The Battle of Champion Hill is rarely ever mentioned in the same breath as other great Civil War. Nevertheless an important battle it was. On 16 May 1863 more than 50,000 men fought a brutal death struggle around Sidney and Matilda Champion’s home about 25 miles east of Vicksburg. The results of the battle would have military significance far in excess of the historical interest that has been afforded this affair. This is the story of Champion Hill and the men that fought there.
Preliminary to the battle was Ulysses S. Grant’s campaign down the Louisiana bank of the Mississippi River and eventual crossing to Bruinsburg, Mississippi. A drive inland by Grant’s three corps pushed back brief defenses at Port Gibson and Raymond before approaching the capital city of Jackson. At Jackson the newly arrived Joseph E. Johnston found the military situation untenable and he evacuated the city leaving orders for Pemberton, leading the forces from Vicksburg, to strike the rear of Grant forces near Clinton. An indecisive and tentative Pemberton attempted to obey the order and led his forces, three divisions, into the waiting arms of two of Grant’s corps.
Champion Hill – Genesis of Defeat
The evacuation of Jackson and subsequent retreat to Canton and beyond left Pemberton as the only legitimate force standing in the way of the ultimate Union prize – Vicksburg. Although Johnston had been reduced to a military non-factor by his retreat, his command influence was about to play a huge role in the coming events. His insistence on unifying the two commands would push Pemberton into a battle he did not want and was not prepared to win.
Johnston’s 13 May request that Pemberton strike the Federal rear at Clinton peeled the scab off the wound that was Pemberton’s command structure. Pemberton could not justify the action in his own mind given the orders from Davis to defend Vicksburg at all cost. He felt the move would open the way for McClernand’s Corps to assault the city. Despite these misgivings he wired Johnston:
“I move at once with the whole available force from Edward’s Station.”
The movement had not yet begun when he had a change of heart and rescinded the order. He decided to open the matter for discussion and invited his commanders to a council of war on the 14th. The meeting turned rancorous as most of those present favored the planned advance. Pemberton continued to argue against it in the face of this dissent. Division commanders Loring and Stevenson eventually calmed the dispute by offering an alternative plan. They suggested that a move be made against Grant’s extended supply line to the south. Pemberton mulled the plan over and finally agreed. He notified Johnston of the new arrangement and began planning his move in pain-staking detail.
The proposed move revealed much about Pemberton’s lack of field experience and the hidden under currents of discontent amongst his officers. Despite planning the move down to the number of yards between elements Pemberton failed to account for two critical elements of combat operations; logistics and reconnaissance. On the morning of the 15th it was discovered that there was not enough food or ammunition on hand to supply all the troops for the move. A train had to be dispatched to Vicksburg to pick up the necessary supplies to cover the difference. The march, originally slated to begin at 0800 did not set off until after 1300.
The march was destined to be a short one. After only two miles Colonel Wirt Adams, in the van with his cavalry, discovered that the ford over Baker’s Creek had been made unusable by the heavy rains. No effort had been made to recon the site despite the short distance from the start point. Pemberton wasted two additional hours deciding what seemed obvious to his subordinates. They would have to detour to the bridge on the Jackson Road. During the delay the command atmosphere continued to erode. BG Tilghman, leading the main column with his brigade, somehow incurred the wrath of Pemberton and was placed under arrest and command given to Colonel Robert Lowery of the 6thMississippi. When Loring heard of the affair he rushed to the defense of his subordinate. Although the story is disputed, Tilghman wrote in a letter that day that Loring told Pemberton that if he could do without Tilghman then he could do without him as well. Pemberton, facing an imminent engagement with the enemy, had no recourse but to revoke the order. According to Tilghman’s version of events the order was bitterly scribbled out on the pommel of Pemberton’s saddle.
The march moved on at 1600 when Pemberton finally adopted the move to the nearby bridge. The cumulative delays had restricted the march to just four miles in eight hours. As darkness fell camp was made in the vicinity of the Coker house around 2200 by the lead elements. The trailing units continued to arrive until 0300 on the 16th. Exhausted and disgruntled the Confederates were in for one more alteration in their designed move.
Champion Hill – Opening Moves(Loring’s Division)
While the Confederate column closed up near the intersection of the Raymond Road and the Ratliff Road on the night of the 15th Colonel Edward Goodwin was ordered to report to MG William Loring, the division commander. Loring ordered Goodwin out into the “deep dusk” to picket the Raymond Road about a mile in advance of the head of the column with his 35th Alabama Infantry. Also deployed was the 22nd Mississippi of LTC H. J. Reid. The two regiments straddled the road and Company F of the 35th was sent out “several hundred yards in advance.” In front of them Colonel Wirt Adams’ cavalry rode a distant picket in the vicinity of the Davis House. During the night only an “occasional gun was fired” and that by the cavalry picket.
