Afghanistan Neg Upgrade

SDI 2010BBHS

Afghanistan Neg Upgrade

Afghanistan Negative Upgrade

Iran 1nc (1/6)......

Ext-Afghanistan Good for Relations......

Ext-Incrementalism Fails (1/2)......

Ext-Opium Shift......

Ext-Alt Casualties to Econ (1/2)......

Relations Bad Impact Turn (1/4)......

Ext – Sanctions Key......

1NC—Central Asia Advantage Frontline—1/3......

2NC/1NR—Extend #1—Escalation Empirically Denied—1/1......

2NC/1NR—Extend #2—Instability Inevitable 1/1......

2NC/1NR—Extend #3—Russia Won’t Lash Out—1/1......

2NC/1NR—Extend #4—Central Asia Presence Solves—1/3......

2NC/1NR—Extend #5—Not Enough Insurgents Left—1/1......

2NC/1NR—Extend #6—Status Quo Solves—1/1......

2NC/1NR—Extend #7—Withdrawal Bad—1/1......

SCO-NATO 1NC (1/4)......

Ext – Can’t Increase Co-op......

Ext – Co-op Fails......

Ext – No Artic Conflict (1/2)......

Add on CP’s......

NATO Disad 1nc......

Link Ext......

U.S. key......

Brink/ Afghanistan Key......

Impact – Nuclear War......

A2: We are going to lose the war AND Turns Baltic......

Iran 1nc (1/6)

1. Staying in Afghanistan is net better for cooperation – 1ac Farnik ev says that Iran was angered by the surge but it also lists a bunch of other things that we are cooperating over in Afganistan such as the removal of Al Qaeda, reconstruction of the country, and drugs

2. Even if Iran fears U.S. troops in Afghanistan, multiple areas of mutual concerns means that Iran would prefer to have the U.S. there

Anand Gopal, “US-Iran thaw could bolster Afghanistan rebuilding efforts,” Christian Science Monitor, staff writer, April 3, 2009, DA 7-25-10, lexis

In a crowded section near the western edge of the capital sits a sprawling new university compound, a structure of ornate white stone and blue-tiled domes.As hundreds of students here file in for morning classes, many say they have one country to thank for helping to improve higher learning in this education-starved country: Iran.The $100 million university is one of Iran's many development projects across Afghanistan - and just the type of contribution Washington wants to bring positive change to this troubled country.At an international conference on Afghanistan in The Hague this week, Iranian officials offered to cooperate with the United States on developing and reconstructing Afghanistan. Though deep mistrust remains between the two countries, the move marked a thaw in relations and could facilitate Washington's efforts to turn the situation around here. "The conference underlines Iran's willingness to play a cooperative role and can jump-start Obama's policy of getting more support throughout the region," says Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department analyst on Afghanistan-Pakistan and currently a scholar in residence at the Middle East Institute based in Washington.More cooperation between Washington and Tehran could bolster development efforts. For example, according to "Afghanistan's Other Neighbors: Iran, Central Asia, and China," a recent report from the Washington-based think tank, the Hollings Center for International Dialogue, the US forbade contractors to purchase cheaper and more readily available Iranian asphalt to build a key highway here, presumably because of the hostile relations between the two countries.Iran's support is crucial, Mr. Weinbaum says, because of its longstanding political, cultural, and economic interests in Afghanistan. For example, Tehran has been working on an ambitious development plan here since 2001, mostly near its shared border with Afghanistan but also in the north and in major cities. Iran's projects provide a glimpse of how much more it could help the country in the future, says Weinbaum.According to the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, an umbrella organization that tracks aid here, Iran has disbursed nearly a half-billion dollars in aid since 2001. In fact, Iran is one of the most effective donors in the country, delivering 93 percent of the aid it has pledged. By comparison, the US has delivered only 48 percent of $5 billion in pledged aid; India has contributed 24 percent of its $200 million in pledged aid.The western city of Herat has boomed with Iran's beneficence. Unlike most of the country, the city boasts 24-hour electricity, dozens of industrial zones, paved roads, and more. Iran is responsible for much of this, according to government officials. Elsewhere, Iran has built mosques and education centers and provided loans to Afghan businessmen. Iranian entrepreneurs have poured investment dollars into the country.These investments might be the driving factor in Iran's interest in the country. Afghanistan is a valuable market for the Iranians, says Weinbaum: "Iranian businessmen are operating pretty freely in Afghanistan, and more consumer goods are being exported into the country from Iran." Iran doesn't want an unstable neighbor Another motivation for Iran might be the fear of a destabilized Afghanistan. "Their nightmare is that a radical Sunni group like the Taliban come to power next door," Weinbaum continues.The Taliban and Tehran have been at odds for years. The ultraconservative Sunni militants view Shiite Islam and its adherents with severe hostility. During Afghanistan's civil wars in the 1990s, Iran supported Shiite groups and other non-Pashtun groups. It later backed the arch rivals of the Taliban government, the Northern Alliance.Iranian officials also worry that a destabilized Afghanistan could spark a refugee crisis within its borders. Iran is already home to more than 2 million Afghan refugees, most of them illegal. The problem has caused tensions between Tehran and Kabul, as Iran periodically expels the illegal refugees. Drug smugglers frequently infiltrate the 560-mile border between the two countries, driving up crime and opium addiction rates. Iranian officials have pledged to cooperate with US counternar- cotics efforts. "While Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium, Iran is the world's largest consumer," writes the Hollings Center in its recent report. Iranian officials have not yet outlined how they plan to help fight the drug trade, but some officials say they might increase border security to limit smuggling.US, Afghans question Iran's motivesDespite pledges of cooperation, the US and Iran have much mutual suspicion to overcome. "Iran is certainly fearful of the US developing a strategic partnership with Afghanistan," says Weinbaum. Officials in Tehran worry that the Americans will build permanent military bases in Afghanistan that could

