30TH INF. DIV.

ARDENNES

16-25 DEC 44

Extensive coverage of winter defensive against powerful attacks. Integrated narrative based on numerous interview, covering the action fully, from Division to companies. Much detail on platoon, squad and individual combat, and TD fighting against Panzers. Copies of official documents, serial photos and overlays.

Narratives by Historical Officer

Capt. Franklin Ferriss

The defeat of the 1st SS Panzer Division, Adolf Hitler 53 pages

Personal Narrative of CO, Co. A, 526th AIB 3 pages

Defense of Spa Gas Dump 6 pages

Task Force Hansen (Vic, Malmedy) 3 pages

This entire Document was originally classified as “C O N F I D E N T I A L”

This entire Document was ‘Regraded’ to “UNCLASSIFIED” on 15 April 1946

Per Order SEC. ARMY, by TAG per

‘Capt. L.S. Grints’ AGD

This Document was “DECLASSIFIED” per Auth: NND735017

By WDP NARA 5/24/01
THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 16 DECEMBER:

THE DEFEAT OF THE 1ST SS PANZER DIVISION, ADOLF HITLER

BY: CAPTAIN FRANKLIN FERRISS


GL – 225

30TH INF. DIV. ---- GERMAN BREAKTHROUGH

1. 526th Armored Inf. Bn. (Sep) --- Ferriss

2. Defeat of 1st SS PANZER DIVISION, ADOLF HITLER --- Ferriss

3. Defense of SPA Gas Dump --- Sgt. L. Jones

4. Casualty figures --- Ferriss

5. PFC. Currey Medal of Honor recommendation

6. Task Force Hansen, Malmedy vicinity – Ferriss

7. GO 6, 6 Jan 1945

8. G-2 Periodic Report, 30 Dec. 1944

9. Maps (2) Malmedy

10. Map, Stavelot

11. Enemy vehicles knocked out or captured


PREFACE

The authority for nearly all the statements in the following narrative consists of statements made to Captain Franklin Ferriss by men who participated in the defeat of the 1st SS Panzer Division. These statements are gathered in a series of interviews held by Captain Ferriss from 2 to 8 January 1945. In order to simplify the documentation of the narrative, these interviews are listed below, with a code letter for each interview. Each statement in the narrative which is based upon one or more of these interviews is indicated by the appropriate code letter following the statement. If no code letter or other footnote follows a statement, continue reading until a code letter does appear. This code letter gives the authority for all statements between it and the last preceding code letter or footnote. The code letter “Z” refers to the author, Captain Franklin Ferriss (better a poor authority than none.)

On 24 January 1945 this narrative, substantially in its present form, was shown to Brigadier General Harrison, Assistant Division Commander of 30th Division. With a few corrections which have been incorporated, he approved the text.

A. Interview with Capt. Richard J. Wood, S-3 of the 2d Battalion, 117th Infantry, held at the Battalion CP (671020) on 2 January 1945.

B. Interview with Lt. Col. Samuel McDowell, CO of the 3rd Battalion, 117th Infantry, and Lt. Andrew Allen Executive Officer of Company K, 117th Infantry, held at the 3d Battalion CP in Roanne on 2 January.

C. Interview held at the CP in Stavelot of the 1st Battalion, 117th Infantry, on 3 January. Present were Lt. Col. Robert Frankland, CO; Capt. Clifford Frieman, S-1; Lt. David W. Morgan, S-2; Capt. David K. Easlick, S-3; Capt. John Kent, CO of Company A; Capt. Morris Stoeffer, CO Company C; Capt. Stanley W. Cooper, CO of Company D.

D. Interview with Capt. Charles G. Smither, S-3 of the 119th Infantry, held at the Regimental CP in Francorchamps on 3 January.

E. Interview with Major Nathaniel J. Laney, Jr., Executive Officer of the 2d Battalion, 119th Infantry, and Lt. Kenneth H. Aamodt, Platoon leader of Company G, 119th Infantry, held at the 2d Battalion CP in Bernister (7806) on 4 January.

F. Interview with Brig. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., Asst. Commander of the 30th Infantry Division, and Major H. D. McCown, CO of the 2d Battalion, 119th Infantry, held at the 2d Battalion CP on 4 January.

G. Interview with Lt. Edward C. Arn, CO of Company F, 119th Infantry, held at the Company CP in Burnenville, (767046) on 4 January.

H. Interview with Capt. Donald R. Fell, CO of Company C, 119th Infantry, and Lt. Col. Robert E. Herlong, CO of the 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry, held at the 1st Battalion CP in Ster , (748083) on 5 January.