About 0630 as Pemberton was meeting with Adams the skirmishing of the cavalry pickets became “very brisk”. Adams departed to assess the situation just as a message from Johnston was arriving. Johnston’s instructions were specific;
“Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton…”
Clinton, of course, was in the opposite direction of travel so Pemberton ordered;
“A retrograde movement, by reversing the column as it then stood, for the purpose of returning to Edward’s Depot to take the Brownsville Road…”
As the column was being reversed Colonel Adams’ pickets were driven in and a long range artillery barrage opened by the 17th Ohio Light Artillery. Despite the developments on the Raymond Road Pemberton decided to continue the counter march because he could not determine if “…this was an attack in force or simply an armed reconnaissance.”
It did not take long before activity became more serious and he was forced to order his division commanders to form a line of battle.
At the Raymond Road Goodwin rode forward to consult with Adams but before he could find the cavalry leader he saw his pickets being driven in by Federal cavalry with a “long battle line of infantry” behind them. He galloped back to form a line of battle just as the artillery bombardment began. Two Mississippians were severely wounded and the 22nd fell back in disorder.
At 0830 Loring ordered the two regiments to begin falling back to the main line. Taking command, Goodwin ordered one company of the 22nd and Company B of the 35th forward to cover the withdrawal. The remaining portion of the 22nd was sent back about 100 yards to reorganize. After accomplishing this, the whole started a slow retreat. A second order from Loring arrived instructing Goodwin to being the two units back immediately. The units were quickly reunited with BG Abraham Buford’s brigade.
The approaching Federal infantry belonged to BG Stephen Burbridge’s brigade from BG A. J. Smith’s division. In front of Burbridge’s brigade were skirmishers from the 23rdWisconsin. “They did most efficient service” pushing the Confederate skirmish line (35th Alabama and 22ndMississippi) back onto the main line. As Burbridge’s command approached he recognized the main Confederate line, three brigades of Loring’s division, well established on the Coker House Ridge. The advancing line of blue came under “a most terrific fire of shot, shell, grape, and canister.” Burbridge sent back for help to even the odds. Reinforcements arrived in the form of the 19thKentucky, 77thIllinois, and some additional artillery assets. The stage was set for a showdown on the Raymond Road when word came from BG Smith to halt.
Champion Hill – Opening Moves (Stevenson’s Division)
The reversal of the column in the fashion dictated by Pemberton left BG Carter Stevenson with a difficult problem. Since the slow moving trains traditionally trailed a march they were now in the front and blocking the advance of the army. Stevenson was ordered to move the wagons about three miles west on the Jackson Road and then park them on the far side of Baker’s Creek in a manner that would not impede the infantry and artillery. One regiment was to lead them while the remainder of the rear brigade secured the important crossroads of Jackson and Middle Road.
As the rear of the previous night’s column the brigade of Colonel Alexander Reynolds exhausted troops drew the task. The wagons were turned around and a line established near the intersection. A thick line of skirmishers was pushed out about 800 yards to the east on the Middle Road where cavalry picket activity indicated the greatest threat. Reynolds all Tennessee brigade held the line against light skirmishing until 0830 when the next brigade, under BG S. D. Lee, moved up to trade places according to the plan. Reynolds took his troops and the 3rd Maryland Artillery to tend to the removal of the trains. They were successfully moved across the creek and a defensive perimeter established. Lee expecting trouble positioned Waddell’s battery to fire down the Middle Road and sent a company of the 20thAlabama to the area around the Champion farm to watch the Jackson Road.
About four miles north of the uneasy standoff at the Raymond Road the division of BG Peter Osterhaus was advancing westward on Middle Road. In front of the column rode a cavalry screen comprised of three companies (A, E, and K) of the 3rdIllinois cavalry, under the command of CPT John Campbell. These 90 men would make the initial contact with the Confederate forces near the intersection of the Middle Road and the Jackson Road. After locating the Confederate picket line they were dismounted and drove them back about a mile. While waiting for the infantry column to arrive Campbell received an order to conduct a charge. The mounted men passed through the Confederate skirmishers and directly into “three lines of battle on each side of the road” that opened a “galling” fire on the Union troopers. Captain Campbell, later noting that “no cavalry could long live” under such a fire, ordered a retreat which was “promptly executed.” Osterhaus sent Campbell and his men to open communication with BG Smith as the infantry took over the field.
