Issue 2 –2002
Online Journal
ARGUMENTATION, INTERPRETATION, RHETORIC
Argumentation: an overview of theoretical approaches and research themes
Frans H. van Eemeren
University of Amsterdam
1 Subject-matter and aims of the study of argumentation
Argumentation is a phenomenon we are confronted with daily. We argue all the time for our own views and we react continually to oral or written argumentation put forward by others. Apart from being a verbal activity, argumentation is also a social activity directed at other people. On top of that, it is a rational activity aimed at defending a standpoint in such a way that it is acceptable to a reasonable judge.
A person who argues something starts - rightly or wrongly - from the assumption that there is an explicit or implicit difference of opinion with regard to the acceptability of a certain standpoint. By putting forward the constellation of propositions which constitutes the argumentation, the speaker or writer attempts to convince the listener or reader that the standpoint at issue is acceptable.
Taking these observations as our point of departure, we can describe the subject-matter of the study of argumentation in the following way:
Argumentation is a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable judge of the (in)acceptability of a standpoint by advancing a certain constellation of propositions which is designed to justify (or refute) the standpoint.
This definition does justice to the 'process-product ambiguity' of the word 'argumentation': it not only refers to the activity of advancing reasons but also to the shorter or longer text that results from it. In general the context will make clear which of the two is the intended meaning.
In publications in speech communication and discourse analysis the term argumentation is usually used in this (ambiguous) way while in philosophy and logic the use of the term argument is predominant. The latter term can lead to confusion because it has four different meanings: (1) reason, in the sense of the German Argument, (2) discussion or exchange of opinions, (3) quarrel, (4) form of reasoning in the logical sense, consisting of one or more premises and a conclusion. Although after the appearance of O'Keefe's classical definition paper of 1977 the difference in meaning between (1), (2) and (3) has been given a great deal of attention in the argumentation literature in English, it is particularly the confusion of the meanings (1) and (4) that has been responsible for a great many problems (van Eemeren en Grootendorst 1992a: 60-62). It is important that the study of argumentation incorporates both the pragmatic level which is at stake in meaning (1) and the logical level at stake in meaning (4); but it is at the same time also important to maintain a clear distinction between these two levels.
The study of argumentation concentrates on the analysis, evaluation and presentation of the 'point of departure' and the 'organisation' of argumentation. The point of departure consists of all explicit and implicit premises and assumptions that are taken as the starting point in argumentation. The organisation of the argumentation comprises the way in which the various reasons are connected with each other and the standpoint at issue to justify or refute this standpoint. Both in the study of the point of departure and in that of the organisation of argumentation logical and pragmatic considerations play a part.
On the logical level a whole constellation of verbal, contextual, situational and other pragmatic factors influencing the course and outcome of the communication process are left unexamined: the way in which the premises concerned are exactly phrased in ordinary language use, who is addressing whom, the precise situation in which this happens, all the things that occurred before, et cetera. Logicians are not generally concerned with argumentation as it is put forward in natural circumstances by somebody who attempts to convince someone else of a certain standpoint, but with abstract 'argument forms' or 'patterns of reasoning' in which a conclusion is derived from a particular set of formalized premises with the help of various sorts of 'logical constants'. To be able to clearly distinguish between the 'valid' argument forms and the 'invalid' argument forms underlying specific specimens of reasoning, they leave pragmatic aspects of argumentative reality outside consideration that are indispensable for developing an adequate theory of argumentation (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 5-12).
The general aims pursued in the study of argumentation can be summarized as follows:
The study of argumentation aims at determining which soundness criteria a reasonable judge applies when evaluating the point of departure and the organisation of argumentation and at making clear how these criteria are to be applied in the analysis, evaluation and presentation of argumentation.
2 Components of the study of argumentation
In argumentation there is always an explicit or implicit appeal to reasonableness, but this does, of course, not mean that each argumentation is indeed reasonable. In practice, an argumentation can be lacking in all kinds of respects. It is the task of argumentation theorists to determine which soundness criteria should be satisfied in the argumentation for the argumentation to be called 'reasonable'. Many argumentation theorists are inspired by logic and they study argumentation for normative purposes. However, there are also argumentation theorists who have a merely descriptive goal. Especially linguistically-oriented scholars in textual and discourse analysis are, as a rule, only interested in describing how, with varying degrees of success, language users make use of argumentation to convince others.
In current research practice both extremes are represented - with Biro and Siegel (1992) on the normative side and Willard (1989) on the descriptive side. Most argumentation theorists, however, take a middle position. Their starting point is that the study of argumentation has a normative as well as a descriptive dimension. In Argumentation, communication, and fallacies (1992a), Rob Grootendorst and I propose a - now broadly accepted - integrated research program. In this program, a theoretical model of acceptable argumentation based on a philosophical ideal of reasonableness has been developed and by means of empirical research it is established how argumentative reality is organized and which problems may occur in it (1992a: 5-6). The normative and the descriptive parts of the research program are connected with each other through a reconstruction of argumentative reality with the help of analytic operations from the perspective of the theoretical model of reasonable argumentation and through the development of methods to improve argumentative practice methodically (van Eemeren 1986, van Eemeren et al. 1993, 1997). A fully-fledged research program of this design has a philosophical, a theoretical, an empirical, an analytic and a practical component.