I. Interview with Lt. Col. James W. Cantey, CO of 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry, held at the Battalion CP in Chodes (805053) on 6 January.

J. Interview held at the CP in Malmedy of the 3d Battalion, 120th Infantry, with the following members of Company K: Lt. Arnold L. Snyder, mortar observer with the 3d platoon; PFC. Raymond W. Gould, scout of the 3d platoon, PFC. Francis S. Currey, automatic rifleman with the 3d platoon; S/Sgt. Raymond F. Snow, asst. squad leader, 3d platoon; T/Sgt. Fred Taff, platoon sergeant of the 3d platoon.

K. Interview with Lt. Col. Hansen, CO of the 99th Infantry Battalion, and Capt. Howard Winholtz, CO of Company D, 99th Infantry Battalion, held at the Battalion CP in Masta (745025) on 7 January.

L. Interview held at the CP in Burnenville, of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion on 7 January with the following members of the staff: Major Paul J. Solis, Executive Officer; Major Roy E. Battson, S-3; Lt. John V. Pehovic, S-1.

M. Interview with Lt. Jack Doherty, leader of the 1st platoon, Company A 825 TD Bn, held at the CP in Burnenville, of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion on 7 January.

N. Interview with Capt. Dibert, CO of Company A, 825th TD Battalion, held on 7 January at the CP in Burnenville, of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion.

O. Interview with the following members of the staff of the 3d Battalion, 119th Infantry, held at the Battalion CP in Xhoffraix (818079) on 8 January: Lt. Col. Roy G. Fitzgerald, Jr., CO; Capt. Carlton E. Stewart, Executive Officer; Capt. Francis J. Delbene, S-3.

P. Interview held with the following members of Company B, 743d Tank Battalion, at the Company CP in Malmedy on 8 January: Lt. Jean M. Ubbes, CO; Lt. Jean Hansen, leader of the 3d platoon.

Q. Interview held with Lt. Col. William D. Duncan, CO of 743d Tank Battalion, at the Battalion CP in Francorchamps on 9 January.

R. Interview held on 9 January at the CP near Spa of the 823d TD Battalion. Present were the following members of the Battalion: Major Ashby Lohse, Executive Officer; Capt. Bruce A. Crissinger, CO of Company A; Lt. Thomas Springfield, leader of the 1st platoon of Company A; Lt. Ellis W. McInnis, leader of the 1st platoon of Company C.

S. Interview with Col. Walter Johnson, CO of 117th Infantry, held on 1 January at the Regimental CP in Francorchamps.

T. Interview with Brig. Gen. William E. Harrison, Jr., at 30th Division CP in Malmedy on 24 January 1945.

U. Interview with Lt. Col. George K. Rubel, CO of 740th Tank Battalion, and Capt. James D. Berry, CO of Company C, at Battalion CP near Spa on 25 January 1945.

V. Interview with Lt. Col. Lowell S. Love, Armored Section, First U.S. Army, held at Spa on 23 January 1945.

W. Interview with Lt. Col. William F. Curran, CO of 110th A.A.A. Gun Battalion, held at the Battalion CP in Spa on 24 January 1945.

X. Interview with Lt. Walter R. Butts, Jr., Headquarters Company, 9th Armored Group, held by Sgt. Linnell Jones on 12 January 1945.

Y. –

Z. Refers to author, Capt. Franklin Ferriss.


THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 16 DECEMBER

THE DEFEAT OF THE 1st SS PANZER DIVISION, ADOLPH HITLER

I. INTRODUCTION

In the early morning of 16 December 1944, Germany launched its biggest offensive of the Western European campaign. A total of nine divisions struck at various points along the VIII Corps, and the southern sector of the V Corps front. The enemy had chosen sectors where the front line was thinly held. There were no strategic objectives either west or east of this sector of the Allied line. General Bradley had taken the “calculated risk” of concentrating the bulk of the strength of the 12th U.S. Army Group to the north and south of this sector. Attack in the sector was dangerous because of the possibility that the enemy might succeed in breaking through at one or more of the several points initially attacked, then turn northwest to seize Liege and Maastricht and thus envelop most of the First and Ninth U.S. Armies

By 2400 16 December, the enemy had advanced as much as three miles in several places along the V and VIII Corps fronts. One of these penetrations was aimed at Malmedy. This town was situated astride the shortest route to Liege. West of Malmedy, all routes to Liege necessitated a crossing of the Ambleve River. In view of the road network, the most satisfactory crossings were at Stavelot, Trois Ponts and Aywaille. (See Map #1)

