Military Recruitment DA DDI 09 - Berthiaume
Military Recruitment Generic
Military Recruitment Shell 1/3 4
Military Recruitment Shell 2/3 5
Military Recruitment Shell 3/3 6
Overview 7
UNIQUENESS 8
Uniqueness Ext- Unemployment 9
Uniqueness ext.- Economy 10
Uniqueness – Lack of Jobs 11
Uniqueness – Lack of Jobs 12
Uniqueness – Down Economy 13
Uniqueness – Down Economy 14
Uniqueness -- Generic 15
Uniqueness -- Generic 16
Uniqueness – Readiness 17
LINKS 18
Generic Social Services Link Block 19
Link – Social Services 20
Link – Social Services 21
Link – Social Services 22
Link – Social Services 23
Link – Social Services 24
Link – Jobs 25
Link – Jobs 26
Link – Jobs 27
Link – Jobs 28
Link – Health Care 29
Link – Health Care 30
Link – Education 31
Link – Education 32
Link - Immigration 33
2NC: Jobs/Training 35
INTERNAL LINKS 36
Internal Link – Readiness 37
Internal Link -- Readiness 38
Internal Link -- Troops key to Success 39
Internal Link -- Troops key to Success 40
Internal Link -- Human Rights 41
Internal Link -- Economy 42
IMPACTS 43
Impacts – Legitimacy key to Heg 44
Hegemony Internals 45
Hegemony Internals – Soft Power 46
Impacts - Hegemony 47
Impacts - Hegemony 48
Impacts – Afghanistan 49
Impacts – Afghanistan 50
Impacts – Deterrence 51
Impacts: Military Readiness Prevents War 52
Impact -- Democracy Promotion 53
Impact -- Economy (1/4) 54
Impact -- Economy (2/4) 55
Impact – Economy (3/4) 56
Impact -- Economy (4/4) 57
Impact -- China war (1/1) 58
Impact -- Terrorism (1/1) 59
AT: Military Recruitment Racist 60
AT: Military has enough troops 61
A2: Social Services not considered 62
AT: It’s just the economy 63
AT: Case o/w DA 64
A2 Tech not size is key (1/2) 65
A2 tech not size key (2/2) 66
A2 troop levels low 67
Economy is still bad 68
Economy is still bad 69
Economy is still bad 70
AFFIRMATIVE 71
AFF – No Link 72
AFF – Military Recruitment Takeouts 73
AFF – Recruitment Decreasing 74
AFF -- Recruitment Low 75
AFF -- Recruitment Low 76
AFF – Social Services Now 77
AFF – Social Services Now 78
AFF – Social Services Now 79
AFF: Economy Will Rebound 80
AFF: Economy Will Rebound 81
AFF -- Unemployment Will Decrease 82
AFF – Troops Not key to Success 83
AFF – Troops Not key to Success 84
AFF – Troops Not key to Success 85
AFF – Troops Not key to Success 86
AFF – Troops Not key to Success 87
AFF – Troops Not key to Success 88
A2: Economy Impact 89
AFF – Alt Cause to readiness 90
AFF – Alt Cause to readiness 91
AFF-- Alt. Causality: Econ Crisis 92
AFF-- Alt. Causality: Econ Crisis 93
AFF-- Tech Solves 94
AFF-- Tech Solves 95
AFF-- Tech Solves 96
AFF -- Hegemony Unsustainable 97
AFF -- Readiness Collapse Inevitable – DADT 98
AFF -- Readiness Collapse Inevitable – DADT 99
AFF – Military bad: Heterosexism 100
AFF – Military bad: Patriarchy 101
AFF – Military bad: Racism 102
AFF – U.S. troops not key 103
AFF -- Economy turns 104
AFF – Imperialism turn 105
AFF – Illegal Immigration turn 106
Military Recruitment Shell 1/3
A. Weak economy means that military recruitment is strong.
Rocky Mountain News, ’09, (“Economic Slide a boon to military recruiters”, Rocky Mountain News, 2-1-09, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2009/feb/01/economic-slide-boon-military-recruiters/)
Chief Petty Officer Mario Laracuente has heard similar tales before. He's been hearing it for months actually, ever since the economy went south. People getting laid off, people having trouble finding work and making ends meet. People looking for a modicum of stability. Laracuente believes the military is well-positioned in this environment to meet and exceed recruiting goals — even as the United States continues to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. "You can sense that as the economy appears more unstable, people are looking at the military more," Laracuente said. "We are seeing an older age group come in and they are seeing the benefits the military can provide them." All branches of the U.S. Military are showing strong recruiting numbers with the flagging economy. The last reporting period for December showed the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps exceeding recruitment goals, reaching 115 percent and 113 percent of their goals, respectively. The Air Force and Navy met their targets as well. Those results came as private employers made sweeping rounds of layoffs. In December, the U.S. Dept. of Labor reported unemployment rates rose from 6.8 percent to 7.2 percent. Colorado, which has weathered the storm better than many states, showed the jobless rate at 6.1 percent. Finding refuge in the military during tough economic times isn't unusual. Safe harbors can often be found in government and the military — which accounts for about a fifth of the nation's budget and is set at $515 billion for fiscal year 2009. Gordon Von Stroh, professor of management at the University of Denver, said the lure of incentive-laden deals offered by the military coupled with staggering job losses make for plum pickings among military recruiters. "They get a larger pool of people and can be more selective," he said. "For the applicants, they see an opportunity to train in some fairly advanced fields while having the job stability provided by the military."
