Amitabha Buddhist Centre Lama Tsongkhapa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom
Transcript of the teachings by Geshe Chonyi
Root textfrom The Medium-Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment Practised by Persons of Three Capacities by Lama Tsongkhapa, translation Jeffrey Hopkins, Tsong-kha-pa’s Final Exposition of Wisdom © 2008 Jeffrey Hopkins, Snow Lion Publications.
All outline references refer to the outline by Trijang Rinpoche unless otherwise stated. Outlines are in bold.
Lesson No: 23 Date: 29thJuly 2010
If the “I” or self exists in the way it appears to us that “I” or self must be either one with the aggregates or different from the aggregates.
If the self or person is one with the aggregates, it must be inherently one with the aggregates. If this is so, there are three fallacies:
- It would be pointless to posit an “I” or person
- One would have to assert many selves or persons
- An inherently existent self will undergo production and disintegration
With regard to the third fallacy, we need to know the following difference: Conventionally speaking, the “I” or self does undergo production and disintegration, i.e., there is the conventionally existent production and disintegration of the self. But here we are talking about the inherently existent self. If the “I” or self is one with the aggregates, it has to be inherently one with the aggregates. That means the inherently existent self will have to undergo production and disintegration. This presents a problem. The problem relates to the inherently existent self undergoing production and disintegration, notthe conventionally existent self.
If the inherently existent self wereto undergo production and disintegration, Chandrakirti points out three fallacies in his Commentary on the "Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) 'Treatise on the Middle'":
- Memory would be impossible
- Whatever action one has done would be wasted
- One would meet with the results of actions one did not create.
This is like a discussion on the side relating to the third fallacy.
We have to understand and see for ourselves what are the fallacies that will arise if the self is inherently one with the aggregates. First, we have to read the text. Then, we base our analysis on what is written in the text. With that as the basis, we have to think about the fallacies that were pointed out:
- What are the reasons used to point out those fallacies?
- Why is it that when the self and aggregates are inherently one, that will lead to the fallacy that it will be pointless to assert a self?
- Why (does that also lead to the fallacy) that one will with many selves?
- Why is it that the inherently existent self has to undergo production and disintegration?
You have to understand and see, “Oh, it is like that.”When you understand the reasons and someone were to ask you: “What is the problem if the self is inherently one with the aggregates?” you would be able to answer that person, isn’t it?
Of course, achieving that (level of) understandingis not something that can happen overnight. There must be a combination of listening to (the teachings and) explanations, reading and analysing and engaging in discussions.
We are looking at the “I” that appears to us which we believe to be so real. Does that “I” exist in the way it appears to us? If such an “I” exists, then it can only do so in two ways:
(1) it exists as one with the aggregates or
(2) it exists as different from the aggregates.
We talked about this by using reasoning and logic and we have pointed outhow the fallacies arise, how it is impossiblefor the self and the aggregates to be the same. Once we see that is so,we eliminate that possibility from our minds, i.e., that this “I” who appears so real to us is one with the aggregates. After applying logic and reasoning and coming to the conclusion in our minds that the real “I”who appears to us is definitely not one with the aggregates, we will then wonder: “If that is the case, is the “I” different from the aggregates?”
If the real “I”who appears to us is different from the aggregates, then it has to be inherently different from the aggregates. That will alsolead to many fallacies.
If the “I” is inherently different from the aggregates, that self will not possess the characteristics of the aggregates such as production, abiding and disintegration. When the self is inherently different from the aggregates, they will have nothing to do with one another,i.e., there will be no relationship or any mutual dependency between them whatsoever. If that is the case, the self will not have the characteristics of production, abiding and disintegration like the aggregates. This fallacy is mentioned in Nagarjuna’s 'Treatise on the Middle.'
Question: What fallacy is there if the self and the aggregates are asserted to be inherently established as different?
Answer. There is the fallacy described in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle:
If [the self] is [established as inherently] other than the aggregates,
[The self] would not have the characteristics of the aggregates [namely, production, abiding, and disintegration] (Pages 70-71 of the root text)
.
This verse says that if the self and aggregates are inherently different, then the self will not possess the characteristics of the aggregates. This is the first fallacy.
The second fallacy is this: We have five aggregates (form, feeling, discrimination, compositional factors and consciousness) which we can identify and distinguish individually from one another. If the self is inherently differentfrom the aggregates, then after eliminating all the five aggregates, at the end of that process, we should be able to point to something that is the self, that is completely different from the aggregates but it is not like that.
Thinking along these lines, one realises that the self and aggregates cannot be inherently different. This fallacy is also mentioned in Nagarjuna'sTreatise on the Middle.
Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle says:
It is just not feasible that the self
Be another [entity] from the appropriated [aggregates].
