Emergence of the 5th Generation of Leadership:
Periscoping the 17th CPC Congress by Navigating within a Series of Dialectical Models
W. Emily CHOW and Peter Kien-hong YU
(Emails: and )
Graduate School of International Affairs
Ming Chuan University
Taoyuan Campus, Taiwan, R.O.C.
September 24, 2007
Emergence of the 5th Generation of Leadership: Periscoping the 17th CPC Congress by Navigating within a Series of Dialectical Models
W. Emily CHOW and Peter Kien-hong YU
Graduate School of International Affairs
Ming Chuan University
Taoyuan Campus, Taiwan, R.O.C.
September 28, 2007
Abstract This paper is an attempt to decode and decipher the Chinese Communist words and deeds. The HU Jintao regime is likely to remain in power until the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). However, it has to continue to pick or groom a suitable elite or the next cohorts of leaders to succeed HU. Arguably, the successor, keeping the pace of time, must learn to navigate within the safe zones of a series of dialectical models, because the mainstream Market Economy line is suppose to continue for a long period of time.
Key words HU Jintao, Communist Party of China congress, successors, models and theories, dialectics
In John M. H. Lindbeck’s Understanding China: An Assessment of American Scholarly Resources, we learned that, in 1958-1959, the study of both Taiwan and mainland China was in its developmental decade.[1] In David L. Shambaugh’s American Studies of Contemporary China, we were told that the new generation of (Communist) China studies in the 1990s has acquired a better “feel” for China.[2] Years later, WU Yu-shan of the Republic of China (ROC) attempted to theorize relations across the Taiwan Strait in terms of nine contending approaches, such as the divided-nation model, the power asymmetry model, the strategic triangle model, and cognitive psychological model.[3] SHU Keng argued that we should move beyond those dyadic models as examined by WU. As an alternative, he proposed the linkage communities analytical framework, which can allow more serious, in-depth, and comprehensive assessments of the impacts of socio-economic contacts or interactions, political pressures, and policy outputs across both sides of the Taiwan Strait.[4]
Arguably, if we want to have a closer and fuller understanding of Chinese (Communist) politics, we should first apply the dialectical approach. There is ample evidence to show that the Communist Party of China (CPC), the Nationalist Party of China or Kuomintang (KMT), the Democratic Progressive party (DPP), etc. apply dialectics of one kind or another, not the models or theories mentioned in the last paragraph.
To be sure, a typical Chinese mind works in the following way: First, he or she would first think of a dot,[5] be it a symbol, a concept, a sentence, a house, the Earth, the solar system, or even the universe. Second, the dialectician would find its opposite or extreme. For example, one would think of house, and its opposite or extreme would be non-house and vice versa. Third, he or she would make side-ways moves like a crab. Fourth, if this House versus Non-house model cannot describe and explain, if not infer or predict, certain phenomena, the dialectician would right away construct another dialectical model. Hence, we would see a series of dialectical frameworks at work. In other words, the dialectician would play a role of a frog, leaping from this model to another model.[6]
One of the authors’ models is as follows. It was first constructed in September 1994 and later somewhat modified four times:
1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E
time/space sequence (1)
time/space sequence (2)
………………………..
time/space sequence (n)
1 (or 100% of the concept or whatever);
3 (or 50% of the concept or whatever);
5 (or 1% of the concept or whatever).
E (or 100% of the concept or whatever);
C (or 50% of the concept or whatever);
A (or 1% of the concept or whatever).
