by Zulkarnaev Timur

Reflection paper.

Strategic nonviolent conflict.

In fact, conflict is the clash of interests. Such a clash often can be prevented, but when the measures for that purpose are unsuccessful, the struggle begins. Such a struggle can be both violent and nonviolent. It was said a lot about the conflicts, which are accompanied by violent acts and everyone has heard about those examples. The interest to them is knowingly higher than to the nonviolent, which is caused by several factors, the most important of them is involving in conflict all possible facilities and methods. In situations like this the opponents can not reach the compromise and the conflict is resolved often with heavy human, material, cultural and other casualties. Such conflicts usually transform into a military sphere in which military technologies and military tactical actions play the main role.

However, the realization that the sacrifices and losses of such actions only exacerbate the situation and can not be justified by anything, led the researchers to develop theoretical constructs of nonviolent resistance, nonviolent conduct of conflicts, bringing conflicts into a peaceful course. The example is the book «Strategic Nonviolent Conflict» by P. Ackerman & C. Kruegler. Although, I must say that some pointsof the conception proposed in this book are closely connected to those, which are devoted to conducting of military actions. The authors do not hide this fact, referring in the bookthe most famous theorist of war - Clausewitz.

Today it is obvious that the theory of nonviolent action is one the essential element of public policy and also civil participation, where everyone accumulate his interests peacefully without taking up arms. Literally every day we can see evidence of this assertion. According to my opinion the most important reason for this, is the lack of strategic context and tactics of such actions. That is why it is important to consider the research of Ackerman and Kruegler.

In Chapter 1 the authors generally describe the states of nonviolent conflicts, the causes of their emergence, development and results. They propose a hypothesis and it is hard to disagree with it. According to the researchers, all nonviolent conflicts differ from each other, which is due to differences in terms, in tense, etc. So, strategies of conflicts in each certain case are unique. Thus, it is not worth to look for something common in nonviolent actions, because it will only hinder us to analyze every single episode. This idea, as I have already noticed, is indisputable.

Another thing that I grasped in Chapter 1, is the authors' claim that when analyzing nonviolent actions, it is necessary to look at them from the standpoint of their campaigns and its effectiveness. Generally speaking, the question of the effectiveness of nonviolent action occurs very often in the book, which shows us that this is the most important principle in the analysis of nonviolent actions.

As for me, the most interesting material begins in Chapter 2, where the authors descried the principles of strategic nonviolent conflict. Before presenting 12 basic principles of strategic nonviolent action, the authors ask the question – if the strategy is possible? Is it valid, when people fightfor their interests through nonviolent actions? Dopeople act extempore in such situations, not realizing their goals? I would not dare to answer these questions unambiguously.There are different points of view, and everything depends on particular situation. On one hand people consciously assert their interests, they have in mind a clear understanding of what they are doing.For example, the leader of Serbian «Otpor» movement, who told us about the activities of this organization, stressed several times, that people consciously joined their shares, they had advanced political slogans and they really understood the reasons of their actions.But on the other handLe Bon in the work «Crowd», based on the experience of the French Revolution, wrote that people form a crowd, which is so called because its members do not articulated interests.This problem is closely related to the 1-rst principle proposed by the authors.This is the first step to effective action - setting goals. It is impossible to advance in solving the problems without this important step. But it is often the problem in defining the purpose, because it should not be too general and must meet the objectives in a particular case.

After that, the authors wrote about the organizational structure of the nonviolent action. In my opinion, it is the most important element of the strategy, because without this principle it is almost impossible to achieve efficiency.Here Ackerman and Kruegler focus on Even more important thing– it is the so-called «operational corps», which act as a "glue" and keep the entire organizational structure.The third important principle is communication. It is closely connected with one of the other principles – external assistance.The researchers note the fact that if you can not get help and assistance from a third party yourself, then you need to neutralize such help for the enemy. In my point of view, it is very difficult, but there are several ways, for example, through the mass-media. Indeed, the authors emphasize that public attention plays a major role in the success of all activities. I absolutely agree with P. Ackerman andC. Kruegler, this principle is the «key to success».

No less important is the second block of the principles of the strategy, called «Principles of Engagement». The principles which are described in this part of the chapter seems to me pretty risky.For example, principle «Attack the Opponent's Strategy for Consolidating Control '», in my opinion, can provoke responding aggression from the opponent, lead to a bitter struggle and cause using violent methods. Really, principle «Expand the repertoire of sanctions» often comes to the fore.Rules of Conduct, described in this part of the chapter, are disregarded at many events and actions, so it causes the appearance of provocateurs whose purpose is to undermine the nonviolent course of events.

All those principles can be illustrated by concrete example – «Freedom Flotilia» in May 2010. It is an action that was undertaken by activists of several organizations, best known of them are the Turkish Committee of IHH (The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief) and Free Gaza Movement, to break the blockade in Gaza and to deliver humanitarian relief there. Moreover there were activists of other human rights foundations and organizations on the board of one of the ships. The goals of all these people were common - to break the blockade and to help the civilian population, which was blocked at the epicenter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.The organizational strength of the activists was good, as we can see by their coordinating, preparing and implementing the action (to remind, there were7 ships).Communication was built very competently, as well as external assistance. At least, the protagonists were able to gain quite a lot of outsiders both before the conflict with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and after it.As for the second part of the principles - the principles of engagement, it should be noted that the undermineand neutralization of support for Israelby a third party was organized at the highest level, which is proved by the analysis of the outcomes of the campaign. The only question in this case, which is now much disputed - is a question related to the principle of «maintain nonviolent discipline».Many experts argue that some activists werecertainly prepared for violent acts and were armed. This is a difficult moment to interpret. It seems that even if such people on board would not have been avoided clashes with the Israeli army would not have succeeded. And so the struggle between IDF and the protagonists of «Freedom Flotilia» resulted in victims on both sides.

According the analysis of the campaign and its effectiveness, as it had been written in the book, the campaign was successful in all senses. I can note four main results of this particular campaign. 1.Israel suffered a severe political defeat in the international arena. 2. The problem of the Gaza Strip attracted the attention of more and more people around the world. 3.The Gaza Strip began to receive humanitarian assistance. 4. Turkey, as the main organizer of the campaign, run to the leadership among the Arabic world of the Middle East, consolidating the Arab resistance against the Israeli state.

An example of this case shows us that the strategy proposed by Ackermann andKrueglerfunctioning very well.It only confirms that the authors have developed a very effective strategy.This model is very useful to see the efficiency of the campaign, its outcome and implications.