If it were [feasible for the self to be] another [entity from them], it would be reasonable [for the self] to be apprehendable [by the mind]
Without the appropriated [aggregates], whereas it is not apprehended [that way] (Pages 71 – 72 of the root text).
The analysis of the four essential points delineating the view of the selflessness of persons determines that the self and aggregates are not inherently different through the two ways of reasoning we just covered.
2. Actual generation of the two views in stages
A. Delineating the selflessness of persons
a. Identifying persons
b. Delineating persons as not inherently existent
1) Delineating “I” as not inherently existent
a) How the view realizing selflessness is born from the four essential points
b) Extensive explanation of the third and fourth points in particular
i) [Third essential point:] Refuting that the self and the aggregates are inherently one
ii) [Fourth essential point]: Refuting that the self and the aggregates are inherently different
1' Indication of a source
2' The consequence that if the two were different by way of their entity, the self would not have the characteristics of the aggregates
3' The other approved syllogism establishing that by the sign of being unaccompanied it is unsuitable to be apprehended as the basis of designation and as the self
4' Explaining that it is not apprehended in that manner with the consequence that something other than the characteristics of the aggregates would be apprehended as self
5' The importance if gaining certainty concerning such reasoning
1' Indication of a source
Question: What fallacy is there if the self and the aggregates are asserted to be inherently established as different?
Answer. There is the fallacy described in Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle.
If [the self] is [established as inherently] other than the aggregates,
[The self] would not have the characteristics of the aggregates [namely, production, abiding, and disintegration] (Pages 70-71 of the root text).
2' The consequence that if the two were different by way of their entity, the self would not have the characteristics of the aggregates
Concerning that, if the self were inherently different from the aggregates, it would not possess the characteristics that characterize the aggregates as compounded phenomena—production, abiding, and disintegration. For example, because a horse is established as factually other than an ox, it does not have the characteristics of an ox (Page 71 of the root text).
3' The other approved syllogism establishing that by the sign of being unaccompanied it is unsuitable to be apprehended as the basis of designation and as the self
If you think, "That indeed is so but" [that is, if you are not entirely convinced], then [this so-called self] is not feasible as the object of observation that is the basis of designating the convention "self" by innate apprehension because it is uncompounded, like a sky-flower or like nirvana (Page 71 of the root text).
The preceding paragraph pointed out that if the self and aggregates wereinherently different, the self would not possess the characteristics of production, abiding and disintegration which characterise the aggregates, which are compounded phenomena.
“If you think, "That indeed is so but":This refers to a scenario where one accepts the above but the thought comes, “So what?”
If one accepts the selfdo not possess those characteristics that characterise the aggregates, which are compounded phenomena, the self will be devoid of those characteristics. If the self is devoid of these characteristics, it follows then that that self cannot be the object of observation of an innate apprehension of “I,” the thought that generates“I.”That is the consequence.
The reason for that is because the inherently existent self will be permanent, like a sky-flower or nirvana which is permanent phenomena. Something that is permanent cannot be the object of observation that causes us to generate the thought “I.”
Is there an object of observation for the innate apprehension of “I”? Is it the permanent “I”?
There has to be something that causes us to generate the thought “I.”We can then direct this argument against someone who holds this view: “For you, there isn’t an object of observation that causes you to generate the thought “I” because for you, the self is permanent. If that is the case you (will not be able to generate the thought “I.”)”
Question:If (the self) is permanent, it is necessarily not the object of observation of the innate apprehension apprehending “I.”Earlier on, we learnt that the innate apprehension of “I” is necessarily that of an impermanent mere “I.”Are we to apply that earlier understanding to this section or are we expected to generate some idea of this by relying on this section itself without referring to the earlier apprehension? Do we draw on our (earlier) conclusion to help us understand that because it is a sky-flower, therefore it is not an object of observation of the innate apprehension of “I”?
Answer: We have already established from the beginning that the object of observation of the innate apprehension of “I” has to be the mere “I.” It cannot be something else. This is something we should not forget.
- The “I” is necessarily impermanent.
- Here we are ascertaining the fourth essential: Refuting that the self and the aggregates are inherently different. If the self and the aggregates are inherently different, it follows then that the self would not possess the characteristics of the aggregates.
- It followsthen that the self has to be permanent.
- It follows then that for the person who believes that (the self and aggregrates are inherently different and so forth) there is no way of positing an object of observation for the innate apprehension of “I.”
Question: How do we establish that if the “I” is other than the aggregates, it cannot have the characteristics of the aggregates?
Answer: If they are inherently different,the self and the aggregates will not have the slightest connection or any interdependent relationship whatsoever. Whatever happens to the aggregates – they can undergo production, abiding and disintegration -will have no effect on the self. This is the consequence when we say the self and aggregates are inherently different.
