SNFI 2011-12
[Solar Storms Aff] [4 Week MHLM Lab]
Solar Storms Affirmative – 4 Week Lab [1/3]
***1AC 3
Solar Storms 1AC [1/12] 4
Solar Storms 1AC [2/12] 5
Solar Storms 1AC [3/12] 6
Solar Storms 1AC [4/12] 7
Solar Storms 1AC [5/12] 8
Solar Storms 1AC [6/12] 9
Solar Storms 1AC [7/12] 10
Solar Storms 1AC [8/12] 12
Solar Storms 1AC [9/12] 13
Solar Storms 1AC [10/12] 14
Solar Storms 1AC [11/12] 16
Solar Storms 1AC [12/12] 17
***Inherency Extensions 17
DSCOVR Funding Cut Now 18
ACE Fails Now 19
ACE Fails Now 20
***Advantage One Extensions 20
Solar Storms Coming Now 21
Solar Storms Coming Now 22
Solar Storms Coming Now 23
Solar Storms Preparedness Declining 24
Solar Storms Preparedness Declining 26
Electricity Grid is Vulnerable 27
Electricity Grid is Vulnerable 29
Solar Storms Impact – Global Katrina 30
Solar Storms Impact – Economy 32
Solar Storms Impact – Economy 33
Solar Storms Impact – Electronic Pearl Harbor 34
Solar Storms Impact – Grid/Transformer Collapse 35
Solar Storms Impact – Grid/Transformer Collapse 37
Solar Storms Impact – Grid/Transformer Collapse 38
Solar Storms Impact – Blackouts 39
Solar Storms Impact – Nuclear Meltdown 40
Solar Storms Impact – Laundry List 41
AT: No Impact – Past Solar Storms Prove 43
AT: No Impact – Storms Happen Constantly 44
A2: NASA FAQ – Solar Storms Won’t Occur 45
***Advantage Two Extensions 45
Warming Real/Anthropogenic 46
Warming Real/Anthropogenic 47
Satellite Instruments/Data Collection Failing 48
Satellite Instruments/Data Collection Failing 50
DSCOVR k2 Satellite Calibration 52
DCSOVR K2 Satellite Calibration 53
DSCOVR K2 Satellite Calibration 55
Satellite Data K2 Solve Warming 56
Satellite Data K2 Solve Warming 57
Satellite Data K2 Solve Warming 58
Satellite Data K2 Solve Warming 60
Satellite Data K2 Solve Warming 61
Satellite Data K2 Solve Warming 63
Solar Storms Affirmative – 4 Week Lab [2/3]
Satellite Data K2 Solve Warming 65
A2: Low Earth Orbiting Satellites Solve 67
Impact Calculus – Warming Outweighs 68
Impact – Extinction** 69
Impact – War 70
Impact – Economy 73
Impact – Prolif 74
Impact – Terror 75
Impact – Hegemony 76
Impact – Food Scarcity 77
Impact – Resource Wars 80
Impact – Global Instability 81
Impact – African Instability 83
Impact – China-India War 84
Impact – South China Sea 85
Impact – Agriculture 86
Impact – Water Scarcity 87
Impact – Oceans 88
Impact – Tropical Forests 90
Impact – Biodiversity 91
Impact – Reefs 95
Impact – Reefs (AT: Sea Levels) 97
Impact – Flooding 98
Impact – Droughts 99
Impact – Hurricanes 100
Impact – Disease 101
Impact – AIDs 104
Impact – Wildfires 105
***Solvency Extensions 105
DSCOVR Solves 106
DSCOVR Solves – Solar Storms 107
DSCOVR Solves – Environment 109
DSCOVR Solves – Environment 110
DSCOVR Solves – Environment 111
DSCOVR = Better Detection Times 113
DSCOVR = Better Detection Times 115
DSCOVR = Better Detection Times 116
DSCOVR = Tech Spillover 117
DSCOVR = Tech Spillover 118
DSCOVR = Tech Spillover 119
DSCOVR = Tech Spillover 124
Now Key Time 126
***Answers To Case Arguments 126
AT: Other Satellites Detect Solar Storms Now 127
A2: Not Feasible/Won’t Work/No Solvency 128
A2: Not Feasible/Won’t Work/No Solvency 129
A2: Squo Solves Grid/Alternative Energy Now 130
A2: NASA/NOAA Won’t Cooperate 131
Solar Storms Affirmative – 4 Week Lab [3/3]
***Answers to Off Case 131
A2: Smart Grid CP 132
A2: Agent CP’s [International/Privates] 133
A2: International CP/Have X Launch DSCOVR 134
A2: International CP – EU CP 135
A2: International CP – Canada/EU/Japan CP 137
A2: International CP – Russia CP 138
A2: Executive Agency CP’s/ASPEC 139
A2: Private/Free Market CP [General] 140
A2: Private/Free Market CP [General] 141
A2: Private/Free Market CP [General] 143
A2: Private/Free Market CP [General] 145
A2: Private/Free Market CP [Perm Solves] 146
A2: Disaster Porn Kritik 147
A2: Politics – Obama Won’t Push 148
A2: Politics – Plan Popular 149
A2: Topicality – Mesosphere 151
A2: Topicality – Space Development 152
***1AC
Solar Storms 1AC [1/12]
Plan: The United States federal government should launch the Deep Space Climate Observatory.