The 1 2 3 4 5 spectrum is equivalent to what I call the safe zone, and the A B C D E spectrum, danger zone. 5 is the middle way/road/path/line/track in the safe zone and A, the middle way/road/path/line/track in the danger zone.[7]
When one makes a move at any time/space sequence, he or she is thinking of only one Number or Letter, and, therefore, there is no contradiction whatsoever. In the course of making moves, the negation of negation, the affirmation of negation, the affirmation of affirmation, and the negation of affirmation may also appear before time/space sequence (n) is reached. This process is known as the sub-dialectical game. It should be pointed out that there are three basic stages (or nodal points) of development (or for each concept or whatever): nascent, ascendant, and mature for the Numbers and mature, descendant, and moribund for the Letters. In other words, 5 is nascent; 3, ascendant; and 1, mature. On the other hand, E is mature: C, descendant; and A, moribund. Last but not least, a series of other dialectical, theoretical models must be applied, in order to describe, explain, and infer (or predict) more phenomena.
At this juncture, a caveat should be added, that is, whenever we use the word, versus, it means that the concept or whatever on the left extreme, say Yes, or 1 will eventually defeat, coopt, absorb, etc. the concept or whatever on the right extreme, say No, at time/space sequence (n). However, in the process, the following arrangement may be necessary, such as flexibly positioning Yes at 1 and No at 5. In other words, a contradictory or even adversary relationship between Yes and No has been transformed into a non-contradictory, non-adversary relationship, meaning that whoever chose Yes or whoever opted No should learn to tolerate the existence of each other, because they are in the safe zone spectrum.
The following series of models, which were first conceived in late 2000 and put in print in early 2005,[8] can help us to have a closer and fuller understanding of what should the fifth generation leaders of the CPC should understand, if they want to climb the power ladder or to have better, if not higher, positions. Needless to say, they have to comply with the Centralism versus Democracy model and to ask the party members to do it as well. Otherwise, all the models could crumble, like a domino effect.
In the first section of this paper, we will first spell out the structures of Marxism, Leninism, MAO Zedong Thought, the DENG Xiaoping Theory, the JIANG Zemin Important Theory or Sangedaibiao (Three Represents). We will also outline HU Jintao’s credo or theoretical proposition (lunshu) of Scientific Development Perspective in All Aspects of Economic Work (kexuefazhanguan) or the outlook of scientific development in an all-round way, and another of HU’s vital theoretical innovations, named harmony in the society.[9] Then, the authors will remind the fifth generation leaders about the mainstream economic lines/paths/tracks/ways/roads since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the next section, we will discuss the first superstructure, namely, country, which includes the national title, national song, national anthem, etc. In the third section, the authors will talk about the ideology, which is the second superstructure. In the fourth section, we will analyze the third superstructure, politics. Finally, the authors will talk about military affairs, which follow politics. In each section, we will discuss mainland China’s relationship with Taiwan.
Why Dialectical Politics?
MAO is the first generation or echelon leader. This is because it was he who led the Chinese Communist Party since January 1935 to eventually overthrow the CHIANG Kai-shek Government. When he was over 40 years, he said he became well versed in dialectics. For him, there were two dots/points/extremes (liangdianlun) at present. In future, there will still be two points. He also said that, in ancient China, the two points were called Yin and Yang, respectively. MAO certainly relied on dialectics to play politics and engage in military affairs. Once, he said he would like to convert the 600 million Chinese into dialecticians. In this respect, what he did has influenced the second generation leaders like ZHOU Enlai and DENG Xiaoping, who were also Long Marchers. In short, their political language is definitely couched in terms of dialectics.
One of the best examples of the dialectical model as constructed by DENG is: One Center, Two Points. One Center refers to the Economic Construction. It is like a roof, housetop, or eaves. Under the roof, there are two points. The first point is the Four Insistences (sigejianchi), such as adhering to Marxism, Leninism, and MAO Zedong Thought; and the other point, Reform and Opening to the Outside World (gaigekaifang), because he knows that, once opened to the outside world, the Chinese mainland (neidi) will be bound to have corruptions. This is also true in capitalist countries. So, in order to reconcile the two points or extremes, he instructed his subordinates to, serving as a dynamic, operational concept or what the Chinese Communists called fangzhen, conduct anti-corruption campaigns (fanfubaiyundong), so as to bring about the disappearance of the right extreme by elimination, cooptation, absorption, etc. To be sure, HU, to this day, is carrying out the campaigns. In March 2007, a National Corruption Prevention Bureau (NCPB) (Guojiayufangfubaiju) was approved by the National People’s Congress (NPC) for the first time, to, among other things, to meet commitments to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Certainly, HU’s successors will do the same, so as to enable the party to stay in power. Otherwise, the CPC may become an opposition party.