All of the terrain between Malmedy and Aywaille is mountainous and characterized by thick pine forests and steep ravines, at the bottom of which streams and all main roads are found. Military progress in this terrain is governed largely by the road network. The surrounding hills are valuable objectives only to the extent that they command a clear view of the important highways. (Z)

II. AMERICAN FORCES WIN THE RACE TO MALMEDY

At 1115 17 December, the 30th Infantry Division, which was then holding a sector of the Ninth U.S. Army front between Julich and Altdorf, Germany, was ordered to move as rapidly as possible to the vicinity of Eupen, Belgium, to be employed in the V Corps sector. (1) That afternoon, General Bradley ordered the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion, (Separate), and the 99th Infantry Battalion, (Separate), to proceed at once to Malmedy. (L) (2) Because of the congested roads caused by the great quantity of personnel and materiel being evacuated from the threatened areas, the progress of both of these battalions toward Malmedy was slow. Company B, 99th Infantry Battalion, took a separate route and arrived at the destination at approximately 2400 on the 17th. By that time, the town had been evacuated by all military personnel, with the exception of approximately 60 men of the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion, under the command of Lt. Col. David Pergrin. The engineers had established road blocks consisting of mines and were prepared to dynamite bridges and trees, to further block the approaches to the town. Company B, 99th Infantry Battalion, immediately took up positions to the southwest of Malmedy, to block the roads and occupy the high ground commanding the approach to the town from the south. (3)

The 526th Armored Infantry Battalion, with Company A of the 825th TD Battalion attached, reached the western outskirts of Malmedy at about 0200 18 December, when 12th U.S. Army Group ordered it to send one Company of armored infantry and one platoon of TD’s to Stavelot. Company A of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion and the 1st Platoon of Company A, 825th TD Battalion, were given this mission and entered Stavelot between 0200 and 0300 of the 18th.

The rest of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion and the attached TD’s reached Malmedy about 0300. They were ordered to block the approaches to the town from the southwest. Shortly afterwards, the 99th infantry battalion arrived and immediately deployed to reinforce the road blocks established by the 291st Engineers. (L)

Meanwhile, the 30th Infantry Division had been motorized and was moving from assembly areas north of Aachen, Germany, to the vicinity of Eupen in Belgium. (A) Its route was lighted by flares dropped by the German Luftwaffe all of the way. Some bombs were dropped and there were a number of close calls, but there were no casualties either to personnel or vehicles due to enemy action. Anti-Aircraft fire was almost constant. (A) (D). The 119th Infantry was the leading Regiment in the column and was moving into defensive positions northeast of Eupen before 2400 17 December. Then word was received from First U.S. Army, to send one Regiment to Malmedy. Brig. Gen. William K. Harrison, Assistant Division Commander, decided to send the 117th Regiment, which was following the 119th Regiment, as it was still mounted and on wheels. The 120th Regiment followed the 117th Regiment and was held temporarily north of Eupen. (T)

On the road from Eupen to Malmedy, the 117th column encountered a heavy flow of traffic moving in the opposite direction. All vehicles were using “Cat-eyes” only, and as a result, the column’s progress was slow. Just as it was beginning to get light, the convoy was ordered to halt in the vicinity of Beverce, a small town approximately one mile north of Malmedy. By this time, the Regimental Commander, Col. Walter M. Johnson, was in Malmedy conferring with officers of the 12th U.S. Army Group. He was also in communication with the V Corps commander and the 30th Division commander, Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs. The enemy situation was very fluid and there was considerable disagreement as to where the 117th Infantry should be committed. The final decision was that one Battalion would be left at Malmedy to further strengthen the road blocks protecting that town. Another Battalion would proceed to Stavelot to defend that town, or to evict the enemy if he had already captured it. and the third Battalion would protect the left flank of the Battalion going into Stavelot, blocking the roads running northeast out of Stavelot.

Col. Johnson gave the mission of reinforcing the defenses of Malmedy to his 3rd Battalion, sent his 1st Battalion to Stavelot and gave his 2nd Battalion the mission of protecting the 1st Battalion’s left flank.

To reach their assigned objectives, all three infantry battalions, and also the supporting artillery battalions, had to proceed through Malmedy. Movement was extremely slow, due to heavy outgoing traffic and the completely inadequate force of Military Police in the town. The 2nd Battalion took nearly two hours to pass through the town of Malmedy. (A)