An Anonymous Mishna Is According to Rabbi Meir: a Critical Investigation

An anonymous mishna is according to Rabbi Meir: A Critical Investigation

GE Lier

1INTRODUCTION

In a recent paper (2009), Rabbi Dr. Richard Hidary explored the question of “Traditional versus Academic Talmud Study”. He notes that the split between “traditional” and “academic” study is fairly modern and somewhat unfortunate. Hidary adds that “Just as traditional learning benefits from academics, so, too, academic Talmud suffers without traditional learning” since “deficiencies in scholarship in Second Temple and Rabbinic literature by individuals without a yeshiva background or some kind of equivalent are evident.” He concedes that while the worlds of academic and traditional Talmud study are generally mutually beneficial, there are some areas of conflict and some methodological challenges. In the extreme, some academics categorically deny the historicity of Rabbinic stories and reject the authenticity of all attributions, but Hidary warns that too much scepticism can lead to as much historical inaccuracy as too little. Among some solutions to this problem he proposes that students should know something about the history of Jews in Israel and Babylonia during the Talmudic era and the functions of basic Rabbinic institutions such as, the Nasi, the Resh Galuta, the Yeshiva, the kallah and the sidra as well as something about the background cultures of the Romans and Sassanians.

Hidary’s recommendation that traditional learning should go hand-in-hand with academic Talmud is the incentive for the mode of arrangement for this paper and so my research follows the structure of “Cause and Effect” where I try to explain why something happened, and what the influence of one event upon another. I take into account the background history of Jews in Israel and Babylonia during the Talmudic era as well as the functions of basic Rabbinic institutions. In this context, my research question critically engages with the traditional view for arriving at decisions in Tannaitic disputes that relate to the figure of Rabbi Meir. For this purpose I take into account specific mishnaic rules that have become guidelines for the traditional study of Talmud[1]:

A.An anonymous mishna is according to Rabbi Meir [Sanhedrin 86a].

B.When Rabbi Meir is named in a source, and his decision is disputed, either by Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbi Yose, Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, the halakah is like his opponent [cf. Eiruvin 46b and 62a; Sanhedrin 27b; Yevamoth 93a].

C.When it is stated “others say” (אֲחֵרִיִם אוֹמְרִים), Rabbi Meir is meant [Horioth 13b].

From the above rules three questions issue, which this paperseeks to address in term of cause and effect:

(i)What is the import for Rabbi Meir’s anonymity in the context of the Mishna and Talmud?

(ii)What is incentive for disagreement with Rabbi Meir in the Talmud?

(iii)What is the connotation of the plural “Others say” (אֲחֵרִיִם אוֹמְרִים) when Rabbi Meir (in the singular) is meant?

My aim is to show how these traditional rules that relate to Rabbi Meir interlink with each other as they appear in thecontext and functions of basic Rabbinic institutions within the historical framework of formative Judaism.

2WERE THE RABBIS JOKING?

In relation to the rule in Sanhedrin 86a[2] רַבִּי יוֹחַנַן: סְתָם מַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי מֵאִיר( R. Johanan said: [The author of] an anonymousMishnah] is R. Meir),Boyarin (2009:526) comes to the conclusion that the Talmudic accounts of Rabbi Meir’s life are “characteristic of the culture of the time of their production”. In line with this, Boyarin(2009:543-550) suggests that there are several hybrid representations of Rabbi Meirin the Talmud, which he seeks to place into the category of Mennippean satire[3] (2009:528). In Boyarin’s view, the anonymityof Rabbi Meir in the Talmud represents him both in a serious and a satirical way. “Serious” where Meir’s anonymity is a sign of his great authority and “satirical” where for one, his anonymity isthe result of a“punishment” by the Patriarch, R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, who chastises himin terms ofonewho should not be named (see BT Horayot 13b)[4] and further, where his anonymity is due to his continued association with and loyalty to his third teacher Elisha ben Abuja[5] after that one had become an apostate (see Chagigah 15b)[6].In this instance, Boyarin reasons that just as Elisha ben Abuja was dispossessed of his name and thereafter only known as Acher (other) so Meir likewise becomes the one who may not be named(Boyarin 2009:543).Boyarin sees another hybrid representation of Meir in the Talmud,which he linksto Meir’s strange teaching method. Accordingly, in Boyarin’s view (2009:546-550) the Talmud exemplifies Meir from a “sophist” perspectiveif the halakha is stated not to be in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s views (see Tractate Eruvin 13b and 53a)[7]. Boyarin argues that the reason for this was thatMeir could produce equally compelling arguments on both sides of any halakhic question and thus the disciples were not able to determine his true view.