JIANG is a third generation leader of the core, who, as an underground Communist member in Shanghai Municipality, sided with the Chinese Communist Party on the eve of the creation of the PRC. He was confirmed as the core leader in September 1994 at the 4th Plenum of the 14th CPC Congress. He practices dialectics. From July 1995 to March 1996, it was he who ordered seven waves of military exercises of one kind or another against the ROC. The dialectical model he chose was Not to Attack versus To Attack. In terms of the 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E model mentioned above, military exercises were being positioned at 5, because, while, for example, unarmed ballistic missiles were launched, no one was hurt or injured during this period. In September 1997, it was JIANG who announced the Market Economy line.[10] Later, he added the Three Represents, which should be understood in terms of the whole picture. We will show this in the next section. JIANG’s Shanghai gang gradually lost its power, especially after October 2006.[11] With the death of HUANG Ju in June 2007, who was JIANG’s protégé, the Shanghai gang could be said as being symbolically lost its power. WANG Weigong, who had headed the office in Beijing of HUANG Ju, was detained in a widening probe over misuse of Shanghai Municipality's pension funds in August 2007. Vice President ZENG Qinghong, also the right hand man of JIANG, has expressed his intention to step down from the party’s Political Bureau Standing Committee in a letter to HU in April 2007.[12] CHEN Liangyu, the former Shanghai Municipality party secretary, was also arrested, and expelled from both his administrative post and the party (called double expulsion, shuangkai) for corruption.[13] Moreover, JIANG Mianheng, son of JIANG Zemin, and YOU Xigui, Head of Central Police Bureau (CPB) and JIANG Zemin’s body guard, both failed to be elected as representatives to the 17th CPC Congress.[14] All these further indicated the collapse of the gang.
HU, who is a fourth generation leader,[15] is also well versed in dialectics. In September 2004, JIANG handed HU the chairman position in the Central Military Commission (CMC), completing the first bloodless leadership succession in the party’s turbulent history. Again, HU’s Scientific Development Perspective in All Aspects of Economic Work, and harmony in the society are part of the whole picture, which will be elaborated in later sections.
The fifth generation leaders are being defined as those who were born in the 1950s. They consist of many “sent-down youth,” who are often referred to as members of “the lost generation” of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (GPCR).[16] Some potential candidates have been surfaced in the press, such as LI Keqiang, YU Zhengsheng, ZHOU Yonggang LI Yuanchao, XI Jinpping, BO Xilai, WANG Qishan, MA Kai, WANG Yang, and LIU Yandong,[17] many of them are the so-called princelings (taizidang) or the children of incumbent, retired, or late Chinese Communist high-ranking leaders. Although the two LIs are widely believed to be HU’s possible successors, it is still too early to predict as today’s political stars may not become the leader tomorrow, especially in a rapidly changing society. We must remember the “Who is HU?” days when HU was first elected into the Political Bureau Standing Committee in October 1992.[18] He afterwards still carefully took a low profile, made steady progress, and gradually lined up support for 11 years while waiting for his day to come.
But in general, this generation differs profoundly from preceding generations in terms of their formative experiences, educational credentials, political socialization, administrative backgrounds, foreign contacts and world views. For example, both LI Keqiang and LI Yuanchao hold doctoral degrees.[19] The latter has studied at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in June 2002.[20] And both of them tend to be market-friendly and popular with the foreign business community.[21] The collective characteristics and intra-generational diversity of this new generation of leaders will likely have a strong impact on the Chinese mainland's political trajectory and socio-economic policies in the years to come.[22]