ZIMBAWE CATHOLIC BISHOPS’ CONFERENCE (ZCBC)
A REPORT
ON THE HARMONISED ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE
HELD ON 29 MARCH 2008
THE EFFECTS OF PARTY-STATE ON DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
THE CASE OF IN ZIMBABWE
PRODUCED BY THE
CATHOLIC COMMISSION FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE IN ZIMBABWE (CCJPZ)
© May 2008
Table of Contents
Map of Zimbabwe………………………………………………...…… 4
Foreword…………………………………………………………...….. 5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY…………………………………………… 6
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………. 19
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE…… 20 Zimbabwe’s Principles – the Electoral Act………………….…. 20
SADC Principles and Guidelines…………………………….… 21
The AU Principles…………………………………………….... 21
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT………………………………………… 22
The Party-State Phenomenon………………………………..…. 22
Defining Moments…………………………………………….... 25
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT……………………..… 32
The Economic Crisis ………………………………………….... 32
The Humanitarian Crisis……………………………………….. 34
ZIMBABWE: A COUNTRY IN CONFLICT? ……………………….36
STATE ORGANS AND 29 MARCH ELECTIONS………………….. 39
The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission……………………….… 39
The Military/Security Institutions……………………………..... 44
The Media Terrain ………………………………………………48
TOWARDS 29 MARCH ELECTIONS ………………........................ .51
Summary of Improvements and Deficits ………………………..51
Accreditation of Observers and Media…………………………. 55
Preparations for Voting ................................................................ 57
Polling Day and Vote Counting ………………………….…….. 58
RESULTS AND POST-POLLING DEVELOPMENTS …………..…. .59
Results of Parliamentary Elections ………………………….…. .60
Anxiety over Presidential Election Results
Verdicts of Some Election Observers ………………………….. 63
CONCLUSIONS………………………………………………………. 70
RECOMMENDATIONS ……………………………………………... 70
APPENDIXES
Appendix 1 SADC Communiqué March 2007 Extra-Ordinary Summit ….. 73
Appendix 2 SADC Communiqué April 2008 Extra-Ordinary Summit……....76
Appendix 3 Summary of Local Authority Results …………………………... ..80
Appendix 4 Full Parliamentary Results ……………………………………… ..82
Appendix 5 ZCBC Pastoral Letter on Elections 2008 ……………………….. 106
Appendix 6 CCJP Press Release No. 1 ……………………………………….. 110
Appendix 7 CCJP Press Release No. 2……………………………………….. 112
Appendix 8 CCJP Press Release No. 3 ……………………………………….. 117
Appendix 9 CCJP Press Release No. 4 ……………………………………….. 121
Appendix 10 CCJP Press Release No. 5 ……………………………………….. 123
Appendix 11 Archdiocese of Harare Report …………………………………....125
Appendix 12 Gokwe Diocese Report …………………………………………….134
Appendix 13 Mutare Diocese Report ……………………………………………143
Appendix 14 Chinhoyi Diocese Report ………………………………………….146
Appendix 15 Hwange Diocese Report …………………………………………. 150
Appendix 16 Masvingo Diocese Report …………………………………………155
Appendix 17 Gweru Diocese Report……………………………………………. 158
Appendix 18 Archdiocese of Bulawayo Report ………………………………… 161
MAP OF ZIMBABWE
FOREWORD
The 29 March 2008 Harmonised Elections were indeed a historic event which brought about new insights into the whole process of conducting democratic elections.
Since 1980, Zimbabwe has had several elections some which brought about disputed results in most cases while a few brought about positive, genuine results that reflected the free will of the people.
The March 2008 elections were held in the context of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) mediated negotiations between ZANU PF and the two the MDC formations. Some of the fruits of these negotiations included the agreement to harmonise all elections and more significantly to make some important but modest changes to the electoral playing field.
Of most importance are the SADC Principle and Guidelines Governing the Holding of Democratic Elections and the African Union guidelines on the holding of elections assisted in the improving the pre polling conditions this time as compared to the 2000,2002 and 2005 elections. There was significant improvement in terms of freedom, movement, assembly, association and speech even though there were some resistance by some stakeholders especially the ruling party functionaries and state security agents to allow contestants to campaign freely.
The state electronic and print media demonstrated that they still need to do a lot of adjustments or transformation in order to conform to the SADC norms and standards on the holding of democratic elections.