The philosophical component of the study of argumentation involves reflection on the ideal of reasonableness underlying the theorizing about argumentation; the outcome of this reflection is pertinent to the question of when argumentation may be considered sound or not sound. Toulmin (1976) distinguished between three major conceptions of reasonableness: (1) the 'geometrical' formal conception which characterizes the logical approach to argumentation, (2) the 'anthropological' empirical conception, which is prominent in the rhetorical approach to argumentation, and (3) the 'critical' transcendental conception, which lies at the heart of the dialectical approach to argumentation. The differences between these reasonableness conceptions are expressed in argumentation theory in different views of 'sound argumentation'. According to the geometrical conception sound argumentation is equal to a valid argument with true premises; according to the anthropological conception, it amounts to a way of persuading that is successful in a certain cultural environment; according to the critical conception, it comes down to a constructive contribution to the resolution of a difference of opinion.
In the theoretical component of the study of argumentation it is, starting from a certain conception of reasonableness, indicated more precisely what reasonable argumentation consists of. Which ways of arguing are acceptable to a reasonable judge? Geometrical logicians will answer this question quite differently from anthropological rhetoricians or critical dialecticians. The theoretical ideal models will therefore vary in these three cases.
In the empirical component of the study of argumentation descriptions and explanations are given of the factors and processes involved in producing, interpreting and evaluating argumentative discourse. As a consequence of the different theoretical angles of approach, the emphases may be put differently in the various empirical investigations. The geometric-logical approach has only recently led to an interest in empirical research; and the experiments have so far almost exclusively been restricted to deductive reasoning. The empirical investigations connected with the anthropological approach have so far been dominated by so-called 'persuasion' research aimed at determining the effectivity of the means of persuasion that are brought to bear. In empirical studies starting from the critical approach it is, among various other things, systematically investigated to what extent ordinary arguers' argumentative notions and norms agree with the theoretical ones.
In the analytic component of the study of argumentation an attempt is made to create a bridge between the ideal model of argumentative discourse and argumentative reality. The central question is how the text or discussion can be reconstructed in such a way that only those aspects are illuminated that are relevant in the light of the theoretical perspective which is chosen as the starting point. Depending on the approach that is favoured, the reconstructions can vary from formalizing the logical elements to the identifying the persuasive aspects or making explicit the contributions to the resolution of a difference of opinion.
In the practical component of the study of argumentation the insights gained in the philosophical, theoretical, empirical and analytic component are being used for developing methods to improve argumentative practice in a variety of (institutionalized and non-institutionalized) contexts. In this endeavour it is examined how argumentative practice can be positively influenced from a certain approach and how the individual skills in argumentation and the interpretation and evaluation of argumentation can be enhanced.
I shall give a brief overview of some important approaches to the study of argumentation. Together with other approaches, with a more limited scope or a less developed research program, these approaches are discussed in more detail in van Eemeren et. al. (1996). Before discussing the various approaches, it is important to emphasize that all modern approaches of argumentation developed in the past decades are highly influenced by classical and post-classical rhetoric and dialectic. Classical syllogistic logic (or 'analytics') has not played such an important role: from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards this logic has been gradually replaced by modern formal logic concentrating on symbolic reasoning by means of formally valid derivations rather than argumentative practice.
3 Influential approaches to the study of argumentation
3.1 Toulmin's model of analysis and Perelman's new rhetoric
The study of argumentation, and particularly the teaching of argumentation, has for a long time been dominated by the theoretical contributions of Toulmin and Perelman (with his collaborator Olbrechts-Tyteca). Both contributions were published in the fifties and both intend to offer an alternative for formal logic that should make it possible to make an adequate analysis of ordinary argumentative discourse. Another commonality is that the rational procedure of legal reasoning is in both cases taken as the point of departure.
Toulmin's The uses of argument, published in 1958, is mainly known for the model of argumentation presented in this book. This model represent the 'procedural form' of argumentation: the various steps that can be distinguished in the defence of a standpoint. According to Toulmin, the soundness of argumentation is primarily determined by the degree in which the warrant, which connects the data adduced in the argumentation with the claim that is defended, is made acceptable by a backing. The following analysis is an example of a description of argumentation in terms of the Toulmin model (Fig. 1)
The procedural form of argumentation is in Toulmin's view 'field dependent'. This means that the steps that are taken - and which are represented in the model - are always the same, irrespective of the kind of subject the argumentation refers to. What kind of backing is required, however, is dependent on the field to which the question at issue belongs. An ethical justification, for instance, requires a different kind of backing than a legal justification. Toulmin concludes from this that the evaluation criteria for determining the soundness of argumentation are 'field dependent'.