Observation One – Inherency
NOAA funding for Earth Observation Satellites will increase in 2012 – however DSCOVR didn’t make the cut
Brinton, 7/13/2011
[Turner, Space News Staff Writer, “House Panel Denies Funding for Space Climate Probe, Satellite Constellation”, Space.com, http://www.space.com/12259-house-panel-space-climate-satellites-funding.html, BJM]
The U.S. House Appropriations Committee is set to vote today (July 13) on a 2012 spending bill that denies funding for a pair of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellite programs, one to provide advance warning of solar storms, the other a collaborative project with Taiwan. The House version of the 2012 commerce, justice, science and related agencies appropriations bill also would trim $50 million from NOAA’s $617.4 million request to develop a new generation of geostationary orbiting weather satellites, according to the report accompanying the bill published July 12. It appears the savings would be applied to help kick-start NOAA’s polar-orbiting weather satellite program, which was delayed by the protracted 2011 budget process. The 2012 budget request NOAA sent to Congress in February asked for $47.3 million for the Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) and $11.3 million for Constellation Observing System for Meteorology Ionosphere and Climate-2 (COSMIC-2). The House bill would not provide funding for either. DSCOVR would utilize hardware left over from a planned NASA Earth observation mission dubbed Triana that was canceled several years ago. COSMIC-2 is a multisatellite radio occultation experiment being conducted jointly with Taiwan. "While the Committee supports NOAA’s efforts to establish a radio occultation satellite constellation in partnership with Taiwan, the recommendation does not include any funding for the COSMIC-2 program given funding constraints and the need to fund other higher priority NOAA satellite programs," the report said. The higher priority satellite program is the Joint Polar Satellite System created last year after the White House dismantled a joint military-civilian weather satellite program. NOAA had sought $1 billion for the program in 2011 but Congress provided less than half of that amount. The House bill would provide $901.3 million for the Joint Polar Satellite System in 2012, which is $429.4 million more than appropriated for the program in 2011 but $168.6 million less than the request. NOAA sought $9.5 million for 2011 to ready the long-shelved DSCOVR spacecraft for launch and $3.7 million to initiate development of COSMIC-2. Congress was unable to pass any of the 12 traditional federal spending bills for 2011 and instead passed an all-in-one spending bill that held most federal spending to 2010 levels. Funding was generally not provided for so-called new start programs such as DSCOVR and COSMIC-2. The 2012 funding bill, meanwhile, would provide $567.4 million for NOAA’s Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series, $94.9 million less than provided for this year.
Solar Storms 1AC [2/12]
Advantage One – Solar Storms:
New solar cycles make the conditions for a Carrington Event-like solar storm increasingly likely; one whose effects would be felt throughout society
Phillips, production editor of Science@NASA, 6/21/11
(Dr. Tony, NASA “Getting Ready for the Next Big Solar Storm,” http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2011/22jun_swef2011/ , June 21, accessed 7-22-11, ASR)
In Sept. 1859, on the eve of a below-average1 solar cycle, the sun unleashed one of the most powerful storms in centuries. The underlying flare was so unusual, researchers still aren't sure how to categorize it. The blast peppered Earth with the most energetic protons in half-a-millennium, induced electrical currents that set telegraph offices on fire, and sparked Northern Lights over Cuba and Hawaii. This week, officials have gathered at the National Press Club in Washington DC to ask themselves a simple question: What if it happens again? "A similar storm today might knock us for a loop," says Lika Guhathakurta, a solar physicist at NASA headquarters. "Modern society depends on high-tech systems such as smart power grids, GPS, and satellite communications--all of which are vulnerable to solar storms." She and more than a hundred others are attending the fifth annual Space Weather Enterprise Forum—"SWEF" for short. The purpose of SWEF is to raise awareness of space weather and its effects on society especially among policy makers and emergency responders. Attendees come from the US Congress, FEMA, power companies, the United Nations, NASA, NOAA and more. As 2011 unfolds, the sun is once again on the eve of a below-average solar cycle—at least that’s what forecasters are saying. The "Carrington event" of 1859 (named after astronomer Richard Carrington, who witnessed the instigating flare) reminds us that strong storms can occur even when the underlying cycle is nominally weak. In 1859 the worst-case scenario was a day or two without telegraph messages and a lot of puzzled sky watchers on tropical islands. In 2011 the situation would be more serious. An avalanche of blackouts carried across continents by long-distance power lines could last for weeks to months as engineers struggle to repair damaged transformers. Planes and ships couldn’t trust GPS units for navigation. Banking and financial networks might go offline, disrupting commerce in a way unique to the Information Age. According to a 2008 report from the National Academy of Sciences, a century-class solar storm could have the economic impact of 20 hurricane Katrinas.