Iran 1nc (2/6)

one day be used to launch attacks against Iran. Iran has been critical of US troop presence in the region, saying at Tuesday's conference that the planned increase in forces "will prove ineffective." The US, for its part, has accused Iran of surreptitiously supporting the Afghan insurgency, citing instances in which Iranian-made weapons were recovered from the insurgents. But Iranian officials respond that such weapons are readily available on the black market and do not indicate active support from Tehran. Many Afghans suspect Iran's motives. Due to its historical, religious, and cultural ties with Afghanistan's Persian-speaking minorities, who together make up roughly half of the country, Iran is sometimes perceived as favoring them with their support."They build everything for Shiites," says Kabul resident Fazel Minlallah."They don't help the Pashtun people," says lawmaker Najib Kabuli. "They use their money to win influence, like they do in Lebanon," where Iran supports the Shiite group Hezbollah.Other Afghans are wary of Iran's cultural influence - the country is more socially liberal than Afghanistan and many returned refugees bring such ideas back home, causing tensions in this ultra-conservative society. In some cases, young Afghan women return from Iran and dress less conservatively, for example.But the overlapping American, Afghan, and Iranian interests here suggest that the countries can find areas to work together. None of the countries involved, notes Weinbaum, wants Afghanistan to descend into instability or civil war, and therefore they have an interest in helping to rebuild and develop the country.

3. The terminal impact card to U.S. invasion of Caspian is talking about Russia invading Turkey – it has absolutely nothing to do with the U.S. invasion of the Caspian.

4. Afghanistan doesn’t spill over and even if it did cooperation is impossible.

AP, Jason Straziuso, writer, “Iran official: US ties don't affect Afghan unrest,” March 17, 2009, DA 7-26-10, lexis

