Asymmetry and Military Experimentation
Strategic Studies Institute SSI
Special Report
Asymmetry and
Military Experimentation
D. Robert Worley
U.S. Army War College
Pre-Publication Draft
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Biographical Sketch of the Author
D. Robert Worley recently joined the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies where he serves as a senior research fellow in the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities. His defense analysis career began at the RAND Corporation in 1985 through 1992 and continued at the Institute for Defense Analyses from 1992 through 2000. Analytic activities have been concentrated in higher echelon command and control but include wargaming, training exercises, and experimentation at the national command, Allied Command Europe, US unified command, and joint task force levels, as well as at Army corps and division level through the battle command training program. Prior to becoming a defense analyst, Dr. Worley managed and directed research and development efforts at the Hughes Aircraft Company, NASA, and UCLA. He served in the United States Marine Corps from 1967 to 1971 with one tour in Vietnam. Dr. Worley earned a PhD in Engineering and an Engineer Degree from UCLA in 1986 and 1985, respectively. He earned a Master of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Southern California in 1980 and a Bachelor of Arts with a major in Computer Science from the University of California at Berkeley in 1978. He earned a Masters in Government from Johns Hopkins University in 1995 and a Master of Arts in National Security Studies from Georgetown University in 2000. He formerly served on the computer science faculty at UCLA and is now a Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Washington Center for the Study of American Government and a member of the adjunct faculty at the George Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Why and Why Now?
The Nature of Asymmetry
Gaps Grow between Wars
Transformation May Open or Close Gaps
Experimentation as the Means
A Spectrum of Experiments
Attacking Conceptions of Warfare
Attacking Theories and Assumptions
Developer vs. Threat Driven Experiments
Recommendations
Mission Area Experimentation Plan and Knowledge Base
Elements of a Robust Experimentation Program
An Experimentation Portfolio
Table of Figures
Figure 1. Asymmetric Threats Aim for the Gaps
Figure 2. Incremental Transformation
Figure 3. Transformation through Destruction and Creation
Figure 4. Alternative Methods of Inquiry
Figure 5. Experimentation in Other Domains
Figure 6. Upstream and Downstream Experimentation
Figure 7. Threat-driven Experiments Explore the Gaps, Developers Don’t
Preface
The dominant form of experiment supporting combat development is conducted according to the needs of the developer of a system or a capability and therefore excludes consideration of gaps between systems and capabilities. Asymmetric actors seek to exploit gaps in US military capabilities. This document recommends changes to the combat development experiments that elevate the role of the asymmetric threat in experimentation.
This document is the output of The Army-Marine Corps Warfighter Working Group, Task 4 on Asymmetric Approaches. Army lead is the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS) with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT) in support. Marine Corps lead is the Deputy Commandant for Policy, Plans, and Operations (DCPP&O) with the Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command (CG MCCDC) in support. The views contained in this document do not necessarily represent official Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense policy.
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Combat Development in the Face of Asymmetry
by D. Robert Worley
Introduction
The dominant form of military experiment is ineffective in dealing with the asymmetric threat. Effectively pursuing combat developments to cope with asymmetry requires that a substantial portion of authority, and the concomitant resources, be shifted from capability and system developers to those focused on emerging threats.
Viewing the post-Cold War era as an interwar period immediately suggests that there are relevant lessons to be learned from previous interwar periods. A common characteristic of past periods is the lack of a known threat to focus planners’ attention. One common outcome of past interwar periods is the mismatch exposed by warfare between those capabilities we developed and those that we eventually needed. The problems we chose to solve are those determined by institutional inertia and by the conceptions of war held by the services, service branches, or other institutional proponents. Unlike the business community, where feedback is a constant, the military gets feedback on its efforts only episodically.
It appears natural that the mismatch between what we have and what we need develops in times of relative peace due to internal influences (conceptions) and the infrequency of external interaction (episodic feedback). The present asymmetric environment compounds the effects of this natural tendency. Asymmetric actors look for the gaps in our capabilities, to avoid our strengths and to exploit our weaknesses. Defeat lurks between our capabilities.
Resources and authority are in the hands of system and capability developers who have been tasked to solve a specific range of problems and who have programs at risk. They are champions for specific solutions in a competitive resource environment. The experiments we choose to conduct are those that benefit the developer. It is precisely this environment that produces gaps. Therefore, in the face of asymmetry, a robust experimentation program must focus on exposing the gaps in our capabilities. Developers and champions have nothing to gain and everything to lose by participating in experiments they don’t control. Threat experts, on the other hand, focus on the changing threat and have nothing to lose by exposing gaps in capabilities.