The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) conducted its duties to some extend in a professional manner before the polling period but the events that followed the counting of votes brought some serious doubts on the role and professionalism of such a national institution. The displaying of results outside the polling stations as required by law was but a small and significant revolutionary innovation in the electoral process.
It is against this background that the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ) was mandated by the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC) to observe these elections and noted quite a number of anomalies and makes these recommendations institutional, structural and administrative if our future elections are to be credible in the eyes of all stakeholders. For example, there has to be a clear cut separation between the party and state structures. The fusion of the two into one result into confusion that undermines the tenets of democracy and human rights.
As we look forward to other elections in the future, it is important for us to think through the recommendations given in this report seriously and work towards correcting the shortcomings so as to build electoral confidence and ultimately our country.
+ Bishop Alexio Churu Muchabaiwa
Bishop Chairman of CCJPZ
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
On 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe conducted what are arguably historic elections in several senses. First, it was the first time that Zimbabwe simultaneously held four elections to elect the President, 210 members of the House of Assembly, 60 Senators and nearly 2 000 local government councillors. Second, is that the four-tier elections were all held on one day rather than over several days as was the previous tradition. Third was that they were being held in the context of a SADC-mediated negotiation process between the then ruling ZANU-PF party and the then opposition MDC party. Some of the fruits of the negotiations included agreement to “harmonise” all elections and more significantly, to make some important but modest changes to the electoral and political playing field. Lastly was that the pre-election campaign period was the most peaceful (even carnival) since the beginning of the multi-layered Zimbabwe crisis in 2000.
Framework for Analysis
In reviewing the 29 March elections, we do so against the background of the 2004 SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. We also note that the Electoral Act governing elections in Zimbabwe also provides for general principles guiding democratic elections. The African Union also has similar guidelines and principles.
We found it useful to approach the task by elaborating on the framework the CCJP first applied for our Report on the March 2005 parliamentary elections. This refers to the perspective that sees post-independence Zimbabwe as incrementally moving towards the construction of a party-state whereby the ruling ZANU-PF party imperceptibly merged with the structures of the state. The party and the state increasingly became indistinguishable and resources of the state (i.e. public resources) were taken to be resources of the ruling party. State institutions – including electoral and security institutions – became integral parts of the party-state.
We also found it useful to observe that Zimbabwe, given the depth, scope and longevity of the crisis and some of its violent manifestations, was in many senses similar to conflict situations in other parts of the world. The very existence of a SADC-brokered mediation process at the time attests to the existence of conflict that needed to be resolved. It could then be argued that Zimbabwe was not really ripe for elections and that the mediation efforts should have been exhausted, concluded and the conditions created for elections before holding them. The developments that happened after 29 March lend credence to this line of argument.
The Socio-Economic Context
Zimbabwe went to the polls in the midst of an unprecedented economic meltdown signified by a 364% inflation rate in March 2008, the highest inflation rate in the world; to put this into proper perspective, the next highest inflation rate was 53% for war-torn Iraq. The purchasing power of the average Zimbabwean has fallen to levels last seen in the early 1950s and according to some economists, Zimbabwe’s gross domestic product declined by over 43% between 2000 and 2007. Agriculture is on its knees, largely a consequence of the fast-track land reform programme hastily and chaotically implemented since 2000 and which played havoc with commercial agriculture. The manufacturing sector has shrunk by more than 47% between 1998 and 2006, the same output figures as in 1972. In June 2007 the Government announced and implemented the populist Operation Reduce Prices whereby retailers were to slash their commodity prices by 50% and in the six months that followed, manufacturing output fell by more than 50% and some firms were forced to close down.
The informal economy has blossomed where the formal economy used to be. In 1980, the informal economy accounted for less than 10% of the labour force. This rose to 20% in 1986 and to an estimated 40% in 2004. In June 2005, nearly 3 million Zimbabweans earned their living through informal sector employment while the formal sector employed only about 1.3 million people.
The human cost of the economic crisis has been catastrophic. Millions have taken the exit option and estimates put the number of Zimbabweans – most of them professionals – in the Diaspora at about 3 million or a quarter of the population. The unemployment rate is over 80%, so is the poverty level, having doubled since mid-1990s. Zimbabweans have one of the lowest life expectancies in the world; life expectancy at birth is now 37 years for men and 34 years for women. In short, the social and economic situation in the pre-election period was dire and desperate.