AlthoughBoyarin’s suggestion seems reasonable that the representation of Rabbi Meir in the Talmud follows the genre of the seriocomic it does not satisfactorily deal with all the aspects linked to Talmudic discourse. For instance, when the Talmud refers to Rabbi Meir it makes use of the plural denotation “others say” (אֲחֵרִיִם אֲמוֹרִים). Here the term אֲחֵרִיִם “others” is coupled with the plural verb form אֲמוֹרִים. This import is anomalous since the phrase “others say” (אֲחֵרִיִם אֲמוֹרִים) is traditionally understood to allude to Rabbi Meir in the singular. The point is that the so-called “others”אֲחֵרִיִם constitute an unknown component and this unknown component is by convention linked to Rabbi Meir.

The question is why, at times, is Rabbi Meir’s opinion linked to the unidentified component “others say” (אֲחֵרִיִם אֲמוֹרִים)?I would like to suggest that the answer to this inconsistency may lie with the Talmudic way of dealing with probabilistic notions, an avenue that was earlier explored in two interesting studies by Nachum L. Rabinivitch (1969) and again more recently by Dov M. Gabbay and Moshe Koppel (2011). Both studies refer to the Talmud’s guiding principles for dealing with uncertainty in terms of the rule “follow the majority” בתררובא(Chullin 11a):

Whence is derived the principle which the Rabbis have adopted, viz.: Follow the majority? Whence? [you ask]; is it not expressly written: Follow the majority? In regard to those cases where the majority is defined, as in the case of the Nine Shops or the Sanhedrin, we do not ask the question. Our question relates to cases where the majority is undefined [since we cannot count all the people], as in the case of the Boy and Girl. Whence then is the principle derived?

For rabbis, the argumentin the above statement is concerned with instances“where the majority is undefined”. Significantly, Rabinovitch points out: “Not all the sages agreed to follow a majority when that is not actually enumerated. He adds that Rabbi Meir and others ‘are concerned for the minority’ (Gittin 2b), except where the uncounted majority is overwhelming.” Here the important point is that Rabbi Meir was ‘concerned for the minority’(Chullin 6a: ור״מלטעמיה, דחיישלמיעוטאRabbi Meir according to his own opinion who is concerned for the minority[8]).While it was even important in the instance of explicit majorities to determine whether the majority was relevant to the case in question, Rabbi Me’ir was adamant that an absent majority does not constitute sufficient grounds to overturn an existing status quo but he implied that a present majority does (Gabbay and Koppel 2011:65-66). In other words, Meirwas concerned to debate cases where the majority was undefined or where the majority was absent. In practical terms such an undefined majority could amount to a defined minority if an accurate count of the number of involved people was entailed. In other words, such a claim would then be based on an operational sample. Sinceempirical data are by nature often incomplete, the crucial pointthat inspired Rabbi Meir was how convincing he could argue on the available data, not probable data. In this regard Gabbay and Koppel (2011:65-66) suggest that Rabbi Meir heldthat empirical claims were only adequateto yield a default rule. For him the default rule was not stronger than a different default rule that rested on the premisesustained by the last known status quo. The point is that he was concerned with operational or workable reasoningprocesses and not with hypothetical cases. The reality thus required that on a day-to-day basis the law had to yieldmultiplespecific decisions regarding duties and rights;unlike his opponents,who held that a sufficiently strong empirical claim could be treated as a certainty for legal purposes in the general (cf. also Rabinovitch 1969:441). This explains why the Talmud credits Meir with exceptional dialectical power in halakhic decision making, stating: “He was able to give a hundred and fifty reasons to prove a thing legally clean, and as many reasons to prove it unclean” (Eruvin 13b). Italso clarifies why most of Meir’s contemporaries followed him with difficultyandmay help to explain the numerous instances in the Talmud where the halakha is not decided in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s views.To be sure, in his own generation Meir often had to put up with reproofs by his colleagues such as “Enough, Meir!” דייך מאִיר(Schir rabba 2:4)[9]. In the same, as Bacher points out (1890:9-10) that an old interpretation of the expression “others” (אֲחֵרִיִם) (Horajoth 13b) links it to a derogatory view of Rabbi Meir where his teachings are in the name of his apostate teacher “Acher”.