An improvement in Iran's relationship with the United States would have no effect on Afghanistan's Taliban militancy or the country's booming drug trade, an Iranian diplomat said Tuesday. The comments came ahead of a conference to discuss the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, proposed by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Afghan Foreign Minister Rangeen Dadfar Spanta has said that any decrease in tensions between Iran and the West would benefit Afghanistan. But Feda Hussein Maliki, Iran's ambassador to Kabul, said he wasn't even sure that Iran would attend the March 31 conference, adding that Tehran has yet to receive an invitation. Dutch Foreign Ministry spokesman Christoph Prommersberger says an invitation has been delivered by the Dutch embassy in Tehran and to the Iranian Embassy in The Hague. "Our relation is a strategic relation with Afghanistan ... a deep relationship that has no links with other relations, whether America would or wouldn't be in Afghanistan," Maliki said on the sidelines of a ceremony marking a trade pact to import Iranian cars to Afghanistan. The invitation to Iran to a U.S.-proposed conference was seen as a new emphasis on diplomacy by the administration of President Barack Obama. The U.S. and Iran haven't had diplomatic relations in almost 30 years. Clinton told the BBC this month that Iran was "helpful" during the early days of the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, a conciliatory gesture at the beginning of a new administration. Clinton said the Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan had "almost daily" contact with the U.S. ambassador in the early stages of the war. Adrian Edwards, the top U.N. spokesman in Afghanistan who traveled to Iran this month, said top Iranian officials expressed interest in the conference, but he said it wasn't yet clear they would attend. "I think they'll wait until the last minute before deciding," he said. But Edwards also said that in conversations with Iran's director of counternarcotics and top Foreign Ministry officials, he got the impression Iran is interested in more regional cooperation. Iranian officials expressed interest in helping train Afghanistan's fledgling police force, he said, a job now mostly undertaken by the U.S. "They speak the same language, they're from this region," he said. Iranian expertise is "cheaper than bringing people from further afield who may not know Afghanistan as well." U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said last week he would open the one-day conference. Malek Sitez, an international law expert in Kabul, said Iran, the U.S., Europe and Russia all have a common desire to reduce the opium and heroin trade in Afghanistan but can't maximize their cooperation due to political disagreements. "This is a big problem for Afghanistan and the international community," he said. An increasing role for Iran in Afghanistan could also vastly alter the regional power balance, he said. Pakistan has long had a strong hand in Afghanistan, particularly in support of the country's Sunni Pashtuns. Iran, a Shiite country, could alter that dynamic, throwing more support to Afghanistan's minority Shiites, Sitez said. "If Iran undertakes a stronger role, the role of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will be weakened," he said. "If a balance of power can be found ... it will help Afghanistan's push toward ethnic equality." The governor of Nimroz a province in southwest Afghanistan that shares a 60-mile (100 kilometer) border with Iran said he hopes U.S.-Iran relations improve so the fight against the Taliban might be strengthened. "When the relationship gets better, then the enemy has no rear support," said Gov. Ghulam Dastagir Azad.

Iran 1nc (3/6)

5. There are only 8 million Uighurs in all of China – that’s not enough to trigger Taiwan secessionism which is what their impact is based off of.

Doug Gladney, professor of anthropology at Pomona College, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge,” Centre for World Dialogue, Winter/Spring 2007, DA 7-27-10,

According to the reasonably accurate 2000 national census of China, the total Muslim population of the People’s Republic is 20.3 million, including: Hui (9,816,805); Uighurs (8,399,393); Kazakhs (1,250,458); Dongxiang (513,805); Kyrgyz (160,823); Salar (104,503); Tajiks (41,028); Uzbeks (14,502); Bonan (16,505); and Tatars (4,890). The Hui speak mainly Sino-Tibetan languages; Turkic-language speakers include the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Salar and Tatars; combined Turkic–Mongolian speakers include the Dongxiang and Bonan, concentrated in Gansu’s mountainous Hexi corridor; and the Tajiks speak a variety of Indo-Persian dialects. It is important to note, however, that the Chinese census registered people by nationality, not religious affiliation, so the actual number of Muslims is still unknown, and all population figures are clearly influenced by politics in their use and interpretation. Nevertheless, there are few Han converts to Islam, and perhaps even fewer members of the ten nationalities listed above who would dare to say they are not Muslim, at least in front of their parents. Islamic identity in China can best be described as ethno-religious in that history, ethnicity, and state nationality policy have left an indelible mark on contemporary Muslim identity and it is almost impossible to discuss Islam without reference to ethnic and national identity.