But we know that that is not true because when the aggregates age, we say, “I am getting old.” We need to posit that whatever happens to the aggregates has an effect on the self. When this set of aggregates disintegrates, we should know how to posit that this particular self will no longer exist. When the aggregates of this life came into being, that is when we say, “I am born.” If the self and aggregates are inherently different, we will not be able to say, “I am born/getting old” and so forth.
The analogy used in the text is the difference between an ox and a horse. If the horse undergoes production, abiding, and disintegration, it has no effect on the ox’s production, abiding, and disintegration as the two are factually different. If the self and aggregates are different from one another, they will have to be different just like an ox is different from a horse.
4' Explaining that it is not apprehended in that manner with the consequence that something other than the characteristics of the aggregates would be apprehended as self
Moreover, if [the self] exists as inherently different from the characteristics of the aggregates—such as being suitable as form, and so forth—it must be observed that way, just as, for example, form and mind are apprehended as different. Further, since there is no such apprehension, the self does not exist as factually other [than the aggregates]. Nagarjuna's Treatise on the Middle says:
It is just not feasible that the self
Be another [entity] from the appropriated [aggregates].
If it were [feasible for the self to be] another [entity from them], it would be reasonable [for the self] to be apprehendable [by the mind]
Without the appropriated [aggregates], whereas it is not apprehended [that way].
and Chandrakirti’s Supplement to (Nagarjuna’s) "Treatise on the Middle" says:
Hence there is no self [as] another [factuality] than the aggregates
Because [an innate mind] apprehending [the self as another factuality] aside from the aggregates is not established (Pages 71 – 72 of the root text).
This is the second fallacy for the (fourth) essential (point, i.e., that the self and aggregates are inherently different).
If the self exists as inherently different from the aggregates, i.e., form, feeling, discrimination, compositional factors and consciousness, after eliminating each of the aggregates individually, one should be able to find the self. If one were to compare form and mind, when one eliminates form, one should be able to find the mind.Since there is no such apprehension, the innate apprehension of “I” therefore does not operate in that way. It does not apprehend the self as factually different from the aggregates. Since there is no such apprehension, therefore the self does not exist as factually other than the aggregates.
Question: “If you think, "That indeed is so but": the point related to this part of the text that Geshe-la explained earlier, may I clarify if this point should be seen as related to the first fallacy or should it be treated as a separate fallacy on its own? I would like to clarify whether there are two fallacies or three fallacies.
Answer: If the self and the aggregates are inherently different, there are two fallacies:
(1) the self will not possessthe characteristics of the aggregates – but that is not true and
(2) if one eliminates all the aggregates, one should be able to find the self – but that is also not true.
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The subject matter we have been studying these couple of months is emptiness. Just to hear teachings on emptiness is not an easy feat. It is difficult. If one were to compare reflecting on and analysing the topic of emptiness, that is more difficult than the difficulty involved in listening to teachings on emptiness. If one were to compare meditating on emptiness, that will be even more difficult than the difficulty encountered in analysing and reflecting on it. It is not an easy thing.
In order to succeed in trying to understand emptiness, these conditions must come together.
- First there must be a strong foundation in the practice of refuge.
- On the basis of that strong refuge practice, one then need to engage in purification practices such as confessing all one’s negativities in the Vajrasattva practice and so forth.
- One also needs to accumulate merit through practices such as the seven-limb practice and the mandala offering.
- In order to receive blessings in one’s heart, one needs to engage in guru yoga.
These are the practices that have to precede what we are doing now:learning, studying, reflecting and meditating on emptiness.
One may ask whether it is possible for one to understand and realise emptiness when all these factors come together. We have to say: “Yes, it is possible.”
But even so, even if all these conditions came together, it is still difficult to realise emptiness. On top of those preliminaries, one needs to put in sheer effort and hard work into studying this topic.
Trying to understand and realise emptiness is not an easy thing. It is really challenging. When we look at the story of the Buddha, after he achieved enlightenment, he did not teach for 49 days. If we try to understand why this is so, it is said that the Buddha was not very confident that his future disciples would understand what he was going to teach, especially the topic of emptiness which he knew was so difficult to understand. Because of that, the Buddha did not teach. It was only at the request of the gods such as Brahma that the Buddha turned the Wheel of Dharma by teaching the Four Noble Truths.
I think it will be really difficult for us to understand every single thing in this text but if one were to study, learn and read the text and engage in discussions and so forth, definitely one would get something. At the very least, one places very virtuous imprints on the mental continuum.
The reason I am pointing this out is that when you become discouraged, give up coming to class, give up reading and give up attending discussions, at the end of the day, you are one who lose out.
Emptiness cannot be realiseddirectly immediately. Before the direct perception of emptiness, you must first gain an ascertainment of the object itself, emptiness. You arrive atthat ascertainment in your mind by applying logic and reasoning, (looking at the object) through many avenues and angles such that you come to a decisive ascertainment that the object of negation, the inherently existent “I” which appears so real to you, does not exist.