B. Expanded entitlements make military benefits worthless for recruitment efforts.
Brian Gifford The Camouflaged Safety Net: The U.S. Armed Forces as Welfare State Institution, Published by Oxford University Press Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 2006 13(3):372-399; doi:10.1093/sp/jxl003 http://sp.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/13/3/372?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
While space constraints exclude a detailed analysis of the political and legal histories of contemporary military social welfare benefits, such an examination may underscore the relative importance of polity members to the development of similar programs aimed at different groups. For example, health care for military dependents developed incrementally within a framework of existing institutional resources for delivering care to service members. Expansions of the program would thus be expected to activate a different set of bureaucratic interests than did the establishment of publicly funded health programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, or SCHIP. High-ranking officers and Department of Defense officials may have taken on roles elsewhere played by labor representatives or advocates for the poor. Actors may also invoke a diversity of political frames and ideological bases for claims, given the varying levels of political and social esteem enjoyed by target recipients. The development of the U.S. welfare state itself, then, may have involved a broader array of political actors than has been previously recognized. Given that military social welfare benefits have characteristics resembling both social insurance and social assistance programs, they provide an example of how social arrangements that may latently deliver benefits associated with one category of programs may nonetheless produce outcomes typically associated with the other. Military social welfare benefits thus confound attempts to characterize the U.S. welfare state as either "bifurcated" or uniformly "liberal." Including the military with other institutions, policies, and programs that achieve social welfare ends by intervening in social and labor market processes reinforces conceptions of the U.S. welfare state as composed of an array of social welfare strategies. Such a perspective suggests a more well rounded conception of the American model of public social provision and may lead to more fruitful strategies for comparing welfare states across nations. Although appropriate data are not yet readily available, future comparative analyses may reveal whether the United States spends a greater percentage of its defense budget on social welfare benefits than other Western industrialized countries spend for their own military personnel. Different nations induct personnel into their armed services under disparate labor market, social, and political conditions and thus employ a variety of diverse recruitment strategies. These differences complicate direct comparisons of expenditures on military social welfare benefits and obscure the true measure of public social provision. Yet we would still expect those nations identified by established welfare state "regime" conceptualizations as having comprehensive, rights-based social policies to dedicate a smaller (continued)
Military Recruitment Shell 2/3
percentage of their defense budget to social welfare functions—either because service is compulsory, and thus requires no economic inducement, or because universal entitlements make military social welfare benefits of little value to recruitment efforts. For example, because the Netherlands offers relatively generous, inclusive welfare state benefits (but has maintained a volunteer military since the early 1990s), we would expect a greater percentage of its defense spending to go toward purely "military" purposes than occurs in the U.S. defense budget. By the same token, military social welfare benefits enjoyed by Dutch military families should affect their economic well-being less dramatically than those in the United States. It is impossible to operationalize these issues with the requisite precision in this article; nonetheless, they provide emphasis to the notion that welfare state typologies may be most meaningful when they consider not only direct social welfare efforts but also the impact of alternative strategies for achieving social welfare ends and the conditions under which such alternatives would most likely be implemented.