The Union infantry was being led by BG Theophilus Garrard’s brigade. In front were skirmishers from the 7thKentucky and 49thIndiana. They pushed the Confederate line back just as the Lee and Reynolds were swapping places. Momentarily stalled at the crossroads Garrard strengthened his line with the 69thIndiana and the 118thIllinois. As these units were deploying a messenger arrived at Lee’s headquarters from the detachment of 20thAlabama. BG Alvin Hovey was marching south down the Jackson Road with the lead elements of his division. Lee now faced a difficult decision. How to secure the critical intersection against the growing Union threat? Loss of the position would cut the entire army off from the intended route of march essentially trapping them between Grant’s three way pincers. Lee reacted quickly without consulting Stevenson.
“My brigade was at once marched by the left flank for the purpose of checking the enemy.”
Naturally the movement of Lee’s brigade created a large gap in the Confederate line. Lee sent a message back describing the situation and requesting help to extend his line. The closest available troops belonged to BG Cumming who had replaced him on the Middle Road. Cumming was at that moment meeting with Stevenson and the request was immediately approved. Three of Cumming’s Georgia regiments (34th, 31st, and 39th) sidled northward to fill the gap left by Lee’s departing Alabamans. The 56th and the 57thGeorgia were left to secure the crossroads with Waddell’s battery. What had started out as a change of direction for the army’s march was rapidly becoming a gathering of forces for a set piece battle.
Champion Hill – Battle Developed (16 May 1863)
The Federal advance down Jackson road came to a stop when the cavalry advance (Company C 1st Indiana Cavalry) reported an enemy battery only 800 yards to the front.
The lead brigade of Hovey’s division, under BG George McGinnis, broke out of column formation and formed a line of battle with three of his five regiments (24th Indiana, 29th Wisconsin, and 11th Indiana) while the brigade of Colonel James Slack formed on his left. After deploying his troops McGinnis became concerned about the veracity of the report;
“After halting for some time and seeing no signs of the enemy…I determined to satisfy myself by personal observation…”
Sergeant Davis Wilsey, of Company C, personally escorted the general to the front and pointed out the enemy battery (most likely the Botentourt Virginia Battery) in question. His curiosity thus satisfied, McGinnis returned to his line and continued preparations for the battle he knew was imminent.
Despite gaining an advantage in the early troop deployments, particularly at the Jackson and Middle Roads, the Union commanders were being cautious. Although Hovey learned of Lee’s new position on the crest of Champion Hill he was not going to face the responsibility of “opening the ball” without proper authority. When his messenger found the Corps commander, MG John McClernand, on the Middle Road he deferred the matter to Grant, who was not yet on the field.
At 1000 Grant arrived on the scene, with son Fred, and established a command post at the Champion farm. Matilda Champion and her four children beat a hasty retreat for Bolton. Hovey, eager for the attack, was soothed by Grant, who told him to wait for Logan’s division of McPherson’s Corps to arrive. A short time later BG Mortimer Leggett, leading McPherson’s Corps, arrived and formed his brigade on the left with BG John Smith’s brigade falling in on their left. The third and final brigade of Logan’s division, under BG John Stevenson, was posted in reserve behind DeGolyer’s Michigan Battery. Another battery, 1st Illinois Light Artillery unlimbered in a tree line on the far right. With two divisions deployed and another on the way (BG Marcellus Crocker) Grant was ready to do battle.
On the Confederate line BG Cumming bent back the right of his line to protect against any move from his right by repositioning the 36thGeorgia and a portion of the 34thGeorgia. Having barely set his line, the word was passed that Lee was advancing to the attack. To keep pace with the reported movement, which he could no see through the trees and intervening elevation, Cumming ordered his men forward. When he realized that the report had been a mistake he stopped his men and formed a new line. Unbeknownst to him his problems were being compounded when his skirmishers got bogged down in the rutted and wooded terrain and were actually positioned well to his right. He was without an early warning system. The timing could not have been worse for at that very moment Grant gave McClernand the order to attack.
At 1030 Hovey and Logan lurched forward into an attack on Lee’s Champion Hill position. As the Confederate artillery opened McGinnis could not distinguish Lee’s main line through the trees and smoke and ordered his men to lie down. After a short delay while he conducted a leader’s reconnaissance he got his men to their feet and proceeded on with fixed bayonets. On his left two regiments (47th Indiana and 56thOhio), part of Colonel James Slack’s brigade, struck the bent portion of Cumming’s line were greeted by volleys from the units at “the angle.”