This is increasingly likely due to the face that current status quo instruments are incapable of providing early warming – there are no replacements
Brooks, PhD in quantum physics, 3/23/09
[Michael, New Scientist, “Space storm alert: 90 seconds from catastrophe”, online, BJM]
However, observations of the sun and magnetometer readings during the Carrington event shows that the coronal mass ejection was travelling so fast it took less than 15 minutes to get from where ACE is positioned to Earth. "It arrived faster than we can do anything," Hapgood says. There is another problem. ACE is 11 years old, and operating well beyond its planned lifespan. The onboard detectors are not as sensitive as they used to be, and there is no telling when they will finally give up the ghost. Furthermore, its sensors become saturated in the event of a really powerful solar flare. "It was built to look at average conditions rather than extremes," Baker says. He was part of a space weather commission that three years ago warned about the problems of relying on ACE. "It's been on my mind for a long time," he says. "To not have a spare, or a strategy to replace it if and when it should fail, is rather foolish."
Solar Storms 1AC [3/12]
And, the electric grid is unprotected and increasingly vulnerable to solar storm impact – blackouts and wide-scale damage will ensue
NRC, 2008
[National Research Council, Committee on the Societal and Economic Impacts of
Severe Space Weather, “Severe Space Weather Events--Understanding
Societal and Economic Impacts Workshop Report”, http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12507.html, BJM]
Severe space weather has the potential to pose serious threats to the future North American electric power grid.2 Recently, Metatech Corporation carried out a study under the auspices of the Electromagnetic Pulse Commission and also for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to examine the potential impacts of severe geomagnetic storm events on the U.S. electric power grid. These assessments indicate that severe geomagnetic storms pose a risk for long-term outages to major portions of the North American grid. John Kappenman remarked that the analysis shows “not only the potential for large-scale blackouts but, more troubling, … the potential for permanent damage that could lead to extraordinarily long restoration times.” While a severe storm is a low-frequency-of-occurrence event, it has the potential for long-duration catastrophic impacts to the power grid and its users. Impacts would be felt on interdependent infrastructures, with, for example, potable water distribution affected within several hours; perishable foods and medications lost in about 12-24 hours; and immediate or eventual loss of heating/air conditioning, sewage disposal, phone service, transportation, fuel resupply, and so on. Kappenman stated that the effects on these interdependent infrastructures could persist for multiple years, with a potential for significant societal impacts and with economic costs that could be measurable in the several-trillion-dollars-per-year range. Electric power grids, a national critical infrastructure, continue to become more vulnerable to disruption from geomagnetic storms. For example, the evolution of open access on the transmission system has fostered the transport of large amounts of energy across the power system in order to maximize the economic benefit of delivering the lowest-cost energy to areas of demand. The magnitude of power transfers has grown, and the risk is that the increased level of transfers, coupled with multiple equipment failures, could worsen the impacts of a storm event. Kappenman stated that “many of the things that we have done to increase operational efficiency and haul power long distances have inadvertently and unknowingly escalated the risks from geomagnetic storms.” This trend suggests that even more severe impacts can occur in the future from large storms. Kappenman noted that, at the same time, no design codes have been adopted to reduce geomagnetically induced current (GIC) flows in the power grid during a storm. Operational procedures used now by U.S. power grid operators have been developed largely from experiences with recent storms, including the March 1989 event. These procedures are generally designed to boost operational reserves and do not prevent or reduce GIC flows in the network. For large storms (or increasing dB/dt levels) both observations and simulations indicate that as the intensity of the disturbance increases, the relative levels of GICs and related power system impacts will also increase proportionately. Under these scenarios, the scale and speed of problems that could occur on exposed power grids have the potential to impact power system operators in ways they have not previously experienced. Therefore, as storm environments reach higher intensity levels, it becomes more likely that these events will precipitate widespread blackouts in exposed power grid infrastructures. The possible extent of a power system collapse from a 4800 nT/min geomagnetic storm (centered at 50° geomagnetic latitude) is shown in Figure 7.1. Such dB/dt levels—10 times those experienced during the March 1989 storm—were reached during the great magnetic storm of May 14-15, 1921. The least understood aspect of this threat is the permanent damage to power grid assets and how that will impede the restoration process. Transformer damage is the most likely outcome, although other key assets on the grid are also at risk. In particular, transformers experience excessive levels of internal heating brought on by stray flux when GICs cause a transformer’s magnetic core to saturate and to spill flux outside the normal core steel magnetic circuit. Kappenman stated that previous well-documented cases have involved heating failures that caused melting and burn-through of large-amperage copper windings and leads in these transformers. These multi-ton apparatus generally cannot be repaired in the field, and if damaged in this manner, they need to be replaced with new units, which have manufacture lead times of 12 months or more. In addition, each transformer design can contain numerous subtle design variations that complicate the calculation of how and at what density the stray flux can impinge on internal structures in the transformer. Therefore the ability to assess existing transformer vulnerability or even to design new transformers that can tolerate saturated operation is not readily achievable.