C. More troops key to military power, surge proves
Gardiner, Ph.D., a director at The Heritage Foundation, 4-1-08
Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., is the Director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation, The Battle for Basra: Britain Should Launch a Troop Surge in Iraq, Heritage Foundation, April 1, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iraq/wm1876 .cfm
The U.K. should follow the example of the successful U.S. surge campaign, launched more than a year ago with the phased introduction of an additional 30,000 American soldiers in central Iraq. It demonstrated that the West is capable today of fighting and winning a protracted counter-insurgency war against well-armed and highly trained militia groups thousands of miles away in the Middle East.
Since June 2007, terrorist attacks in Iraq are down by more than 60 percent, with a 90 percent reduction in Anbar Province, once a hotbed of al-Qaeda activity. Iraqi civilian deaths fell by more than 70 percent in the eight months following July 2007, and Coalition military losses have decreased by the same figure in the period since May of last year. Overall ethno-sectarian violence is down by nearly 90 percent since June 2007, its lowest level since early 2005. Bombings in Baghdad are now at their lowest level since late 2005/early 2006, with weekly terrorist attacks falling to 57 per week in the past four months, down from 225 a week in summer 2007.
Al-Qaeda is on the run across large swathes of the Sunni heartlands, with previously warring Iraqi factions now uniting against the foreign Jihadists who have ravaged their country. Such is the improvement in the security situation that Iraqi security forces are now responsible for nine of the nation's 18 provinces. Operation Phantom Phoenix, a series of joint Iraqi-Coalition operations launched in January of this year to hunt down remaining al-Qaeda cells operating in Iraq, has already resulted in the capture of 26 senior al-Qaeda leaders, with several hundred terrorists killed, including 142 in Mosul alone.
D. Military power is critical to maintain HEG
Hartman, Department of Political Science, 08
(Thomas Hartman, Department of Political Science at University of California, 2008, http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/research/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=13&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=fa567ae4f20db2ce78dafbe0bca882c8)
Literature today suggests there is an existing relationship between the military prestige of a state and its impact on attracting foreign government elites.25 Realists have noted that a hegemonic power can utilize its military and economic resources to coerce, provide financial support, or exchange cultural values for the purpose of building for itself a positive image.26 Similarly, with military power a state can alter the ideals and interests of policymakers in other countries. As they note, instruments traditionally used for coercive purposes can ―generate shared beliefs in the acceptability or legitimacy of a particular international order.‖27 It is therefore no surprise that the military organization has played an integral part of shaping, promoting, and protecting American national security interests. Most importantly, through the exchange of military training, technology, and alliance activities, trust in American normative beliefs among foreign military leaders, politicians, and their populations is formed, leading to an increased understanding of legitimacy in American foreign affairs.
Military Recruitment Shell 3/3
E. U.S. HEG key to prevent all out nuclear war
Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., 95
(Zalmay, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War”, Spring Washington Quarterly)
Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system. Continues To sustain and improve its economic strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm. Its success will depend on the choices it makes. In the past, developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were able to take advantage of them and negatively affecting those who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of another such transformation, which will shift the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative position will necessarily worsen.
Overview
Currently, people are joining the military to gain access to the social services that they need during this economic crisis. Our Gifford 06 card clearly states that offering social services to people living in poverty takes away the military’s ability to recruit by offering social services as incentives to enlist. A lack of new recruits would prevent the U.S. military from getting the number of troops that they need to maintain hegemony which is our Khalilzad 95 card says is key to prevent all out nuclear war.
UNIQUENESS
Uniqueness Ext- Unemployment
Unemployment means recruitment is skyrocketing
Chicago Tribune, 7/26
(Chicago Tribune, 7/26/09, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-tc-nw-army-recruit-0725-0726jul26,0,7346978.story)
Recruiting has been so heavy that many local offices have already reached their goals for the 2009 fiscal year, which ends Sept. 30, and are working toward 2010. The Army has yet to establish a recruiting goal for 2010. Through June, the Army had enlisted 48,565 for active duty, 4 percent above its goal. Army officials say the economy, with unemployment nationally at 9.7 percent, has had an impact on recruiting.
Military recruitment lures the unemployed- recruiting high