations. New Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto promises to restore citizen security and continue overhauling Mexico’s police and judiciary.Often overlooked in the U.S. is Mexico’s emerging economic status—the world’s 11th largest economy and growing. If Mexico opens its energy sector to equity participation with American companies (with their advanced deepwater, fracking, and horizontal drilling technologies) and makes other serious reforms, it can reverse an alarming decline in its oil production and tap massive shale gas deposits. The U.S. should continue to help Mexico fight organized crime with a continuation of the Merida Initiative, enhanced military-to-military ties, and serious attention to building real citizen security. The U.S. and Mexico need to act jointly in troubled Central America, particularly in the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) to combat trafficking organizations and shore up weak police and judicial institutions. Investing in border infrastructure, avoiding protectionist flare-ups, and exploring new cross-border energy alternatives can also cement a stronger U.S.–Mexico relationship. The U.S. will find it hard to project global leadership without a democratic, prosperous, and stable Mexico.
1AC: Mexico Security Affirmative6
2) Drug violence is spilling over into the United States because a new generation of dealers and gangs are completely lawless, anarchic, and bloodthirsty.
PERKINS AND PLACIDO, 10
[Kevin, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division; Anthony, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence
Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation; “Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico: Implications for the United States,” 5/05,
Excessive violence by the cartels is a national security problem for Mexico, and—as our close neighbor and political ally—presents high stakes for the United States. In the past year, U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have worked diligently to reach a consensus view on “spillover” violence and on U.S. vulnerability to the Mexican cartels’ violent tactics. These discussions required the interagency to define “spillover” in practical terms. As agreed to by the interagency community, spillover violence entails deliberate, planned attacks by the cartels on U.S. assets, including civilian, military, or law enforcement officials, innocent U.S. citizens, or physical institutions such as government buildings, consulates, or businesses. This definition does not include trafficker on trafficker violence, whether perpetrated in Mexico or the U.S. Spillover violence is a complicated issue. It is crucial, in order to address the problem with the appropriate programs, resources, and operations, that we understand the difference between the intentional targeting of innocent civilians in the United States, or official U.S. government interests in Mexico or the United States, and actions that are characteristic of violent drug culture, such as the killing of an individual who owes a drug debt to the organization. Certain isolated incidents in the United States, such as the torture by a Mexican trafficker of a Dominican drug customer in Atlanta, are frightening, but do not represent a dramatic departure from the violence that has always been associated with the drug trade. Much of the risk of spillover violence is posed by younger-generation traffickers whose approach to the drug trade is less rational and profit-minded than that of their “elders,” or by multi-national street and prison gangs working in concert with Mexican cartels as enforcers and street-level drug distributors. As the GOM has continuously and successfully disrupted the cartels’ command and control structure through operations against their leaders, less-experienced “junior” cartel members are inhabiting roles formerly held by traffickers of long standing who, while violent, tended to be more deliberate and cautious in their actions. In Ciudad Juarez, where three individuals associated with the U.S. consulate were killed in March, the Barrio Azteca (BA) street gang is the best known of several gangs being used as enforcers by La Linea, gatekeepers for the Juarez Cartel. The BA has been linked to drug trafficking, prostitution, extortion, assaults, murder, and the retail sale of drugs obtained by Mexican DTOs. Elsewhere in Mexico, the link between street gangs and the Mexican cartels is more fluid and tenuous, with gang members typically filling retail drug sales roles rather than providing enforcement.
1AC: Mexico Security Affirmative7
3) Drug violence in Mexico is killing thousands every month. Even children are being turned into trained assassins.