6. No risk of U.S. – China war over Taiwan, the independence movement is dead. Their evidence is a decade and a half old and doesn’t assume this development

Robert Ross, professor of political science at Boston College and an Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, “Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, DA 7-27-10,

Political developments in Taiwan over the past year have effectively ended the independence movement there. What had been a major source of regional instability -- and the most likely source of a great-power war anywhere in the world -- has become increasingly irrelevant. The peaceful transformation of relations between China and Taiwan will help stabilize eastern Asia, reduce the likelihood of conflict between China and the United States, and present an opportunity for Beijing, Taipei, and Washington to adjust their defense postures -- all without hurting Taiwan's security or threatening U.S. interests. Taiwan's independence movement gained momentum in 1995 when Washington allowed Taiwan's then president, Lee Teng-hui, to visit the United States. During his stay, Lee gave a speech at Cornell University that signaled his impatience for independence. Before that trip, the United States had long banned visits by Taiwan's leaders in deference to Beijing's insistence that Taiwan is a Chinese province. By suddenly allowing Lee to visit, Washington seemed to Beijing to be encouraging independence. China reacted by deploying short-range missiles across the strait from Taiwan and accelerating its purchase of Russian submarines and advanced aircraft. In March 1996, it conducted provocative missile tests near the island, interfering with shipping to Taiwan and provoking the United States to deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan. Following the face-off, the Pentagon began actively planning for hostilities with China and expedited U.S. deployments to eastern Asia and its acquisition of new weaponry. Washington also pressed for closer defense ties with Taipei, which it urged to buy costly, high-profile weapons such as submarines and Patriot missile defense systems. Beijing, viewing these measures as further evidence of the United States' encouragement of Taiwan's independence, became increasingly suspicious of U.S. intentions.

Iran 1nc (4/6)

7. Trying to increase relations with an incremental approach fails

Leverett, Senior Fellow at the New American Foundation, ’06

(Flynt, “Dealing with Tehran: Assessing US Diplomatic Options Toward Iran,” American Century Foundation Report,

Taken together, these considerations argue for a serious diplomatic effort by the United States to resolve the current controversy over Iran’s nuclear activities. However, such an effort cannot be serious if it is not comprehensive. Diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issue inevitably will require a broad-based restructuring of U.S.-Iranian relations, amounting to an effective rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. As Iranian officials have repeatedly made clear in diplomatic exchanges and private conversations, Iran will not agree to strategically meaningful restraints on the development of its nuclear infrastructure without having its core security concerns addressed. This means that Tehran will require, among other things, a security guarantee from Washington—effectively a commitment that the United States will not use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran—bolstered by the prospect of a lifting of U.S. unilateral sanctions and normalization of bilateral relations. But, no American administration would be able to provide a security guarantee unless U.S. concerns about Iran’s support for terrorist organizations and its attitude toward Israel were also addressed. And, the Iranian leadership would not be willing or able to address those concerns absent a strategic understanding with Washington about Iran’s place in the region. At this juncture, resolving any of the significant bilateral differences between the Islamic Republic and the United States inevitably means resolving all of them. This is particularly the case with regard to the nuclear issue. That is why proposals to resolve the diplomatic impasse over Iran’s nuclear activities solely by assuring Iranian access to nuclear fuel and various types of civil nuclear technologies in exchange for Tehran’s commitment not to develop fuel cycle capabilities cannot provide the basis for a stable settlement.9 That is also why Western offers of economic and trade incentives, without corollary measures addressing core Iranian security concerns, will not induce Tehran to freeze its nuclear development.10 Moreover, that is why the predictable recommendation of eminent persons’ groups on how to improve U.S.-Iranian relations—an incremental, issue-by-issue or step-by-step approach—entirely misses the point.11 Tactical cooperation with Iran on specific issues where American and Iranian interests converge has been tried by successive U.S. administrations: by the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations in Lebanon, the Clinton administration in Bosnia, and the current Bush administration in Afghanistan. In all cases, such cooperation could not be leveraged into a broader strategic opening; usually this was because U.S. policymakers allowed domestic political considerations or other foreign policy interests to undermine diplomatic initiatives toward Iran.12 To assume that an incremental approach somehow can resolve the current standoff between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear activities ignores the lessons of this history.