Pre-29 March Developments
Constitutional and Statutory Changes
Between the last parliamentary election of March 2005 and the March 2008 which is under review, two major constitutional amendments were made. The first, Constitutional Amendment No. 17 made several changes, the most significant for our purposes being the re-introduction of the Senate of 66 members, 50 of whom were directly elected. The second amendment - Constitutional Amendment No. 18, hereafter referred to as CA 18 – also made several changes to the constitution but the most significant was to increase the size of both chambers of Parliament: the House of Assembly was increased from 150 members (120 elective) to 210 all elective members; and the Senate was increased from 66 to 93 members (60 being directly elected and the other comprising 18 chiefs, 10 provincial governors appointed by the president and five presidential appointees). The other major innovation in CA18 was to consolidate all national and local elections so that they would be held simultaneously and their terms run concurrently. CA 18 was a direct product of the Thabo Mbeki-led SADC mediation process.
The other product of the SADC-brokered talks was the amendment of media, security and electoral legislations whose combined effect was to somewhat improve the political and electoral playing field. However, the late enactment of the amendments diminished their effectiveness because of the limited time left to adequately prepare for the complex harmonised elections.
Institutional Changes
Another significant development since March 2005 was the consolidation of electoral agencies and functions in the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) unlike in the past elections when several electoral bodies existed, with overlapping functions and causing unnecessary confusion among all stakeholders. However, the Electoral Act failed to clearly distinguish between ZEC’s functions and those of the Registrar General’s office. The former is meant to maintain the voters roll but the latter continues to shoulder responsibility for registration (though now supervised by the ZEC) giving rise to a “recipe for confusion.” The Electoral Act should have transferred management of all electoral processes to the ZEC, including management of the voters roll. We also note that, due to time constraints, the changes in the composition of the ZEC occasioned by CA 18 could not be effected. ZEC was also forced to fast-track the delimitation process and had to short-circuit some of the stages while this also gave rise to allegations of gerrymandering of electoral districts. Other changes relating to the Media and Information Commission could also not be effected because of time constraints.
Overall though, it is fair to say the legal and institutional framework for the March 2008 elections was comparatively better than any in the post-2000 period. There was really notable improvement in media coverage in the last two weeks of campaigning though this should have been done much earlier to ensure a level playing field.
Impaired Integrity of Electoral Institutions
The pre-election period was characterised by instances of impaired autonomy and impartiality by designated electoral institutions in executing their constitutional functions. This is with particular reference to the Electoral Court and ZEC. For instance, in mid-March, the Electoral Court turned down an application by the MDC seeking an order compelling election authorities to: (a) disclose information pertaining to the number of ballot papers printed for the elections; (b) order ZEC to disclose the identity of the firm contracted to print ballot papers; (c) allow inspection and auditing of ballot papers; and (d) order ZEC to increase the number of polling stations in urban areas. The Electoral Court claimed it had no jurisdiction to hear the matters when in fact it was created to adjudicate on electoral matters. Fair minded Zimbabweans found this judgement baffling. We also highlight the reluctance of ZEC to clarify the apparent inconsistencies in the Electoral Act regarding circumstances surrounding a Presidential “second election”. Section 110 (3) of the Electoral Act allows for a second election within 21 days if none of the candidates emerges with a clear majority of the total number of valid votes cast while as Section 3 (1) of the second schedule of the same Act says the candidate with a plurality of votes – and not necessarily a majority of the votes – should be declared the winner. As many observers have noted, this inconsistency had great potential to not only cause confusion but bitter disputes if none of the candidates achieves a minimum 50% plus one vote of the valid votes cast. This confusion could easily have been avoided by a prompt and decisive interpretation that guided all stakeholders.
Intimidatory Pronouncements
From September 2007 right up to the eve of the 29 March elections, statements and declarations were being made by various security chiefs to the effect that they would not recognise the election of any one other than the incumbent as president of the country. Such inflammatory statements raised tensions and had the clear effect of intimidating the voting public to vote in a particular way. In a functional democracy, we firmly believe it is not the function of security forces to veto the will of the people.
The ZANU-PF presidential candidate and Commander-in-Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces also repeatedly vowed that the opposition MDC would never win the election. CCJP further regrets that ZEC was unable or unwilling to sanction such conduct.