A variety of serious theoretical objections have been raised against Toulmin's views of argumentation and his model. In addition, in concrete cases the model very often appears hard to apply. Toulmin's definitions, which combine functional and formal differences, are such that data and warrants are in practice difficult to distinguish. The distinction between the two is only really clear in carefully selected examples. And without this distinction the model is in fact nothing more than a newly-clad reasoning scheme from classical antiquity, the 'epicheireme'. All the same the model and the connected idea of field-dependent norms of rationality are still extremely popular.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca provide in La nouvelle rhetorique (1958), which appeared in an English translation in 1969, an inventory of frequently-used 'argumentation techniques'. They regard argumentation as sound if this argumentation adduces (more) assent with the standpoint that is defended among the audience the argumentation is aimed at. Thus the soundness of argumentation is in the new rhetoric measured against its effect on the target group. This target group may consist of a 'specific audience', but it can also be the 'universal audience': the people who are for the speaker or writer the embodiment of 'reasonableness'.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's theory consists most of all in an extensive list of elements which can serve as point of departure or as argument scheme when constructing the argumentation that should convince or persuade the audience (see van Eemeren et al. 1996: ch. 4). With the help of a 'quasi-logical' argument scheme, which resembles a logically valid argument form in some way, one can, for instance, sometimes achieve the effect that the public considers the standpoint defended in a reasonable way:
The club is held to maintain certain regulations and therefore its members are also committed to these regulations.
Another way of justifying a standpoint is the use of an argument scheme such as analogy that 'structures reality', so that the audience will conclude that the standpoint that is defended is in a similar way acceptable as a different kind of standpoint which was already accepted for a long time:
It is clear from the current lack of discipline and the tolerance with respect to immoral conduct in modern western society that this society is about to come to an end, because the Roman empire too was near to destruction when people lost their sense of order and discipline and allowed immoral conduct to take place.
Unfortunately, the descriptions of the various categories distinguished in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's catalogue of points of departure and argument schemes are not so clear. In some cases the various categories also strongly overlap. These and other problems make it difficult to achieve a unequivocal analysis of argumentation with the help of the theoretical tools provided by the new rhetoric.
Neither Toulmin's approach nor the new rhetoric has led to the desired results. This is partly due to the prejudices of these argumentation theorists with regard to logic, which is, without paying any attention to modern developments, equated with classical syllogistic logic. Both Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca start, without having any qualms about it, from the assumption that logic has nothing to offer for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation, whereas in this endeavour certain logical insights are indispensable. Because both Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca concentrate also exclusively on isolated arguments of reasonings and ignore all pragmatic, contextual and situational aspects, their approaches are certainly no real alternative to the formal-logical approach of argumentation. Neither of the two approaches does justice to the fact that argumentation is a specific form of functional language use which should be treated as such.
Until his death in 1984, Perelman remained involved in the new rhetoric, but he did not develop any important new theoretical insight after the publication of La nouvelle rhetorique. His influence is still pretty strong though, in particular in rhetoric and among lawyers. Unlike Perelman, Toulmin has after the publication of The uses of argument hardly been active in the study of argumentation. Instead, he directed his attention to topics of a historical-philosophical nature and problems in the theory of science. At the 1990 conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) Toulmin, for once, returned to his argumentation model. He declared that he had come to believe that, unlike he had earlier argued in The uses of argument, not only justifications and backings that are used in argumentation are field-dependent, but also the various contextual aspects and the various forums that are supposed to evaluate the argumentation (1992: 9).
3.2 Informal logic
Out of dissatisfaction with the way in which argumentation was treated in introductory textbooks in formal logic an approach to argumentation has been propagated in Canada and the United States from the beginning of the seventies which is known as informal logic (Johnson and Blair 1980, eds. 1994). The main theoretical sources of inspiration were the studies by Toulmin and Perelman en Olbrechts-Tyteca . Since 1978 the journal Informal Logic, edited by Blair and Johnson, has been the speaking voice of the informal-logic movement. In spite of its name, informal logic is not a new kind of logic, but just an approach to the normative study of argumentation in ordinary language which remains closer to the practice of argumentation than formal logic (van Eemeren et al. 1996: ch. 6).
Informal logicians would like to develop norms and procedures for interpreting, assessing and construing argumentation. The starting point is that argumentation should be sound in a logical sense (Blair and Johnson 1987). Apart from the fact that it is clear that something else is meant than that the arguments that are used must be valid in a formal-logical sense, it is not yet clear what this means. It is certain though that informal logicians are primarily interested in the relations between premises and conclusions in arguments; it is also certain that their interest is not restricted to reasoning aimed at convincing.