The fact that Rabbi Meir was concerned for the minority and further, that his dialectic was often not comprehensible for his associates accounts for the instances where his contemporaries renegaded his line of argumentation into a doubtful category. Where such sayings were repeated by his students, these were not mentioned by name but remained anonymous in terms of “others say”. However, the Talmud shows evidence that the brilliance of Rabbi Meir was gradually discovered and recognized in the generations of sages that succeeded him:

Rabbi Aha the son of Rabbi Hanina said: It is revealed and known beforethe One Who Spoke and the World Was that there was none like RabbiMeir in his generation. Why then did they not establish that the halakhais [always] like his view? Because his colleagues could not determine histrue opinion, since he would say of the impure: “pure” and of the pure:“impure” and find arguments for this. We have a tradition thathis name was not Rabbi Meir but Rabbi Miyasha. Why then was hecalled Meir [the Enlightener], because he used to enlighten the faces ofthe Sages in the halakha… Rav said: the fact that I am sharper than mycolleagues is because I saw Rabbi Meir from behind, and if I had seenhim from in front, I would have been even sharper, for it says “let youreyes see your teachers.”[Tractate Eruvin 13b and similar in Eruvin 53a]

It came to the point where the expression “others say” (אֲחֵרִיִם אֲמוֹרִים) was no longer acceptable, as the following discourse reveals:

It was shown to them in a dream: “Go and make peace with RabbiShimon the son of Gamaliel.” Rabbi Natan went and Rabbi Meirdidn’t go, saying, “The words of dreams neither raise nor lower[count for nothing].” When Rabbi Natan went, they said to him,“Granted that the buckle of your father [a badge of office] was efficaciousfor you in becoming the Chief of the Court, should it have beenefficacious in becoming the Patriarch?”Rabbi teaches Rabbi Shimon the son of Rabbi [that is, cited thefollowing tradition in this form to his own son, the grandson of RabbiShimon ben Gamaliel]: “Others say: If it were temura, it is not sacrificed.”He [the son] said to him [the father]: “Who are these whosewater we drink and don’t mention their names?” [Who are you citingas authorities but in this strange anonymous fashion?] He answeredhim, “People who wished to uproot your honor and the honor ofyour father’s house.” He [the son] said to him, “Your love and yourhatred and your jealousy are all lost and gone” [Eccl. 9:6]. He [thefather] answered him, “The enemy is dead, the swords are forever”

[Psalms 9:7; the effectiveness of the past in the present]. He [the son]said to him, “Those words [apply] in a case in which his [the enemy’s]actions were effective. As for these, their actions had no effect.”He [the father] repeated it again and said in the name of Rabbi Meir:If it were temura, it is not sacrificed. Rava commented: “Even Rabbiwho was a humble man said ‘They said in the name of Rabbi Meir’;he didn’t say, ‘Rabbi Meir said.’” [Horayot 13b-14a]

Rav Sherira Gaon explains the shifting process as follows:

Rabbi Meir had a certain way of teaching the mishnayot to his disciples; and Rabbi (Judah HaNasi) chose and established this way to teach [the mishnayot] to everyone. Rabbi Meir had received his way of learning [the Mishnah] from his teacher, Rabbi Akiva; and Rabbi Akiva had received it from his teachers, the earlier sages. Thus, we say: “Rabbi Yohanan said, ‘An anonymous Mishnah is Rabbi Meir. An anonymous Tosefta is Rabbi Nehemiah. An anonymous Sifra is Rabbi Judah. An anonymous Sifre is Rabbi Simeon. And all of them taught in the way of Rabbi Akiva’… Since there were Rabbis who had heard from great sages a different opinion [from that in the Mishnah] or who taught minority opinions anonymously, if someone heard about this he could become confused [when studying the Mishnah]. [But] when Rabbi explained the matter, no doubt [regarding the halakhah] could set in. Thus we learn in the Mishnah[10]: Rabbi Judah said: “Why is the opinion of the minority recorded along with the majority? In order to nullify it, so that if a man says this, [another can] say to him: ‘Where did you hear this?’ If he replies: ‘I received it [as a tradition from my teachers]: one can say to him: ‘Perhaps what you heard was the opinion of so-and-so.” When everybody [eventually] saw the form of the Mishnah, the truthfulness of its teachings, and the exactness of its words, they abandoned their previous formulations and compilations.