CNN, 12
[Ashley Fantz, “The Mexico drug war: Bodies for billions,” 1/20,
But the Mexican drug war, at its core, is about two numbers: 48,000 and 39 billion. Over the past five years, nearly 48,000 people have been killed in suspected drug-related violence in Mexico, the country's federal attorney general announced this month. In the first three quarters of 2011, almost 13,000 people died.Cold and incomprehensible zeros, the death toll doesn't include the more than 5,000 people who have disappeared, according to Mexico's National Human Rights Commission. It doesn't account for the tens of thousands of children orphaned by the violence. The guilty live on both sides of the border. Street gangs with cartel ties are not only in Los Angeles and Dallas, but also in many smaller cities across the United States and much farther north of the Mexican border. Mexican cartels had a presence in 230 cities in the United States in 2008, according to the U.S. Justice Department. Its 2011 report shows that presence has grown to more than 1,000 U.S. cities. While the violence has remained mostly in Mexico, authorities in Arizona, Georgia, Texas, Alabama and other stateshave reportedly investigated abductions and killings suspected to be tied to cartels. Mexican black tar heroin (so called because it's dark and sticky), is cheaper than Colombian heroin, and used to be a rarity in the United States. Now it is available in dozens of cities and small towns, experts say. Customers phone in their orders, the Los Angeles Times reports, and small-time dealers deliver the drug, almost like pizza deliverymen. Traffickers are recruiting in the United States, and prefer to hire young. Texas high schools say cartel members have been on their campuses. Most notoriously, a 14-year-old from San Diego became a head-chopping cartel assassin. "I slit their throats," he testified at his trial, held near Cuernavaca. The teenager, called "El Ponchis" - the Cloak - was found guilty of torturing and beheading and sentenced to three years in a Mexican prison. For more than a decade, the United States' focus has been terrorism, an exhausting battle reliant on covert operatives in societies where the rule of law has collapsed or widespread violence is the norm. The situation in Mexico is beginning to show similarities. In many border areas, the authority of the Mexican state seems either entirely absent or extremely weak. In September 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said cartel violence might be "morphing into or making common cause with what we would call an insurgency." If cartel violence is not contained in Mexico, which shares a nearly 2,000 mile border with the United States, the drug war could threaten U.S. national security and even survival of the Mexican state.
1AC: Mexico Security Affirmative8
4) Mexican drug cartels have begun to partner with nuclear terrorists, opening the United States up for attack.
ANALYSIS INTELLIGENCE, 11
[“Iron Triangle of Terror: Iran, Hezbollah and Los Zetas,” 12/19,
Some sources have said that the strengthening relationship between Iran and Venezuela has increased Hezbollah’s influence in the region. Both leaders are staunchly anti-American, and it is reasonable to think that they would pursue activities that would undermine US interests. Roger Noreiga, the same official that warned of an attack by Hezbollah, indicates that Venezuela, “has allowed Iran to mine uranium” and that Venezuela’s Margarita Island has eclipsed the infamous TBA as the principal safe haven and center of Hezbollah operations in the Americas”. This is particularly disturbing as Iran is suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapon while simultaneously funding Hezbollah close to the US border. Therefore, there major concerns that if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon it might share the weapon with Hezbollah.There are two major Hezbollah networks operating in the Americas under the direction of the Iranian Quds Force. The first is the Nassereddine network, operated by a former Lebanese citizen that became a Venezuelan and is now the second-ranking diplomatic official to Syria. He currently resides on Margarita Island and runs money laundering operations for the group. The other network is purportedly run by Hojjat al-Eslam Mohsen Rabbani, a culutral attaché from Iran who is involved in various recruitment activities and frequently travels under false papers in Latin America. The two networks together make up the majority of Hezbollah’s activity in the Americas. Now back to the cartels. Why is the link between Hezbollah and Los Zetas so important? The main concern is that if Hezbollah and Los Zetas are cooperating on drugs (which they are to the tune of hundreds of millions), then why would they not cooperate on weapons?Hezbollah and other extremists may be willing to export their knowledge of IEDs to the cartels. The relationship between Hezbollah and Los Zetas appears to have already expanded beyond drugs. In October 2011, the US authorities revealed that there was an attempt made by Iran to assassinate the Saudi ambassador on US soil.
1AC: Mexico Security Affirmative9
Thus, we present the following PLAN:
The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement toward Mexico by providing financial assistance to Mexico for violence prevention programs near the US-Mexico border.
1AC: Mexico Security Affirmative10
Contention Two is Solvency: Increasing economic assistance to Mexico to strengthen border security will decrease drug violence.
1) Shifting focus in the drug war toward community violence prevention creates empirically proven, local solutions.