This paper begins with a review of the nature of asymmetry. It then examines the lessons of past interwar periods and identifies two types of gaps eventually exposed by warfare after years of relative peace. The evolutionary and revolutionary schools of thought on transformation are examined for their effect on gaps that might be similarly exposed and exploited. Experimentation has been accepted as the means to transform the military, but the current interpretation fails to address the problems identified. A more expansive and responsive interpretation is offered. Finally, an experimentation portfolio is presented to give substance to the new interpretation. Rather than considering experimentation for asymmetry as a separate issue, this paper considers experimentation for asymmetry in the context of a larger joint combat development process.
Why and Why Now?
There are lessons from interwar periods about the development of capabilities, and there is the nature of asymmetry. One produces gaps; the other exploits them. Considered together, they conspire for our defeat. There are two models of transformation—evolutionary and revolutionary—and the dominant model does nothing to weaken the conspiracy. With everything apparently stacked against us, experimentation is offered as the means to overcome the conspiracy, but the dominant model does nothing to overcome the natural trends. Still, the solution lies in experimentation, but a different type of experimentation.
The Nature of Asymmetry
Asymmetry has many connotations. To reduce confusion, we begin with and build on the definition of asymmetry offered by Metz and Johnson.[1]
In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological and physical dimensions [emphasis in original].
A taxonomy developed for Cold War force planners partitions the spectrum of operations into low, medium, and high intensity conflict. The dominant type of force employed defines each. High intensity conflict was characterized by the large-scale exchange of strategic nuclear weapons but would likely include all other forms of force. Mid intensity conflict was characterized by direct conflict between conventional forces, possibly in multiple theaters and possibly including limited nuclear exchanges. The dominant characteristic of low intensity conflict was its prosecution by unconventional, guerilla, and militia forces, or by roving bands of armed civilians.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between US military capability and various threat types. Symmetric threats pit strength against strength, while asymmetric threats aim for the gaps in strength. The capability shown to the far fight represents strategic nuclear forces. Throughout the bi-polar Cold War, the two symmetric actors fortunately produced deterrence and a stalemate. To the center of the spectrum, US conventional forces are organized, trained, and equipped to deter, or if necessary, to defeat another nation’s or coalition’s conventional forces. The increasing perception is that opposing US conventional forces spells certain defeat. Some would suggest that our success at the strategic nuclear and conventional force levels has led to deterrence at those levels and has left no option but to employ unconventional forces and methods, as depicted toward the left of the spectrum. But our opponents will seek to exploit gaps in capabilities throughout the spectrum wherever they appear. Figure 1 intentionally does not equate asymmetric threats to the low intensity end of the conflict spectrum, but it does depict a preponderance of gaps there.
Figure 1. Asymmetric Threats Aim for the Gaps
Gaps can be transient or enduring. An enduring gap in conventional force capability appears to be that caused by the lack of will or ability to deploy ground forces. An example of a transient gap in conventional force capability would be the gap in time between the rapid arrival of air forces and the later arrival of heavy ground forces. Another enduring capability gap is caused by the inadequate integration of air and ground forces associated with close air support and battlefield air interdiction. At the high end of the spectrum, rather than the deterrence that existed between symmetric nuclear forces, the post-Cold War threat is from small numbers of weapons of mass destruction, from our inability to deter rogue state and non-state actors through massive retaliation, and from our inability to defend against ballistic missile attacks or weapons of mass destruction delivered by less sophisticated means.
Producing capability uniformly across the entire spectrum is an exhaustive approach and is financially untenable unless the capability is uniformly low. Given finite resources, plugging one gap almost certainly creates another gap elsewhere. Choices must be made carefully. The first step in the combat development process is to know where the gaps are. Other important considerations include evaluating the consequences of accepting an existing gap and the consequences of creating a new gap by reallocating resources. Building rapidly adaptable capabilities that can be presented to an ever-evolving enemy by dynamic reallocation and recombination of building blocks provides a more effective and affordable approach. It also provides a more flexible foundation from which to expand the force in the direction demanded by our opponents as the future comes more clearly into view.
Building blocks can be at the weapon system level. For example, building small numbers of several alternatives instead of large numbers of a single alternative. The former allows for more alternatives in the hands of operators and more meaningful exploration of combinations. The latter makes our opponents’ planning simpler and increases the possibility that a gap in capabilities will be built, exposed, and exploited.
Building blocks can be at the small unit’s mission level. Excellence in execution of the fundamentals is as critical as ever. Examples include long-range precision strike, raid by airmobile forces, and tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel.
Experimentation must focus on the ability to rapidly form new combinations from fundamental building blocks in the face of an evolving threat.