Why then was the reference to an anonymous mishna retained in the Talmud? The Encyclopedia of Judaism[11] explains this, stating, “If the Mishnah statement is an anonymous one, the amora can defend himself by attributing it to a particular tanna, while he himself sides with a different tanna on this point of law.” In other words, anonymity in the Mishnahwas retained to provide later generations of sages the opportunity to develop dialectic skills.

3CONCLUSION

It appears that initially, anonymous referencesin terms of אֲחֵרִיִם אֲמוֹרִים ‘others say’ were linked to minority opinions which carried a negative connotation. But as successivegenerations of sages engaged with these halakhic disputations, the expression became converselyan indication of implicit dialectic brilliance that Talmudic students could make use of to develop their own reasoning skills. In other words, it becamea general mishnaic ruling, which entailed that an anonymous citation was to be understood as the ruling of the Mishnah itself and therefore most authoritative.

Here I agree with Neusner that there is “nothing amusing, merely clever, or particularly erudite”[12] in the manner in which Rabbis are represented in Rabbinic writings. Rather, rabbinic discourse is an expression of the “urgency and immediacy”[13]of matters that confronted the sages of formative Judaism. For us remains the task to unravel the historical connotations that are implicitly extant in their traditions.

[1] As stated in (Carmell 1998:74).

[3]“Menippean satire, also known as spoudogeloion (“serious laughing”; the seriocomic), is a peculiar

type of literature produced by and for intellectuals in which their own practices are both mocked and asserted at one and the same time; hence, its cognomen” (Boyarin 2009:526).

[4] Our rabbis have taught: “When the Patriarch comes in [to the House of Study], all the people stand and they don’t sit down until he asks them to. When the Chief of the Court comes in, they make for him one row of standees on each side [of the pathway in] until he sits in his place. When the Sage comes in, one stands and the other sits, until he comes to his place [In other words, the one student closest to him stands and then sits when he has passed him].”

R. Johanan said: “This mishna was issued in the days of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel [II], when R. Simeon b. Gamaliel was the Patriarch (President), R. Meir the Chakam (Sage), and R. Nathan the Ab-beth-din (Chief of the court). Whenever R. Simeon b. Gamaliel entered all the people stood up for him; when R. Meir and R. Nathan entered all the people stood up for them also. Said R. Simeon b. Gamaliel: Should there be no distinction between my [office] and theirs? And so he issued that ordinance. R. Meir and R. Nathan were not present on that day. Coming on the following day and seeing that the people did not rise for them as usual, they inquired as to what had happened. On being told that R. Simeon b. Gamaliel had issued that ordinance, R. Meir said to R. Nathan, I am the Chakam (Sage) and you are the Ab-beth-din (Chief of the court), let us retaliate. Now, how are we to proceed against him? — Let us request him to discourse upon the tractate of Ukzin with which he is unfamiliar, and as he will be unable to discourse upon it we shall tell him: Who can express the mighty acts of the Lord; make all His praise to he heard; for whom is it becoming to express the mighty acts of the Lord? For him who can make all his praise to he heard. We shall then depose him and I shall become Ab-beth-din and you the Nasi.’ R. Jacob b. Korshai on hearing this conversation said, ‘The matter might, God forbid, lead to [the Nasi's] disgrace.’ So he went and sat down behind R. Simeon b. Gamaliel's study, expounding [the tractate of ‘Uksin], and repeating it again and again. He said, What could this mean? Did anything, God forbid, happen at the college!’ He concentrated his attention and familiarized himself with it. On the following day when they said to him, ‘Will the Master come and discourse on Uksin, he began and discoursed upon it. After he had finished he said to them, Had I not familiarized myself with it, you would have disgraced me!’He gave the order and they were removed from the college. Thereupon they wrote down scholastic difficulties on slips of paper which they threw into the college. That which he solved was disposed of and as to those which he did not solve they wrote down the answers and threw them in. Said R. Jose to them: The Torah is without and we are within! Said R. Simeon b. Gamaliel to them: We shall re-admit them but impose upon them this penalty, that no traditional statement shall be reported in their names. [As a result] R. Meir was designated ‘others’, and R. Nathan ‘some say’.”