David Hume (1711-1776)

A Treatise of Human Nature – Book III, Of Morals

■  The Artifice of Justice

■  Of Justice and Injustice, Natural or Artificial?

■  Virtuous acts are perceived as meritorious only because they are considered as signs or indications of good motives

■  The Acts themselves cannot be meritorious (or not). Only the motive can be described as meritorious (or not) since the motive is assumed to be an indication of a state of mind.

■  Though a person may act without the motive, this idea presupposes a virtuous motive distinct from the act, but which is capable of producing the act.

■  Of Justice and Injustice, Natural or Artificial? (Cont.)

■  In other words, honesty, justice, etc., are not the acts taken, but the pre-existing motive supposed to exist in human nature as the underlying reason for the action.

■  Cannot say both that:

▸  The just motive renders an action just, and

▸  That a just act is indicative of a just motive, since

▸  Such reasoning is circular

■  Acts, then, can only be just if just in themselves, but acts are just only when produced by just motives.

■  A just motive must, therefore, preceed our observation that the act produced is just.

■  We cannot equate the motive, and our observation of its character.

■  How, then, do we discern just motives or decide what motives are Just? Answer: Artificial Conventions adopted by people.

■  Of Justice and Injustice, Natural or Artificial? (Cont.)

■  There must, then, be some motive to acts of justice and honesty which is distinct from our regard for justice and honesty.

■  This is the great difficulty of moral thought.

■  Private interest does Not Suffice to produce Justice or honesty.

▸  Private interests would never compel one to repay a secret loan

▸  Private interests would not require honesty to the deteriment of ones goods or standing (why not lie if you can get away with it and obtain a benefit?)

■  Public interest does Not Suffice to produce Justice or honesty.

▸  Public interests attach only after the creation of the artificial rules of justice

▸  If a loan was made in secret, then no public interests attaches, although a moralist would claim that an obligation or duty to repay still exists

■  Ordinary people in ordinary affairs don’t consider the public interest

■  Of Justice and Injustice, Natural or Artificial? (Cont.)

■  No real motives for doing right exists but the very idea of doing the right thing

▸  “Doing right” cannot be determined without first knowing what is “right.”

▸  But “right” is determined by the motive of the action.

▸  Therefore, “right” must be determined artificially, not through nature, but by human convention.

■  This understanding explains the “I ought” from “what is” – the distinction between “is” and “ought.”

■  Human Passions will influence our convention on right, as a sense of duty will arise from the course of our passions.

■  Thus the rules may be artificial, but are not arbitrary.

■  The Origin of Justice and Property

■  ‘Tis by society alone that man overcomes:

▸  Lack of power to survive well

▸  In having to do everything, one is expert at nothin

▸  Individuals are insecure, and must be ruined if he fails anything by misfortune or accident

■  To Hume, society forms from the family – i.e. the attraction between the sexes (Aristotle)

■  To Hume, People are basically good – Selfishness is balanced by Affection and Generosity

■  Hume describes three kinds of Goods (of life)

▸  Our minds (internal goods)

▸  Our health (of body, but thought of as internal)

▸  Our goods (external) – and here are the problems which cause society’s creation:

–  Instability of possession without society

–  Relative scarcity

■  The Origin of Justice and Property (cont.)

■  Aritifice of Society, then, is to stabalize possession of goods and leave us in peaceable possession of them.

■  This artificial convention is not in the nature of a promise, but rather a general assumption that all will comply with the artifice.

■  From that artificial convention arises all ideas of property, right, and obligation.

■  The “state of nature” is nothing but a mere fiction.

■  Increase the benevolence of people, or increase nature’s bounty to satisfy all peoples needs, and you render the concept of “justice” useless.

■  Peoples’ selfishness and lack of resources are the origin of Justice.

■  The impressions which give rise to the concept of justice are not “natural” to the mind of man, but artificial conventions created by man