O’NEIL, 12
[Shannon, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at Council on Foreign Relations; “Refocusing U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation,” Dec,
The need to adapt to the changing realities in Mexico coincides with political change. On December 1, 2012, Enrique Pena Nieto became president. During his campaign, he promised to shift the country's current security strategy away from combating drug trafficking toward reducing violence. The United States has an opportunity with this new administration and legislative branch to push past the current limits on security cooperation and implementation. The U.S. government should continue to provide between $250 million and $300 million a year in Merida money. These funds, which are managed by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), should prioritize civilian (versus military) law enforcement institutions, and fund training programs and other efforts to professionalize Mexico's police forces and transform its justice system. Long-term sustainable security will only exist when Mexico has a strong civilian-based rule of law, able to take on and punish all types of criminal activity. In addition, U.S. and Mexican joint efforts should concentrate on realizing the other so-far-neglected pillars of the Merida Initiative, particularly modernizing the border and engaging citizens and communities. On the border, the United States should upgrade its roads, bridges, and FAST lanes (express lanes for trusted drivers), as well as increase the number of U.S. customs officers, agricultural specialists, and support staff to help facilitate legal trade and identify and keep out illicit goods. To finance the multibillion dollar cost of modernizing the border, the U.S. Congress should pass the NADBank Enhancement Act (H.R. 2216) or similar legislation, to allow the North American Development Bank to support infrastructure projects in the border regions; currently the bank is limited primarily to environmental initiatives. And it should also reauthorize and refund the Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program, which managed federal funds dedicated for border area roads and infrastructure. In terms of
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1AC: Mexico Security Affirmative11
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reinforcing local communities, this involves not just particular programs but reorienting U.S. resources and programs in Mexico to focus on state and local law enforcement and justice institutions, where violence and insecurity are most concentrated and devastating. This will mean millions more in funds for the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) community projects and youth programs, as well as INL's training of state and municipal police (as opposed to just federal-level officers). A shift to the local level would also enable policymakers and U.S.-supported programs to recognize and address the varying nature of the violence. In cities such as Ciudad Juárez, local gangs today are perhaps as threatening as transnational drug cartels. USAID should share models developed and implemented in U.S. cities to deal with gang problems, such as those in Boston and Los Angelesand Chicago's Operation Ceasefire initiatives. In addition, it should share the United States' experiences with community policing strategies, alongside basic training and vetting programs that cultivate a close working relationship between law enforcement officers and those they protect. The United States should also move its drug policies away from eradication and interdiction abroad and incarceration at home to greater funding for prevention and rehabilitation, in order to reduce the demand supplied by organized crime. Under the direction of the White House Office on National Drug Control Policy and the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Education, and Justice, new policies should include the expansion of promising pilot programs that deal with addiction, such as Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) program, which by swiftly punishing parolees who test positive for drugs has successfully lowered recidivism among a heavy-drug-use population. Though some will prefer to continue an eradication and interdiction–focused international drug control regime, the tens of billions of dollars spent during the now over forty-year war on drugs in Mexico and Latin America suggest the need for a revised policy approach. The outlined initiatives have a greater chance of reducing violence (if not drug flows) in Mexico by strengthening police forces, court systems, and communities. The border improvements, moreover, will likely benefit both the U.S. and Mexican economies, which can have indirect positive effects by providing greater legal opportunities to young people. In the end, Mexico's security will depend on the actions and decisions of Mexico. But there is much the United States can do to help or hinder the process. A transition to a demilitarized justice and a community-focused approach to U.S. security assistance will help Mexico establish more effective and long-lasting tools for combating crime and violence.
1AC: Mexico Security Affirmative12
2) The U.S. can provide economic assistance through USAID funding targeted at crime prevention in Mexico. Empirically these programs reduce violence.
SEELKE AND FINKLEA, 13
[Clare, Specialist in Latin American Affairs; Kristin, Analyst in Domestic Security with Congressional Research Service; “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond,” 1/14,
In April 2011, the U.S. and Mexican governments formally approved a bi-national pillar four strategy. 109 The strategy focuses on three objectives: (1) strengthening federal civic planning capacity to prevent and reduce crime; (2) bolstering the capacity of state and local governments to implement crime prevention and reduction activities; and (3) increasing engagement with at-risk youth. 110 U.S.-funded pillar four activities complement the work of the Mexico’s National Center for Crime Prevention and Citizen Participation, an entity within the Interior Department that implemented projects in high crime areas in 237 cities in 2012 where local authorities were making similar investments in crime prevention. In support of this new strategy, USAID launched a three-year, $15 million Crime and Violence Prevention program in nine target communities identified by the Mexican government in Ciudad Juárez, Monterrey, Nuevo León, and Tijuana, Baja California. The program supports the development of community strategies to reduce crime and violence in the target localities, including outreach to at-risk youth, improved citizen-police collaboration, and partnerships with private sector enterprises. More recently, USAID awarded $10 million in local grants to six civil society organizations for innovative crime prevention projects that engage at-risk youth and their families. USAID also supports a $1 million evaluation of crime in the target communities that will help the U.S. and Mexican governments understand the risk factors contributing directly to increased violence and enable both governments to identify successful models for replication.