Experimentation is typically viewed as a tool of combat developers. But the present environment demands that the skill be present in the operational commands that face evolving threats in real time. Experimenting with task organizing a wide array of building blocks is training for an adaptive force. That topic having been dealt with elsewhere,[2] the remainder of this paper deals with experimentation by combat developers.
Gaps Grow between Wars
Some argue that war is changed forever and the world will never again see conventional force-on-force warfare. Instead, the US will face asymmetric opponents in complex environments—including jungle, mountain, riverine, and urban terrain or in cyberspace—or will face opponents armed largely with weapons of mass destruction. More moderate forecasters suggest that US forces will face those same asymmetric actors intermingled with conventional forces until a near-peer or regional competitor arises that can challenge US conventional forces symmetrically with some expectation of success.
The purpose of experimentation, whether oriented on asymmetry or not, is to acquire knowledge of sufficient quality to inform decision makers, those who must create or approve innovative doctrine or initiate acquisition programs. The ultimate purpose is to produce military effectiveness for an uncertain future.[3]
Experimentation informs decision makers about a very uncertain future.
Two types of gap develop during periods of extended peace. The first is a gap between the capabilities developed and the capabilities needed, the gap being exposed only in war. The second gap is between technology and the methods of employing it; the two largely following separate development paths.[4]
The military must plan for the future, with or without a known foe. Planning without a foe forces services to make decisions driven largely by their conceptions of warfare. It is not a pattern unique to any single military department—the Departments of Navy, Army, and Air Force have all fallen victim to their conceptions of warfare and an uncooperative enemy—nor is it unique to the United States.
Conceptions of warfare, derived from the last year of World War II and driven by the specter of World War III between the East and West, resulted in a mismatch between the military developed and the one need to underwrite national strategy with respect to Korea and Vietnam. A conception of warfare oriented on the clash between great industrial-age powers was ill suited to warfare fought between agrarian or non-industrial societies. The same conception of warfare was ideally suited to the conflict with Iraq’s industrial-age military.
Some advocates for transformation base their recommendations on the transition from the industrial age to the information age. Given our past record in applying dominant industrial age power against agrarian or non-industrial-age adversaries, one might expect that a mismatch could occur between the information-age force we are building and the force fielded by non-information-age societies.
Experimentation must challenge conceptions of warfare, and proponents must not be allowed to pick the threat.
Unlike the continuous feedback present in the commercial world, the military gets only episodic feedback of the most severe type. In the absence of empirical feedback, conceptions of warfare and theory prevail. Planning with a foe is hard enough; planning without a foe is error prone to say the least. Asymmetric opportunity is a product of our own decisions made in the absence of a foe or based on the miscalculation of a foe.
Continuous experimentation substitutes for the episodic feedback of warfare.
Conceptions can lead to a capability gap between those developed and those needed, but Murray and Millett[5] identify a second gap that develops between wars, that between doctrine and technology due to their separate development.
On 6 September 1939, a false radar warning caused the British to scramble a squadron of Hurricanes to intercept what was imagined to be inbound German Messerschmitts. The outbound Hurricanes appeared on radar to be an additional inbound squadron, causing another squadron to be scrambled. The earlier error was repeated. Eventually, two British Hurricanes and one Spitfire were lost. The so-called Battle of Barking Creek, involving no enemy aircraft, is an example of technology and doctrine developing separately and at different rates resulting in a costly mismatch.[6] The response to this “experiment” driven by an uncontrolled “threat” was improved doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Experimentation must bring technology and doctrine developers together.
Past interwar periods warn against two predictable problems: the mismatch between technology and methods, and the mismatch between capabilities developed and needed. Conceptions of warfare unchallenged through warfare seem to lead naturally to these two mismatches and the resultant gaps. Just as naturally, asymmetric actors seek to exploit these gaps. While both problems produce gaps, their roots are different and each requires a separate solution. The technology/doctrine mismatch may be well addressed by the dominant form of military experimentation used today, for example, Fleet Battle Experiments and those in Army Battle Labs. The capabilities mismatch is definitely not well addressed by developer-driven experiments.
Transformation May Open or Close Gaps
Many, not all, agree that there is a need for transformation. Even within the community that subscribes to the necessity of transformation, there is disagreement as to the nature of the transformation. The two schools of thought on transformation might be called the evolutionary and the revolutionary schools. At the heart of the disagreement between the two schools are the effects of the transformation on service core competencies.[7] The first school was clearly the dominant school of thought throughout the Cold War’s long-term, symmetric competition between NATO and Warsaw Pact states, and it remains entrenched and institutionalized. The more radical school talks of a revolution in military affairs. The end of the Cold War and the attendant radical changes in the security environment have bolstered the revolutionary school’s adherents.